SACW | June 13-14, 2007

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | June 13-14, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2418 - Year 9

[This issue of SACW is dedicated to remember 
Ramachandra Gandhi the writer, philosopher and 
humanist. Ramu Gandhi died on the 13th of June 
2007 in New Delhi. He had for long while 
encouraged and supported information sharing via 
SACW dispatches]

[1]  Sri Lanka:
    (i) A war strange as fiction (The Economist)
    (ii) Letter by Chairperson, International 
Independent Group of Eminent Persons (P.N. 
Bhagwati)
[2]  Bangladesh: Father Homrich Battles Logging. 
. .; Murder of an Activist (Yaroslav Trofimov)
[3]  Support Pakistan's secular movement  (Beena Sarwar)
[4]  India / Kashmir: Response to the EU 'Report on Kashmir' (JKCCS)
[5]  India - Assam: Never A Moment To Breathe Easy (Sanjib Baruah)
[6]  India: Witch-hunt among Santhals - A letter to EPW (Daya Varma)
[7]  Announcements:
   (i) Call for submission to The Daily Star 
non-fiction anthology (deadline, July 31, 2007)
   (ii) National Consultation on The Communal 
Violence Bill, 2005 (New Delhi, 16 June 2007)
   (iii) Encounter Killings National Seminar (Bombay, 26 June 2007)

______


[1]

(i)

The Economist
Jun 7th 2007

Sri Lanka: A war strange as fiction

BATTICALOA, COLOMBO AND JAFFNA

An opportunistic president and a dyed-in-the-wool 
rebel appear to have ended Sri Lanka's best-ever 
hope for peace
AFP

SITTING in a refugee camp outside Batticaloa, in 
eastern Sri Lanka, Radikhela, a skinny 
21-year-old in a pink pinafore, softly describes 
how her father died. He had his hands cut off, 
his belly sliced open, and then was beaten in the 
dust until he expired. His crime was to have been 
forced into skivvying for Sri Lanka's rebels, a 
ruthless guerrilla army and suicide cult known as 
the Tamil Tigers. His killers were from another 
Tamil militant group, in the pay of Sri Lanka's 
democratically elected government. Radikhela 
knows this: her 13-year-old brother was forced to 
watch the murder, then join the murderers.

More typically, however, the refugees-of whom 
there are over 100,000 near Batticaloa-describe a 
less savage sort of warfare. They heard artillery 
shells exploding near their villages, and they 
ran. Sometimes the army, which, like the 
government, is almost entirely composed of 
Buddhist Sinhalese, a bullying majority, told 
them the bombardment was coming. At any rate, in 
nine months of almost constant artillery barrage, 
mostly by the army, which has depopulated much of 
Sri Lanka's formerly Tiger-held east, the 
shelling has killed only around 100 civilians.

As the refugees speak, crowding together on the 
blistering sand or under wilting plastic 
sheeting, a periodic ground-muffled boom 
resounds. From the roads and villages that it 
controls, every few minutes, the government is 
shelling the green jungle beyond.

The Conradian imagery is appropriate. There is 
something strange about Sri Lanka's 24-year 
ethnic war, a mismatch of high and low intensity, 
of first world and third, that almost savours of 
fiction. Horrors like that visited upon Radikhela 
and her family should not be happening in Sri 
Lanka. With an income per head of $1,350, almost 
twice India's, it is a bright star of South Asian 
development. Its economy grew by an average of 5% 
during the 1990s, even as the war raged. It grew 
by around 7% last year, when the war was 
re-ignited after an unprecedented three-year 
pause. And this growth also came despite the 
devastating tsunami of December 2004, in which 
35,000 Sri Lankans died.

What is more, Sri Lanka is an unusually 
delightful war-torn country. Half a million 
tourists last year are a sign of that. It has 
well-watered hills, rolling green tea estates and 
miles of palm-fringed white sands. Sri Lanka's 
almost wholly literate inhabitants, 75% of them 
Sinhalese and 12% Sri Lankan Tamils, share an 
understandable pride in their island. Away from 
the war zone-despite a history of pogroms and 
other discrimination against the minority 
group-they seem to rub along reasonably well.

In fact, almost half of Colombo, the island's 
seaside capital of a million people, is Tamil or 
Tamil-speaking Muslim. More Tamils live peaceably 
in government-controlled areas than in the 
north-eastern enclave held by the rebels, whose 
full name is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). In the way of ambitious minorities, these 
Tamils thrive in business, as do Sri Lanka's 
Muslims.

Meanwhile an ugly war that has claimed over 
70,000 lives flickers and, as currently, flares. 
Last year, according to official figures, more 
people died violently in Sri Lanka than in 
Afghanistan. In the past 18 months over 5,000 
have been killed, compared with fewer than 200 in 
the previous three years. Sri Lankan pundits are 
calling this violence "Eelam War IV": the fourth 
round in the struggle for an Eelam, or 
independent Tamil homeland. A ceasefire, brokered 
by Norway in 2002, is officially still in place. 
Yet government and Tigers are both preparing for 
bigger battles. A peaceful resolution to Sri 
Lanka's conflict may never have looked less 
possible.

As the shells rained around Batticaloa on June 
2nd, the Tigers launched a fierce night attack 
along the front line near Omanthai, south of 
their northern fief. The Tigers say they killed 
30 soldiers. The army says it killed 52 Tigers, 
including many of the child fighters that their 
leader, a tyrannical hermit called Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, prefers. Both sides are prone to 
lie. But on June 5th the Tigers handed over 13 
army corpses to the Red Cross.
Strategies of terror

Yet many, perhaps most, of the war's victims did 
not fall in pitched battle. Guerrilla and 
terrorist attacks by the Tigers have cost 
hundreds of soldier and civilian lives. On May 
28th seven soldiers and civilians were killed, 
and dozens wounded, by a Tiger roadside bomb in 
Colombo. On May 24th the Tigers claimed to have 
killed 32 sailors in an attack by their naval 
wing, the Sea Tigers, on an island off the 
isolated government-held Jaffna peninsula.

The government of President Maninda Rajapakse 
also uses terrorism. More than 300 Tamil 
civilians, including many with family links to 
the Tigers, have been murdered in Jaffna alone. 
Armed members of a Tamil political party, the 
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), allegedly 
with close ties to army spies, have been accused 
of some of these killings.

In Jaffna, M.V. Kanamylnathan, editor of the 
leading Uthayan newspaper, has decorated his 
office walls with photographs of the bloodied 
corpses of his journalists. Last year, on Press 
Freedom Day as it happened, two of his staff were 
shot dead at their computers by masked men.

After the Tiger attack near Omanthai, on June 
5th, the army chief, Lieut-General Sarath 
Fonseka, said it was time for a new ceasefire. If 
he meant it, this would be a big strategic shift 
by the government. Earlier this year, after a 
visit to Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site, Sri 
Dalada Maligawa, General Fonseka promised to 
"annihilate" the Tigers.

Alas, there are reasons to doubt the general's 
change of heart. His comment this week looked 
suspiciously well-timed to coincide with a visit 
from Yasushi Akashi, a so-called "peace envoy" 
from Japan, Sri Lanka's biggest aid donor. 
Moreover, when the government has experienced 
setbacks, it tends to tone down its pugnacity. It 
did so after a disastrous attack launched from 
Jaffna last October, in which independent reports 
suggest that around 200 soldiers were killed and 
six tanks (nearly half of the army's total) were 
captured, with not a yard gained.

In an interview last week, General Fonseka seemed 
uncertain what strategy the government was 
pursuing. Asked if he would continue attacking 
the Tigers in the north, he said: "We don't have 
anything on the drawing-board...there will be a 
political solution, there will be peace talks." 
Yet at the same time, "A political solution can 
never come while the LTTE is strong."

In the east the army now holds more ground than 
it has for a decade. With 25,000 soldiers around 
Batticaloa, it is trying to drive an estimated 
500 Tigers from their last two eastern hideouts, 
in thick jungle to the north-west and south-west 
of the town. General Fonseka says this will be 
done within two weeks. Yet whether the army can 
retain its ground as the refugees return, with 
Tigers hiding among them, is uncertain. Either 
way, it would be wrong to call this campaign a 
military triumph. It owes more to the defection 
in 2004 of the Tigers' eastern commander, 
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, who is known as 
Colonel Karuna.

Compliant in the way of other militias, Colonel 
Karuna demobilised 5,000-6,000 Tiger fighters 
ahead of the army's advance. He has since 
recruited a fresh militia, including, says the 
UN, over 200 children. This mob, which itself 
split last month, is being used by the government 
in time-honoured fashion: for intelligence, to 
rile the Tigers and to murder its opponents. The 
government, of course, denies this.

The north is a different case. As Colonel 
Karuna's defection suggests, the Tigers' grip on 
the east was always loose. The eastern population 
includes many Muslims and Sinhalese, and eastern 
Tamils consider themselves different from-and 
speak a different dialect to-the Jaffna Tamils 
who dominate the Tigers. In the north, however, 
Mr Prabhakaran runs a de facto state, with its 
own police force, justice system and tax regime. 
Penetrating the minefields and fortified trenches 
that encircle it, as the army has several times 
tried, would be bloody and perhaps impossible. 
Indeed, the Tigers' attack near Omanthai was 
retaliation for the army's latest half-dozen 
failed attempts. The government denies it; but a 
joint Norwegian-Icelandic monitoring mission says 
that around 200 soldiers were involved in each of 
these attacks, which were also near Omanthai. Up 
to a third of them were killed.

Ships and boats and planes

This is another oddity of Sri Lanka's war: the 
many-times proven ability of 10,000 self-trained 
guerrillas to defeat the government's 250,000 
armed forces in conventional battles. A 
shimmering example of this is the Tigers' latest 
weapons system: a fleet of ten light aircraft, 
imported in pieces during the ceasefire and 
unveiled in two recent bombing raids on Colombo. 
One night in April, as the capital's air defences 
blazed wildly into the night sky, the flying 
Tigers dropped bombs on a gas installation and an 
air force base. The Czech-made planes are 
believed to have a top speed of 260kph. To shoot 
them down, the government is negotiating to buy 
five Russian MIG-29s, capable of a speed of 
2,400kph. A top official suggested it would do 
better to buy a couple of second-world-war 
British Spitfires.

A main reason for the Tigers' success is their 
support base: a loyal and prosperous Tamil 
diaspora in America, Canada, Britain and 
Australia. Around 700,000 refugees from the 
current conflict are among them. The Tigers tax 
these exiles. Involvement in criminal schemes, 
notably credit-card fraud, also provides cash to 
buy arms. To bring in the guns, bought from 
South-East Asian arms dealers, the group has a 
merchant fleet of ten ocean-going vessels. In 
recent months the government claims to have sunk 
three of these ships, laden with guns bought in 
Indonesia. It seems, however, that these were 
different vessels, chartered for the task.

Whatever General Fonseka is planning, a military 
end to the war looks impossible. A pity, then, 
that Mr Rajapakse looks so incapable of 
peacemaking. He won election in November 2005 in 
part by promising the Sinhalese masses a less 
conciliatory approach to the Tigers than that 
shown by his opponent, Ranil Wickremesinghe, a 
former prime minister. By agreeing to a 
ceasefire, which recognised the Tigers' control 
of the north, Mr Wickremesinghe had riled many 
Sinhalese nationalists.

Those nationalists-led by a bigoted Buddhist 
clergy, whose small but shrill political party 
shares power with Mr Rajapakse's Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party-considered the ceasefire a 
precursor to splitting the country. Since in 
their view the Sinhalese are the sole owners of 
Sri Lanka, and all minorities are alien to it, 
this was unacceptable. Though the monks' 
orange-robed parliamentary leader, the Venerable 
Athuraliye Rathana, wants peace for most sentient 
beings, Tamil rebels are clearly excluded. "Day 
by day we are weakening them with our military 
force," he says. "Talk can come later."
AFP Rajapakse surveys the troops

The second secret to Mr Rajapakse's election was 
that, at the Tigers' command, north-eastern 
Tamils did not vote. Had they done so, most would 
have plumped for Mr Wickremesinghe, whose 
peacemaking delivered freedoms to travel and 
trade that they had not enjoyed in decades. This 
had represented a challenge to Mr Prabhakaran. 
Autocratic to his fingertips, incapable of 
sharing power even with trusted deputies such as 
Colonel Karuna, he wanted out of the peace 
process.

Mr Prabhakaran declared the election a Sinhalese 
affair, not for independence-seeking Tamils. A 
Sinhalese-chauvinist government suits Mr 
Prabhakaran, helping bolster Tamil support for 
the Tigers. Recent reports have even suggested 
that he struck a secret deal with the 
opportunistic Mr Rajapakse. In return for, in 
effect, delivering Mr Rajapakse to power, Mr 
Prabhakaran was promised cash, Colonel Karuna in 
chains and recognition of the Tigers' control of 
the east. Yet no sooner was Mr Rajapakse elected 
than both sides were shelling and murdering each 
other. Within six months, the war was back on.

Or rather, it had reverted to a different phase 
of what many Sri Lankans see as an endless cycle. 
On the government side, Mr Rajapakse's pledge to 
get tough on the Tigers has been heard from 
previous Sinhalese populists. Among southern 
Sinhalese this message is effective. In their 
pretty fishing villages and state-subsidised 
paddy-fields, most are too removed from the war 
to feel much urgency to end it. According to a 
poll in February by the Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, a Sri Lankan think-tank, 59% of 
Sinhalese wanted a "military solution" to the 
conflict. Mr Wickremesinghe's predecessor, 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, had also tried 
to please this majority. She waged a policy of 
"war for peace" against the Tigers-as 
unsuccessful as it was illogical.

But Mr Rajapakse has plunged further into the 
past. Though the Tigers demand independence for 
the north-east, most Tamils would settle for a 
decent measure of autonomy. At the last round of 
peace talks, in Oslo in 2004, even the Tigers 
seemed to accept this; they issued a demand for 
"internal self-determination". Mr Rajapakse, 
however, has proposed as his solution a modest 
devolution at the village level. This idea, 
modelled on India's system of Panchayats, was 
aired, and discredited, in the early 1980s.
What Tamils want

It is hard to exaggerate how inadequate, and 
depressing, most Tamils considered this. Yet Mr 
Rajapakse perhaps need not care. He remains 
popular, and not only for waging war. Mr 
Wickremesinghe made himself unpopular by 
introducing liberal economic reforms. By cutting 
a ruinous subsidy on paddy fertiliser, for 
example, he lost the votes of many peasant 
farmers. Among other populist measures, Mr 
Rajapakse has restored the subsidy. He has also 
tightened his grip in even less admirable ways.

Wary of political allies, Mr Rajapakse has 
appointed his three brothers to run important 
ministries. He has nabbed the ministries of 
finance, defence and public works for himself. 
Together, the brothers Rajapakse control over 70% 
of Sri Lanka's budget. The defence budget, which 
was increased by 40% this year, is being overseen 
by the unelected Gotabhaya Rajapakse. A former 
fire-eating army officer who spent 17 years in 
America, at one time managing a 7-Eleven store, 
Mr Rajapakse has proved as bellicose as Mr 
Prabhakaran and General Fonseka combined.

The government's profligacy and misrule is taking 
a toll. To sustain public expenditure, the 
governor of the central bank, another crony of Mr 
Rajapakse, has printed lots of new money. This 
has helped drive inflation to around 15%. 
Collapsing tourist revenues after the Tigers' 
blitz on Colombo augur more economic damage. Yet 
Mr Rajapakse may gamble that, with annual 
remittances of $2.5 billion from Sri Lankans 
working in the Middle East, the economy can ride 
this out. And he would probably be right.

All of which is good news for the appalling Mr 
Prabhakaran. Justified by the war, he has 
re-mobilised the north-east, demanding up to two 
child fighters from each family. War has also 
increased his opportunities to throttle dissent. 
Given little to hope for by the government, even 
Tamil moderates, who have no reason to love Mr 
Prabhakaran, are more likely to support, or at 
least suffer, him. "The Sinhalese authorities are 
not willing to talk to moderates," says Suresh 
Premachandran, a parliamentary member of the 
Tamil National Alliance, who has several times 
escaped assassination attempts by the Tigers. 
"They only understand the LTTE."

What could break the cycle? It is rather hard to 
imagine. As in other ethnic conflicts, from 
Palestine to Northern Ireland, the solution to 
Sri Lanka's conflict seems obvious. Tamils 
require an end to the discrimination that has 
virtually barred them from holding jobs in the 
army and police. After so long a struggle, they 
also require a fair apportioning of power to a 
united north-eastern province. Nothing less will 
bind them to Sri Lanka and diminish Mr 
Prabhakaran's brutish hold over them.

For their part, the Sinhalese need to understand 
that this is so. Mr Wickremesinghe, an 
uncharismatic sort, had the right vision but 
failed to sell it. If Mr Rajapakse were wiser 
than he is, he might have done better. But the 
current prospects for rallying the Sinhalese 
behind an accommodation with the Tigers appear 
little better than hopeless.

Supposing Mr Rajapakse even wanted this, he would 
need to shed his nationalist allies and seek an 
alliance with Mr Wickremesinghe's United National 
Party (UNP)-though the UNP, a score of whose MPs 
Mr Rajapakse has co-opted into his coalition, 
would probably have none of this. If Sri Lanka is 
to have peace, it may not be under Mr Rajapakse. 
And it may not be soon, with no general election 
due in Sri Lanka until 2010.

o o o

(ii) LETTER BY CHAIRPERSON, INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

On 1 June 2007, we, the International Independent 
Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), submitted our 
first Interim Report to the President of Sri 
Lanka. The report contains our observations and 
concerns about the President's Commission of 
Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged 
Serious Violations of Human Rights (the 
Commission).

We reported to the President that the Commission 
has so far made hardly any noticeable progress in 
investigations and inquiries since its inception 
in November 2006. Moreover, since our formation 
in February 2007, we have identified and raised a 
number of concerns with the Commission and the 
Government of Sri Lanka. We remain concerned that 
current measures taken by the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the Commission to address issues such 
as the independence of the Commission, timeliness 
and witness protection are not adequate and do 
not satisfy international norms and standards.

Independence: We are concerned about the role of 
the Attorney General's Department as legal 
counsel to the Commission. The Attorney General's 
Department is the Chief Legal Adviser to the 
Government of Sri Lanka. Members of the Attorney 
General's Department have been involved in the 
original investigations into those cases subject 
to further investigation by the Commission 
itself. As such, members of the Attorney 
General's Department may find that they are 
investigating themselves. Furthermore, it is 
possible that they be called as material 
witnesses before the Commission. We consider 
these to be serious conflicts of interest, which 
lack transparency and compromise national and 
international standards of independence and 
impartiality that are central to the credibility 
and public confidence of the Commission.

We are concerned that the Commission's finances 
are managed by the Presidential Secretariat. The 
Commission does not have financial independence 
enabling it to exercise control of its human 
resources and operations. In particular, the 
Commission should be allocated sufficient funds 
to secure the permanent confidentiality, safety 
and integrity of its victim and witness 
protection scheme.
Timeliness: We are concerned that the Commission 
did not commence even preliminary investigations 
and inquiries until May 2007, despite being 
constituted six months earlier in November 2006. 
To date, internal processes have not been 
transparent; no detailed work plan has been 
announced; essential staff have not yet been 
fully recruited; investigative and witness 
protection units are not functioning; and 
significantly, evidence already known to be in 
the possession of Governmental bodies relating to 
the cases has not been gathered and transmitted 
to us. Such unnecessary delays undermine public 
confidence in the ability of the Commission to 
carry out its mandate in a timely manner.

Witness protection: We are concerned that there 
are no adequate victim and witness protection 
provisions under Sri Lankan law. We are of the 
view that witness protection is absolutely 
essential in order to investigate serious 
violations of human rights that are within the 
Commission's mandate. Appropriate legislation 
that accords with international norms and 
standards should be enacted and implemented as 
soon as possible to protect victims and witnesses.

We regret that the Commission still has no 
functioning victim and witness protection 
mechanism. In the absence of appropriate 
legislation, an effective scheme or functioning 
protection unit, we fail to understand how the 
Commission could have invited the public, as it 
did as recently as 14 May 2007, to come forward 
and give evidence. As the Commission is operating 
without witness protection legislation, it is 
unable to guarantee the safety and security of 
witnesses. Summoning and examining potential 
victims and witnesses may create fear in their 
minds about safety and security, deterring them 
from coming forward to give evidence.

Mandates: The Presidential Warrant limits the 
scope of the Commission to a retrospective and 
fact finding role. The core work of the 
Commission is to obtain information, investigate 
and inquire into alleged serious violations of 
human rights arising since 1 August 2005, 
including 16 specific cases; and to examine prior 
investigations into these cases. The Commission 
is required to make findings and report to the 
President on the facts and circumstances 
pertaining to each case; the descriptions, nature 
and backgrounds of the victims; the circumstances 
that may have led to, or resulted in, those 
persons suffering such deaths, injury or physical 
harm; the identities, descriptions and 
backgrounds of the persons and groups responsible 
for the commission of deaths and other acts; 
measures of reparation to be provided to the 
victims; and recommendations in order to prevent 
the occurrence of incidents in the nature of 
those investigated and any other recommendations 
considered as relevant.
The IIGEP, comprising of 11 Members, has been 
invited by the President to observe the 
investigations and inquiries of the Commission, 
in order to ensure transparency and observance of 
international norms and standards. The IIGEP does 
not have a mandate to conduct independent 
investigations and inquiries; nevertheless, we 
are open to all persons who wish to provide 
information and evidence on the cases under 
review by the Commission. Although we are obliged 
by the Presidential Invitation to transmit third 
party information to the Commission, it would not 
be right for us to disclose any information 
without the consent of the third party, or which 
may impair the safety or security of such third 
parties until we are satisfied that effective, 
functioning and credible witness protection 
measures are in place.

We regret that public statements from State 
officials are creating the misleading impression 
that the Commission and IIGEP have wide mandates 
and powers and the resources to address ongoing 
alleged human rights violations in Sri Lanka. 
This is not the case. In the current context, in 
particular, the apparent renewed systematic 
practice of enforced disappearance and the 
killings of Red Cross workers, it is critical 
that the Commission and IIGEP not be portrayed as 
a substitute for robust, effective measures 
including national and international human rights 
monitoring.

P N Bhagwati
Chairman, IIGEP

______


[2]

Wall Street Journal
13 June 2007

MAN ON A MISSION
In a Bangladesh Forest, Priest Fights for Tiny Tribe
Father Homrich Battles Logging and Old Age; Murder of an Activist

by Yaroslav Trofimov

PIRGACHA, Bangladesh -- A half-century ago, the 
Rev. Eugene Homrich set up a Catholic mission 
among a tiny pagan tribe clinging to a tropical 
forest.

He is still here. As a result, perhaps, so are 
the Garos, a predominantly farming people whose 
sari-clad women own the family land and pass on 
the family name.

A native of Muskegon, Mich., Father Homrich has 
founded schools and built clinics for the Garos, 
most of whom have converted to Christianity. 
Once, he personally delivered a baby on the back 
of his motorcycle. During Bangladesh's bloody 
civil war in 1971, he stockpiled explosives in 
his mission and narrowly avoided execution. Now, 
Father Homrich is confronting the country's 
forestry department to stem illegal logging of 
the Modhupur forest, the Garos' ancestral 
homeland.
[Father Homrich at mass]
Yaroslav Trofimov
Father Homrich says Mass at the mission. Most 
Garo are Christian, which makes them subject to 
discrimination in the largely Muslim nation.

To the chagrin of the local administration, the 
blunt, portly American has become the de facto 
leader of some 20,000 tribe members. "If it 
weren't for the father we'd be in a sea of 
trouble," says Simon Marak, a Garo community 
activist. "By his grace we're living here."

But there is only so much Father Homrich can 
still do for the Garos. He is turning 79 this 
year, and recently spent several months in the 
U.S. for medical treatment. He can be expelled 
from the country at any time. And despite his 
efforts, the Modhupur forest has shrunk through 
logging and development to some 23,000 square 
miles, one-tenth its size in the 1950s.

As the country's population keeps soaring, 
conflict between the Garos and land-hungry 
outsiders intensifies. The world's third-largest 
Muslim nation, Bangladesh packs 150 million 
people, about half the population of the U.S., 
into an Iowa-sized territory.

In recent years, more than a dozen tribe members 
have been killed by forestry officers and 
soldiers because of land disputes, say Garo 
leaders and human-rights groups in Bangladesh's 
capital, Dhaka. In March, the Garos say a 
prominent tribal activist, Cholesh Ritchil, was 
tortured to death while in army custody, an 
incident that sparked a wave of outrage in 
Bangladesh and prompted protests from Western 
embassies.

Shaken by the killing, Father Homrich says it's 
only a matter of time before the Garos' unique 
culture disappears from Modhupur. "The future for 
them is in the city, or in India. There is no 
future here in the jungle," he said last month at 
the Pirgacha mission, a neat compound shaded by 
jackfruit and mango trees. "Anyway, there is no 
jungle left."

But a few hours later, as he shuffles through 
photos of Mr. Ritchil's cadaver, the priest's 
fire ignites. "I'll keep going," he vowed. "We'll 
get their ass."

Father Homrich's path to rural Bangladesh began 
in a classroom in Muskegon during World War II. 
One of six siblings born to a factory worker, 
Father Homrich was fascinated by tales of 
Catholic missionaries who often visited his 
primary school. He prepared for missionary work 
at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana and at 
the Holy Cross College in Washington, D.C. The 
Holy Cross, a Catholic congregation, had one 
mission abroad at the time, in what is now 
Bangladesh.

Tropical Agriculture

The young priest arrived here in 1956, equipped 
with knowledge of the Bengali language and 
tropical agriculture. The country was still part 
of Pakistan, its population less than one-third 
of today's level. Since ethnic Bengalis usually 
follow Islam or the Hindu religion, Christian 
missionaries sought new converts in outlying 
tribal areas populated by non-Bengali minorities. 
The Modhupur forest was one of the closest such 
areas, a half day's drive by car from Dhaka.
[Eugene Homrich]

In the late 1950s, the forest still teemed with 
monkeys, deer and leopards. Some 25,000 Garo 
people made their home here, in an enclave 
separated from South Asia's larger community of 
Garos -- people ethnically and linguistically 
related to Tibetans and Burmese, and concentrated 
in India's Meghalaya state. Moving to the 
Modhupur forest alone, Father Homrich established 
a new mission deep in the jungle.

Most of the Garos whom Father Homrich encountered 
followed animist cults, sacrificing chickens and 
goats to shrines of multiple gods. Living in 
small huts in clearings, they followed 
slash-and-burn agriculture on a rotation that 
anthropologists say gave the forest time to 
recover.

He was immediately won over by the Garos' serene 
demeanor. "These are wonderful people," he says, 
as smiling tribal women in colorful saris sweep 
leaves from the mission's garden. "They have an 
inner peace that is amazing in this messy 
country. They live in the eye of God."

The jungle was a deadly place at the time. 
Malaria, scabies, intestinal parasites and a 
lethal black fever, known in the West as visceral 
leishmaniasis, claimed lives almost daily. Father 
Homrich taught villagers to dig wells and set up 
separate outhouses, and provided rudimentary 
medical services at a mission clinic.

The American priest was also accepted as a member 
of the tribe soon after arrival, and became 
intimately involved in running the tribal affairs.

The peace was shattered in March 1971, when the 
country sought independence from Pakistan. 
Pakistani troops assisted by Islamist militias 
responded with a bloody crackdown, and most 
ethnic Bengali soldiers deserted. On an April 
morning, Father Homrich woke up to find two 
Indian army officers sipping tea on his porch. 
India, as an enemy of Pakistan, supported 
Bangladesh's independence bid. The officers had 
come to help organize the local insurgency.

Father Homrich embraced the guerrillas, 
stockpiling India-supplied arms and explosives at 
the mission. The Pakistanis shelled his mission 
with mortars, and Father Homrich and 32 Garo 
leaders were taken to a military encampment. 
There, the group was told they would be executed 
for aiding the insurgents, say Father Homrich and 
Garo villagers.
Father Homrich, a U.S. citizen, discusses the 
accomplishments of his 52 years helping and 
living with the Garo tribe in Bangladesh.

Aware that the Pakistani army was trained and 
supported by the U.S., Father Homrich asked the 
local Pakistani commander where he had studied. 
"Camden, New Jersey," came the answer. "Would you 
really want this headline in tomorrow's U.S. 
newspapers: American priest executed by 
American-educated Pakistani officer?" Father 
Homrich recalls asking. The officer later ordered 
the detainees to be released.

When the war ended in December 1971, the new 
Bangladeshi state awarded Father Homrich a 
"Freedom Fighter" certificate that he displays 
above his door.

The new country was hard-pressed for land. Waves 
of ethnic Bengalis flocked to the Modhupur area, 
the only unfarmed patch in central Bangladesh. 
The democratically elected administrations and 
military regimes that governed Bangladesh after 
1971 were consistent on one issue: They sought to 
evict the Garos from Modhupur to make room for 
the fast-growing Bengali majority.

At one point, a colonel in charge of Bangladesh's 
Tea Board, a government agency supervising the 
tea-growing industry, arrived at the mission with 
a proposal: All the Garos should be resettled on 
tea plantations elsewhere.

Father Homrich, who had been aware of the idea, 
says he invited some bearded Maoist rebels who 
prowled the region. He knew the rebels from 
treating their family members at the mission 
clinic, open to all comers. "Look behind you -- 
these men have come to cut your head off," he 
recalls telling the colonel. The colonel left. 
The tea plan was never raised again.

Having established himself as a voice for the 
Garo people, Father Homrich became their advocate 
in a larger struggle. In 1984, Bangladesh's 
government declared that most of the land 
inhabited by the Garos was state forest. The 
tribe members, it said, were illegal squatters.

Outside Poachers

The Garos aren't the only ones cutting down the 
forest's valuable sal trees. Forestry officials 
often allow outside poachers to log, and usually 
look the other way when Bengali villagers convert 
forest land into farms, Father Homrich and 
villagers say. "Wherever there is the forest 
department, there is no forest left," quips 
Father Homrich. Yet the government has filed 
thousands of illegal-logging suits against the 
Garos and razed many of their banana and 
pineapple plantations.

Rabindranath Adahkary, the chief local forestry 
official in Modhupur, said in a recent interview 
that there is no corruption in his department. A 
few days later his boss, the forest department's 
national chief, was arrested on corruption 
charges.

Mr. Ritchil, the Garo leader, was one of many 
tribe members wanted by the forestry department. 
On March 18, witnesses say he was picked up by 
the Bangladeshi army at an improvised roadblock 
on his way back from a wedding. He was taken to a 
military camp near Modhupur for interrogation 
about weapons he allegedly owned, according to a 
tribe member who was arrested with him. 
Bangladesh's army enjoys wide-ranging powers of 
arrest and detention after intervening in January 
to abort an election and to put the country under 
emergency rule.

Mr. Ritchil's body was returned to the family the 
following day. According to witnesses and 
photographs, most of it was covered in dark 
bruises. Mr. Ritchil's testicles were cut off and 
his eyes were mutilated. His finger bones were 
snapped, with pliers, says the tribe member who 
says he witnessed the torture. At the time, 
officials said Mr. Ritchil died of a heart attack.

Determined to ensure the killing didn't go 
unnoticed, Father Homrich used a patchy 
mobile-phone connection -- there are no land 
lines in the forest -- to send emails about Mr. 
Ritchil's death, as well as photos of his corpse, 
to Western embassies, journalists and 
human-rights groups.

The emails caused an uproar. Human-rights groups 
sent investigators to Modhupur. The U.S. 
ambassador in Dhaka, Patricia Butenis, raised the 
case directly with senior Bangladeshi military 
commanders, and Bangladesh's government 
established a commission of inquiry into the 
incident. The local army commander and forestry 
officials were transferred out of the region.

The outcry over Mr. Ritchil's death showed the 
formidable influence an American Christian 
missionary exerts in the middle of this 
predominantly Muslim nation -- an influence that 
some ethnic Bengalis resent. Human-rights 
activists and nongovernmental organizations in 
Dhaka, while appreciative of Father Homrich's 
work, point out that in the long run, the Garos' 
association with the Christian religion might 
hurt the tribe's interests.

Here in the forest, the most vocal critic is 
Zakir Hussein, the Modhupur-based chairman of the 
local administration, which governs a territory 
inhabited by most of the area's Garos and some 
45,000 ethnic Bengalis. He says he is frustrated 
that the Garos view the missionary, and not his 
administration, as their authority. "I expect 
Father Homrich to be neutral," says Mr. Hussein, 
a pious Muslim who wears a red-hennaed beard and 
keeps a model of Mecca's Kaaba shrine on his 
desk. "But whenever there is a conflict, he 
always takes a position defending the Garos 
because they are Christian."

Father Homrich points out that Mr. Hussein's 
supporters organized a public celebration when 
Mr. Ritchil was killed in March.

The American missionary is more concerned with 
the attitude of Bangladesh's army-installed 
government, which displays less and less 
tolerance for critics like him. A U.S. citizen, 
Father Homrich must have his visa renewed every 
year. "They will probably kick me out of the 
country," he says.

In the meantime, the priest, who reports to the 
local bishop, wakes at 4:30 a.m. to prepare for 
mass in the mission, which has flush toilets and 
a satellite-TV hookup that lets him keep abreast 
of current events. Unlike the rest of the day, 
when he walks around dressed like a farmer in a 
nondescript T-shirt and khaki shorts, Father 
Homrich wears a prim white cassock as he delivers 
a sermon.

Native Nurses

The mission, supported by donations from 
Christian organizations in the West, now has 24 
primary schools throughout the forest, employing 
45 teachers and producing a literacy rate of some 
85% among the Garos, according to Father Homrich. 
That's well above Bangladesh's national average 
of less than 50%. Improved education and health 
-- what Father Homrich describes as his lasting 
legacy -- have allowed many Garos to find 
relatively well-paid jobs in the capital as 
nurses, beauticians, and, because of their 
reputation for honesty, as household help for 
wealthy families. Dozens of local Garos have even 
gone to college in Dhaka, and the mission's 
clinic is staffed nowadays by five native nurses.

Recently, some of them have had to take care of 
Father Homrich. Two and a half years ago, the 
priest slipped off a ladder while entering a 
nearby pond for a swim, and broke his leg. With 
an open fracture, the leg became infected.

After unsuccessful treatment in a Dhaka hospital, 
Father Homrich was flown to the U.S., where he 
says advanced antibiotics saved his leg and his 
life. He spent seven months recovering, in part 
in a retirement community. With every day, he 
grew desperate to return to the Garos. "I 
couldn't stand to be with old people," Father 
Homrich says. "They live in the past."

Back at Pirgacha, Father Homrich made rounds at 
the mission clinic on a recent day, checking on 
fever-ridden children. Nurses teased him for the 
braces he wears on his leg, suggesting he needs a 
new limb. He complained that he still hasn't 
gotten used to the weather.

All three of Father Homrich's brothers passed 
away this year. He hopes to remain among the 
Garos for the rest of his life. "Here," he says, 
"is a garden of Eden."

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov at wsj.com

______


[3]

SUPPORT PAKISTAN'S SECULAR MOVEMENT

by Beena Sarwar (June 13, 2007)

Given that Washington's enemy number one is 
'Islamic militancy' you would expect America to 
support the emergence of a mass secular movement 
in Pakistan. But what if the movement is pitted 
against the country's president and army chief 
who is Washington's key regional ally in the 'war 
on terror'?

President General Pervez Musharraf's suspension 
of Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry on March 9 on 
charges of misuse of authority unexpectedly 
sparked off widespread agitation.  Further 
unexpectedly, lawyers led the charge, holding 
that Musharraf has no constitutional authority to 
take this action. Braving police batons, arrests 
and tear gas, they have held public 
demonstrations with a one point agenda: reinstate 
the Chief Justice. Lawyers' black coats have 
become a symbol of the struggle between the 
military and the Constitution. They have been 
joined by the major political parties.

Pakistan's military has long called the shots in 
the country's politics, behind doors or openly – 
usually with Washington's support.  Such support 
propped up the previous military dictator 
President General Ziaul Haq in power for over 
eleven years while Pakistan was a front-line 
state in the Afghan war against communism. Zia 
mutilated the Constitution with repressive 
'Islamic' laws. His regime curbed political 
dissent through torture, imprisonment, floggings 
and executions.

Since 9/11, Washington has supported President 
General Pervez Musharraf, who heads Pakistan as a 
front-line state in the 'war on terror'. The 
Pakistani establishment has since made a U-turn 
away from its previous policy of supporting 
'Islamic holy warriors'. Western policy makers 
and 'liberals' see this as necessary in order to 
prevent Pakistan from falling into the arms of 
the 'fundamentalists'.

The 'war on terror' provides the cover for a 
spate of enforced 'disappearances'. Secret 
agencies selectively target journalists and 
political workers. The Pakistan army for the 
first time entered the northern areas bordering 
Afghanistan, in an attempt to crush the ongoing 
process of 'talibanisation'-only to further 
exacerbate it.

Over the last few months, there has been visible 
frustration in Washington at Musharraf's 
perceived ineffectiveness at delivering 'the 
goods' in this war, and media speculation that 
Musharraf may not, after all, be indispensable. 
His withdrawal or removal from power will not 
necessarily deliver Pakistan to the 
'fundamentalists'.

There is some truth in these speculations. 
Pakistanis, contrary to the image built up by the 
politicians and the media, are a pluralistic 
rather than a 'fundamentalist' lot. We have 
traditionally voted for 'secular' or nationalist 
rather than religious, political parties. But 
during the 2002 elections, the Musharraf regime 
prevented the heads of the two major political 
parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, from 
contesting. Into the vacuum jumped the 'religious 
parties'. They joined hands and, buoyed by the 
bombing of Afghanistan, cobbled together 
governments in the two western provinces 
bordering Afghanistan. Even so, they polled no 
more than 13 per cent of the total votes.

The current support for the low-key Chief Justice 
is building into a popular mass movement that has 
nothing to do with religion. This must be 
encouraged, at a juncture that many feel is a 
defining moment in Pakistan's history.
However, rattled by the growing dissent and media 
coverage of the protests, the Musharraf regime is 
resorting to ham-handed and openly repressive 
tactics reminiscent of the Zia era. These include 
blocking the news transmission of some 
independent television channels followed by the 
state broadcasting authority being given powers 
to shut down TV stations. These controls were 
retracted after a week of protests by journalists 
and foreign criticism. Earlier, police smashed 
the Islamabad office of a private television 
channel reporting the lawyers' protests.

On May 12, the administration allowed armed 
workers of a political party allied to the 
government to block Choudhry's arrival in Karachi 
to address the bar association. Almost fifty 
people were killed on 'Black Saturday' but 
Musharraf referred to it as the 'political 
activity of a political party'.

At the end of May, the administration tried to 
prevent a launch in Islamabad of a book exposing 
the military's widespread and entrenched 
financial interests. The author, Dr. Ayesha 
Siddiqa held the event at a non-government 
organization's office after being refused space 
by all the hotels. Her book, Military Inc:, 
Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (Pluto Press, 
U.K., 2007), subsequently disappeared from 
bookstores across the country. Book store owners 
are jittery about disclosing the reasons why.

Pakistan has undergone some positive changes 
during Gen. Musharraf's eight years in power. The 
high economic growth rate is second only to China 
but with high inflation and unemployment rates, 
the gap between rich and poor has increased. The 
US Department of State still asserts that General 
Musharraf has not yet reached the "end of his 
line", but that line, as Islamabad-based 
columnist Farrukh Saleem argues, "now forks out 
either to democracy or repression (no third 
choice)."

The general elections scheduled for later this 
year, if held, will be meaningless if Bhutto and 
Sharif are again prevented from contesting, or if 
Musharraf is removed from the helm of affairs 
only to be replaced by another military general 
running the show.
The struggle for a pluralistic, secular Pakistan 
must be supported and allowed to develop. The 
political process must be allowed to continue, 
and the people of Pakistan allowed to forge their 
own destiny, without interference.

______


[4]    RESPONSE TO THE EU 'REPORT ON KASHMIR (2005/2242(INI)'

Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society
The Bund Amira Kadal, Srinagar - 190001, Jammu and Kashmir
                                                                  

June 12, 2007

Initial Response to the 'Report on Kashmir: 
Present Situation and Future Prospects 
(2005/2242(INI)' as finally adopted by the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of European Parliament 
on May 23, 2007.

Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) 
is an alliance of different civil society groups 
and individuals that engaged a wide spectrum of 
Kashmiri civil society to discuss the European 
Union Report: 'Present Situation and Future 
Prospects (2005/2242(INI)' as finally adopted by 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of European 
Parliament on May 23, 2007.

Following a month-long intense debate, the 
following response was adopted by JKCCS 
(www.jkccs.org) and other participating civil 
society members. This is an initial and brief 
response to the EU report, which will be followed 
by a detailed and comprehensive report from 
Kashmiri civil society.   


1          The description "International 
Terrorism" cannot be used as an approach to any 
understanding of the Kashmir conflict. Armed 
groups in Kashmir come from the former princely 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. Most of those who are 
referred to as "foreign militants" are in fact 
from amongst the state subjects displaced from 
1947 to 1953.
             The so called "foreign terrorists" 
like Afghans, Sudanese etc are those who were 
nurtured by western democracies to fight against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. They have now spread 
across the region and come into other unresolved 
conflicts zones, like Kashmir. The foreign 
element constitutes a miniscule proportion of the 
armed rebels in Kashmir. The indigenous Hizbul 
Mujahideen (HM) has always been by far the single 
largest armed rebel group fighting Indian forces 
in the region.

2          As far as dialogue on Kashmir is 
concerned, it has yielded nothing on the ground. 
The biggest Kashmir-specific "Confidence Building 
Measure" (CBM), the Trans border bus service, has 
been rendered meaningless by administrative 
difficulties. For example, most aspiring 
travelers still have to wait endlessly for a 
response about the travel permit for the bus, let 
alone actually getting permission to travel. This 
"CBM", which was a consequence of the rights’ 
struggle of the people of Kashmir, has become a 
mere symbol. During the two years of its running, 
only a few hundred people have managed to travel 
on the bus.
             For the people of Kashmir the current 
peace process has meant nothing. Principally, 
because there is no acknowledgement whatsoever of 
the peoples' struggle for Right to Self 
Determination, and their resistance to the Indian 
occupation of the region.

3          The deliberate omission in the report 
of the extreme degree of militarization in 
Kashmir is regrettable. 

4          The prolonged denial of a negotiated 
political settlement of the Kashmir dispute 
cannot be overlooked. The western descriptions of 
the peoples' movement in Kashmir sees it as 
having transformed from nationalistic to 
secularist nationalistic, from that to Islamist, 
and finally to pan Islamist. The civil society 
here feels that this western descriptive gift 
cannot take the real content of the movement away 
from it.
             The International Committee of 
Jurists has recognized the Right to Self 
Determination of the people of Kashmir. Can this 
right be denied on the basis that it is demanded 
by Muslim majority only?

5          Bilateral agreements between India and 
Pakistan in principle do not apply to the Kashmir 
conflict. No country or authority has power to 
enter into an agreement with other party which 
affects the rights of the third party. The 
indigenous struggle for political rights 
fundamentally deems any bilateral agreement 
invalid for the absence of Kashmiri participation.

6          The application of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA) by the Indian 
authorities in the part of Kashmir held by it has 
allowed its armed forces to throw the 1949 Geneva 
Convention to winds. Cases of war crimes like 
massacre of civilians have been established many 
a time but the AFSPA in essence allows the state 
to render all other laws ineffective and grants 
impunity to the armed forces for crimes against 
humanity. In this backdrop, the civil society of 
Kashmir demands from global civil society and 
international institutions like the EU and UN 
constitution of an international tribunal for war 
crimes committed by Indian armed forces in 
Kashmir.
             The report also fails to look at 
issues of grave concern to the civil society in 
Kashmir. Widespread use of the infamous Public 
Safety Act (PSA) is disturbing. The number of 
people detained under the Act is increasing 
amidst claims of 'restoration of normalcy'.

7          The secular democratic ideals as 
practiced on ground in India defy the flowery 
description of this governing system. The 
communal edge of the governing system in India 
has been seen getting sharper, particularly post 
the Gujarat pogrom, when 2000 Muslims were killed 
with the connivance of the state.
             The Hindu religious symbols 
prominently displayed on average armed forces 
vehicles as well as their camps in Kashmir reveal 
only the tip of the communal attitude of Indian 
forces deployed in Kashmir. None the less, the so 
called secular democratic character of India or 
lack/absence of democracy in Pakistan does not 
change the fundamentals of the Kashmir conflict. 
By his own admission the former Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee conceded that Jammu 
and Kashmir had never been allowed any semblance 
of democracy.
             The multi faith nature and secular 
traditions in Jammu and Kashmir have been not 
only kept alive but also nurtured by its people. 
In the process the people have defied the efforts 
of the Indian state in polarizing the society 
through the machinations of its armed forces and 
its intelligence establishment. The civil society 
of Kashmir unreservedly subscribes to the 
observation in Para 7 of the report.
In this context people of Kashmir feel doubly 
hurt when their legitimate struggle for right to 
self determination is condemned as Islamic 
terrorism, pan Islamism or fundamentalism.

8          The Round Table Conference (RTC) is 
nothing more than a discussion to refurbish 
Kashmir – New Delhi relations, a process to 
strengthen the status quo. Civil society believes 
that India and Pakistan have engaged politicians 
of their choice, who have given up on the demand 
for right to self-determination. So, the RTC 
process sans the involvement of individuals who 
demand the right to exercise Right to Self 
determination has no credibility. India refuses 
to engage with those in Kashmir whose political 
struggle forced India for dialogue, namely armed 
resistance. Those engaged in dialogue have 
further fragmented the society.

9          The proposals of demilitarization, 
self governance, porous borders, and joint 
control are, in essence, an attempt to compound 
the conflict in perpetuity.
Demilitarization will take the Indian army to the 
1989 position, which is back to the barracks. Our 
demand is complete withdrawal of armed forces 
from Jammu and Kashmir and thus restoration of 
pre 1947 position.
Self-rule means restoring what has been taken 
away incrementally by India through 
constitutional fraud from 1952 onwards. Hence, 
there is nothing new on offer.
Porous borders at best will mean regulated flow 
of people between the two parts of Jammu and 
Kashmir, whereas as the demand is for total 
unification and freedom.
Joint control means partial Indian control will 
be extended even to Pakistan administered 
Kashmir. In exchange, partial Pakistani control 
comes to Indian held Kashmir. People of Jammu 
Kashmir get nothing!

10        It's regretful that the nature of the 
political relationship between AJK and Islamabad 
is seen through the prism of standard political 
principles whereas the history of political 
arm-twisting by India in the part of Kashmir held 
by it is not just ignored but never seen in a 
standard perspective. This takes away any 
credibility of the principles applied in the 
approach for the conflict resolution. It's 
baffling to the civil society in Kashmir that the 
report does not even "regret" non-inclusion of 
Kashmiris in the so called dialogue process 
between India and Pakistan.

11        Civil society appreciates the EU 
concern over the civil liberty issues in Pakistan 
and wants to remind it of the earlier 
observations/descriptions of its officials who 
described Indian held Kashmir as "a beautiful 
prison". However we deeply regret the EU's 
complete failure to even mention the gross 
violation of the rights of minorities like 
Dalits, Muslims and Christians in India. Dalits, 
whose population is close to 300 million, 
continue to be treated as "untouchables" and 
Muslims "enemies of the state". Also, it is 
regretful that the international community 
overlooks the unrest in the underprivileged 
classes of India, including the anti exploitation 
phenomenon of Naxalism.
             The civil society of Kashmir is 
primarily involved in seeking the right to self 
determination as enshrined in various UN 
resolutions, international covenants and the UN 
charter itself. We reserve our right not to get 
entangled in issues like the rights of women and 
children in Pakistan or the situation of 
minorities in India.
             It's revealing that on burning issues 
of corruption, widespread torture, custodial 
disappearances and extra judicial killings in 
Indian held Kashmir have not grabbed the 
attention of the EU. To the civil society it 
appears that the EU has a different set of 
barometers used in AJK and in Indian administered 
Kashmir. What allows the EU not to interrogate 
the manner and the circumstances in which close 
to 70,000 people have been killed in the decade 
and a half in Kashmir "the beautiful prison".

13        No elections in Kashmir can be 
considered legitimate or fair in the intimidating 
presence of 600, 000 Indian armed forces. The 
voting percentage in the local body elections is 
misleading because these elections were held only 
in the urban and the semi urban areas. The actual 
voting percentage, coercion by armed forces 
notwithstanding, during the legislative and 
parliamentary elections is much lower. Power has 
not been devolved to people and rests with the 
bureaucracy. Elections in Kashmir have been 
nothing more than rituals. Polling percentages 
cannot be used as oath of allegiance to India.
             The very process of elections and the 
profiles of most candidates are bereft of any 
credibility where even the Indian army has its 
favorites and makes it clear to the people 
through overt and covert means. This was 
vindicated recently by the group of Indian human 
rights' defenders after touring Kashmir.  The 
group observed that Indian held Kashmir was under 
"martial law".

14        Kashmir civil society asks why the EU 
can't propose constitution of an international 
tribunal, for most 'violations' by Indian armed 
forces in Kashmir constitute war crimes under 
1949 Geneva Convention. Particularly when 
dispensing justice to the perpetrators of war 
crimes by Indian armed forces in Kashmir still 
remains a function of New Delhi's permission 
needed for prosecution under the AFSPA. We in 
Kashmir believe that in this era of globalization 
the responsibility for dispensing justice and 
protection of human rights has to be shared 
globally.  

15        It's worth interrogating the fact that 
every Indian Prime Minister – including the 
current incumbent–have announced big economic 
packages to Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that 
these packages continue to be doled out by the 
Indian authorities establishes that the previous 
ones have not worked. Corruption is inbuilt in 
packages and a substantial portion of these 
packages is spent through the armed forces.

16        Response to the section on 'Combating Terrorism':
             The observations are partial and the 
language used echoes the Government of India 
propaganda about Kashmir. The overall references 
to AJK and Pakistan, while completely overlooking 
state terrorism by India in Kashmir, reveal a 
partisan approach to the extent that the 
description/concerns here mirror the standard 
propaganda unleashed by the Indian foreign 
relations apparatus.
             The concerns/perceptions about AJK, 
Gilgit and Baltistan receive generous attention 
at the cost of ignoring the brute repression 
unleashed by the Indian state in its held 
Kashmir. The approach clearly is motivated, a 
reflection perhaps of the size of the market that 
India is - economics taking precedence over 
morality and politics!

17        This is the first direct experience 
people of Kashmir have had with the EU, always 
seen by them as defenders of human rights. 
However the report as adopted by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the EU undermines the 
legitimate expectations of the people of Kashmir.
             On one hand EU recognises the 
inalienable right to self determination and on 
the other is opposed to any redrawing of borders 
that might possibly accrue from a final solution 
of the Kashmir conflict. This is a contradiction 
and goes to endorse the Indian position in the 
dispute.

18        Lastly, the observations/mention of 
Siachen Glacier in the report that further takes 
away credibility from it. Siachen was occupied by 
India in 1984 in violation of the Shimla 
Agreement. There was no final demarcation of this 
area before or after the agreement signed in 1972.

Ends

We welcome your comments on our response to the 
EU report on our blog 
www.kashmircivilsociety.blogspot.com or it can be 
directly emailed to us on ccs at jkccs.org

______


[5]

Telegraph (Calcutta)
June 12, 2007


NEVER A MOMENT TO BREATHE EASY

Sanjib Baruah

After yet another bloodbath carried out by Ulfa, 
Sanjib Baruah ponders whether negotiations can 
still hold the magic answer in Assam


The public protests in Assam against the killing 
of innocent civilians by the United Liberation 
Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good 
news. However, it would be premature to read them 
as a sign that a big change is round the corner, 
since another kind of reaction is also visible. 
An umbrella body of 30 trade associations, 
representing groups that bore the brunt of Ulfas 
attacks, has strongly come out in support of 
unconditional talks with Ulfa.

The implications of this response are ambiguous. 
It is a contrast from the way similar groups had 
reacted when Ulfa targeted Hindi-speaking 
labourers last winter. The call then was for more 
security, for increased presence of the army, and 
for tougher counter-insurgency operations. The 
Ulfa may have reasons to be quite pleased with 
this turn of events.

Counter-insurgency experts might see the support 
for talks among new groups as Ulfas devious 
game-plan. Indeed, this explains why some people 
feel that, with growing evidence of Ulfas 
isolation, there is even less reason for the 
government to talk to it now than before.

This view, however, ignores the logic of 
asymmetric warfare. Insurgents everywhere choose 
tactics that play to their strengths, not to 
their weaknesses, vis--vis governments. It is 
nave to think that rebel groups would simply give 
up the battle and surrender once they lose 
militarily to government forces. After all, even 
the most elementary lesson of armed conflicts 
suggests that military power is only one factor 
among many in determining outcomes.

Thus, when tough security barriers go up to 
protect VIPs and strategically or symbolically 
important public places, it is only to be 
expected that insurgent groups would turn to soft 
targets. The people can be excused for being 
shocked and surprised by such insurgent tactics, 
but those in charge of devising official strategy 
cannot claim to be equally surprised. They must 
be able to outsmart insurgent leaders, and 
anticipate how the logic of asymmetrical warfare 
plays out.

There is a difference between the way governments 
as institutions may want to respond to insurgent 
demands, and those who bear the brunt of their 
threats and actions might. Such a difference 
becomes apparent in a situation like a 
kidnapping, when a government position of never 
negotiating with terrorists does not resonate 
with the families of victims. Insurgent groups 
can try to leverage this intrinsic asymmetry.

There is plenty of evidence of insurgent groups 
making civilians pawns in their conflicts. A 
study at Uppsala Universitys Peace and Conflict 
Research Department found that in hundreds of 
low-intensity armed conflicts worldwide, attacks 
on civilians are a tactic of choice by armed 
rebel groups engaged in asymmetric warfare with 
government forces. According to Lisa Hultman, the 
author of this study, by targeting civilians, 
rebel groups signal both their resolve to 
continue the battle and their willingness to pay 
high costs in order to pursue victory against a 
militarily stronger adversary.

This finding is in keeping with a long 
intellectual tradition of military thought that 
sees war as a violent form of bargaining. 
Insurgent groups, of course, realize that in 
attacking civilians, they run the risk of 
alienating their primary audience, from whom they 
draw their core support.
The protests against Ulfas actions underscore 
that risk. At the same time, the return for such 
grave risks can be quite high. Targeting 
civilians in a foreign country is not quite the 
same as targeting civilians at home. Yet the 
terrorist attacks by al Qaida on the Madrid 
trains in 2004 must count as one of the most 
spectacular examples of political gains derived 
from an attack on civilians. The attacks caused a 
rift between the people of Spain and their 
elected government, and precipitated the 
withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.

What then are our policy choices in Assam today? 
The failure of two decades of counter-insurgency 
speaks for itself. At the same time, it is hard 
to argue that negotiations hold the magic answer 
at this stage. Insurgent groups do not usually 
fight long and costly battles against impossible 
military odds, for what someone once called the 
mere privilege of quitting. Ulfa is unlikely to 
be an exception.

There is, however, a sense of deja vu about the 
current situation which is disturbing. Assam has 
been in similar situations before. Indeed 
counter-insurgency in the North-east is replete 
with instances of history repeating itself. 
Indian officials in charge of counter-insurgency 
never tire of repeating the clich that there are 
no military solutions, and that a solution 
ultimately would have to be political. Yet there 
is little sign of any change in a strategy that 
seeks to establish the military superiority of 
the government in the expectation that it would 
force insurgent groups to accept peace on its 
terms. There is little evidence of an ability to 
respond to the adaptive capabilities of its 
adversaries, and to their ability to constantly 
take conflicts to new realms. Still, no one 
except the civilians of the region has had to pay 
a price for this long history of policy failure.

The author is at the Centre for Policy Research, 
New Delhi and the Indian Institute of Technology, 
Guwahati.

______


[6]

Economic and Political Weekly
June 9, 2007
Letters

WITCH-HUNT AMONG SANTHALS

The well-researched and informative article 
'Witch-hunts, Adivasis, and the Uprising in 
Chhotanagpur' by Shashank Sinha (May 12) places 
the practice of witch-hunt among santhals in the 
anti-colonial context of 1857. However, it is 
worth examining the santhal practice in the 
general context of witchcraft and witch-hunt 
worldwide.  Witchcraft as a primitive human 
endeavour to deal with adversity is perhaps as 
ancient as humanity. The witch-hunt came later 
and became a mania in 16th century Europe. The 
innocent practice of witchcraft came in direct 
opposition to the superstitions of both the Old 
and the New Testament.  The first trial of a 
witch, recorded with any degree of certainty, 
took place in 1324 in Coventry, UK. All over the 
world, including Chhattisgarh, witches were 
mostly poor working class women, old and widowed. 
Next to join this heinous practice of witch-hunt 
were medical men who felt that their exclusive 
right to cure for money was challenged by 
witches; their santhal equivalent were the 
affluent ojhas. Others pitched in too. 
Shakespeare wrote Macbeth for the professed 
demonologist King James I who claimed he could 
prove the existence of witches.
The santhal practice of witch-hunt was in many 
ways worse than that in Europe. While in Europe 
witches were strangulated before being set afire 
lest they land up pronouncing ill words against 
God, santhals in most cases forced witches to eat 
human excreta and drink blood before throwing 
them into the flames. The santhal practice of 
witch-hunt predates British control of India and 
lasted long after they left and perhaps still 
continues.

Archana Mishra, in her book, Casting the Evil Eye 
(Roli Books, New Delhi, 2003), based on a field 
study in Chhattisgarh, describes 75 cases of 
witch killing between 1991 and 1997; 61 of these 
were females and two children. A B Chaudhuri in 
his book, The Santhals: Religion and Rituals 
(Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987), 
records witch killing as late as 1983; according 
to him, 16 witches were killed between 1978 and 
1979 and 16 were killed in the first half of 
1982. Chaudhury wonders and so do I, why do 
santhals, a hardworking people who participated 
in the Tebhaga peasant movement, carry on 
witch-hunting?  There is an unpleasant answer.


Daya Varma
Westmount, Quebec, Canada

______


[7]  ANNOUNCEMENTS:

(i)

The Daily Star (Dhaka)

Announcement

The Daily Star literature page, in order to 
promote English-language writing among 
Bangladeshis, will publish a second anthology, 
this time of non-fiction. Bangladeshi 
writers/authors/translators plus our readers are 
invited to send in their contributions for 
consideration. Themes and contents must deal 
broadly with Bangladesh, or with Bangladeshi 
life, whether here or abroad.

Submissions should be limited to 2500-3000 words, 
though this condition can be relaxed in the case 
of outstanding efforts. High-grade translations 
will also be considered. Translators should send 
in the original Bangla if they are to be 
considered.

Submissions should be sent electronically as Word 
attachments to starliterature at thedailystar.net or 
by snail mail to The Literary Editor, The Daily 
Star, 19 Karwan Bazar, Dhaka-1215. All 
submissions must be clearly marked 'For 
Anthology' (in case of electronic submission on 
the subject line).

Only Bangladeshis need submit.

We specially welcome submissions from outside 
Dhaka, as well as humorous pieces dealing with 
the lighter side of life.

The last date of submission is July 31, 2007.

---The Literary Editor

Note: Non-fiction means real-life stories and 
accounts, not poems or fictional narratives. 
Non-fiction may deal with anything, for example, 
the death of a father, schooldays, or travel 
accounts. Amar Chelebela by Tagore is an easy 
example of nonfiction for the Bengali 
writer/reader. They must be compelling in some 
way and may illuminate a side of life that is 
rarely seen or felt.

(ii)

National Consultation
on
The Communal Violence (Prevention, Control And 
Rehabilitation Of Victims) Bill, 2005

Conference Room, 1St Floor, India International Centre
New Delhi
June 16, 2007


(iii)

ENCOUNTER KILLINGS
NATIONAL SEMINAR AT MUMBAI

Dear Sir / Madam,

The recent spate of encounter killings by the 
State machinery in various parts of the country 
has brought the need to investigate the fake 
encounter cases and bring to justice those who 
are responsible for the elimination of innocent 
lives.   To discuss the various aspects involved 
in encounter killings, the newly formed National 
Confederation of Human Rights Organizations 
(NCHRO) will hold a National Seminar on Encounter 
Killings at Mumbai on the International Day for 
the Victims of Torture. It will mark the 
beginning of a wider campaign to be undertaken by 
NCHRO. 
The seminar is aimed also to enlighten the 
general public on the seriousness of the issue 
and also adopt practical methodologies to 
encounter this trend.    


Date:		Tuesday 26 June 2007
Time:		02.00 to 06.00 p.m.
Venue:		Marathi Patrakar Sangh Hall,
Second Floor, Patrakar Bhavan, Mahapalika Marg,
Azad Maidan, (Opp. V T Station)
Mumbai - 400 001
(Ph: 022-2262 0451/2270 0715)

Human rights activists and legal experts from 
different states and the relatives of the victims 
of encounter deaths are expected to participate 
in the seminar.  

Many leading activists like Former Justices Mr. 
H. Suresh, Ms. Teesta Setalvad (Mumbai), Ms. 
Gauri Lankesh, Prof. N. Babayya, Mr. Seshaiah 
(Bangalore), Mr. S. A. R. Geelani (Delhi) etc. 
have consented to participate. 

A Get-together of the Human Rights Activists will 
also be held on the same day at the same venue 
from 11.00 a.m. to 01.00 p.m.

I humbly request you to attend the programme and 
support this noble cause.  We can bear sleeper 
class train journey cost and arrange moderate 
accommodation for outstation candidates.  Kindly 
confirm your participation latest before 
18-06-2007. 


In solidarity,

K. P. Muhammed Shareef
General Convener


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