A POST-KARGIL- MORTEM

by Shad Moarif


(20 July 1999)

 

First some irritating questions:

 

Why did the Pakistani Government behave in such a politically furtive

manner when conducting a clandestine proxy war against India, in (and over)

Kashmir? By repeating ad nauseum that the government provided "only moral

support" to Kashmir liberation fighters, the refrain lent to their military

and intelligence support, a remote and abstract quality. Which amounted to

giving the truth quite a tweak. But why the tweak? What was so unsavory

about the truth that it needed such a tweak? Did it HAVE to be disguised?

And that too, in a manner that made the truth only more recognizable and

suspect, in the eyes of the international community ( admittedly with a

good deal of help from the Indian government).

 

The Pakistan government's political guilt springs, no doubt, from

violating the Simla Accord: a document that pins and staples its hopes down

to bilateral talks, dialogues, arguments, negotiations with India.

Basically, it is designed to inhibit both parties from taking arbitrary

force to up the ante in Kashmir. It is a pity that the Pakistani government

had to be reminded through reprimands from Clinton and the like, to stick

to an agreement it had signed with its neighbor, India. On the other hand,

what's new here? Pakistani governments are so used to being prodded and

rapped by bigger powers that their thick-skinned insensitivity to it is

often marketed domestically as "standing up to western imperialism". Not

surprisingly, many observers, even in Pakistan, are secretly relieved over

President Clinton's intervention, as indicated by the Karachi Stock Market

rally.

 

What’s more, a morally corrupt regime, an economically bankrupt

government of Nawaz Sharif with no credibility in its own peoples’ eyes,

and even less in the eyes of the west, is more vulnerable to strident

public protests and pressures. This sort of vulnerability is evident in the

manner the Pakistan government conducted nuclear tests. Its

pro-fundamentalist leanings seem to be anchored in guilt and fear more

than in faith. Why else was the regime perfectly willing to trade nuclear

testing in return for financial incentives from the west? Which is another

reason why there is general skepticism at home and abroad, about Mr.

Sharif's ability to behave scrupulously or intelligently, in the face of

a crisis.

 

Granted that the nature of Pakistani involvement in Kashmir's liberation

movement remains murky. Within Pakistan there appear to be a number of

distinct commitment levels to direct military involvement in the area. The

army is committed to the patriotic act of supporting Kashmiris in their

struggle for liberation. Islamic fundamentalists remain intent on pursuing

their crusade against the Western-Zionist threat of world domination by

turning Kashmir into a major flash-point. While the rest of the

non-fundamentalist Pakistanis (comprising among them, much of the educated

citizenry) are inclined to step back and regard the alarming scenario with

a mixture of apprehension , puzzlement and pragmatism (who the hell, they

wonder, needs war…..and now?).

 

Pakistani democracy has been quaking under the constant threat of

fundamentalist Islamic extremist groups, armed to their teeth. Successive

Pakistani Governments, starting from Z.A. Bhutto, to Ziaul Haq, then

Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's, have all been swept off their feet by the

tornado of Islamic fundamentalist forces. Towards the beginning of his

fall, Mr.Bhutto suddenly felt politically bald without his Islamic cap,

and declared Friday (instead of Sunday) to be the official "day of rest".

Next, it took lots and lots of US dollars to ignite Gen. Zia's solidarity

with Islamic anti-Soviet nationalists in neighbouring Afghanistan. Once

the ignition was turned, the engine of Islamic fundamentalism roared into

life. Ever since, opportunistic trade-offs with Islamic militants in

Pakistan is the established daily currency of Pakistani politics.

 

Ironically enough, the wider the doors are opened to democracy, the more

likely it is to vote in a wrangling clutch of die-hard, bullying,

fanatical Islamic extremists into the senate and parliament, along with

their critics. It falls upon the latter to guard the Quaid's secular

manifesto against such Talibaan type threats. Outspoken critics clearly do

not wish to see the extremists’ experience of street terrorism and

gun-dialogues sculpt the inner organs of the future Pakistani state; nor

do they want to deal with the harshness of their religious, gender-based

and sectarian prejudices. So, the fear of such a thing happening, is

understandable among most Pakistanis who never vote religious parties into

political office, in the first place. But in today's Pakistan, it is not

ideas or visions, that influence voters’ behavior but the degree of

animosity towards western powers and the anti-west rhetoric coming out of

the barrels of militant guns. Things, we know, can change, and the fear

mounts.

 

The present regime "morally" supported the Kashmir liberation fighters

out of fear ( "We shall be devoured by fundamentalists if we don’t befriend

them now") and guilt ("How can we keep plundering the country and also

behave dishonorably towards our oppressed Kashmiri bretheren?").

Mr.Sharif tackled the historical obligations that shackle Pakistan’s feet,

in ways that make cleverness appear a doubtful virtue. By insisting that

the support is "moral" the intended ambiguity reveals half the truth.

The ambivalence in such a half-truth can cut both ways. For, it is true

that Pakistani government has doubtful military control over rebel

factions in Kashmir in terms of exercising any direct authority over them

(other than moral, of course). On the other hand, the clandestine sharing

of military intelligence and hardware might pave the way for future

cooperation over any tussles between the Pakistani State and armed

Islamic militants of the Talibaan type. Many fear the Government’s

defeatist anticipation that the state’s citadel of power is doomed to be

challenged by militant Islamic forces.

 

So at the heart of Pakistan's "state-democracy" lies fear, guilt and

confusion about its own world-view. And its Prime Minister played this out

by indulging in reckless brinkmanship. Thus: let the world think that the

Pakistani nation is crusading for a moral cause over which it has full

control (when it really didn’t). Let it internationalize the problem by

exploiting the west's pet nightmares (e.g. nuclear-wars detonated by crazy

trigger-happy Third World leaders). By hedging its poorly calculated bets

foolishly, Mr. Sharif portrays Pakistan to be as it truly is: an unstable

nation with a politically foolish and infantile leadership. Clinton had

only to rap Nawaz’s wrists with the IMF stick, to bring this dangerous

round of military adventurism over Kashmir, to a decisive close. That makes

the entire Pakistani nation feel like a child being scolded for playing

with fire.

 

By adding such insult to injury (of having to pull out of Kargil), Mr.

Sharif's ears can only grow redder and his nose longer. Self-conscious

pro-democracy Pakistanis are probably mature and astute enough to blame

their Prime Minister, rather than the West, for making them all feel

humiliated. Even worse, using the nuclear ruse to hurl the Kashmir problem,

in all its pitiful rags, upon the world's stage, appears to have demeaned

the magnitude of the problem. Why, after all, should one resort to all

kinds of ruses to internationalize a problem? What ruses internationalized

the Irish problem or The Quebec problem? The Bangladesh problem or the

Iraqi problem? The Kurd problem or the Kosovo problem?

 

It is unfortunate that the Pakistani government has been unable to

articulate its honest gut-level support for the cause of Kashmir's

liberation quite unashamedly, right from the start. It is unfortunate that

it had to go about its business of supporting freedom-fighters in such a

dark, secret and clandestine manner. Pakistan’s endless refrain over

providing "moral support only" reeked with guilt and shame over being

caught by the west (or India), doing something naughty. And when finally

caught, an indignant India threatened to unleash the full might of its

military powers.

 

There must be something quixotic in the way Mr.Sharif and his advisers can

relish the mess they create as another opportunity to advance their own

personal interests. The scale of India’s military response must have

startled Mr. Nawaz Sharif, a man believed to have the attention span of a

gnat. Until then, the Pakistan Army had been resting upon their laurels

after planting liberation fighters on snowy Himalayan peaks. The graft was

expected to take, and grow . What they did not foresee ( a poor reflection

of intelligence on their part) was how the pattern of their actions was

interpreted, in Indian minds, as an outrageously cheeky message: "We caught

you napping. Now you have no option but to eventually cross the LOC over

to our side to dislodge our fighters and that too, before September. Would

you dare provoke a nuclear confrontation by taking such a risk?"

 

When the Indian Defense forces called the bluff, Mr.Sharif and his

henchmen panicked. Many in Pakistan will probably wonder if it is not this

panic that fired their government’s desire to "internationalize" the

Kashmiri problem. Beneath this disguise lay a desperate appeal to the

West to defuse the dangerous situation among nuclear rivals. And when, at

Mr. Sharif’s own request, Clinton did, the Prime Minister calculated that

being bullied by a superpower into retreat, would sell better than being

bullied by Indian forces on multiple fronts along Pakistan’s border ("How

can we take on a superpower?" sounds more palatable than "How can we take

on India?"). The PM has a knack of pulling strange rabbits out of his

face-saving hat.

 

All this is a rather deluded, (many would call it stupid) way for a state

to represent the interests and attitudes of a nation caught in the throes

of complex developments in that region. Perhaps, given the current

Pakistani leader's intellectual limitations, a better choice would have

been for the Pakistani government to have simply remained silent. If the

state and the people truly wished to help the Kashmiris out of a sense of

deep and abiding conviction, but couldn’t honestly reconcile the

geo-political consequences of its actions with western (and

Indian) interests, that alone makes a plausible case for feeling

politically tongue-tied. So why say anything at all? Why not confront the

Indian protests in silence, and act on that quiet strength that is a mark

of true conviction? And in doing that, why not also persuade, the

Kashmiris to speak in their own true voice, for it is after all they who

need to respond to the progressively growing ferocity of Indian repression?

 

 

Had Nawaz's governments been silent, or occasionally expressed its stand

in terms of an unflinching and consistent historical intent, its actions

may have been interpreted as a genuine problem begging international

attention. But when people with shallow intents and blinkered vision, plot

to "internationalize" the Kashmir problem, what is one to expect? Their

bungling effort exposes the Pakistani regime's true colours: politically

naive, morally weak, and even vindictive (for there are many who would like

to "teach India a lesson over what they did to us in East Pakistan").

 

So, in a sense, Mr. Sharif followed a well-paved path. Determined to

squeeze some mileage out of nuclear deterrence, and trusting in the pet

nightmares of the West, Mr.Sharif strode unwittingly into a ring of fire:

the fire raging in the hearts of many Islamic militants from Afghanistan

and elsewhere, who were pouring in to join Kashmir's liberation militia.

What did he hope to achieve, in the company of grim, committed fighters,

given his poor motives and fuzzy long-term visions? Much to his

consternation and dismay, he stumbled upon a power-game in which India

carries greater military weight and political clout. Its fierce (indeed

parochial) opposition to Islamic insurgency upon its soil and in Kashmir

resonates empathically in much of the western world. And now, even in

China..... what with Muslim dissent brewing in Mongolia.

 

It is hardly surprising that the West, together with other potential powers

in the region, lend a serious and interested ear to India's

indignation and arguments. Western powers in particular, clearly do not

wish to transplant a Kosovo-type solution in parts of the world that do

not fall under the protective NATO umbrella. (At least not yet!). Indeed,

they would hardly be in a position to take a self-righteous stand on human

rights abuses elsewhere if they refused to attend to the one taking place

in their own backyard. Nor are they interested in stoking more Islamic

militancy flash-points, that may de-stabilize potential markets of the

future e.g. in China, Africa and India. Even less would the West

encourage nuclear saber-rattling among developing countries. Therefore,

Pakistan government's injured appeal to the West to bear pressure upon

India suggests either (a) how out of tune its is with realities on the

ground or (b) how difficult it is for it to discriminate between being

cunning and being silly. The most that western clout can do (and has

doneà) at this stage, is prevent an all-out war that could turn Pakistan,

Kashmir and Afghanistan into a blazing inferno, with flames licking the

edges of a frighteningly volatile region.

 

One can only hope that those who died in Kargil and elsewhere in the

valleys, and those who lie wounded in hospitals, as well as those who

retreat under orders, feeling bitter and betrayed, those who battle on

bravely, and all those from the ring of fire ( that their loss will not

go in vain. But can Pakistan, or for that matter India, in their continued

state of political, economic, moral and social crisis) guarantee their

widows and children, their sisters and mothers the dream their men

sacrificed themselves for? Most Pakistanis, upon doing a careful

reality-check, may soon begin to doubt it.

 

This is pathetic and sad, and evokes much shame and grief. But

acknowledging it may be Pakistan’s first step out of its stunted

adolescence into political adulthood. It is increasingly doubtful if

Pakistan’s political and economic salvation lies in succumbing to its

historical impulse over Kashmir. Salvation, of any sort, may depend on how

much (and how quickly) the collective intelligence of its educated

citizenry is willing to un-hinge itself from a legacy it is unable to

honour or shoulder without betraying it repeatedly . Essentially it is this

inability that makes Pakistan's legacy of the Kashmir problem, quite

unaffordable.

 

As long as the collective will of the Kashmiris: (Mulsims, Hindus and

Buddhists) remains inarticulate in the rowdy din of competing

Indo-Pakistani egos, both sides, India and Pakistan, are setting themselves

up for an expensive no-win situation. Each government, trapped in a

face-saving game, is doomed to bleed its financial and human resources

slowly by footing the Himalayan cost of financing an armed truce along the

LOC. And if the bottom-line resolution of the Kashmir conflict continues

to be war between these two countries, one doesn’t have to be a rocket

scientist to predict who the ultimate loosers will be : the men, women and

children of Pakistan, India, and, mother of all ironies, the people of

Kashmir themselves.


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