A POST-KARGIL- MORTEMby Shad Moarif
(20 July 1999)
First some irritating questions:
Why did the Pakistani Government behave in such a politically furtive
manner when conducting a clandestine proxy war against India, in (and over)
Kashmir? By repeating ad nauseum that the government provided "only moral
support" to Kashmir liberation fighters, the refrain lent to their military
and intelligence support, a remote and abstract quality. Which amounted to
giving the truth quite a tweak. But why the tweak? What was so unsavory
about the truth that it needed such a tweak? Did it HAVE to be disguised?
And that too, in a manner that made the truth only more recognizable and
suspect, in the eyes of the international community ( admittedly with a
good deal of help from the Indian government).
The Pakistan government's political guilt springs, no doubt, from
violating the Simla Accord: a document that pins and staples its hopes down
to bilateral talks, dialogues, arguments, negotiations with India.
Basically, it is designed to inhibit both parties from taking arbitrary
force to up the ante in Kashmir. It is a pity that the Pakistani government
had to be reminded through reprimands from Clinton and the like, to stick
to an agreement it had signed with its neighbor, India. On the other hand,
what's new here? Pakistani governments are so used to being prodded and
rapped by bigger powers that their thick-skinned insensitivity to it is
often marketed domestically as "standing up to western imperialism". Not
surprisingly, many observers, even in Pakistan, are secretly relieved over
President Clinton's intervention, as indicated by the Karachi Stock Market
rally.
What’s more, a morally corrupt regime, an economically bankrupt
government of Nawaz Sharif with no credibility in its own peoples’ eyes,
and even less in the eyes of the west, is more vulnerable to strident
public protests and pressures. This sort of vulnerability is evident in the
manner the Pakistan government conducted nuclear tests. Its
pro-fundamentalist leanings seem to be anchored in guilt and fear more
than in faith. Why else was the regime perfectly willing to trade nuclear
testing in return for financial incentives from the west? Which is another
reason why there is general skepticism at home and abroad, about Mr.
Sharif's ability to behave scrupulously or intelligently, in the face of
a crisis.
Granted that the nature of Pakistani involvement in Kashmir's liberation
movement remains murky. Within Pakistan there appear to be a number of
distinct commitment levels to direct military involvement in the area. The
army is committed to the patriotic act of supporting Kashmiris in their
struggle for liberation. Islamic fundamentalists remain intent on pursuing
their crusade against the Western-Zionist threat of world domination by
turning Kashmir into a major flash-point. While the rest of the
non-fundamentalist Pakistanis (comprising among them, much of the educated
citizenry) are inclined to step back and regard the alarming scenario with
a mixture of apprehension , puzzlement and pragmatism (who the hell, they
wonder, needs war…..and now?).
Pakistani democracy has been quaking under the constant threat of
fundamentalist Islamic extremist groups, armed to their teeth. Successive
Pakistani Governments, starting from Z.A. Bhutto, to Ziaul Haq, then
Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's, have all been swept off their feet by the
tornado of Islamic fundamentalist forces. Towards the beginning of his
fall, Mr.Bhutto suddenly felt politically bald without his Islamic cap,
and declared Friday (instead of Sunday) to be the official "day of rest".
Next, it took lots and lots of US dollars to ignite Gen. Zia's solidarity
with Islamic anti-Soviet nationalists in neighbouring Afghanistan. Once
the ignition was turned, the engine of Islamic fundamentalism roared into
life. Ever since, opportunistic trade-offs with Islamic militants in
Pakistan is the established daily currency of Pakistani politics.
Ironically enough, the wider the doors are opened to democracy, the more
likely it is to vote in a wrangling clutch of die-hard, bullying,
fanatical Islamic extremists into the senate and parliament, along with
their critics. It falls upon the latter to guard the Quaid's secular
manifesto against such Talibaan type threats. Outspoken critics clearly do
not wish to see the extremists’ experience of street terrorism and
gun-dialogues sculpt the inner organs of the future Pakistani state; nor
do they want to deal with the harshness of their religious, gender-based
and sectarian prejudices. So, the fear of such a thing happening, is
understandable among most Pakistanis who never vote religious parties into
political office, in the first place. But in today's Pakistan, it is not
ideas or visions, that influence voters’ behavior but the degree of
animosity towards western powers and the anti-west rhetoric coming out of
the barrels of militant guns. Things, we know, can change, and the fear
mounts.
The present regime "morally" supported the Kashmir liberation fighters
out of fear ( "We shall be devoured by fundamentalists if we don’t befriend
them now") and guilt ("How can we keep plundering the country and also
behave dishonorably towards our oppressed Kashmiri bretheren?").
Mr.Sharif tackled the historical obligations that shackle Pakistan’s feet,
in ways that make cleverness appear a doubtful virtue. By insisting that
the support is "moral" the intended ambiguity reveals half the truth.
The ambivalence in such a half-truth can cut both ways. For, it is true
that Pakistani government has doubtful military control over rebel
factions in Kashmir in terms of exercising any direct authority over them
(other than moral, of course). On the other hand, the clandestine sharing
of military intelligence and hardware might pave the way for future
cooperation over any tussles between the Pakistani State and armed
Islamic militants of the Talibaan type. Many fear the Government’s
defeatist anticipation that the state’s citadel of power is doomed to be
challenged by militant Islamic forces.
So at the heart of Pakistan's "state-democracy" lies fear, guilt and
confusion about its own world-view. And its Prime Minister played this out
by indulging in reckless brinkmanship. Thus: let the world think that the
Pakistani nation is crusading for a moral cause over which it has full
control (when it really didn’t). Let it internationalize the problem by
exploiting the west's pet nightmares (e.g. nuclear-wars detonated by crazy
trigger-happy Third World leaders). By hedging its poorly calculated bets
foolishly, Mr. Sharif portrays Pakistan to be as it truly is: an unstable
nation with a politically foolish and infantile leadership. Clinton had
only to rap Nawaz’s wrists with the IMF stick, to bring this dangerous
round of military adventurism over Kashmir, to a decisive close. That makes
the entire Pakistani nation feel like a child being scolded for playing
with fire.
By adding such insult to injury (of having to pull out of Kargil), Mr.
Sharif's ears can only grow redder and his nose longer. Self-conscious
pro-democracy Pakistanis are probably mature and astute enough to blame
their Prime Minister, rather than the West, for making them all feel
humiliated. Even worse, using the nuclear ruse to hurl the Kashmir problem,
in all its pitiful rags, upon the world's stage, appears to have demeaned
the magnitude of the problem. Why, after all, should one resort to all
kinds of ruses to internationalize a problem? What ruses internationalized
the Irish problem or The Quebec problem? The Bangladesh problem or the
Iraqi problem? The Kurd problem or the Kosovo problem?
It is unfortunate that the Pakistani government has been unable to
articulate its honest gut-level support for the cause of Kashmir's
liberation quite unashamedly, right from the start. It is unfortunate that
it had to go about its business of supporting freedom-fighters in such a
dark, secret and clandestine manner. Pakistan’s endless refrain over
providing "moral support only" reeked with guilt and shame over being
caught by the west (or India), doing something naughty. And when finally
caught, an indignant India threatened to unleash the full might of its
military powers.
There must be something quixotic in the way Mr.Sharif and his advisers can
relish the mess they create as another opportunity to advance their own
personal interests. The scale of India’s military response must have
startled Mr. Nawaz Sharif, a man believed to have the attention span of a
gnat. Until then, the Pakistan Army had been resting upon their laurels
after planting liberation fighters on snowy Himalayan peaks. The graft was
expected to take, and grow . What they did not foresee ( a poor reflection
of intelligence on their part) was how the pattern of their actions was
interpreted, in Indian minds, as an outrageously cheeky message: "We caught
you napping. Now you have no option but to eventually cross the LOC over
to our side to dislodge our fighters and that too, before September. Would
you dare provoke a nuclear confrontation by taking such a risk?"
When the Indian Defense forces called the bluff, Mr.Sharif and his
henchmen panicked. Many in Pakistan will probably wonder if it is not this
panic that fired their government’s desire to "internationalize" the
Kashmiri problem. Beneath this disguise lay a desperate appeal to the
West to defuse the dangerous situation among nuclear rivals. And when, at
Mr. Sharif’s own request, Clinton did, the Prime Minister calculated that
being bullied by a superpower into retreat, would sell better than being
bullied by Indian forces on multiple fronts along Pakistan’s border ("How
can we take on a superpower?" sounds more palatable than "How can we take
on India?"). The PM has a knack of pulling strange rabbits out of his
face-saving hat.
All this is a rather deluded, (many would call it stupid) way for a state
to represent the interests and attitudes of a nation caught in the throes
of complex developments in that region. Perhaps, given the current
Pakistani leader's intellectual limitations, a better choice would have
been for the Pakistani government to have simply remained silent. If the
state and the people truly wished to help the Kashmiris out of a sense of
deep and abiding conviction, but couldn’t honestly reconcile the
geo-political consequences of its actions with western (and
Indian) interests, that alone makes a plausible case for feeling
politically tongue-tied. So why say anything at all? Why not confront the
Indian protests in silence, and act on that quiet strength that is a mark
of true conviction? And in doing that, why not also persuade, the
Kashmiris to speak in their own true voice, for it is after all they who
need to respond to the progressively growing ferocity of Indian repression?
Had Nawaz's governments been silent, or occasionally expressed its stand
in terms of an unflinching and consistent historical intent, its actions
may have been interpreted as a genuine problem begging international
attention. But when people with shallow intents and blinkered vision, plot
to "internationalize" the Kashmir problem, what is one to expect? Their
bungling effort exposes the Pakistani regime's true colours: politically
naive, morally weak, and even vindictive (for there are many who would like
to "teach India a lesson over what they did to us in East Pakistan").
So, in a sense, Mr. Sharif followed a well-paved path. Determined to
squeeze some mileage out of nuclear deterrence, and trusting in the pet
nightmares of the West, Mr.Sharif strode unwittingly into a ring of fire:
the fire raging in the hearts of many Islamic militants from Afghanistan
and elsewhere, who were pouring in to join Kashmir's liberation militia.
What did he hope to achieve, in the company of grim, committed fighters,
given his poor motives and fuzzy long-term visions? Much to his
consternation and dismay, he stumbled upon a power-game in which India
carries greater military weight and political clout. Its fierce (indeed
parochial) opposition to Islamic insurgency upon its soil and in Kashmir
resonates empathically in much of the western world. And now, even in
China..... what with Muslim dissent brewing in Mongolia.
It is hardly surprising that the West, together with other potential powers
in the region, lend a serious and interested ear to India's
indignation and arguments. Western powers in particular, clearly do not
wish to transplant a Kosovo-type solution in parts of the world that do
not fall under the protective NATO umbrella. (At least not yet!). Indeed,
they would hardly be in a position to take a self-righteous stand on human
rights abuses elsewhere if they refused to attend to the one taking place
in their own backyard. Nor are they interested in stoking more Islamic
militancy flash-points, that may de-stabilize potential markets of the
future e.g. in China, Africa and India. Even less would the West
encourage nuclear saber-rattling among developing countries. Therefore,
Pakistan government's injured appeal to the West to bear pressure upon
India suggests either (a) how out of tune its is with realities on the
ground or (b) how difficult it is for it to discriminate between being
cunning and being silly. The most that western clout can do (and has
doneà) at this stage, is prevent an all-out war that could turn Pakistan,
Kashmir and Afghanistan into a blazing inferno, with flames licking the
edges of a frighteningly volatile region.
One can only hope that those who died in Kargil and elsewhere in the
valleys, and those who lie wounded in hospitals, as well as those who
retreat under orders, feeling bitter and betrayed, those who battle on
bravely, and all those from the ring of fire ( that their loss will not
go in vain. But can Pakistan, or for that matter India, in their continued
state of political, economic, moral and social crisis) guarantee their
widows and children, their sisters and mothers the dream their men
sacrificed themselves for? Most Pakistanis, upon doing a careful
reality-check, may soon begin to doubt it.
This is pathetic and sad, and evokes much shame and grief. But
acknowledging it may be Pakistan’s first step out of its stunted
adolescence into political adulthood. It is increasingly doubtful if
Pakistan’s political and economic salvation lies in succumbing to its
historical impulse over Kashmir. Salvation, of any sort, may depend on how
much (and how quickly) the collective intelligence of its educated
citizenry is willing to un-hinge itself from a legacy it is unable to
honour or shoulder without betraying it repeatedly . Essentially it is this
inability that makes Pakistan's legacy of the Kashmir problem, quite
unaffordable.
As long as the collective will of the Kashmiris: (Mulsims, Hindus and
Buddhists) remains inarticulate in the rowdy din of competing
Indo-Pakistani egos, both sides, India and Pakistan, are setting themselves
up for an expensive no-win situation. Each government, trapped in a
face-saving game, is doomed to bleed its financial and human resources
slowly by footing the Himalayan cost of financing an armed truce along the
LOC. And if the bottom-line resolution of the Kashmir conflict continues
to be war between these two countries, one doesn’t have to be a rocket
scientist to predict who the ultimate loosers will be : the men, women and
children of Pakistan, India, and, mother of all ironies, the people of
Kashmir themselves.