SACW | Sept. 27-28, 2007 | Faith and history
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Thu Sep 27 19:51:28 CDT 2007
South Asia Citizens Wire | September 27-28, 2007
| Dispatch No. 2454 - Year 10 running
[1] Sri Lanka: Zero tolerance and the fate of victims (Nikhil Mustafa)
[2] Problems of Using Women as Weapons in
Recounting the Bangladesh War (Sarmila Bose)
[3] Pakistan at Sixty (Tariq Ali)
[4] India:
(i) Where fusion cannot work -- faith and history (Romila Thapar)
(ii) Myth, history and politics (K.N. Panikkar)
(iii) Crossing the Sethu Rubicon (P Radhakrishnan)
[5] On the India - US Nuclear Deal:
(i) Down the garden path (Aaron Tovish)
(ii) Indo-US Nuclear Deal: In Whose
Interests? (Aditya Sarkar, Anish Vanaik)
[6] Announcements:
(i) Publication: 'Chains To Lose - autobiography of Dada Amir Haider khan'
(ii) Contemporary Miniature Painting in
Pakistan: Talk by Salima Hashmi (Hong Kong, 16
October 2007)
(iii) Health and Human Rights - An intensive
course (Bombay, 12 - 24 November , 2007)
(iv) South Asian Feminisms: Gender, Culture and
Politics (University of Pennsylvania, March
28-29, 2008)
______
[1]
Daily Mirror
September 27, 2007
ZERO TOLERANCE AND THE FATE OF VICTIMS
by Nikhil Mustafa
Much has been said recently of zero tolerance of
a number key areas of concern in this country.
These include on corruption, waste, extra
judicial killings, abductions, child recruitment,
impunity etc. Much of these are in the terrain of
regaling the readers of such assertions. It
though is not so funny for those who meet such
excesses. Much coffee has been poured, short eats
consumed, workshops organized, submissions made
on these issues. However, the pesty Sunday press
continues to highlight as does on some Dailies
that these excesses are part and parcel of our
daily diet of horrors. It has come to the point
at which discerning observers believe the reports
are treated with disdain and dismissed with
contempt by those who are responsible. Can this
though go on without some volcanic eruption
surfacing? See for example rumblings by monks in
Myanmar. Who would have thought it likely. The
final word on which has still not been cast but
predictions are we are seeing an eruption likely
to lead to change of the kind Aung San Su Kyi has
stood for under house arrest.
The focus today is on the debates on Child
recruitment and the statement of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict Dr.Radhika
Coomaraswamy. "It is also important to point out
the I have engaged in dialogue for the explicit
purpose of child protection with all parties,
both state and non-state, whose actions have a
significant impact on children. However, such
dialogue, particularly with non-state actors,
does not imply or confer political recognition or
legitimacy of such parties.
"Although a wide range of issues and themes have
been covered during the course of my visits, I
have made an effort to focus more concentrated
attention on four primary concerns: the
recruitment and use of children as soldiers;
grave sexual violence against children; the
safety and access of humanitarian personnel; and
rehabilitation and reintegration of children."
Sri Lanka
"The mission's findings revealed that the LTTE
has not complied with its commitments: underage
recruitments continue and several hundred
children as verified by UNICEF have not yet been
released. It was also ascertained that the
break-away Karuna faction of the LTTE abducts
children in government-controlled areas of the
East, with credible evidence that certain
elements of the Sri Lankan army may have aided in
this practice.
In addition, humanitarian workers have been
killed and NGOs threatened in an increasingly
militarized environment. "Following the visit by
my Special Advisor to Sri Lanka, the following
commitments were made: The LTTE gave assurances
that they would work with UNICEF to accelerate
the release from their ranks of all children
under the age of 17, with the objective of
completing this process by the beginning of 2007.
(Unfortunately, the LTTE did not commit to the
full release of children under the age of 18
years in contravention to applicable national and
international law. They also committed to better
training for their military commanders in
relation to recruitment, and instituting a
process to discipline those who do not comply;
The Karuna faction undertook to publish formal
policy statements forbidding under-age
recruitment and to release children who may be in
their ranks. The also agreed to work with UNICEF
in an effort to trace the whereabouts and arrange
the release of those abducted children whose
families have notified UNICEF; The Government of
Sri Lanka committed to undertake an independent
and credible investigation into the allegations
that elements of the Sri Lankan army have aided
the abduction and recruitment of children by the
Karuna faction and has recently announced the
formation of a Committee to Inquire into
Allegations of Abductions and Recruitment of
Children for use in Armed Conflict.
"The Security Council Working Group on children
and armed conflict has requested that a report on
progress be submitted by October 2007. The
continuing violence continues to exacerbate the
problems of IDP children and the delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
"I must also say there are some positive steps
with regard to the Government. The Government has
adopted and we welcome its adoption of a zero
tolerance policy on child recruitment, it has
also voluntarily submitted itself to the 1612
process and it has set up a Committee to
investigate allegations. And there are some
positive steps with regard to the LTTE as well:
for the first time the numbers taken in are less
than those being released but of course there are
many more to be released. But the Karuna faction
continues to function with impunity, much of it
in the Government-controlled areas so we welcome
the notion of this Committee to investigate these
abductions.
There are other areas as mentioned by one of the
speakers, and as you know in October this year we
will be presenting a report to the Security
Council Working Group, the Secretary-General will
presenting the report, monitoring the six grave
violations and some of those violations relate to
humanitarian access and to attacks on schools and
hospitals."
The words in bold are important to the extent of
the commendations, expectations and the SG's
report on 'six grave violations' in Sri Lanka to
the WG of the Security Council.
The substance of Radhika's comments are derived
from a visit by her representative which caused
quite a storm. This was before Sir John Holmes
became a 'terrorist' and an assortment of actors
found themselves being named in unflattering
terms by the 'personal' as well the 'official'
view points of significant personas from Sri
Lanka. So what did Alan Rock her representative
say when he dropped by last time around?
Recommendations
The LTTE must
(i) immediately stop all recruitment of children,
defined as all persons below the age of 18.
(ii) fulfill its commitment to me to release all
children in its ranks and work with UNICEF
towards the return of those children to their
families;
(iii) train and discipline its command ers so
that they are well aware that the recruitment and
deploy ment of children will not be toler ated;
and
(iv) allow access to all LTTE camps by UNICEF and
other international protection agencies to
determine whether child recruits are present.
TMVP/Karuna must
(i) immediately stop all recruitment of children,
defined as all persons below the age of 18;
(ii) fulfill its commitment to me to release all
children in its ranks and work with UNICEF
towards the return of those children to their
families;
(iii) train and discipline its commanders so that
they are well aware that the recruitment and
deployment of children will not be tolerated; and
(iv) allow access to all Karuna camps by UNICEF
and other international protection agencies to
determine whether child recruits are present.
Government of Sri Lanka
I would respectfully recommend that the Government of Sri Lanka should
(i) immediately commence a thorough and impartial
investigation into allegations of complicity by
Government security forces in the abduction of
children by the Karuna faction in such a way that
(a) complainants and witnesses will be protected from reprisal by any party;
(b) the results of the investigation will be made public; and
(c) the population of Sri Lanka and the
international community will have confidence in
the fairness and integrity of the investigation;
(ii) hold accountable any and all persons that
might be found to have been complicit in such
abductions;
(iii) secure the release and return to their
families of all children abducted by the Karuna
faction;
(iv) require that the police and Government
security forces thoroughly investigate all
complaints of child abductions, no matter by whom
they were allegedly committed, and seek to find
and return the abducted children;
(v) enforce the criminal prohibition against
child recruitment under existing domestic law,
and enact and enforce such additional measures as
may be necessary to deter and punish the
abduction of children in Sri Lanka;
(vi) make every effort to enable and facilitate
humanitarian access to its population; and
(vii) assess and address the welfare and security
of the Sri Lankan Muslim community, and
especially its children and youth.
The Working Group of the Security Council
I respectfully recommend that the Working Group
propose to the Security Council that it should :
(i) consider targeted measures against LTTE to
address its continuing failure or refusal to stop
recruiting and deploying children; those measures
might include travel bans, asset freezes and an
arms embargo;
(ii) call upon Member States to assist in the
application of those measures; and
(iii) consider the adoption of similar measurers
in relation to TMVP/Karuna should those parties
not, by the time this matter is next considered
by the Working Group, implement the
recommendations made in respect of them and set
forth above.
The Alan Rock report if one were to read in full
is candid, damning in terms of evidence of
horrendous and terrible acts of omission on the
part those whose task is to provide for the
safety and well being of civilians particularly
children.
A discerning reader who may persuse the
recommendations could reasonably arrive at
conclusions on whether Radhika was correct in her
diplomatic utterances on the positives she has
observed. Point being 'zero tolerance 'true or
false? This column thinks it is a charade of
cynical proportions of all engaged in this
enterprise.
______
[2]
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol 42 No. 38 September 22 - September 28, 2007
LOSING THE VICTIMS: PROBLEMS OF USING WOMEN AS
WEAPONS IN RECOUNTING THE BANGLADESH WAR
by Sarmila Bose
Every war is accompanied by sexual violence
against women. That rape occurred in East
Pakistan in 1971 has never been in any doubt. The
question is what was the true extent of rape, who
were the victims and who the perpetrators and was
there any systematic policy of rape by any party,
as opposed to opportunistic sexual crimes in
times of war. This paper brings into focus the
real victims of sexual violence by pointing out
the paucity of reliable material, critically
analysing widely cited testimonies of rape and
suggesting the next steps to address the issue
meaningfully.
Full Article at:
http://www.epw.org.in/uploads/articles/11060.pdf
______
[3]
London Review of Books
4 October 2007
PAKISTAN AT SIXTY
by Tariq Ali
Pakistan is best avoided in August, when the
rains come and transform the plains into a huge
steam bath. When I lived there we fled to the
mountains, but this year I stayed put. The real
killer is the humidity. Relief arrives in short
bursts: a sudden stillness followed by the
darkening of the sky, thunderclaps like distant
bombs and then the hard rain. Rivers and
tributaries quickly overflow; flash floods make
cities impassable. Sewage runs through slums and
posh neighbourhoods alike. Even if you go
straight from air-conditioned room to
air-conditioned car you can't completely escape
the smell. In August sixty years ago, Pakistan
was separated from the subcontinent. This summer,
as power appeared to be draining away from Pervez
Musharraf, the country's fourth military
dictator, it was instructive to observe the
process at first hand.
[. . .]
FULL TEXT AT: http://www.lrb.co.uk/
______
[4] India : Faith
(i)
The Hindu
September 28, 2007
WHERE FUSION CANNOT WORK -- FAITH AND HISTORY
by Romila Thapar
Faith and history have been brought into conflict
once again by being forced to jointly occupy the
same public space in contemporary India. In
effect, there should be no conflict if it is
recognised that the two are irreconcilable and
that they cannot be fused together. They are
independent of each other. Their premises, their
methods of enquiry, and their formulations are
dissimilar. So instead of trying to conflate
them, it might be better to concede the
difference and maintain the distance.
When historians speak of the historicity of
person, place, or event, they require evidence -
singular or plural - that proves the existence of
any of these and this evidence is based on data
relating to space and time. The two important
spaces in the Valmiki Ramayana are Ayodhya and
Lanka, on the location of which scholarly opinion
differs.
The location of Lanka, for example, has been
disputed by Indian scholars for the past century
and remains unidentified with any certainty. Some
have located it in the Vindhyas - in Amarkantak
or in Chota Nagpur - and others in the Mahanadi
delta. The identification with present day Sri
Lanka is problematic. The earliest name for
Ceylon judging by Indian and Greek and Latin
references of the Mauryan and post-Mauryan period
was Tamraparni (Taprobane in Greek). Ashoka in
the third century BC, in one of his edicts,
mentions Tamraparni as on the frontier. Later,
the more commonly used name was Sinhala or
Sinhala-dvipa, (Silam or Sieledib in Greek). It
would seem that the name Lanka was a later
adoption of the centuries AD.
This becomes puzzling for the historian. If
Valmiki was referring to Ceylon, then the name
should have been the one by which the island was
known, either Tamraparni or else Sinhala, at the
time of his composition. But since the name used
is Lanka, which at this time appears not to have
been the name for Ceylon, then perhaps Lanka was
located elsewhere. The location of the Ram Setu
would have to be reconsidered. This has been
suggested by scholars who have argued that the
setu was more likely located in a small expanse
of water in central India and not in the Palk
Straits. Nor is the setu referred to in every
version of the story. Alternatively, if Lanka in
the text is a reference to Ceylon, then the
composition of the Valmiki poem would have to be
dated to a later period when the island came to
be called Lanka. All this uncertainty is quite
apart from the question of the technical
viability of building a bridge across a wide
stretch of sea in the centuries BC.
It is said that the Ram Setu is cultural heritage
and therefore cannot be destroyed even if it is a
natural geological formation and not man-made.
Has the idea become the heritage? To search for a
non-existent man-made structure takes away from
the imaginative leap of a fantasy and denies the
fascinating layering of folk-lore. It would be
more appropriate to recognise the undersea
formations in the Palk Straits as a natural
heritage and protect the relevant areas. We pay
no attention to the fact that such marine parks
are as important to our ecological future as
those visible on the landscape.
That Rama is central to variant versions of the
story is, in itself, not evidence of historicity.
If the variants contradict each other as they do,
this may create problems for those who believe
that only one of the variants is true. But
multiple variants enrich the interest of
historical and comparative analyses in assessing
the degree to which each approximates, if at all,
to the historical past or what the divergence
symbolises.
The two closest in time to the Valmiki are the
Buddhist and Jaina variants. The Buddhist version
in the Dasaratha Jataka differs entirely from the
Valmiki. Rama is the son of the raja of Varanasi;
exile is to the Himalayas; and there is no
kidnapping of Sita by Ravana.
The earliest of many Jaina versions, the
Padmacharita of Vimalasuri, dating to the
centuries AD, contradicts all earlier versions
and states that it is doing so in order to
present the correct version of what happened. It
differs substantially from the Valmiki narrative.
Ravana is not a demonic villain but a human
counter-hero. It presents the story in the
conceptual framework of Jainism.
These other versions might be objected to or
dismissed by the person who has faith in the
Valmiki version since the other versions differ.
What is of interest to the historian is not the
number of variant versions, which is impressively
large, but why major changes were introduced into
these.
This does not happen with the biographies of
those who were known to be historical figures and
who founded belief systems: the Buddha, Jesus
Christ, Mohammad. Their biographies adhere
largely to a single story-line and this helps to
endorse the 'official' narrative of their life.
Their existence is recorded in other sources as
well that are not just narratives of their lives
but have diverse associations. The historicity of
the Buddha, for example, is established, among
other things, by the fact that a couple of
centuries after he died, the emperor Ashoka on a
visit to Lumbini had a pillar erected to
commemorate the Buddha's place of birth. This is
recorded in an inscription on the pillar.
If the current debate had grown from a genuine
sense of enquiry, historians might have
participated. Human activity has a historical
context and this is open to historical comment.
But it is only too evident that the issue of the
Ram Setu has become a matter of political
strategy on the part of those who are mobilising
in the name of faith, and on the part of those
who are reacting to the mobilisation. From the
point of view of archaeology and history, the
Archaeological Survey of India was correct in
stating that there is to date no evidence to
conclusively prove the historicity of Rama. The
annulling of this statement was also a political
act. Reliably proven evidence is of the utmost
significance to history but not so to faith.
Blasphemy does not lie in doubting historicity.
The historian is not required to pronounce on the
legitimacy of faith. But the historian can try
and explain the historical context to why, in a
particular space and time, a particular faith
acquires support. And we need to remind ourselves
that our heritage has been constantly enriched
not just by those of faith but also by those who
contend with faith.
If there is a strong faith - in the religious
sense - among millions of people, then it does
not require to be protected through massive
demonstrations and the killing of innocent
persons, through political mobilisation. Nor do
archaeology and history have to be brought in to
keep that faith intact. Faith finds its own place
and function, as do archaeology and history. And
the place and function of each is separate.
To say that the partial removal of an underwater
formation in the Palk Straits is going to hurt
the faith of millions is not giving faith its
due. Is faith so fragile that it requires the
support of an underwater geological formation
believed to have been constructed by a deity?
Making faith into a political issue in order to
win elections is surely offensive to faith?
What is at issue is not whether Rama existed or
not, or whether the underwater formation or a
part of it was originally a bridge constructed at
his behest. What is at issue is a different and
crucial set of questions that require neither
faith nor archaeology but require intelligent
expertise: questions that are being wilfully
diverted by bringing in faith. Will the removal
of a part of the natural formation eventually
cause immense ecological damage and leave the
coasts of south India and Sri Lanka open to
catastrophes, to potential tsunamis in the
future? Or can it be so planned that such a
potentiality is avoided?
What would be the economic benefits of such a
scheme in enhancing communication and exchange?
Would the benefits reach out to local communities
and if so, how? Equally important, one would like
to know precisely what role will be played by the
multinational corporations and their associates
in India. Who will finance and control the
various segments of such an immense project? It
is only when such details are made transparent
that we will also get some clues to the
subterranean activities that are doubtless
already simmering. These are the questions that
should be asked of this project and that at this
point in time should be occupying public space.
(Romila Thapar is a distinguished historian of
ancient India. She is the author of several
books, including Asoka and the Decline of the
Mauryas, 1961; A History of India: Volume I,
1966; Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300,
2002; and Somanatha: The Many Voices of History,
2005. An expanded version of this article will be
published in Economic and Political Weekly, 29
September 2007.)
o o o
(ii)
Frontline
Sep. 22-Oct. 05, 2007
MYTH, HISTORY AND POLITICS
by K.N. Panikkar
Now that Ayodhya is no more a potent force, Ram
Sethu has emerged as a possible alternative.
THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
DECEMBER 6,1992. Kar sevaks atop the dome of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya.
EVER since Ayodhya became a disputed territory,
Rama has been at the centre stage of the
political mobilisation by Hindu communal forces.
The incidents associated with the Rama Katha were
invoked one after the other to appeal to the
religious sentiments of Hindus. It began with a
claim to the birthplace of Rama at Ayodhya,
around which Hindu religious sentiments were so
aroused as to lead to the destruction of the
Babri Masjid. In the movement culminating in this
vandalism, several symbols linked with Rama such
as Rama Jyoti, Rama Paduka and Rama Shila were
floated.
Yet, over the years, the political appeal of Rama
has waned despite his strong presence in the
religious life of believers. The temple issue was
indeed kept alive through occasional religious
assemblies and demonstrations. Nevertheless, Rama
ceased to be of much emotional value that would
provide political advantage to Hindu communal
forces. In the elections of 2004, the Ram temple
did not figure as an issue at all. This can be
taken as an indication that believers were
inclined to abandon the Sangh Parivar's
aggressive Rama and return to worshipping his
benign image, looking upon Rama Katha, as they
had for centuries, as an "allegory of the life of
the spirit as it journeyed through the world".
Rama was almost lost to the political Hindu and
was being resurrected to his rightful place in
the religious life of believers. It is in this
context that the Ram Sethu project has come in
handy for the Sangh Parivar, to revive the appeal
of Rama in order to breathe some life into its
sagging fortunes. Once again the Parivar is
bracing up to claim Rama for the communal cause.
In the process it is attempting to turn myth into
history, blurring the distinction between the
two, in order to gain legitimacy for its
political project.
The question of whether the Archaeological Survey
of India (ASI) should have filed an affidavit in
the Supreme Court denying the historical
existence of Rama has led to differences of
opinion. The government has hastened to disclaim
the affidavit and withdraw it, obviously fearing
a Hindu backlash. Unlike the Ayodhya issue, even
the secular voice has been rather muted. However,
implicit in the affidavit is an important
question regarding our approach to the past: Is
there a distinction between myth and history?
Mythic Character
The ASI, it appeared, was conscious of this
distinction in projecting the mythological
character of Rama. The distinction does not imply
a counterposition of myth and history as false
and true. Myth is a way in which the human mind
comes to grips with reality, and therefore, it
can be said that it refers to reality. Yet, myth
in itself is not reality. What the ASI has tried
to state is that Rama was not a historical figure
but a mythic character.
Similarly, the Ramayana being a literary piece,
which was not originally a religious text but
only sacralised later, contains many events and
incidents that are products of imagination. It
would therefore be futile to try to correlate
them with historical fact and establish their
authenticity. Such a view is not in any way a
denigration of Rama or a critical reflection on
the Ramayana. The Ramayana's literary quality,
whether in the original Sanskrit or in regional
languages, is well known. So are the ethical and
moral values it foregrounds, which exercise
considerable influence over the life of believers.
However, devotion to Rama and the influence of
the epic have nothing to do with the historical
veracity of Rama Katha. Devotees consider Rama an
incarnation and do not test his deeds by the
yardstick of historical truth. They are moved by
their devotion and hardly approach the epic from
a rational viewpoint or try to locate it
historically. Whether the Ramayana is
historically true or not is not a factor in their
devotion. The Sangh Parivar has been trying for
long to impute to incidents in the epic a
historical quality to legitimise popular belief,
under a false notion that belief would be
reinforced by historical truth.
The panic reaction of the government in
withdrawing the affidavit in effect endorses the
Sangh Parivar's attempt to equate myth with
history. Like the Sangh Parivar, the government
seems to subscribe to the view that ascribing
mythic character to Rama and the Ramayana is to
undermine their importance and to injure the
sentiments of believers. It overlooks the fact
that believers consider Rama an incarnation.
Traditional religious sources represent him so.
The Matsya Purana, for instance, gives the
following account: "There is also the account of
the pastimes of Lord Rama, spoken by Valmiki - an
account originally related by Brahma in one
billion verses. That Ramayana was later
summarised by Narada and related by Valmiki, who
then presented it to mankind." What accounts for
the devotion to Rama and the veneration of the
Ramayana are not their historical veracity but
their divinity.
Many Ramayanas
K. MURALI KUMAR
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY workers at a rally in
Bangalore on July 6, 2005, condemning the
terrorist attack on the disputed Ram Janmabhoomi
site at Ayodhya the previous day and the UPA
government's security lapse.
In an attempt to attribute historical
authenticity to the epic and its protagonist, the
Sangh Parivar has been striving to privilege one
single version of the Ramayana. But the Ramayana
has several versions. It is difficult to
ascertain the exact number as all of them are not
written but are orally transmitted, both in India
as well as in other Asian countries. A.K.
Ramanujan has argued that these different
"tellings" - a term he prefers to versions or
variants as these imply an invariant or original
text - differ from one another. They are not mere
divergences from Valmiki's rendering but entirely
different tellings.
Highlighting the multivocal existence of Rama
Katha, Paula Richman has drawn attention to the
many Ramayanas, of which Valmiki's composition is
one, Tulsi's another, Kamban's another, the
Buddhist Jataka yet another and the Jaina
tradition yet another. Along with them, there are
also innumerable folk narratives, extant not only
in India but also in almost all the countries of
Asia. They were not Valmiki's Ramayana adapted to
local conditions but substantially different from
one another, both in form and content. In the
Buddhist version, Rama and Sita are originally
brother and sister, a fact that once aroused the
ire of the Sangh Parivar.
Women's folksongs from Andhra Pradesh challenge
the accepted values of a male-dominated society
by questioning the integrity of Rama and
foregrounding the theme of the suffering that
husbandly neglect causes a wife. Thus, the Rama
Katha prevalent in different communities is
vastly different and defies any attempt to
identify a universally applicable text. All of
them draw upon locally specific cultural traits,
which impart to them a distinct character. Recent
studies on different Rama Katha traditions
demonstrate the different tellings of Rama's
story that vary with regional literary tradition,
social location, gender, religious affiliation,
colonial context, intended audience, and so on.
K.R. Srinivasa Iyengar's edited work highlights
the Asian variations of the Ramayana, and the
essays in the volume edited by Avadesh Kumar
Singh focus on the way the epic has found
expression in regional languages. The many
Ramayanas connote that the events and incidents
in the different versions of the epic are not
historical facts but mythical representations or
literary imaginations. The debate on whether the
Ramayana is a true story or whether Rama is a
historical figure is, therefore, off the mark.
The issue of Ram Sethu requires to be situated in
the general context of the mythological character
of the Ramayana. The Sethu Bandhan encapsulates
within it several qualities of Rama and the
character of the epic. Sethu Bandhan was a
humanly impossible task that was made possible
only by the divine powers of Rama. The
description of Sethu Bandhan in one version of
the Ramayana is as follows: "During the first day
of construction, monkeys laid a hundred and
twenty miles of rocks, which floated upon the
ocean. They worked very swiftly, and were happy
to see the bridge take shape. The second day,
they set down a hundred and sixty miles of rocks;
the third day, a hundred and sixty-eight miles;
and the fourth day, their strength increasing,
they completed a hundred and seventy-six miles.
On the fifth and final day, the monkeys
constructed a hundred and eighty-four miles of
bridge, up to Mount Suvala on the northern shore
of Lanka. Thus when the bridge was finished, it
was eighty miles wide and eight hundred miles
long."
Obviously, a vanar sena would not have achieved
this feat. The question, however, is not its
possibility or impossibility but how it enriches
the mythical and divine quality of Rama.
Obviously Sethu Bandhan is a myth.
But then, when myths become part of the belief
system, they can be put to use for different
purposes. Nobody in India has understood this
better than the Sangh Parivar as is evident from
the manner in which they have manipulated the
myth and history of Ayodhya. Ram Sethu is an
opportunity they are unlikely to let go of easily.
The distinction between history and myth is well
recognised. Myths are in a way the opposite of
historical facts, in the sense that, unlike
historical facts, what constitutes a myth is not
verifiable. Despite this, myths and history
cannot be counterpoised as true and false.
THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
L.K. ADVANI ON the Somnath-Ayodhya rath yatra of
1991. Sixteen years later, the BJP apparently
hopes Ram Sethu will yield the same political
mileage as Ram temple.
In fact, myths also represent reality but
represent it symbolically and metaphorically.
Yet, myth masks reality. Therefore, myths are
illusory representations of man and his world.
Given their illusory nature, myths may not help
to unravel the historicity of an event. Most
myths are in a way timeless. Nevertheless, myths
being a reflection of reality constitute a source
of historical reconstruction and a means to
understanding reality. Given this overlap, myths
are used for a variety of purposes. They often
serve as an agency of legitimisation, as in the
case of Parasurama reclaiming land from the sea.
They may also be employed for explaining a
natural phenomenon, as in the case of Helios'
chariot in Greek mythology.
The use of myths has been integral to the
politics of the Sangh Parivar. Beginning with the
movement for the construction of the temple at
Ayodhya, the Sangh Parivar has been engaged in
providing authenticity to various myths
surrounding the life of Rama. The central issue
of the Ayodhya movement was the identification of
the exact birthplace of Rama, which was difficult
to ascertain owing to the lack of evidence. Local
tradition identifies Ayodhya through a popular
myth, which runs as follows: "After Treta Yuga
when Ram was supposed to have been born Ayodhya
could not be located. While Vikramaditya was
looking for Ayodhya, a saint told him to leave a
calf loose and the place at which the calf
secreted milk would be the place where Ayodhya
was located. Vikramaditya did as he was told, and
where the calf secreted milk he located Ayodhya."
This mythical story became the basis for the
identification of Ayodhya as well as the
birthplace of Rama.
In the accounts given by leaders of the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (VHP), the place of birth becomes
an indisputable fact of history. Following this
identification, the VHP accorded historical
status to a series of myths. These include the
existence of the Ram temple at the site of the
Babri Masjid and the attempts by Hindus to
reclaim the temple through 77 battles against the
Muslims in which 300,000 sacrificed their lives.
These myths have now become authentic histories;
not only are they paraded as historical facts,
they have found place in textbooks as authentic
history. Over a period of time, many of these
facts could become part of popular history also.
The politics of the Sangh Parivar is essentially
irrational. The attempt to turn myth into history
and to use it for political advantage is rooted
in irrationality. Now that Ayodhya is no more a
potent force, Ram Sethu has emerged as a possible
alternative. The Sangh Parivar is gearing up to
exploit it. Would the ruling establishment take a
rational and scientific stand and not succumb to
the fear of the irrational?
K.N. Panikkar, a former professor of history at
Jawaharlal Nehru University and a former
vice-chancellor of Sree Sankaracharya University
of Sanskrit, is currently the chairman of the
Kerala Council for Historical Research.
o o o
(iii)
The New Indian Express
September 26 2007
CROSSING THE SETHU RUBICON
by P Radhakrishnan
The ongoing controversy and hullabaloo over the
alignment cutting across the Adam's Bridge-Ramar
Sethu the undersea ridge between Rameswaram and
the Sri Lankan coast in the Sethusamudram
Shipping Channel Project (SSCP) is the latest in
a series which should raise a number of issues
about the nexus between faith and politics, and
its fallout for development. Of these at least
seven are relevant not only in the context of the
Ramar-Sethu row but also in other contexts where
faith is often a bogey for diversionary politics
and short-term political gains.
One, in a country where democracy and secularism
are still nascent in the minds of its unwashed
millions and pale before faith, what the pillars
of democracy legislature, executive, and
judiciary the intelligentsia as a class, and
the media at large should do is to wean people
away from peripheral and superficial aspects of
faith, and faithbased politics through systematic
inculcation of and pragmatic approach to
diversity and development.
It is our failure to do this that caused
demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6,
1992. In retrospect many of us would admit that
the demolition could have been averted if we had
a parliament (central legislature) which was not
made up at that time as it is to a large extent
even today of politicians who carried their
faith inevitably a cultural baggage only
within themselves as a personal matter. That is
precisely how the politicians could be edifying
to the masses and tell them about faith "thus
far, no further", that is faith is essentially a
personal matter which should have no spill over
and spin off effects in public spaces and should
not be a matter of public insignia.
The same could be said about our judiciary which
has on occasions digressed instead of trying to
bring to bear upon itself pragmatic secularism,
secularist pragmatism, and secular and rational
humanism as hallmarks of a secular judiciary. The
recent pronouncement by a high court judge in his
judgment that Bhagavad Gita should be made the
national Dharmashastra, which caused a furore in
different parts of the country, is only part of a
longer story.
The same is true of the executive: the demolition
was the culmination of the drifting and dithering
of the Narasimha Rao government. If the media was
sensational then it is more so now on its
incessant pursuit of instant hype. More so when
the younger generation of the media persons (in
particular of the TV channels) has hardly any
sense of history and society.
Two, as globalisation comes to mean development
of material and human resources at a fast pace
and turning technology itself into spiritualism,
those developing countries which do not chant the
globalisation mantra, adapt to its needs, pace,
and rhythm, and harness resources for their own
development, are bound to be left behind and even
caught up in the eddy of a complex process of
planetary dimensions. This means that we cannot
afford anymore to live in the past and the
present simultaneously, and if there are
roadblocks on our path to development which are
not of vital concern to the nation, we ought to
remove them and keep going.
It is from this perspective that the Ramar-Sethu
row should be understood. The issue is not one of
faith but of development. Those who genuinely
believe Rama as real, as divine, as an avatar,
and who should continue to be revered and
worshipped, already have a surfeit of sites and
structures in different parts of the country.
Even if Ram-Sethu was a creation or legacy of
Rama, it is as archaic as Rama and is only
peripheral in the scheme of divine things in
modern social settings; no devotee has any access
to it. In an age of lebensraum religious
communities have begun to give up some of their
traditional belief systems and related practices
and reconcile to the needs of modernity. One
example is Christianity, which has in principle
accepted cremation as against burial for want of
space, and in some places where cremation has not
yet been adopted the practice of burial itself is
undergoing different forms of change for making
space to the new-comers. Another example is
Islam. Some of the middle-east countries have not
let mosques stand in the way of their development
projects. A third example is Hinduism. For want
of space sections of them who practised burial in
the past have switched to cremation. However, as
a country India is probably an exception where
sites of faith hinder development. We have any
number of such sites even in the highways and
bye-ways, and even if these sites are unused and
totally neglected for ages they are not removed
for fear of communal orgy. Far from vouching for
our democratic, diversity, pluralistic and
secular credentials this clearly shows our lack
of political and administrative will.
Three, if comprehensive feasibility studies have
convinced the government that the SSCP will
indeed contribute to national development and
futuristic impact-assessment studies have
convincingly shown that the project will have no
adverse ecological, environmental, and social
effects, the government should not feel hamstrung
by cries of faith. If for some reason the
feasibility and impact assessment studies have
shown that the dredging is not worth the money
being spent on it the government should not have
undertaken it at all. But as of now we do not
have adequate information on this.
Four, as the idea of dredging away the
Ramar-Sethu dates back to the 1860s if not
earlier, which got formally crystallised after
India's independence, citizens have a right to
know why the attempts since the 1950s at dredging
did not materialise, why they were abandoned, and
if they were abandoned what was the determining
role of faith vs. feasibility.
Fifth, as the decision for dredging was taken
during the NDA government at the Centre the BJP's
sudden love of Rama in the sea-bed of Ravana is
political chicanery at its worst.
Six, what was the role of the Archaeological
Survey of India in a matter which is essentially
in the realm of the Geological Survey of India?
By involving the ASI the government itself has
unwittingly given the Ramar-Sethu a heritage
status and invited trouble.
Seven, in a development project such as the SSCP
what should be the role of the judiciary? Should
it stay the project merely because it has been
petitioned, or should it have dismissed the
petitions outright on grounds that in development
projects conceived by the executive it will
interfere only if there is flagrant interference
with and violation of faith that too as an
interpretation of the constitutional provisions
concerning the right to belief and religion and
not in the context of heritage?
The writer is senior professor of sociology at
the Madras Institute of Development Studies,
Chennai
______
[5] ON THE US INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL:
(i)
The Hindu
September 26, 2007
DOWN THE GARDEN PATH
by Aaron Tovish
Good leadership looks as far down the road as
possible to anticipate obstacles and detours. On
the nuclear deal, a combination of U. S. and
Indian hubris has led India down the garden path
without any clear strategy for reaching the
ultimate destination other than economic
enticements and intimidation.
I write as a partner of India in several
important nuclear disarmament initiatives in the
1980s and 1890s. Good friends warn you when you
are making a mistake. It is in that spirit that I
say the following difficult words.
Indian government leaders have made a major
mistake thinking the United States could be their
battering ram to break out of their nuclear
isolation. Although many illusions have been
carefully cultivated, the final result will be an
embarrassing failure. It is time for the leaders
to look for face-saving ways out of this debacle.
Until recently, India was as articulate as any
country in the international arena in pointing
out and condemning the pronounced unilateralist
tendencies in U.S. foreign policy since the
advent of the Bush administration. So how has it
failed to see that, for the rest of the world,
the U.S.-India deal falls squarely into this
unilateralist pattern - and thus will be rejected
by many countries just as surely as the other
unilateralist policies of the U.S.? If the
U.S.-India deal could be pursued unilaterally,
then whether or not a good idea, it could at
least be implemented. But the deal depends, at
the very least, on a universal absence of
opposition in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) and, as I will show below, the
192-member Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). As anyone who has followed the lame
64-member Conference on Disarmament for the last
decade can testify, consensus is a non-starter in
the diplomatic world.
No one should be fooled by the fact that the deal
appears to be progressing steadily to date -
although even that might be a too-kind
description. It is true that no NSG country has
as yet openly declared an intention to stop the
deal cold. It is clear that to do so would be to
incur the united wrath of the U.S. and India, as
well as a dozen other countries eager for nuclear
reactor contracts. So for now the countries that
oppose the deal are hoping that it will implode
of its own accord. This way they would be spared
the onerous task of stepping into the breach. But
as soon as it becomes clear (if indeed it ever
does) that the deal has reached the stage for
action by the NSG, they will gird themselves and
step forward.
Do not, however, expect direct resistance. The
following logic could well lead to a more
effective opposition than frontal opposition.
Such is the nature of the trap India and the U.S.
have set for themselves.
The fundamental issue that guarantees a veto is
violation of Article I of the NPT. Countries that
take their obligations under treaties seriously
(unfortunately the U.S. is not one of them) will
want strong assurances that peaceful nuclear
commerce is not directly or indirectly benefiting
a nuclear weapons programme. To many it is
obvious that supplying foreign uranium for the
peaceful programme frees up domestic supplies for
the military programme. This goes against the
spirit of Article I, which bans assistance that
"in any way" assists in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. For
some countries that will be reason enough to
oppose the deal.
But many others will be taking a narrow
interpretation of Article I - that is, direct
assistance must be avoided. For them the key
thing will be confidence that a true firewall has
been erected between the peaceful and military
programmes. As was learned in Iraq in the early
1990s, site-specific safeguard agreements are
inadequate to that task. Thus, it will be
essential to have several of the key elements of
the so-called 'Additional Protocol' complementing
the safeguard agreement. These countries will
insist that there can be no action in the NSG
until India and the IAEA have concluded all
safeguard and Additional Protocol negotiations.
Contradiction
Already this sets up a contradiction with the
U.S.-India deal. It would allow commerce to begin
only after the site-specific safeguards are
operational, but would leave the Additional
Protocol out of the picture until it "enters into
force." This is one example of why the U.S. is
precisely the wrong partner to help India
overcome its isolation. The U.S. negotiators
could not press India on this issue because the
U.S. itself has yet to bring its Additional
Protocol into force. This tempted the Indian
government to score a point for sovereignty (and
supposed equality with the U.S.) but the
long-term effect is a collision course with the
NSG.
The Additional Protocol comes in three flavours:
one for nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT;
another for non-nuclear-weapon states parties to
the NPT; and a third for neither of the above.
NSG members will insist on seeing the Additional
Protocol with India so that they can be sure that
specialised equipment, specially trained
personnel, and even specific designs and
operating manuals are not transferred from the
peaceful programme to the military programme. In
short, a thorough Additional Protocol is a sine
qua non for their confidence that the deal will
not lead to violations of Article I.
This Additional Protocol cannot, therefore, look
anything like the nuclear-weapon states'
Additional Protocols, which deal almost
exclusively with export matters. India cannot
expect to negotiate with the IAEA on an equal
footing with the nuclear-weapon states where
there is no pretence even of establishing a
firewall between the peaceful and military
programmes. If India forces this issue, it might
succeed in getting its way with the IAEA, where a
majority of the Board of Governors can help force
the issue, but it will set itself up for a fall
in the NSG, where any single member can veto it.
But it will not be necessary for any NSG member
to use the veto, since it will have a much easier
basis for opposition. If India wishes to be
treated as a nuclear-weapon state, despite the
fact that it does not qualify as such according
to the definition given in the NPT (having tested
a nuclear weapon before 1969), then the effect of
the deal going through would be to create a de
facto sixth nuclear weapon state. As such, this
becomes a matter of direct concern to the
non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, who
have adhered to the treaty on the basis of there
being only five recognised nuclear-weapon states.
Thus, the NSG should not take any action until
the NPT states parties have had a chance to
consider these far-reaching implications of the
U.S.-India deal.
The next opportunity for the NPT parties to take
up this issue will be the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. (Preparations are already under way
for that conference, but those preparatory
meetings have no power to take decisions on
substantive matters.) The operative positions of
the states parties are those adopted by consensus
in 1995 and 2000, i.e., with the concurrence of
the U.S. All of them flatly contradict the very
premise of the U.S.-India deal. (So we see the
ugly head of U.S. unilateralism rising again.) A
nuclear-weapon-state-like Additional Protocol
would require the NPT parties to agree that India
should no longer be considered a
non-nuclear-weapon state. And that would have to
be done by consensus. Not very likely, to say the
least.
The only alternative for action on the deal
before 2010 would be to force the issue in the
NSG. But that would certainly elicit several
vetoes. This would wreck not only the NSG but
also the NPT. It is unlikely that the U.S. would
be willing to go down that road - even if the
administration were willing, Congress would not
let it. In short, India would be left standing
alone at the altar.
If India wants to avoid this long-drawn-out,
losing battle, it will need to agree to an
Additional Protocol that is closer to a
non-nuclear-weapon state's Additional Protocol
than a nuclear-weapon state's. This would be a
first indication of distancing itself from the
U.S. unilateralist approach. It is a necessary
condition for going forward multilaterally with
the deal, but not a sufficient condition. To
satisfy all NSG states, India would have to
further distance itself from its erstwhile
sponsor by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT).
The U.S. signed the CTBT in 1996 but has since
declared that it has no intention of ratifying
it, thereby creating an obstacle to the treaty's
entry into force. The vast majority of NSG
members have not merely signed but have also
ratified the treaty. They will not accept a deal
in which resumed testing is not only condoned but
there are special contingency plans to assist the
testing nation. Again, in the absence of strong
assurances to the contrary, they will defer the
matter to the NPT Review Conference, which has a
longstanding stake in the CTBT.
It is not for me to decide for India whether
concessions on the Additional Protocol and
nuclear testing would be wise - although I have
no doubts they are. I am only describing what
lies ahead. Good leadership looks as far down the
road as possible to anticipate obstacles and
detours. A combination of U.S. and Indian hubris
has led India down the garden path without any
clear strategy for reaching the ultimate
destination other than economic enticements and
intimidation.
There will be a natural urge to find a scapegoat
for this. The obvious candidate will be the
countries that ultimately stand up and say, 'No.'
Before you vent your frustrations on these
countries, reflect for a minute. India's
longstanding criticism of the NPT was that it
accorded mainly privileges to the designated
nuclear-weapon states and mainly obligations to
the non-nuclear-weapon states. These courageous
countries are just resisting a yet more
discriminatory nonproliferation regime. You
cannot in good conscience blame them.
India has a profound heritage of progressive
leadership. That leadership used multilateral
fora to advance global security concerns. Let us
hope that this recent flirtation with 'great
power' unilateralism is soon looked back upon as
a brief aberration.
(Aaron Tovish, a disarmament expert, is former
Director of Peace and Security Programs with
Parliamentarians for Global Action in the 1980s
and 1990s. He worked closely with Indian
government officials on two major arms control
initiatives: the Six Nation Peace Initiative and
the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment. He now
works for the Mayor of Hiroshima, President of
Mayors for Peace, and is responsible for the main
activity of the organisation: the 2020 Vision
Campaign, which is akin to the Rajiv Gandhi Peace
Plan. The opinions expressed in this article are
his own.)
o o o o
(ii)
Economic and Political Weekly
September 22, 2007
INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL: IN WHOSE INTERESTS?
A report of a recent international conference in
New Delhi that critically discussed the foreign
policy, nuclear weapons and nuclear power aspects
of the Indo-US deal.
by Aditya Sarkar, Anish Vanaik
The public debate about the Indo-US nuclear deal
in the English language media has been
characterised by a frighteningly narrow set of
reference points. The space for a genuine and
informed debate has been crushed between
professions of its technical complexity, the
assumption that a national interest will be
served by the deal, and the charge that
opposition to it is based upon a blind
"anti-Americanism".1
Consequently, the range of views offered has been
extremely narrow, typically consisting of
imputations and assertions rather than
information. The importance of the International
Conference on the Indo-US Nuclear deal, held at
Delhi on August 31 and September 1, must be
understood against this perniciously anti-
democratic spirit within which the debate had
hitherto been conducted.
The conference, organised jointly by the Heinrich
Boll Foundation (HBF), the Coalition for Nuclear
Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) and Popular
Education and Action Centre (PEACE) was conceived
of as tackling individually the three main planks
upon which the deal was being championed - the
strategic dimension, nuclear weapons and nuclear
energy. It began, however, with a keynote ad-
dress by Jean Dreze of the Delhi University and G
B Pant Institute. His presentation, made more
powerful by the calm and assured manner of his
delivery, pointed towards all the dangerous kinds
of irrationality that inevitably accompany
nuclear questions.
To a packed auditorium, with some sitting in the
aisles for lack of space, he pointed out that
rational responses to developing situations were
the first casualties in the kind of escalatory
dynamic that nuclear deterrence demands. The
mirage of deterrence - that it would end all
kinds of conflict through preparing for
annihilation - had repeatedly proved illusory
over the last century. His exhortation to
remember the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and the dangers of a nuclear conflagration in
south Asia was important because these are
precisely the kinds of real contexts and
consequences that are so easily and disastrously
lost sight of in the rush towards taking a
"tougher" or more "realistic" stand on questions
of foreign policy. Since they all operated upon
this plane of nuclear deterrence, he suggested,
there could be no such thing as a "responsible
nuclear power". Dreze's address had the salutary
effect of reminding those present that the bigger
picture must not be lost sight of amid the
minutiae of the nuclear deal.
The first panel took up the strategic dimension
of the deal. The first speaker, Achin Vanaik of
Delhi University and member of the CNDP, pointed
out that viewing the outcomes of the deal through
the lens of Indian aspirations for great power
status was the opposite of where an analysis of
the deal's consequences should begin. Rather, the
stakes for which the US was playing, given that
it is clearly the more powerful party here, must
be understood before making sanguine claims about
India's independent foreign policy. The recent
stance of the Indian government on a variety of
issues (such as the Asian energy grid or the vote
against Iran in the IAEA) demonstrated that the
US was achieving its greatest victories in
capturing the hearts and minds of the Indian
elite, thus sapping any long-term determination
to emerge as a strong proponent for a more just
international order. The second speaker, T
Jayaraman of the Tata Institute of Social
Sciences, Mumbai, suggested that India, so long a
critic of an unjust international nuclear order,
was now looking to benefit from that order. The
US, he maintained, far from disman- tling the
non-proliferation order, was bent upon creating a
new, even more unequal and dangerous one of which
this deal formed a cornerstone.
The third speaker, Andrew Lichterman, a nuclear
disarmament activist and lawyer associated with
The Western States Legal Foundation, California,
United States, suggested that the nuclear deal
must be located within a broader integration of
global elites. The package of economic and
military contracts that the "strategic alliance"
would entail, were the currency through which a
network of empire could be maintained. The 123
might well be followed by a 126, referring to the
number of fighter planes that India might well
end up purchasing from the US. A struggle against
the nuclear consequences of such an alliance
cannot, therefore, remain divorced from this much
broader front of struggle against an increasingly
unequal domestic regime. Ejaz Haider, the last
speaker at the session, news editor of the Friday
Times, Lahore, claiming to be a realist,
suggested that India could, in fact, serve its
national interest by joining the US bandwagon
strategically. Inasmuch as this would have
implications for Pakistan, it would pursue a
policy accordingly.
Both of these conclusions were disputed during a
very lively question and answer session.
Jayaraman pointed out that one of the most
distasteful aspects of the atmosphere in which
the deal had been carried through was the
complete lack of dialogue with Pakistan on the
question, if only to reassure them that this deal
was not a provocation. A Pakistani gentleman from
the floor pointed out that we need to think as
south Asians and governments had repeatedly used
the bogey of "internal matters" to keep us
separated, when the reality was that these deals
had immediate effects upon all the people of
south Asia.
National Interest?
In response to one of the questions, Vanaik also
clarified his contention that the whole paradigm
of "national interest" is a fiction. Different
classes have different interests domestically,
and it is folly to think that, somehow, these
coincide on international questions. In fact, as
things stand, the constant claim of policy being
in the "national interest" is little more than a
mask for the pursuit of the interests of the
elite. The second session explored the impact
of nuclear weapons, in the light of the Indo-US
deal, on the possibilities of global and south
Asian disarmament. From different perspectives,
the four speakers at this session all concluded
that the present regime of nuclear power in south
Asia has produced a major, crippling threat to
the possibility of global nuclear disarmament, in
the form of a hawkish and belligerent process of
nuclear weaponisation, with an inherently
escalatory logic.
The first speaker at this session was Kanak Mani
Dixit, the editor of the Nepal- based magazine
Himal Southasia. Dixit's talk foregrounded the
real dangers of nuclear conflict in south Asia,
in the light of the flight time of missiles
between India and Pakistan (six or seven
minutes), the high risk of nuclear accidents, the
fallout of which cannot be contained within
national boundaries, and the per- vasiveness of a
chest-thumping military nationalism in both
countries. It emphasised the importance of an
anti-nuclear movement based on mass mobilisation
in the vernaculars of different regions. Dixit
pointed out that the encasement within US
security architecture has meant refusal of
another energy choice that had been open to India
- the proposed Iran-India-Pakistan gas pipeline,
which, besides producing energy, would have also
created genuine and healthy south Asian economic
link- ages. He suggested that pushing for an
anti-nuclear commitment in the soon-to-be drafted
Nepali constitution might help create a climate
of anti-proliferation. Dixit was followed by
Praful Bidwai, independent journalist and
founding mem- ber of the CNDP. Bidwai offered a
critique of the creeping consensus shared by pro-
ponents of the deal and, at least tacitly, by its
opponents on the official Indian left. Both
sides, he argued, have been trapped within a
discourse of national sover- eignty that neglects
the deeply irrespon- sible nature of India's
nuclear programme. A "responsible" nuclear
weapons state, he stressed, is a contradiction in
terms, and India's claims to such
"responsibility" are plainly fraudulent. As early
as 1974, India, after signing an agreement on the
purely peaceful use of nuclear technology, went
on to illegally use imported fuel for a nuclear
test. The present deal, by offer- ing imported
nuclear fuel and reactors, liberates India's
domestic uranium reserves for weaponisation. In
the light of escalat- ing military expenditure
(which has doubled in the last 10 years), and
massive arms procurement, it is clear that the
Indian government and security experts have no
compunctions about triggering a subcontinental
arms race. Bidwai also pointed out that India has
consistently rejected all measures and talks
aimed at the achievement of disarmament,
replacing an earlier commitment to multi lateral
agreements against nuclear weapons with a
regressive emphasis on purely bilateral treaties
that seek to legitimise Indian nuclear strategy.
If further confirmation of India's role in
triggering off a south Asian arms race was
needed, it was provided by Abdul Hameed Nayyar,
president of the Pakistan Peace Coalition and
member of the Inter- national Panel on Fissile
Materials, who offered an account of the
Pakistani security establishment's response to
the Indian nuclear programme. The Indo-US deal
enables India to produce 60-100 weapons- grade
plutonium a year, and raises its production of
nuclear weapons from six to 26 annually. Within
the mad logic of escalatory nuclear deterrence,
this was bound to trigger off similar ambitions
in Pakistan. Nayyar demonstrated that this is
precisely what has been happening, with the
construction of new plutonium production and
reprocessing plants to increase fissile material
production. The logic of "credible minimum
deterrence" that undergirds the weaponisation
programmes of both countries, is clearly
escalatory and dangerous, as Nayyar's talk
chillingly reminded us.
Oliver Meier, a representative of the Arms
Control Association in Europe, and a fellow at
the Institute of Peace Research and Security
Policy, Hamburg, provided insights into the wider
global context of the deal, in particular the
hesitancy on the part of Germany, as a member of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to give the
deal a green signal. India, he pointed out, has
not accepted all the safeguards prescribed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Full
acceptance of these safeguards is usually a
prerequisite for NSG clearance, which the deal
requires for its operationalisation. India's
refusal to accept the full set of safeguards,
however, as Bidwai's talk had already emphasised,
is in line with its consistent opposition to any
form of global regulation for the most globally
destructive form of energy. Both the first two
sessions - on the strategic embrace of the US by
India and the dangers of nuclear weapons
proliferation - provided a counterweight to the
enormous hawkishness of the Indian state and
security apparatus. But the third session,
focusing on the dangers of civilian nuclear
energy regime, addressed the even wider audience
of those who are uncomfortable with nuclear
weaponisation but believe in the necessity and
manage- ability of civilian nuclear energy. The
speakers at this session were Felix Matthes from
the Institute of Applied Ecology, Berlin, Sudha
Mahalingam, member of the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Regulatory Board, Delhi, Sanghamitra Gadekar,
social activist and editor of the anti-nuclear
magazine Anumukti, and M V Ramana, member of the
International Panel of Fissile Materials and
fellow of the Centre for Interdisciplinary
Studies in Environment and Development,
Bangalore. Matthes, like Meier the day before,
provided a German perspective on India's nuclear
programme, in the light of the history of the
German civilian nuclear energy programme, which
is now being phased out. He emphasised the huge
extent of the damages - computed in financial
terms amounting to over 2,000 billion euros - in
the event of a nuclear accident. A single major
nuclear accident, in other words, may terminate a
country's energy policy and wreck any gains made
from nuclear energy. He argued that recent German
experience showed that renewable sources of
energy may provide a more fruitful bedrock of
energy policy. Sudha Mahalingam's talk amplified
the theme of the costs of nuclear energy, and
exploded the myth that it is "Too Cheap to
Meter". A single nuclear reactor, she pointed
out, was unlikely to have a purchasing cost of
below $ 1,500/kwh. Adding the interest
accumulating during construction, the total costs
of a nuclear reactor would amount to Rs 8-10
crore/MW. Fuel costs, too, have risen to $
105/pound. The risk of a nuclear accident would
also have to be borne financially by the
government, which would bear virtually unlimited
li- ability. Nuclear energy, in other words, is a
much more expensive business than its
propagandists claim. Mahalingam argued that gas
provided a far cheaper energy option for India,
an assertion that further underlined Kanak
Dixit's argument that the Iran pipeline would
have been both practically and politically more
desirable than nuclear energy.
Health Costs
Sanghamitra Gadekar shifted the discus- sion from
the financial to the "real" costs of nuclear
energy. Nuclear power in India, she argued, is
necessarily embedded within forms of immense
social injustice and ecological irresponsibility,
which operate from the very beginning of the
nuclear fuel cycle. She demonstrated that the
culture of the nuclear establishment was
predicated on the exploitation and deception of
low-wage workers and residents in areas taken
over for mining, or for the establishment of
reactors. The land recently acquired for a
nuclear reactor at Madban in Ratnagiri, for in-
stance, was taken under draconian emergency
provisions, without an Environmental Impact
Assessment, or a public hearing. The site of the
proposed plant, furthermore, lies in a zone that
has experienced 88 quakes of an intensity
exceeding three on the Richter scale between 1986
and 2005. At Jadugoda in Jharkhand, where uranium
is mined, workers carry out their work with
virtually no protection from radiation, and
radioactive waste is taken away in open trucks.
Local inhabitants have been crippled by tumours,
congenital deformities, and chronic diseases.
Quite independent of all the other problems with
nuclear energy, the culture of nuclear power in
India is shot through with patent disregard for
the human lives expended in the production of
such energy.
M V Ramana's paper, the last of the seminar,
focused on the absence of effective and
accountable safety mechanisms to guard against
nuclear accidents - a dimension completely absent
from the official "debate" on the nuclear energy
issue. He pointed out nuclear power is unique
among electricity technologies in having the
capacity to inflict instantaneous catastrophic
damage. This is a direct out- come of the speed
and high pressure and temperature at which highly
radio active material must operate. He described
the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident and its
consequences in some detail. Closer home he
listed several narrowly averted nuclear accidents
in India over the last decade and a half, in
particular the fire at the Narora atomic plant in
1993, and the valve failure and radiation
emission at Kalpakkam in 2003, which resulted in
large doses of radiation exposure to three
workers. The likelihood of such accidents can be
minimised through efficient safety mechanisms,
but, argued Ramana, there is no foolproof method
of ensuring complete nuclear safety. Besides, as
his talk demonstrated effectively, the Indian
nuclear establishment is geared towards minimal
and very in- effective investments in safety and
security. It was an important and sobering note
upon which to conclude a conference that would
have alerted many to the real and urgent dangers
to national and global peace and security posed
by India's current enthusiasm for this nuclear
deal.
Note
1 Barkha Dutt, for instance, says: "Frankly, for
most of us, much of the technical jargon is
gobbledygook.... [Nevertheless] no matter how
cynical we are about our politicians, we largely
trust this government when it says there will be
no deliberate sell-out of India's independence."
In taking this stand of claiming not to
understand the deal, and yet sup- porting it out
of a sense of "national interest", she is
representative of an important strand of
positions taken on the question within the
television and print media. Hindustan Times,
August 18, 2007.
By far the lowest level to which the debate fell,
however, was the insinuation that the left, by
opposing the deal, was serving the interests of
China or Pakistan rather than India. This was the
stand taken by the strategic experts quoted in a
front-page article of the Hindustan Times. 'Whose
National Interest Is the Left Protecting?',
Hindustan Times, August 20, 2007.
______
[6] ANNOUNCEMENTS:
(i)
Publication Announcement
The autobiography of Dada Amir Haider khan,
CHAINS TO LOSE , is finally published in two
volumes and ready for sale and circulation.
For those who do not know Dada, whose life and
political work spans the entire of 20th century,
was a revolutionary, an international sea
farer, a railroad worker in the Unites States, a
student at the Lenin University of the People of
the East, an union organizer in Bombay and
Madras, a prisoner of the British in colonial
India and a prisoner of Pakistan's rulers for
being a communist.
An excerpt from the dust cover blurb says: "Much
has been written since the classic treatises of
Karl Marx about proletarians and their role in
the dialectics of change. Some academics have
even disputed the very existence of the
proletariat as a class conscious social entity,
specially outside the parameters of industrial
Europe and North America. But seldom have we come
across a work in which a proletarian of
unmistaken identity speaks for himself. CHAINS TO
LOSE is that rare an exception. ..."
Originally written in his self taught English,
Dada's autobiography is compiled and edited, with
an introduction, by Hassan N. Gardezi, a well
known South Asian social scientist.
To obtain your copies please contact: Mr.
Muhammad Kamran, Office Assistant, Pakistan
Studies Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi,
75270 E-mail
<mailto:pscuok at yahoo.com>pscuok at yahoo.com
For further information the editor can be reached
at:
<mailto:gardezihassan at hotmail.com>gardezihassan at hotmail.com
---
(ii)
TALK: CONTEMPORARY MINIATURE PAINTING IN PAKISTAN: TRANSFORMING TRADITION
by Professor Salima HASHMI (Dean of School of
Visual Arts at the Beaconhouse National
University at Lahore)
Date and Time: Tuesday, 16 October 2007, 6.30-8.00pm
Venue: Bloomberg Auditorium, 27/F Cheung Kong
Center, 2 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong
Registration required (SEATS LIMITED):
chantal at aaa.org.hk or call Chantal Wong on 2815
1112 before 9th October 2007.
Presented by: Asia Art Archive
Sponsored by: Christie's and Bloomberg
Free admission. Conducted in English
---
(iii)
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
An intensive course exploring linkages between
health and human rights and building skills in
rights based monitoring and use of international
and national instruments, designed for health and
human rights activists.
November 12th - 24th , 2007
Organized by
Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes
and
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
About the Course
This intensive 2 weeks residential course focuses
on the relationship between health and human
rights. The course identifies and discusses the
complex interactions between health and human
rights. The key areas covered by the course are:
1. The implications of human rights for public health theory and practice.
2. The effect of health policies and programs on human rights
3. Health consequences of human rights violations
4. The linkage and synergies between
promoting and protecting health and human rights
5. Monitoring health and human rights
This course is designed to provide an overview of
the nature and role of national and international
norms, processes and institutions with respect to
health and human rights issues. The course will
include responses of the national and
international political and legal order to some
of the pressing issues of health and human
rights. It will explore the dialectical relation
between the pursuit of national interest by the
governments and the rhetoric of global objectives
by the agencies that include health or human
rights within their mandates.
Eligibility: Graduation and above
Registration Fees: Rs.5000/-
The cost of food and accommodation will be borne
by us. (Traveling expenses have to be borne by
the participants.)
On basis of need registration fees for few participants may be waived.
Last date of form submission: October 1 , 2007
Venue: Conference Hall
Tata Institute Of Social Sciences ( TISS) Campus, Deonar, Mumbai
Accommodation: TISS Hostel
For more information write:
Course Coordinator
Adv Kamayani Bali Mahabal
CEHAT
Sai Ashray , Aram Society Road
Vakola, Santacruz (East)
Mumbai - 55.
Tel: 26673571 / 26673154
Fax: 26673156
Email:
<http://in.f85.mail.yahoo.com/ym/Compose?To=cehat@vsnl.com>cehat at vsnl.com
/
Web site: <http://www.cehat.org/>www.cehat.org
----
(iv)
SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS: GENDER, CULTURE AND POLITICS
University of Pennsylvania, March 28-29, 2008
This interdisciplinary international conference
on South Asian Feminisms will bring together
distinguished scholars/activists both within and
outside the academy, from the subcontinent
(Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka)
as well as the US, UK, and Canada. Our focus
will be the contemporary dynamics of feminist
activism and theorizing in the region, with
particular emphasis on violence, human rights,
and minorities. These are issues of vital concern
across the region and within the South Asian
diaspora. We envision stimulating discussions
about the promises and difficulties of feminist
legal activism and of human rights discourse for
feminist concerns, especially as they engage
issues of caste, religion, ethnicity, sexuality
and class; the relationship between feminism and
movements for democracy; forms of gendered
violence; and the impact of transnationalism and
globalization on feminist movements within and
outside
the region.
The conference will pay sustained attention to
the specificities of these issues within
different contexts that constitute "South Asia",
but also encourages conversations across these
contexts, reaching out to the shared, unequal,
and overlapping histories of the region.
Distinguished participants will include: Ratna
Kapur, Director of the Centre for Feminist Legal
Research in New Delhi, India and Senior Gender
Advisor to Nepal, United Nations; Malathi De
Alwis, International Centre for Ethnic Studies,
Colombo, Sri Lanka; Flavia Agnes, leading
feminist scholar, women's rights lawyer,
co-founder of Majlis, Mumbai, India; Firdaus
Azim, Professor, BRAC University and activist,
Nari Pokko, Dhaka, Bangladesh; Angana Chatterjee,
Associate Professor, California Institute of
Integral Studies; Amina Jamal, Assistant
Professor, Ryerson University, Toronto, CA;
Anjali Arondekar, Associate Professor, University
of California, Santa Cruz; Dina Siddiqi,
Independent Scholar, New York/Dhaka, Bangladesh;
Priyamvada Gopal, cultural analyst and literary
critic, Cambridge University, UK; Annanya
Bhattacharjee, co- founder, Sakhi (New York) and
International Organizer for Jobs with Justice
(New Delhi, India/Washington, DC, US).
The Conference Committee gratefully acknowledges
support and sponsorship from the following: the
Provost's Global Initiatives Fund, the South Asia
Center, the Alice Paul Center/Women's Studies
Program, the University Research Fund, the School
of Arts and Sciences Dean's Office, the Graduate
School of Education, the Department of English,
the Center for the Advanced Study of India, and
the Department of Anthropology.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
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