SACW | June 19-20, 2007

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | June 19-20, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2421 - Year 9

[1] Nepal between the Monarchy and the republic : 
Child's Play (editorial, The Telegraph)
[2] Sir Salman's long journey (Priyamvada Gopal)
[3] Pakistan in the Balance (Najam Sethi)
[4] Sri Lanka and The merchants of death (Kumar Rupesinghe)
[5] India - Ayodhya : Beyond real estate (Javed Akhtar)
[6] Letter from an Indian Feminist: the arrest 
and incarceration of Dr Binayak Sen (Ammu Abraham)
[7] Book Review: The Right to Choose if, Who and 
When to Marry  (Shalini Grover)
[8] India: Appeal For Support (Narmada Bachao Andolan)
[9] Announcements:
     Afzal Guru meeting @ House of Commons (London, 27 June )

______

[1]


The Telegraph
June 19, 2007

Editorial

CHILD'S PLAY

It is odd to see Nepal going round in circles 
when it should have been rewriting its destiny. 
Despite the pro-democratic deluge last year, the 
country's political leadership, quite obviously, 
is not yet convinced about the complete 
irrelevance of monarchy. In what appears to be 
its last ditch attempt to save the institution, 
it has suggested, with as much severity as it 
could muster, that the present king and his 
immediate successor forsake their claim to the 
throne and anoint one from the next generation. 
Since the grandchildren of King Gyanendra are 
extremely young, they are expected to pose no 
threat at all to Nepal's fledgling democracy. 
(The clause that the sister has greater right to 
rule than the brother is also supposed to 
indicate the progressive mindset of the 
leadership.) However, the parliamentary leaders 
of the country have either forgotten history, 
particularly their own, or have little respect 
for biological science. One cannot hope 
five-year-olds to remain that way forever, nor 
can one presuppose that they are powerless. The 
offer to the king betrays the ruling elite's 
profound mistrust of the democratic process and 
of the participants in it. Nothing could be more 
dangerous for Nepal at this turning point in its 
history.

The parliament's obsessive interest in retaining 
the vestiges of monarchy is bound to stymie 
Nepal's march towards greater democracy. 
Abolition of this institution was the crucial 
plank that held together the countrywide 
pro-democratic movement of 2006. It was what 
brought the Maoists to the negotiation table, and 
ultimately into the interim government. The prime 
minister's revived thrust to save monarchy before 
all is lost for it could not only drive deep 
wedges in the government, but also take the 
country back to violence and bloodshed. There is 
no doubt that the Maoists' reluctance to give up 
arms completely and the waywardness of some 
Maoist frontal outfits are causing a lot of 
discomfort to Nepal's parliamentary leaders. But 
a ceremonial monarchy is not the way out of this 
problem. The institution has, both directly and 
indirectly, stalled the country's move towards 
democracy. Even if retained in a nascent form, 
monarchy could remain the rallying point for 
anti-democratic forces. The recent violence in 
the Terai region, stoked by pro-monarchy forces, 
should have given sufficient proof to the 
parliament about its pernicious influence. 
Unfortunately, it seems to keep looking the other 
way.

______


[2]

The Guardian
June 18, 2007

SIR SALMAN'S LONG JOURNEY

Rushdie's knighthood is a reward for abandoning 
the anti-establishment stance he once espoused

by Priyamvada Gopal

From Indianness to Englishness, speculates the 
narrator of The Satanic Verses, is an 
immeasurable distance. For Sir Salman Rushdie, 
"humbled to receive this great honour" from the 
monarch of a nation he once compared to "a 
peculiar-tasting smoked fish full of spikes and 
bones", that journey has culminated in a 
knighthood. There'll be carping and predictably 
impassioned defences. It will be recalled that 
Benjamin Zephaniah turned down the OBE, refusing 
to join "the oppressor's club", while Granta 
literati will rush to extol the humane virtues of 
English literature and empire.

This is not, ultimately, about one man's oddly 
bathetic "gratitude" or even the meaning of being 
knighted in this day and age. Recognition from on 
high is probably thrilling to even the most jaded 
among us. More interesting is the question of why 
this "honour" comes now and what Rushdie's 
alacrity in accepting it tell us about politics 
and letters in our times, the very stuff of his 
greatest fiction.

To see the knighthood as "belated" endorsement by 
the British establishment is to miss the point 
entirely. Until, and even after, the vicious 
death sentence pronounced by Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Rushdie could not possibly have been endorsed by 
an establishment he had committed himself to 
undermining in merciless prose and brilliant 
satire. Rushdie wrote powerful essays about 
institutional racism, cultural condescension, 
Thatcherism, anti-immigrant legislation, Raj 
nostalgia and a sham multiculturalism where a 
"black man could only become integrated when he 
started behaving like a white man".

With equal ferocity, he criticised those in 
postcolonial nations and ethnic minority 
communities who asserted themselves through 
chauvinism, fundamentalism, censorship and 
literalism. It was necessary to critique 
tyrannical forces in both west and non-west, to 
recognise them as twinned and to pronounce a 
plague on both their houses. From the magnificent 
Midnight's Children to the brilliantly flawed The 
Moor's Last Sigh, this uncompromising ethical 
vision underlies plain Mr Rushdie's best fiction.

Sir Salman, on the other hand, is partly the 
creation of the fatwa that played its role in 
strengthening the self-fulfilling "clash of 
civilisations" that both Bush and Osama bin Laden 
find so handy. Driven underground and into 
despair by zealotry, Rushdie finally emerged 
blinking into New York sunshine shortly before 
the towers came tumbling down. Those formidable 
literary powers would now be deployed not 
against, but in the service of, an American 
regime that had declared its own fundamentalist 
monopoly on the meanings of "freedom" and 
"liberation". The Sir Salman recognised for his 
services to literature is certainly no neocon but 
is iconic of a more pernicous trend: liberal 
literati who have assented to the notion that 
humane values, tolerance and freedom are 
fundamentally western ideas that have to be 
defended as such.

Vociferously supporting the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq on "humane" grounds, 
condemning criticism of the war on terror as 
"petulant anti-Americanism" and above all, 
aligning tyranny and violence solely with Islam, 
Rushdie has abdicated his own understanding of 
the novelist's task as "giving the lie to 
official facts". Now he recalls his own creation 
Baal, the talented poet who becomes a giggling 
hack coralled into attacking his ruler's enemies. 
Denuded of texture and complexity, it is no 
accident that this fiction since the early 90s 
has disappeared into a critical wasteland. The 
mutation of this relevant and stentorian writer 
into a pallid chorister is a tragic allegory of 
our benighted times, of the kind he once narrated 
so vividly.

· Priyamvada Gopal teaches in the English faculty 
at Cambridge University and is the author of 
Literary Radicalism in India


______


[3]

Wall Street Journal
June 16, 2007; Page A9

PAKISTAN IN THE BALANCE

by Najam Sethi

LAHORE, Pakistan -- As lawyers, civil society 
activists and now journalists protest President 
Gen. Pervez Musharraf's ham-handed ouster of 
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry last March and 
his recent crackdown on the press, most 
Pakistanis are convinced the military strongman 
is a "goner." Most international commentators see 
Mr. Musharraf's increasingly repressive measures 
as a sure sign of his regime unraveling. Others 
are already calculating the beneficial effects of 
a likely return to "civilian democracy" sooner 
rather than later.

Mr. Musharraf has other ideas. Last week he told 
worried bigwigs of the ruling Pakistan Muslim 
League party that he might be down but was 
definitely not out. This storm will pass, he 
assured them, the next general elections would be 
held as pledged by the end of this year, and they 
would win.

So how is the United States' core ally in the war 
against terror going to fare? Who will replace 
him if he is ousted, will there be greater or 
lesser democracy, and would that be good or bad 
for Pakistan?

The protests aren't sufficient to end Mr. 
Musharraf's rule. They lack a mass base. There 
haven't been any prolonged countrywide shutdowns. 
Traders and businessmen still support Mr. 
Musharraf. Opposition parties have failed to 
impress in the numbers game. The two main 
opposition leaders, former Prime Ministers Nawaz 
Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, are reluctant to end 
their exile and return to Pakistan, fearing 
arrest. Even the most virulent opposition from 
the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), an alliance of 
six religious parties who hate Mr. Musharraf 
because of his support for the U.S. war against 
terror, is tempered with pragmatism. Its leading 
political party, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, is 
averse to clashing with the federal government, 
which could endanger its political rule in two 
provinces.

All political parties fear that any head-on 
confrontation with Mr. Musharraf might lead to 
martial law. As if to reinforce this fact, Mr. 
Musharraf last week called a meeting of his top 
military commanders -- who duly warned against 
the expression of any anti-army sentiment in 
public or in the media.

The situation could worsen for Mr. Musharraf if 
the Supreme Court were to reinstall the chief 
justice and thereby invigorate the pro-democracy 
movement. Or if the government were to blunder 
into killing protestors, fueling their anger and 
swelling their ranks. Or if Ms. Bhutto and Mr. 
Sharif were to return to the country and succeed 
in whipping up a storm. Or if Washington were to 
nod at another general to take over.

But all these scenarios are uncertain. The 
Supreme Court case may drag on until next year. 
The government may successfully avoid provoking 
more violence. Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif might 
stay away longer. Finally, the U.S. is unlikely 
to ditch Mr. Musharraf, partly because he is 
still shoring up the war against terror in 
Pakistan and partly because there is no guarantee 
that his military or civilian successor would 
fare any better in fulfilling this international 
agenda.

Pakistan's experience with "democratic" 
governments hasn't been reassuring. Previous 
administrations under Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif 
saw corrupt, squabbling politicians drive the 
economy to bankruptcy. They lost their sheen when 
they became dynastic, autocratic and repressive. 
Worse, their political failures no less than 
those of the military led to the growth of the 
religious right.

If Mr. Musharraf were to be ousted by the popular 
forces of "undiluted democracy" in a country that 
is deeply fissured by regionalism, ethnicity, 
religious sectarianism, separatism, Talibanism 
and class struggle, the result could be political 
anarchy and economic meltdown. There is no single 
mainstream party strong enough to hold the center 
and the periphery. Stumbling and squabbling 
coalition governments would bring democracy into 
disrepute again. This would only benefit the 
forces of political Islam, which are the real 
long-term pretenders to the throne in Pakistan 
because of their strategy of merging religious 
ideology, Islamic nationalism and class struggle.

Meanwhile, shorn of all responsibility for its 
actions after retreating to the barracks, the 
powerful army would start pulling strings to 
destabilize and discredit elected governments 
from behind the scenes, as it has done during 
every civilian stint in power. Under these 
circumstances, the gains made under Mr. 
Musharraf's regime, like the peace initiative 
with India, economic revival, efforts to stall 
religious extremism and support for the war 
against terror -- however insufficient -- would 
fall by the wayside without generating an 
alternative sustainable governance paradigm.

One other significant issue needs to be factored 
into the analysis. In the next five years, many 
middle-class army officers recruited from the 
urban areas of Pakistan during the Islamicization 
years of Gen. Zia ul Haq in the 1980s will become 
three-star generals. These homespun officers are 
all imbued with Islamic nationalism, anti-India 
sentiment and anti-Westernism.

Their anti-Americanism is rooted in the 1990s, 
when the U.S. cut off all military aid to 
Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear program. As 
field officers they compelled Mr. Musharraf not 
to wage war against "our own people in 
Waziristan" at the behest of America. They remain 
unhappy at the ostracism of Pakistan's nuclear 
hero, A.Q. Khan, by Gen. Musharraf, again at 
America's behest. And they have personally 
benefited in terms of perks and privileges from 
the direct intervention of the army in politics 
and civilian affairs. If the army is not led in 
the future by a strong, moderate and cosmopolitan 
leader, it could institutionally succumb to the 
collective mindset of Islamic nationalism.

Pakistan's military has historically been part of 
its problem. But, left to themselves, Pakistan's 
mainstream democrats, conservative and liberal 
alike, have not been able to provide the 
solution. Meanwhile, the country has become 
seriously ungovernable and the state's writ has 
progressively broken down in large areas of the 
nation. Political Islam is seeking to fill these 
spaces.

What is needed is a transitional power-sharing 
partnership between the military and political 
parties on the basis of an agreed moderate and 
liberal reform agenda -- a sort of truth and 
national reconciliation process that heals 
political wounds and charts the road to a new 
Pakistan. It is a tall order.

Much will depend on whether or not Mr. Musharraf 
can pull off the next general elections without 
provoking an effective opposition boycott and 
further instability. That, in turn, will depend 
on renewed efforts to diffuse the current 
judicial crisis and make new political allies. 
After the elections he will have to take off his 
uniform and share power with mainstream 
politicians in order to enlarge the new 
government's capacity to reform state and society.

In the past, Mr. Musharraf has demonstrated the 
skills of a commando in blasting his way out of 
trouble or beating a tactical retreat when the 
odds were against him. But in recent times he has 
seemed isolated, arrogant and rigid. Which Mr. 
Musharraf will prevail? What will Pakistan look 
like with or without him in the near future? The 
conclusions are not foregone.

Mr. Sethi is the editor of the Friday Times and 
Daily Times in Lahore, Pakistan.

   URL for this article:
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118195989670537480.html>http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118195989670537480.html

Copyright 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved


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[4]


The Island
June 2, 2007

THE MERCHANTS OF DEATH
by Kumar Rupesinghe

Technically, nobody should want to have war. War 
is so horrendous and so devastating that nobody 
in their right minds would desire it. But 
unfortunately, this is not the case. There are 
those who benefit from war and make enormous 
amounts of money. They are called the Merchants 
of Death. These are arms dealers who make 
exorbitant sums of money through the legal and 
illegal manufacture and sale of weapons, mainly 
small arms. They often sell arms to both sides in 
a conflict.

The global picture

The largest arms manufacturer is Lockheed-Martin, 
closely followed by Boeing and Raytheon. The War 
Resisters' League's Anti Militarism Coordinator 
Simon Harak has noted that 'these companies and 
corporations are literally calling the shots of 
the US government's war making policies. It is 
not so much that they are making profits from war 
- their power and influence are so great that it 
is more accurate to say that they are making war 
for profit'. What all these companies have in 
common is that they fund election campaigns and 
influence the direction of American policy. As 
you can imagine, the American war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have created huge profits for 
American arms dealers. Apart from the USA, there 
are many other countries who manufacture weapons, 
such the U.K, Russia, Czechoslovakia and India, 
to name only a few.

Annual world military spending today has gone 
beyond $1000 billion. At present, it is reported 
that there are over 500 million small arms in 
circulation around the world. It was the weapon 
of choice in 46 out of 49 major conflicts, most 
of which have been armed insurgencies and 
intrastate conflicts. In fact, the extent to 
which human security is threatened by the 
diffusion of small arms in South Asia is still 
under-appreciated. In addition to the substantial 
number of casualties, the costs to the families 
afflicted by this violence are immeasurable. But 
to most arms dealers, the profit accumulated far 
outweighs the human costs.

The Sri Lankan scenario

According to Mugabe, a researcher for the Small 
Arms Survey, there is an estimated fifty two 
thousand deserters from the Sri Lankan Army and 
many thousands from the LTTE who have either 
acquired weapons after deserting or left their 
posts with their firearms. The survey estimates 
that there are approximately 300,000 illegal 
weapons owned by civilians. It is no wonder that 
the crime rate in Sri Lanka is so high and 
contract killings have increased astronomically.

Sri Lanka is the most militarised state in South 
Asia. Sri Lanka's defence expenditure as a 
percentage of its GDP is the largest not only in 
the South Asian region, but overall in the world. 
Reports indicate that defence expenditure has 
gone up to Rs. 100 billion a year and is set to 
increase further, given the new dimension the war 
has taken in the recent weeks. In the last 
decade, Sri Lanka has spent almost Rs. 400 
billion on defence as a result of the conflict.

At the same time however, the expenditure for 
education for the year 2005 was a mere Rs. 26 
billion, whilst for the same year for the entire 
health service it was Rs. 30 billion. Just 
imagine the benefits to the country if the money 
spent on arms purchases was diverted to health 
and education. Whilst Sri Lanka boasts that 90% 
of its population is literate, a deeper analysis 
shows that a majority of our children do not have 
access to good schools, school text books and 
sufficient numbers of qualified teachers. The 
same goes for the health services. Our hospitals 
are overcrowded and people are greatly 
inconvenienced in obtaining proper health 
services. Often pregnant mothers have to wait in 
line to be admitted. There is a shortage of 
hospital beds for patients. Still, it is the very 
same citizens, who bear the cost of these arms 
purchases. The figures given Above give a very 
graphic picture of the staggering increase in 
military expenditure in Sri Lanka for the period 
1983 - 2007.

Laser guided bombs

The average price of a MiG 29 is said to be US $ 
15 million [Rs. 1665 million]. According to Iqbal 
Athas, in 'Fight Now and Pay Later ' [Sunday 
Times, 20th May, 2007] ,the government is now 
considering leasing these combat aircraft on a 7 
- 10 year pre arranged credit basis from Russia 
at an undisclosed cost, which means it will be a 
successive government that would need to meet the 
payment for this procurement. It has also been 
pointed out that the acquisition of these 
aircraft alone would not mean the SLAF will be 
able to defend the country's air space. For the 
MiG 29s to be able to carry out their mission 
effectively, it would also be necessary to 
purchase radar guided, heat seeking infra red or 
laser guided missiles, the approximate cost of 
which is US $30,000 apiece. In addition, the Air 
Force is also planning to acquire a new MiG 29 UB 
trainer, a spares package, a UAV system, brand 
new helicopters, overhaul and upgrade existing 
helicopters, the total cost of which is estimated 
at a staggering US $ 145 million [Rs. 16,095,000 
million]. Thus, it seems to be a very expensive 
business to destroy the fledgling Tiger Air Force 
[TAF]. Interestingly, it has been likened to 
buying a brand new Mercedes Benz to knock down a 
bullock cart, with the question being raised as 
to whether all these exorbitantly priced and 
highly sophisticated equipment are really 
necessary to attack the small Czech built Zlin 
Z-143 aircraft that the LTTE is said to have in 
its possession?

A review of international experiences in Israel 
and Iraq are instructive. For example, the 
Israeli Government is one of the most 
sophisticated military powers with sophisticated 
intelligence, air capacity and a well trained 
military capacity but they have not been able to 
deal with the Hezbollah in Lebanon or quell the 
Palestinian uprising. A more recent example is 
the military debacle which the USA is currently 
facing. During the initial invasion of Iraq, the 
US military boasted that the war in Iraq would be 
short and swift and would end in a year and also 
affect a transfer of power to a National Council. 
After several years it is now clear the death 
toll faced by Allied soldiers has become 
intolerable and that the citizens are suffering 
enormously with daily suicide bomb attacks 
killing over 50.

Information on LTTE military expenditure is not 
available. However, a recent report on the Cost 
of Conflict has calculated that its annual income 
is around $250 - 300 million a year. Part of this 
money is spent on its cadres and in development 
work, but the bulk of the money goes into arms 
purchases. Another report by Human Rights Watch 
published in the USA indicates that apart from 
its regular collections, the LTTE recently called 
for a collection of taxes from the Diaspora for 
the 'Final War'. It collected $3000 from each 
family, over $10,000 from business houses and 
$100,000 from Hindu temples. In a calculation I 
made, based on these figures, it would seem that 
the LTTE collected a staggering amount which 
could be over Rs. 100 billion. Apart from 
'taxing' Tamils abroad and in Sri Lanka, they 
operate a fleet of shipping vessels, invest in 
businesses and also engage in drug trafficking. 
All this allows the LTTE to purchase deadly 
weapons in the pursuit of its war objectives.

If the war continues it is clear that costs will 
rise exponentially and this would mean that both 
the Tamil people and the Sinhalese will be the 
losers. Children will be deprived of an 
education, the people will not have proper public 
transport and the country as a whole will be 
trapped in an ever increasing morass of 
continuous military expenditure. The people of 
Sri Lanka have a role to play. They cannot be 
bystanders, for it is they who pay for the war 
and it is their children who will have to bear 
the burden of the massive investment in arms.


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[5]

Hindustan Times
June 19, 2007

BEYOND REAL ESTATE

Javed Akhtar, Press Trust Of India

I don't think the Ram Janmabhoomi or the Babri 
masjid in Ayodhya is a problem. It is a 
manifestation of a problem. You can solve 
problems. You cannot solve manifestations.

Nobody can deny that Ayodhya is historically and 
mythologically Ram's abode. Nobody in his or her 
right mind can say that a Ram temple should not 
be built there. The bone of contention is not 
Ayodhya, but a particular plot. Not even a 
particular plot but an area of a mere 80/40 
square feet. Not even that. If the 80/40 square 
feet 'sanctum sanctorum' of the proposed Ram 
temple could be located a mere 30 feet away, the 
dispute could be resolved. The problem is that 
while no one is sure of the exact millennium of 
Ram's birth, the Sangh parivar is absolutely 
certain about the precise spot of his birth. Yet, 
leave alone 30 feet, they will not agree to move 
even by three inches to solve the problem 
plaguing all of Indian society.

On the other hand, the 'once a mosque, always a 
mosque' claim of maulvis and mullahs is nothing 
but a lie. They cannot deny that in many Muslim 
countries, mosques have often been shifted even 
to broaden highways. So the insistence that a 
mosque must be rebuilt at the exact spot is 
anything but religious.

That a solution is the last thing on the mind of 
the contestants on either side is obvious. The 
moment newspapers reported that the 
Shankaracharya of Kanchi is in touch with the All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) for a 
mutually acceptable solution, some Urdu papers 
published unsubstantiated news that some AIMPLB 
members had been paid Rs 20 crore by the 
government. On the other hand, VHP leader Giriraj 
Kishore wasted no time in declaring that being a 
Shaivite, the Shankaracharya had no locus standi 
on the Ayodhya issue. (The VHP regained its 
reverence for the Shankaracharya the moment it 
became known that his proposed formula was no 
different from what the Sangh parivar wants). So 
much for these leaders' desire for a solution and 
their claims of religious unity!

Since nothing in the world is done on such scale 
and with such consistency without a grand plan, 
the question that arises is: why are the 
fundamentalists from both sides doing this?

This controversy cannot be understood in 
isolation, for it is just a bit act of a marathon 
drama that is being played in the subcontinent 
for around 150 years. It all began in the 1850s, 
when on the one hand the nationalist forces were 
awakening to the growing power of the British 
colonialists and had started coming together to 
resist it. On the other hand, the British 
realised that they would not be able to control 
the 'natives' without creating a schism between 
them along communal lines. (I wonder if it is a 
coincidence that the Ayodhya controversy, too, 
surfaced for the first time in 1853). For the 
British, the mutiny of 1857 was their worst fears 
come true.

From the record of correspondence at the India 
Office, London, it is clear that the British 
conjured up, preached and propagated the 
two-nation theory in a deliberate and consistent 
manner. In 1859, the colonial administration 
erected a fence to separate the Babri masjid and 
Ram chabutra in Ayodhya, allowing the inner court 
to be used by Muslims and the outer court by 
Hindus. Perhaps another coincidence!

All those who helped the British in promoting and 
propagating the notion that Hindus and Muslims 
are two separate nations and cannot live 
together, cannot be called anything but 
collaborators. And there is no doubt that the 
Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS 
belong to this category. Some people may be 
shocked and outraged at the RSS being called 
collaborators of the colonial power. But I would 
like to ask why from its birth in 1925 till the 
country's Independence in 1947, the RSS did not 
issue a single statement, did not organise a 
single rally and did not court a single arrest 
protesting colonial rule. The same is true of the 
Muslim League. Not a single member of these 
organisations that succeeded in dividing this 
nation and creating Pakistan, went to jail even 
for a day at the peak of the freedom movement.

There is an unbelievable similarity in the 
political stands of the Muslim League and the 
RSS. The Muslim League asked its followers to 
boycott the Quit India movement. The RSS did the 
same. M.S. Golwalkar said such movements create 
chaos and law and order problems, so they should 
be avoided and ignored. The Muslim League was 
rewarded with Pakistan. But the Hindu proponents 
of the two-nation theory were deprived of their 
dream because of genuine nationalists who fought 
for independence.

So who is a fundamentalist? The fundamentalist 
has his own version of history, his own 
definition of culture, his own interpretation of 
religion and his own brand of nationalism. Behind 
all the impassioned sloganeering and pretensions 
of defending culture, religion and nation, the 
real agenda is to legitimise an unjust and an 
exploitative system.

Gujarat is called a laboratory of Hindutva, but 
in my view its biggest laboratory is Pakistan, 
which was founded on those very principles on 
which the Sangh parivar wants to rebuild this 
country. In Pakistan, Islamic fundamentalism is 
but a convenient cover for an exploitative 
economic system. And the parivar's ultimate 
fantasy is a Hindu Pakistan.

In Pakistan, to make a feudal system viable, it 
is necessary that all civil liberties be denied 
to the people. To deny civil liberties, you need 
an undemocratic system. And to justify and 
legitimise an undemocratic system, you need 
religious fundamentalism and majoritarianism 
pretending to be nationalism. This use of 
fundamentalism is also evident in those Muslim 
countries where a few control all national 
wealth. Though the elite dole out crumbs to the 
ordinary citizen in these countries, no civil 
rights exist.

Fascism and fundamentalism (theocracy) have one 
thing in common: both believe in the total 
usurpation of the basic rights and civil 
liberties of citizens. Nazi Germany and Taliban 
Afghanistan are eloquent testimonies of this. 
Interestingly, the Sangh parivar has from the 
very beginning been enamoured by Nazi ideology. 
Given half a chance, like the Taliban, the Sangh 
parivar will start putting women in their place.

It is not that every fundamentalist sees his 
world view as a political instrument. On the 
contrary, the large majority of those who 
subscribe to such views are sincerely committed 
to them. But these are mere pawns and minions who 
have been brainwashed. And among them, those from 
the economically weaker sections are often used 
as canon fodder. But for those who are pulling 
the invisible strings, fundamentalism remains but 
a political strategy.

To think it was reverence for Ram that made L.K. 
Advani launch his rath yatra is like believing 
that actually Jinnah wanted to save Islam in the 
subcontinent. The fact is that Jinnah was a 
cold-blooded, manipulative, power-hungry 
politician who hardly had any religious beliefs. 
The same can be said of Advani.

What should not be forgotten is that when Advani 
and his party picked up the Ayodhya gauntlet, 
Muslim fundamentalists provided a perfect foil to 
him. We also need to understand the Muslim 
fundamentalist agenda. In post-Partition India, 
the Muslim fundamentalist can no longer aspire to 
gain control of the State. But his political 
ambitions intact, he does seek to be a State 
within a State. He is interested in democracy and 
secularism only to the extent that in the name of 
these principles his fundamentalism is

tolerated. He wants tolerance and democracy 
because that serves his interest. But he is not 
prepared to tolerate any freedom or democracy 
within his own community. He wants total control 
over the country's largest minority the same way 
as the Sangh parivar wants total control over the 
entire country.

To be able to exert pressure on the State, the 
Muslim fundamentalist would like to be seen as 
the sole representative of his community. He 
wants to use Muslims as bargaining chips. I hang 
my head in shame every time I recall how at the 
time of Shah Bano, Muslim fundamentalists were 
allowed to force secular India to bend to their 
diktats.

He who speaks out against the Muslim 
fundamentalist is anti-Islam, he who speaks 
against the Sangh parivar is anti-national. Both 
of them have no tolerance for any opinion other 
than their own.

So, the choice is not between fundamentalists of 
two communities, for they are the mirror-images 
of each other. The choice is not even between a 
temple and a mosque. The choice is between 
democracy and a totalitarian regime. Let us make 
all fundamentalist organisations irrelevant by 
telling them in no uncertain terms that it is not 
Ayodhya - they are the problem.

______


[6] LETTER FROM AN INDIAN FEMINIST: ON THE ARREST 
AND INCARCERATION OF DR BINAYAK SEN


18 Jun 2007

The arrest and incarceration for more than a 
month, of Dr Binayak Sen, a doctor who has worked 
in Chattisgarh for nearly 3 decades with the 
poor, the workers and the deprived - all of them 
from the  tribes - bothers me like a little ulcer 
on the middle of my back would. The awareness of 
Sen's continuing imprisonment flares up from time 
to time, even as one goes about attending to 
other matters like the fate of the DV Act, or the 
fate of the Women's Centre where I spend a good 
part of every day, even as my thoughts keep 
turning to my father in Kerala who has cancer. 
Its not just an itch in the middle of one's 
back; during the passage of a whole month, the 
itch has become a little ulcer. One can't see it, 
because its on the middle of one's back. One 
cannot scratch it, because it is no longer an 
itch, it is a little ulcer. Its not worth a visit 
to a hospital, its not that serious, like fake 
encounter deaths.

They say that he is not being tortured. He is in 
judicial custody; not in police custody. (How 
judicious).
That is because Dr. Sen is only 'under 
suspicion'. He has attracted the Suspicion of the 
State of Chattisgarh. 'Its no one's case that Dr 
Sen is a Naxalite', wrote a journalist - 
activist- long time friend, in defence of Dr Sen. 
But the Government of Chattisgarh is not so sure 
of that; and it has charged Dr Sen with 'waging 
war' against it.
Still, the judiciary of Chattisgarh keeps Dr Sen 
under its judicious custody, while the 
investigators of the State of Chattisgarh 
investigate a PC in Dr Sen's office that he 
shares with his social scientist and women's 
rights activist spouse, Ilena. So the charge of 
waging war against the state is a bit of 
Phishing. If any proof turns up, then he has 
indeed waged war, despite his gentle looks and 
speech, his non-violent appearance & words, his 
being a doctor quite unlike Pravin Togadia of the 
VHP.

I remember Snehalata Reddy in Bangalore suddenly, 
during the Emergency. Whose prison diary I 
informally edited for Dr U.R. Ananthamurthy. She 
was 'under suspicion', of having waged war 
against the State, the State of India, and was 
incarcerated without proof. She was an asthmatic, 
and a person for whom any confinement would 
be spiritual strangling. They said that she was 
not tortured. She tried to overcome her gloom in 
prison by taking up literacy classes for women 
prisoners; she wrote a diary. They finally set 
her free, when she had not many days left to 
live. She died soon after release.

The memory brings back the awareness of that 
little almost-ulcer on my mental backside.
What if Dr Sen is neither tortured nor released.
What if they keep him in a 10'x5' prison room with 10 other souls.
What if they just slowly cause a spiritual bleeding to death?
Might it have been better for him if he had 
indeed been a 'Naxalite'; had shot, and been shot 
dead?
Maybe. Its Sen's life. He is and was, what he is and was.

Cheer up, its no one's case that Dr Binayak Sen 
is an asthmatic, I think. Surely he is more 
solid, even, more stolid hopefully, than a dancer 
with a poetic orientation to life, for whom 
confinement meant death?
Dr Sen & Ilena's friends all wait anxiously for 
tomorrow, when he is to be produced in court 
again.

Ammu Abraham [Bombay]

______



[7]


Narmada Bachao Andolan
2, Sai Nagar, Mata Chowk, Khandwa, M.P.
Phone : 094259 -28007, 094253 - 94606
E-mail :  nobigdam at bsnl.in

URGENT APPEAL FOR SUPPORT

16th June 2007

Dear friends,

Today is the 13th day of the indefinite dharna at 
Khandwa of the people of the Indira Sagar and 
Omkareshwar dams on the Narmada river. It is also 
the 11th day of the indefinite fast of five 
representatives of the struggle who have been on 
fast since the 6th of June 2007.

The dharna began on the 4th of June, 2007 with a 
resounding rally of over 12,000 oustees of the 
Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams in the town of 
Khandwa followed by a gherao of the NHDC (Narmada 
Hydro-Development Corporation) which is building 
the dam. Since then 5000 oustees have been 
sitting on dharna in Khandwa with the resolve 
that they would go back to their villages only 
when their demands are met.

The villagers have taken complete financial and 
logistical responsibility for the program, and 
the atmosphere is heady. Food for 5000 people is 
being cooked and served twice a day with the 
condiments and grain and dal brought by each 
individual villager and premises given to us by 
the local Gurdwara. There is a great deal of song 
and dance and sharing of experiences. Desks for 
filing complaints and counseling are also being 
run. Such has been the dire nature of the R&R 
process in the Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams, 
that more than 11,000 complaints have been 
prepared and filed with the NHDC in the last 13 
days.

Dharna and Fast to continue until all demands are met

The activists sitting on indefinite fast are 
Krishnabai, Dalit woman from Village Bichola Mal, 
District Harda, ISP submergence, Surajbai, Dalit 
woman from Village Bichola Mal, District Harda, 
ISP submergence, Ashok Sharma, Village Gogalgaon, 
Omkareshwar dam submergence, Bhagwanbhai Sardar 
Sarovar submergence, senior activist of the NBA, 
and Chittaroopa Palit, activist of the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan.

Today is the 11th day of their fast. Their 
spirits and their resolve to take the struggle to 
victory is very high. Naturally, however, their 
health is declining and weakness has come in. 
Particularly Krishnabai, a frail 32 kgs. is in 
great pain and is continuously vomiting.

Our demands

Our main demands in the Indira Sagar area are that

(1) Agricultural land should be provided to the 
villagers who are facing fresh submergence in the 
thousands of acres of land now found in the 
surveys.

(2) All adult sons and adult unmarried daughters 
of cultivators should be provided land or SRG as 
directed by the High Court in the Order dated 
8.09.2007 and which the State Government is 
refusing to comply with.

(3) Landless families should be provided 5 acres 
land in the draw-down of the Indira Sagar 
reservoir, along with irrigation facilities.

(4) Employment guarantee schemes should be 
provided in every R&R site such as New Harsud, 
Kalapatha, Bangarda where people are undergoing 
starvation.

(5) Thousands of houses that have been 
deliberately and illegally been left out of the 
acquisition process after surveys preceding 
Section 4 Notification and after in many cases 
the service of notices under Section 9 of the 
Land Acquisition Act should be included and 
compensation and R&R entitlements provided.

(6) Every R&R site should be leveled or where 
people have already spent thousands of rupees to 
build plinths in the undulating wastes of the R&R 
sites, compensation should be paid for the plinth 
filling.

For Omkareshwar, the demands are

(1) Agricultural land for the cultivators,

(2) land for the adult sons and unmarried adult 
daughters of the cultivators, as per the R&R Plan 
of 1993 for the Omkareshwar Project

(3) Land for the landless families as per the 
condition of the environmental clearance.

(4) Better facilities including sufficient potable water in the R&R sites.

Callousness of the state and the lack of response

Since the beginning of the dharna, the people 
have been facing the callousness of the State 
government who have till today not bothered to 
address the grave concerns of the people or 
initiate any serious negotiations. On the 
contrary in the last few days, they have been 
trying to bring the dharna to a halt. Two days 
ago, the water supply was stopped for 17 hours. 
Finally, only when the women blocked the streets, 
the authorities were forced to resume the water 
supply. The refusal of the state to respond to 
the popular struggle is extremely troubling but 
the people are determined that they will compel 
the state to accept their demands through 
democratic struggle.

High Court stipulates land for land

On the 18th of May 2007, in the case of the 
Omkareshwar dam, the Madhya Pradesh High Court 
had passed an Order directing that the gates of 
the dam should not be closed until all the 
villagers are rehabilitated with agricultural 
land as per the 1993 R&R Plan of the Project and 
only after giving them 6 months breathing time 
after the completion of R&R.

Supreme Court permits dam filling

However the State of Madhya Pradesh and NHDC 
filed Special Leave Petitions and on the 11th of 
June, the decision of the High Court was stayed 
by the Supreme Court without going into the 
merits of the matter. The State Government and 
the NHDC stated on affidavit that of the 30 
villages affected by the Omkareshwar dam, 25 
villages would not be affected by the rise in 
level up to 189 meters, and the other 5 villages 
are already vacated.

However, the Supreme Court declined to pass any 
order on the land question and sent it back to 
the High Court while disposing off the SLPs. The 
matter begins in the High Court from the 18th of 
June, 2007. After the SC decision, the dam gates 
were closed on the 13th of June. The waters have 
reached crest level 184 meters in the last two 
days already and are rising further.

Repression in Omkareshwar villages after SC Order, resistance by people

It may be noted that the in their affidavits in 
the High Court and Supreme Court, the State 
Government and the NHDC stated that of the 30 
villages, only 5 villages are in the submergence 
at 189 meters and the other 25 villages will not 
be affected at 189 meters. Moreover, they also 
stated that even from these 5 villages, in 
Gunjari where 22 houses were denied compensation 
after having been given Section 9 notices not 
once but twice, would not be affected at 189 
meters and its back-waters.

However immediately after the SC order, the State 
government started severing electricity and water 
in several villages like Ekhand and Gogalgaon by 
removing transformers. The villagers are 
resisting the disconnection of facilities 
fiercely in the villages. At the same time, on 
the 13th the people on dharna ghearoed the 
Khandwa Collectorate and demanded restoration of 
facilities and removal of police. As a result, 
the transformers have been re-connected. The 
villagers have now stated that since it has been 
said that they will not be affected at 189 
meters, no officials should enter their villages.

Gunjari satyagraha begins against illegal submergence

Meanwhile, the 22 houses of Gunjari and several 
more houses of Bakhatgarh and Sailani and 115 
families of Jiroth hamlet of Village Kelwa are 
likely to be submerged in the next one or two 
days - Gunjari probably in the next few hours. In 
the face of the complete denial of their 
entitlements and the false affidavits of the 
State and Project authorities, the people of 
Gunjari have taken a decision to face the waters 
but not move. The people of the other villages 
have decided to join them in their satyagraha.

Appeal for support

As you can see, events are unfolding very 
quickly. Meanwhile the dharna and the indefinite 
fast continues and is taking its toll on the 
fasters. You are aware that both Indira Sagar and 
Omkareshwar dams are complete and are on the 
verge of full reservoir filling which will cause 
full submergence, are only stopped by the stay on 
the full filling of both these dams because of 
non-fulfillment of R&R, due to legal intervention 
by the NBA.

To ensure that this program of struggle against 
the tyranny and impunity of the NHDC and the 
State government and the fulfillment of the legal 
and just rights of the oustees, we need your help 
and support. We request you to:

1.	Come to Khandwa to extend your support to struggling oustees.

2.	Write to Chief Minister and Governor of 
Madhya Pradesh asking them to fulfill the demands 
of oustees.

Shri Balram Jakhar, Shri Shivraj Singh Chowhan

Governor, Chief Minister,
Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Raj Bhawan, Vallabh Bhawan,
Bhopal. Bhopal

Phone: (0755) 4223436/4080300 Phone: (0755) 2441033/2442231

Fax : (0755) 4080112 Fax : (07550 2441781/2540501

3.	Organise support progammes at your places.

We hope, as always, your will extend your full 
support to ensure the rights of thousands of 
struggling oustees.

In solidarity ,

Bhagwan Mukati, Alok Agarwal, Chittaroopa Palit, Krishnabai

Note:

Khanwa is on main Mumbai - Itarsi rail route
Khandwa is 3 hours by road from Indore


______


[8]  BOOK REVIEW


Economic and Political Weekly
June 16, 2007

THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE IF, WHO AND WHEN TO MARRY

Contentious Marriages, Eloping
Couples: Gender, Caste and
Patriarchy in Northern India
by Prem Chowdhry;
Oxford University Press,
New Delhi, 2007;
pp 448, Rs 695.

[Reviewed by] Shalini Grover

Prem Chowdhry's new book synthesises her 
pioneering work (1994, 1997, 2004a, 2004b), 
addressing gender violence pertaining to inter- 
and intra-caste marriages in north India. Drawing 
on historical, legal and archival sources, 
popular culture and oral testimonies, the 
interstices of gender, caste and patriarchy in 
rural and semi-urban Haryana are examined in this 
impressive, yet disturbing monograph. The title 
Contentious Marriages: Eloping Couples refers to 
self- chosen "love marriages" which contravene 
the norm of caste endogamy, intra-caste alliances 
that breach 'got' and territorial exogamy, and 
the remarriage of widows also perceived to be 
contentious. The book's cover is illustrated with 
the author's own paintings of a poor Haryanvi 
couple which typify the shame and isolation 
experienced by parents caught in the saga of 
their children's run-away marriages.

While elopements and love marriages, which often 
elicit intense family opposition, are a prominent 
motif in Indian cin- ema and have been 
vicariously documented in media reportage, 
serious academic contextualisation of shifting 
marital prac- tices, the eschewment of parental 
match- making criteria and individualised agency 
are recent investigative themes in gender and 
sociological studies. Indeed, with the exception 
of studies on alternative sexualities, a cultural 
relativist approach that rigidly posits "Indian 
arranged marriage and family values" against 
"western style love marriages" has thwarted 
efforts to comprehend the nature of individual 
de- sire and the choice of marriage partners. 
Chowdhry contends that in Haryana, elope- ments, 
especially those involving lower- and upper-caste 
pairings, have escalated over time, thereby 
challenging traditional caste, kin and community 
authority. Thus Chowdhry's principal inquiry (p 
20) is to problematise the widespread phenomena 
of gender violence and honour killings associated 
with contentious marriages, whilst also 
questioning the structural and ideological basis 
of such crimes across caste, class, gender and 
age, and crucially why the perpetrators of 
violence are treated with sympathy and allowed to 
abscond.

Sequentially, the opening chapter inter- rogates 
the colonial state, illustrating how marriage 
became a target for social and judicial 
intervention. Following this, four chapters on 
post-colonial Haryana explore how traditional 
caste panchayats, the modern state and the family 
collude against couples asserting their marital 
preferences.  These key chapters delineate the 
collusion between traditional and modern institu- 
tions to wilfully obstruct love marriages, far 
too often resulting in a tragic finale for 
couples. The final chapters discuss the deep 
socio-economic fissures and contra- dictions in 
Haryana's changing political economy to provide 
the necessary back- drop for understanding the 
present antago- nism against inter-caste 
marriages.

Increasing Intolerance

Contemporary Haryana typifies the extreme 
rigidity in the interpretation of marriage rules 
and alliances in northern India. In comparison, 
Chowdhry points out how in the colonial era the 
local populace exhibited a certain degree of 
tolerance for inter-caste unions, which were 
permissible under the custom of 'karewa' (the 
remarriage of widows, divorced or abandoned 
women). Colonial interventions however brought 
about increased strin- gency and cultural shifts 
in indigenous marriage practices. The colonial 
state endorsed and gave legal authentication to 
inter-caste and inter-community marriages through 
the Special Marriage Act of 1872.  While the 
state formulated progressive laws, a series of 
colonial judgments con- tradictorily strengthened 
caste endogamy by invalidating local customs such 
as karewa, which was considered morally 
reprehensible by the British. In practice the 
approach of the colonial administration was to 
adhere to the brahminical scriptures, which 
strictly forbid inter-caste marriages. 
Furthermore, we are informed that in the majority 
of cases pertaining to marriage the verdicts of 
the colonial courts were typically regressive and 
blatantly dis- regarded women's agency and 
assertion in their choice of partner. In this 
extensive chapter on the colonial state a 
question that could have received more attention 
is whether these regressive and paradoxical 
verdicts from the Haryana region were also being 
enforced in other parts of India.  The chapters 
on present day Haryana explicate the ubiquity of 
the ideology of male guardianship, control over 
female sexuality, idioms of honour and obser- 
vance of caste endogamy which guide the social 
behaviour of people across age groups. Couples 
and families in violation of the norms of an 
honourable conduct are brought before caste 
panchayats dominated by higher-caste landowning 
men who have unrestrained powers to authorise 
economic and other sanctions, including the use 
of violence. The latter includes executing the 
couple (by burning them alive, administering 
poison and electrocution in village "executions") 
and expelling their families from the ancestral 
village, as well as destroying their property, 
crops and house- hold goods. As stated by 
Chowdhry:

The general opinion of people in this region, 
cutting across caste and class, is that if a 
lower-caste man is involved with a higher- caste 
woman, he is invariably killed. And the girl, 
whether belonging to the higher caste or the 
lower, is also almost certainly eliminated. This 
is observed to be the general pattern not only in 
Haryana but in the whole of northern India 
adopted by the landowning families and decreed by 
the caste panchayat (p 142).

Chowdhry draws attention to honour killings in 
the rural hinterland as well as in burgeoning 
urban areas such as Gurgaon.  Through extensive 
interviews with local inhabitants, concerned 
families and news- paper readings, Chowdhry has 
put together and reconstructed accounts of honour 
killings and episodes of brutal violence.  Given 
the difficulties and sensitivities involved in 
interviewing eloping couples, who often go 
"underground" or are killed, personal experiences 
of resistance and accounts of those who do 
survive are unfortunately missing from these 
chapters.  We are hence presented with 
painstakingly factual reconstructions of how 
couples are forcefully separated and how their 
marriages and relationships meet with 
inconclusive endings, albeit these are not first- 
hand narrations from the couples concerned. This 
leaves us with little insight into the emotional 
trajectories of runaway marriages or the 
subversive character of premarital love between 
young people.  Chowdhry illustrates how caste 
panchayats in Haryana have nullified  intra- 
caste arranged marriages through the extensive 
case study of Ashish and Darshana from Jondhi 
village (p 100), whose arranged marriage was 
declared void after three years as the couple's 
families had apparently contravened the category 
of prohibited got, thereby breaking a time 
honoured tradition of a 500 year old incest 
taboo. The panchayat converted the couple's 
marriage to a fictive brother-sister relationship 
and Ashish was charged with the responsibility of 
remarrying "his wife turned sister". A series of 
local events whereby the families raised 
objections compelled the panchayat to reconsider 
its extreme decision to nullify the marriage; but 
its revised decree ordered that the couple should 
be thrown out of their got and permanently exiled 
from Jondhi village.  Chowdhry accentuates the 
absence of functional democratic institutions 
able to effectively challenge traditional powers 
such as the tremendous authority of the caste 
panchayats. These panchayats are still widely 
utilised in settling marital disputes, as the 
courts are out of reach for a large proportion of 
the rural population.

Yet it emerges that caste panchayat dictates are 
highly arbitrary, with disparate injunctions 
being issued in very similar instances. If 
families are economically influential their 
breaches are overlooked and uncritically 
questioned, while the less powerful are savagely 
punished. Besides the decrees issued by caste 
panchayats, the author offers examples of how 
families initiate violence against their 
daughters in the name of honour and explains how 
families not seen to be making attempts to 
forcefully search for, separate or eliminate the 
couple are also ostracised and taken to task by 
caste panchayats.  We may ask why the recurrent 
honour killings and outcastings bymale-dominated 
panchayats over the years have not led to 
concrete mobilisation by feminist groups or 
alternative forms of justice, especially as 
haryanvi women are barred from panchayat 
attendance and low caste groupsquestion the 
credibility of panchayat decisions. By way of 
example, since the early 1990s feminist NGOs in 
New Delhi have developed the concept of women's 
arbitration courts ('mahila panchayats'), an 
alternative women-centred justice sys- tem 
providing marital arbitration and in- formal 
dispute settlement services to couples [Grover 
2006]. These women's courts have been devised by 
lower caste activist women specifically to 
replace urban caste ('biradri') panchayats, which 
are no- torious for meting out social boycotts, 
fines and punishments. Women's arbitration courts 
give personalised attention to women's grievances 
and assist couples facing severe opposition from 
their fami- lies. Caste panchayats in Delhi have 
lost their efficacy as women and young couples 
instead approach women's courts and other human 
rights organisations about marriage and 
family-related matters.

Inadequacies of the Law

Chowdhry presents startling insights into how 
state intervention into runaway mar- riages not 
only delegitimises but also criminalises 
individuals who choose un- conventional alliances 
(2007: 174). Rather than affording couples legal 
protection in accordance with the Special 
Marriage Act, the state unequivocally impedes the 
efforts of eloping couples, displaying a strong 
adherence to patriarchal values and no- tions of 
honour. The state enters the frame when, 
following an elopement, the girl's parents file a 
criminal complaint against the boy/her husband 
alleging abduction, kidnapping or rape. From the 
moment such a complaint is filed (p 173) the 
couple become state fugitives and are persecuted 
and hunted from place to place, the police 
issuing posters with photographs in daily 
newspapers with captions such as "Search for 
kidnapped girl" (and kidnapper). If caught, the 
boy is usually imprisoned, and if the case is 
brought before the courts, the focus shifts 
towards the scrutiny of the age of the girl in 
order to ascertain the legal status of the 
marriage. That couples may have acquired an 
appropriate marriage certificate is not a salient 
factor in legal proceedings. Upholding the 
colonial ide- ology and legacy of male 
guardianship, if a girl is below the age of 18 
and has chosen her own marriage her choice is 
overruled by the courts. Yet if her male guardian 
arranges her marriage, irrespective of her age, 
the marriage is deemed valid. The outcome of many 
court cases covering runaway couples is that the 
girl is pressurised by her family to label her 
husband a kidnapper while she herself is either 
eliminated or promptly married off. Even in the 
few cases of verdicts sympathetic to the couple 
the law has often been unable to safeguard the 
girl from violence by her natal kin in the 
aftermath of a court verdict.  The final chapters 
illustrate Haryana's changing political economy, 
marked by political democratisation and a 
liberalised economy, new laws which allow women 
to inherit property and the economic advancement 
and upward mobility of the lower castes, all of 
which engender much anxiety among upper-caste 
groups. An inter-caste marriage constitutes a 
major threat to the resources, unity, strength 
and structural position of a caste in the local 
hierarchy. In this regard, one of Chowdhry's main 
contributions is that she shows how caste and 
class divisions are being altered, redefined and 
contested in a society in rapid flux. Too often 
these emerging challenges are resolved through 
the use of violence at the family and community 
level and are framed and legitimised by 
discourses of culture and tradition. It is a 
compelling paradox that many families themselves 
subvert traditional got prohibitions in response 
to a very constrictive marriage market that is 
tied to escalating dowry demands, an adverse sex 
ratio and high male unemployment. The book's 
epilogue reflects on the underlying nature of the 
intolerance of inter-caste love marriages; 
despite the advent of modern egalitarian laws the 
perpetuation of caste through endogamous 
marriages remains the norm, endorsed by both the 
state and the local population. A more informed 
debate based on comparative ethnography examining 
how families, communities and caste groups are 
contesting and incorpo- rating inter-caste 
marriages can clarify further whether these very 
serious transgressions in the north have 
parallels elsewhere in India. In the bigger 
picture, the Indian women's movement has much to 
gain from Chowdhry's book, which provides the 
necessary stimulus for activists who need to 
urgently address the fundamental theme of women's 
(and men's) right to choose if, who and when to 
marry.

Email: drshalinigrover at yahoo.co.uk

References

Chowdhry, Prem (1994): The Veiled Women: 
Shifting Gender Equations in Rural Haryana, 
1880-1990, Oxford University Press, Delhi.

- (1997): 'Enforcing Cultural Codes: Gender and 
Violence in North India', Economic and Political 
Weekly, 32 (19), pp 1919-28. 

- (2004a): 'Caste Panchayats and the Policing of 
Marriage in Haryana: Enforcing Kinship and 
Territorial Exogamy', Contributions to Indian 
Sociology (ns), January-August, 38 (1-2), pp 1-42.

- (2004b): 'Private Lives, State Intervention: 
Cases of Runaway Marriages in Rural North India', 
Modern Asian Studies, 38 (1), pp 55-84. 

Grover, Shalini (2006): 'Poor Women's Experiences 
of Marriage and Love in the City of New Delhi: 
Everyday Stories of Sukh aur Dukh', unpublished 
DPhil thesis, University

______


[9] ANNOUNCEMENTS:

AFZAL GURU MEETING 27 JUNE HOUSE OF COMMONS

John McDonnell MP(Chair)
Adnan Siddiqui (Cageprisoners),
Amrit Wilson (South Asia Solidarity Group)
Fahad Ansari (Islamic Human Rights Commission)

Wednesday 27 June 7.00pm
House of Commons
Thatcher Room, Portcullis House, Parliamentary Offices
Bridge Street, London SW1A 2LW (tube: Westminster)

Afzal Guru is a Kashmiri currently detained in 
India's notorious Tihar jail and facing a death 
sentence. He is accused of involvement in the 
attack on the Indian Parliament five years ago. 
He  faces hanging although:
* There is no direct evidence against him and he 
is known not to have injured or harmed anyone
* The Courts have found that the investigating 
agencies deliberately fabricated evidence and 
forged documents against him and others accused
* Afzal Guru was denied an opportunity to defend 
himself - he did not even have a lawyer
* He was convicted and sentenced under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which was 
repealed by the Indian Government in September 
2004 on the grounds that it had been misused and 
falls considerably short of fair trial standards.
Afzal was due to be hanged on October 20, 2006, 
however, a stay on his execution was obtained 
through a mercy petition to the Indian President. 
He is still waiting to hear whether the President 
will exercise his constitutional powers and grant 
him a reprieve. 

Afzal  Guru was involved with the JKLF for only 
three months in 1990 when large numbers of 
Kashmiri youth were attracted to the movement. 
During these three months he neither received any 
training nor took part in any activities. After 
he surrendered he was constantly picked up by 
security forces, asked to spy on people and also 
routinely tortured.  He eventually decided to 
move to Delhi hoping to be left alone but even 
here the notorious Special Task Force caught up 
with him and continued to harass him.

The attack on the Indian parliament
The Indian parliament was attacked by five men on 
December 13 2001. They were killed by the 
security forces, but even today their identity 
remains a mystery. Three other men, who according 
to the police masterminded the attack, have also 
not been found. However, on 14 and 15 December 
2001, the investigating agencies together with 
the Special Cell of the Delhi Police picked up 
four persons, all Kashmiris, and charged them 
with the offence of conspiring to attack the 
parliament under India's notorious Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (POTA). 
After a nationwide campaign for a fair trial, two 
of them, Syed Abdul Rahman Geelani and Navjot 
Sandhu, who was jailed along with her newborn 
baby, have been acquitted of all charges, a 
third, the husband of Navjot Sandhu, has had his 
death sentence converted to ten years in prison.
But the fourth, Afzal Guru, who did not even have 
a lawyer was sentenced to death. The Indian 
Supreme Court ruled that although he was not 
involved in the actual attack on the Indian 
parliament, did not kill or injure anybody and 
although there was no direct evidence against 
him, only circumstantial.   "the collective 
conscience of the society will be satisfied if 
the capital punishment is awarded to the 
offender... The appellant, who is a surrendered 
militant ...   is a menace to society and should 
become extinct." 

Abu Ghraib Style Torture: In the Special Cell of 
the Delhi police Afzal was kept naked for two 
days and beaten mercilessly - once by a man who 
later appeared as a prosecution witness; police 
officers urinated in his mouth saying 'This is 
the way you can break your Roza(fast)'.

Trial by Media: After he was tortured he was 
handcuffed and made to sit on a chair and forced 
to 'confess' at a media conference. But 
television broadcasts did not show the handcuffs 
and did not show the men who tortured and 
humiliated him. On the 15 and 16 of December 
2006, New Delhi Television (NDTV) re-ran the 
'confession' several times although they had been 
informed that by now that the Supreme Court of 
India had rejected it and the High Court had 
reprimanded the police for it. The programme then 
invited viewers to act as a virtual lynch mob by 
soliciting SMS messages from them asking whether 
Afzal should be hanged in light of the tape 
telecast by them. Right-wing Hindu chauvinist 
forces of the Sangh Parivar have continually 
harassed members of the India-wide campaign to 
save Afzal Guru while calling for Afzal to be 
hanged.

Afzal is being held in the notorious Tihar prison 
in Delhi. He is being denied basic rights in 
prison - he is not allowed to go out of doors for 
even half an hour of sunlight and the Red Cross 
who have access to Kashmiri prisoners have not 
been allowed to visit him.
A campaign across India and in the UK has urged 
the Indian President to intervene and exercise 
his constitutional powers to grant Afzal a 
reprieve.

Further details from www.saveafzalguru.org or 07814 983105


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Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
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