SACW | April 20, 2007 | Pakistanis Against Fundamentalism / Sri Lanka: Muzzling the media; India: Kashmir, Self Determination and the Left ; Liars of the Hindu right; Communal threat to Goa; The Namesake; Nehru's speeches
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Thu Apr 19 22:13:33 CDT 2007
South Asia Citizens Wire | April 20, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2391 - Year 9
[1] Pakistan: Citizens mobilise against religious extremism
[2] Sri Lanka: Undemocratic Government Pressure
on Media is Unacceptable (National Peace Council)
[3] Revisiting the Kashmir issue (Nirmalangshu Mukherji)
[4] India: [BJP's UP election CD] Family Lies (Mukul Dube)
[5] India: Emerging Threats to Goa's Communal Harmony (Vidyadhar Gadgil)
[6] Film Review: Pleasant, But Seriously Flawed
- 'The Namesake' - Reviewed by Partha Banerjee
[7] Book Review: 'Nehru's India -- Select
Speeches. (ed.) Mushirul Hasan' Reviewed by
Suranjan Das
____
[1]
Daily Times
20 April 2007
CIVIL SOCIETY RALLIES AGAINST EXTREMISM
* Thousands march in blistering heat in Lahore
* Protests also in Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar
Staff Report
LAHORE/ISLAMABAD/ KARACHI/PESHAWAR: Thousands of
Pakistanis staged rallies in major cities on
Thursday to condemn extremism and exploitation in
the name of Islam.
Rights activists organised simultaneous protests
in Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar to
denounce extremist actions by students of the
Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia madrassas,
affiliated to Lal Masjid, in the capital.
Several thousand Lahoris marched in blistering
heat on The Mall - the first time a large crowd
has rallied against religious extremism in the
city - in a rally organised by the Women's Action
Forum (WAF) in collaboration with other
non-governmental organisations.
The protestors - including civil society and
human rights activists, minority groups,
political workers, lawyers, trade unions,
journalists and students - gathered at the Lahore
High Court building and began marching towards
the Punjab Assembly building at 2:00pm.
"Mullahism murdabad. Lay kay rahen gay azadi,"
they shouted. One youth wrote "No to Taliban"
with spray paint on the road.
Hall Road traders hailed the rally as it passed
by, putting up banners reading: "Stop
blackmailing and exploiting traders in the name
of Islam," and "We condemn mullahs' operation
against CD shops."
The City District Government of Lahore had
relaxed Section 144 to allow the rally amidst a
large police presence. One side of The Mall was
temporarily closed for traffic.
Asma Jehangir, chairwoman of the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, said the military was
using mullahs to exploit people in the name of
Islam. "We, the people of Pakistan, are not
oblivious to this mullah-military alliance," she
said. "There can be no democracy in Pakistan
unless GHQ-backed mullahs stop issuing decrees to
exploit people in the name of Islam."
"This mullah is defaming the most beautiful and
peaceful religion in the world and wants to
hamper the prosperity and progress of Pakistan,"
said a WAF activist addressing the rally. "But
the people of this city will continue to confront
this mullahism and religious extremism."
PPP Punjab President Shah Mahmood Qureshi also
suggested that the government had engineered the
standoff in the capital to present Gen Pervez
Musharraf as a bulwark against extremism and
divert attention from the judicial crisis.
Hundreds staged a peaceful protest in Islamabad
against extremists trying to force their version
of Islam on others. Most of the protestors were
women.
Shirin Mazari, a strategic analyst, led the
protestors, who gathered a kilometre away from
Constitution Avenue and walked up to the
roundabout in front of Parliament House.
"Where's the writ of the state?" asked a big
placard at the protest. "No to religious
extremism; yes to life and music", and "Free the
children's library", said other placards.
"Concerned citizens have been watching with anger
and frustration the terrorism being inflicted on
them by an extremist fringe within the society,"
said one speaker as the protestors gathered at
Parade Square.
She was appalled at the state's "inability or
reluctance" to deal with violations of the law
committed by Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia
students. "Their attempt to challenge the writ of
the state by establishing what in effect is an
alternate governing system in the area under
their control poses a threat to all law-abiding
citizens," she said.
Hundreds of Christian women from Qayyumabad,
filmmakers, social workers and university
students rallied against religious extremism
outside Quaid-e-Azam's mazaar in Karachi. "It
would be difficult to find a single woman who has
not at some point in time faced religious
extremism," said Karachi's Naib Nazim Nasreen
Jalil, who also took part in the protest.
Gang-rape survivor Kainat Soomro was also at the
rally.
In Peshawar, hundreds of women's rights
campaigners - including some 60 burqa-clad women
from the tribal areas - staged a rally near the
press club, denouncing threats of suicide
bombings by Lal Masjid clerics and baton-wielding
madrassa students.
"No religion in the world allows their faithful
to use sticks in places of worship," Tribal Women
Welfare Association Chairwoman Dr Begum Jan said.
o o o
The News
20 April 2007
HUNDREDS RALLY AGAINST RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
Civil society opposes 'state' within state; urges
govt to take action against Lal Masjid, Jamia
Hafsa administration
ISLAMABAD: Hundreds of rights activists rallied
in big cities on Thursday against Lal Masjid and
Jamia Hafsa, which are trying to impose a
Taliban-style justice system.
More than 300 demonstrators, around half of them
women, rallied in the federal capital, chanting
slogans including "No to terrorism and extremism"
and urged the government to take action.
"We want to mobilise public opinion against
violations of the law by religious students and
the inability and reluctance of the state to deal
with these violations," rally organiser Shireen
Mazari told AFP.
"The government should take very stern action
against the rowdyism being demonstrated by the
mosque's administration," leading rights activist
AH Nayyar told AFP.
Liberals and rights activists rallied in Lahore
on Thursday to press the government to act
against Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa.
"Mullahs have ruined our society. They have
distorted the image of Islam. We'll not accept
extremism anymore," Jugnu Mohsin, a rights
activist, told a rally after around 700 people
had marched, shouting slogans outside the Lahore
High Court.
"It is government's failure. They have been
blackmailed by the Mullahs of Lal Masjid who are
pushing the country towards Talibanisation,"
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Chairman Asma
Jehangir said. -Agencies
Syed Bukhar Shah adds from Peshawar: Activists of
various civil society organisations and political
parties staged a protest demonstration in front
of the press club and later took out a procession
here on Thursday to condemn what they termed
religious extremism propagated by the Jamia Hafsa
and Lal Masjid in Islamabad.
The Women Action Forum, Peshawar chapter, had
given the call and activists of various NGOs,
including Aurat Foundation, Action Aid, Noor
Education Trust (NET), Human Resource Management
and Development Centre (HRMDC), Strengthening
Participatory Organisation (SPO), Tribal Women
Welfare Association (TWWA), Awami National Party
(ANP) and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP),
gathered in front of the press club to register
their protest against the ongoing activities of
the Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid administration.
Tribal women from Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and
Orakzai agencies were prominent among the
participants.
Carrying banners and placards inscribed with
slogans against religious extremism, the
participants chanted full-throated slogans
against "bigotry in the name of enforcement of
Shariah".
Speaking on the occasion, representatives of NGOs
and political parties deplored that a moderate
majority in the motherland had always been held
hostage by a small conservative minority for the
sake of vested interest. They said the clerics of
Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid were trying to set up
a state within the state by forcing the people to
conform to their own brand of religion.
Criticising the administration of Lal Masjid and
Jamia Hafsa, the speakers said that illegal
occupation of the state land in the federal
capital by fanatics in the name of religion was
totally unacceptable. The protesters reminded the
religious extremists that Islam did not permit
coercion of any type and instead put stress on
tolerance and humility.
"Asking women to give up driving cars and
threatening owners of shops to stop selling
audiocassettes and video CDs and switch over to
other businesses is nothing but an encroachment
on the rights of the citizens," they said.
The civil society members asked all the freedom
loving people to rise in unison and join hands
against the religious intolerance and extremism.
"It is a must as the actions taken by the
intolerant religious elements of Jamia Hafsa and
Lal Masjid are tarnishing the image of the
country in the comity of nations," they said,
telling the baton-wielding students of the
seminaries that the people of Pakistan were
well-conversant with religious teachings and
there was no need to force on them any ideology.
The protesters said they have decided to organise
various functions and seminars to educate the
people regarding the on going activities of the
seminary students in Islamabad. They said it
would lead the country to civil war if the
government did not stop the religious students
from imposing their own brand of Islamic ideology
on people.
o o o
Daily Times
20 April 2007
'IT'S OUR PAKISTAN TOO!'
* Hundreds of women and their supporters say 'No' to religious extremism
* Women narrate their personal experiences with
orthodox and intolerant elements
* 'There is no compulsion in religion'
Staff Report
KARACHI: Christian women from Qayyumabad,
filmmakers, social workers and university
students gathered at a protest rally against
religious extremism Thursday outside
Quaid-e-Azam's mazaar. 'Hum dekhain gay!' they
sang out in a mood that would have made Faiz
proud.
The rally was called by the Joint Action
Committee, a group of NGOs, with Aurat
Foundation, Women's Action Forum, Action Aid,
PAWLA, Helpline Trust, and others in attendance.
Naib Nazim Nasreen Jalil also took part.
It would be difficult to find a single woman who
has not at some point in time faced religious
extremism, said Jalil when asked about her
personal experience with religious extremism.
"Some years ago I reached Karachi from Islamabad.
At the airport there was an entire group of
religious extremists from the Jamaat-e-Islami.
They surrounded me as savages do when they
capture their prey. Someone pushed me to one
side, while another pulled me in another," she
said. "If the people who came to receive me
hadn't saved me, I'm not sure what would have
happened."
Albeit small in number, the rally's participants
represented a small but significant portion of
secular society. Many of the women taking part,
such as Anis Haroon, have long battled anti-women
forces. "We are here thanks to Lal Masjid and
Jamia Hafsa," joked Dr Aqila of the Aurat
Foundation while speaking to a colleague as
Justice (retd) Majida Rizvi embraced Prof
Shahista Zaidi. "At least that's one good thing
that they've done," she said while referring to
the joy many women expressed upon meeting old
colleagues and friends. "In Karachi, things are
still much better if we compare it with the rest
of the country," she said. "One day, when I was
working at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission,
my colleagues and I decided in Ramazan to have a
cup of tea. We made the tea in our room and sat
down to drink it. Then some mullah-type people
found out about it and cursed us. They went to
the extent of printing a pamphlet against us."
Professor Shaista Zaidi said that she had battled
religious extremism for thirty years at the
University of Karachi. "I faced it each day from
[the student wing of a particular religious
party]," she said.
What was apparent was that almost all the women
present had had some brush with extremism. For
example, Justice Rizvi said that once in a legal
case she faced extremism. "I was threatened
against taking a decision against the accused,"
she said. This was the same thing that happened
to a famous activist who took part in the rally
and often comes in the media to talk about
women's issues. She told Daily Times that in her
personal experience she often received threats on
her cell phone after she had been particularly
vocal on some issue. "They call me up and say
'Hum dekh lain ge tumhe'," she said.
When asked about her personal experiences
documentary filmmaker Nazli Haque laughed and
said that mostly young women faced a tough time.
"No one really bothers you when you're
menopausal," she said. "Although, now that [I'm
older] I wish they did."
Citizen Naeem, who was taking photographs of the
rally for his own records, said that religious
extremism was evident everywhere. "Even if you go
for a walk in a park you'll see four people
spring up to say their prayers there," he said.
"Then it becomes very problematic for any woman
to proceed with her walk near them. They taunt
her and berate her for not wearing a dupatta."
Zaib Advocate said that her personal observation
had been that if you are in a public place the
person who looks like a maulvi is more likely to
stare at you than anyone else. "From the cases
that come to me I feel that maulvis are usually
behind sexual harassment cases and not young men.
In fact, people call maulvis to their house to
teach their children less and less."
Gang-rape survivor Kainat Soomro was also at the
rally. "It was after my personal experience that
I began to understand how women are really
treated. Even after the case, I still have to
listen to people taunt me and say terrible
things. But I will remain firm until the accused
are brought to justice."
Journalist Zubeida Mustafa recalled that in 1985
or 1986 her daughter, who was then about 13 years
old, wanted to go out onto the street to welcome
Benazir Bhutto upon her return. They went out but
some men shouted at her for not wearing a dupatta
and scared the young girl. "Eventually she took
my dupatta and took off," Mustafa said. "And I
was left with none."
_____
[2]
National Peace Council
of Sri Lanka
12/14 Purana Vihara Road
Colombo 6
Tel: 2818344, 2854127, 2819064
Tel/Fax:2819064
E Mail: npc at sltnet.lk
Internet: www.peace-srilanka.org
19.04.07
Media Release
UNDEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON MEDIA IS UNACCEPTABLE
Sri Lanka is a country that has been fortunate to
have had a vibrant media except within the
conflict zones of the north and east and in
LTTE-controlled areas. However, recently there
has been a noticeable decline in the freedom of
media and in the accuracy and responsibility of
media expression in the country as a whole. The
National Peace Council appreciates courageous and
balanced reporting in the context of the
pressures faced by the media at present.
Recently two independent newspapers, the Weekend
Standard and the Maubima, had to cease their
operations when their bank accounts were sealed
by the government on the grounds that they had
been acting in violation of laws and national
security. The National Peace Council is gravely
concerned about reports that high ranking members
of the government have been personally
pressurised editors of national media
institutions who have been critical of government
policies and actions.
We particularly deplore the threats leveled
against the editor of the Daily Mirror, Ms
Champika Liyanarachchi, and her staff regarding
their reportage of the human tragedy that has
been unfolding in the east of the country. The
team of young women journalists who head the
Daily Mirror are a credit to the media
profession. We are shocked at the threats against
them, and regret the subsequent government
attempts to downplay the incident.
Freedom of expression is one of the basic pillars
of a democratic society. A free media is
necessary to inform both decision makers and the
people about prevailing realities in the country.
We call on the government to inquire into this
incident and to insist that its members follow a
code of conduct that accepts the fundamental
principles of democratic governance including
respect for the freedom of the media.
Executive Director
On behalf of the Governing Council
_____
[3]
Znet
April 13, 2007
REVISITING THE KASHMIR ISSUE
by Nirmalangshu Mukherji
In a just world order, rights of
self-determination of people, including the right
of independence, ought to be viewed as a basic
and absolute value. As with most moral
principles, however, the actual implementation of
such demands raises difficult issues since they
always arise in a historical context of unjust
distribution of rights. In other words, the
demand for self-determination arises precisely
because it has not been met so far, rendering the
context in which the demand arises an unjust one.
We will briefly examine the right of
self-determination of people in Kashmir from this
perspective.
In that unjust context, dimensions of external
control intervene with people's rights for
decades-sometimes, over centuries. These controls
not only generate vested interests for the
agencies of control, typically they curb people's
ability to voice their demand to the point that
sections of people internalize the features of
control and begin to demobilise on the issue of
self-determination. As a result, people
themselves get divided. Agencies of control are
then able to use this fact to perpetuate their
control in the name of people. The historical
passage of time is a crucial aspect of the
scenario just sketched. We will look briefly at
Iraq to get a sense of the isue before we turn to
Kashmir.
In Iraq, the imposition of (current) external
control is recent, brutal, and clearly linked to
the vested interests of US foreign policy around
control over oil. The imperialist aggression
stands fully exposed; thus, the people subjected
to massive violence stand united in their
opposition to US occupation. Reliable polls
suggest that 1% of Iraqi population welcome US
presence in Iraq while over 80% demand immediate
end to US occupation; the rest varying on when
they want the occupying forces to withdraw. Even
with the tiny minority who demand a phased
withdrawal of US forces, it stands to reason that
their apprehensions about the fallout of
immediate withdrawal is directly linked to the
chaotic state of Iraqi society caused by US
aggression itself.
For the sake of argument, imagine a grim (and
hopefully false) scenario in which the US,
assisted by the client Iraqi regime, is able to
perpetuate its crimes in Iraq for several more
years. During this period, suppose some semblance
of order and stability returns in the natural
course: some oil money is used to restore the
food and the health systems; water and
electricity return to normal flow; people are
able to engage in some trade inside and outside
Iraq; tourists return; some institutions,
including education institutions, begin to
function; violence in the streets is reduced; the
resistance is partly broken; US forces mostly
stay in barracks close to oil installations;
increasing number of people begin to queue up in
US-sponsored elections.
In this scenario, it is quite likely that the
minority of currently wavering population will
increase several folds. Citing favourable polls,
the US will then be in a position to claim that
US presence is needed to bolster stability and
(democratic) order in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is
clear that nothing changes in so far as the
absolute value of people's right to
self-determination is concerned. Violent
enforcement of external control for long periods
of time to drive people to exasperation and
apparent conformity is a tested strategy of
occupying forces with superior gun power. For the
same reason, it is of utmost importance that the
current resistance in Iraq continues to grow
under the common command of people; this is also
a tested method of rendering unsustainable the
tested strategy of occupying forces.
Two other features of current Iraq are relevant
here. First, there is no doubt that Iraq is a
divided society with at least three contending
parties: the sunnis, the shias, and the Kurds.
But the division between the people of Iraq
cannot be an argument against self-determination.
We may have opinions on further dismemberment of
Iraq or on unsustainable alliances between the
parties. But it is for the people of Iraq to
choose which course they wish to adopt. Second,
when the right of self-determination is viewed as
an absolute value, the character of resistance to
imperialism is also of no concern. Once again it
is for the Iraqi people to choose what they feel
is the right form of resistance. Historically,
the choice could well turn out to be a mistaken
one; but then it is again upto the Iraqi people
to correct the course.
To sum up, the right of self-determination cannot
be withheld even if (a) some sections of the
population do not desire it anymore, typically
out of duress, (b) the people in the relevant
region are divided, and (c) the character of
resistance to external rule is questionable. We
recall that the British used each of these to
postpone independence until the circumstances
arising out of the second war and liberation of
people around the globe forced the British to
leave India.
In a recent article posted in Znet ('Is
independence a viable option for Jammu and
Kashmir?', 24 January), Badri Raina, as the title
suggests, has raised the issues the British
raised for decades before they were compelled to
withdraw from India. The interest of this piece
is that the author belongs to the left, and Znet
is a well-known platform for left-wing opinion.
The arguments therefore are more refined than a
mere imperial assertion of the following kind:
Kashmir belongs to us because some raja signed
some piece of paper. The net effect, however,
remains the same.
Raina raises versions of each of (a) to (b) above
as an opposition to 'the formulation that
militancy and violence could not justly be
expected to be shut down till the right to
'self-determination' was granted' (note that the
expression 'self-determination' is used with
quotes by Raina). He also raises versions of (c):
'how long can the valley then resist the push to
theocratise both state and polity in that
'independent' situation. Surely, both Kashmiris
and the Indian state have big stakes in all
this.' But since Raina produced no facts to
support this view, I will ignore this part of his
essay.
The Polls
Raina's first argument, a version of (a),
concerns a poll conducted by the MORI
International organization that 'covered all
regions, urban and rural, of the three provinces
of the Jammu & Kashmir State.' Although Raina
thinks of the MORI Foundation as 'a reputed
agency by all accounts', he does not mention that
the foundation is US-based. Raina also cites
another poll subsequently conducted by Synovate
India which covered just the valley.
In what follows, I will focus on the MORI poll
since, as Raina observed, it covered 'all
regions.' Further, the focus on MORI is justified
because Raina begins this part of his essay with
the condition that 'whatever resolutions are
debated or found must pertain to the entire
state of Jammu & Kashmir rather than merely any
discrete part.' I return to the implications of
imposing this condition on any 'debate' later.
For now, obeying Raina's condition, it is obvious
that the findings of the MORI poll are directly
relevant. Also, I will take the validity of the
findings for granted.
The part of MORI results which has drawn
world-wide attention, and flagged repeatedly by
Raina, suggests that 61 per cent feel that they
would be better off politically and economically
as Indian citizens, and only 6 per cent feel that
they would be so as Pakistani citizens. Raina
comments: 'by no stretch of the imagination then
can it be argued that the overwhelming sentiment
in the state of Jammu & Kashmir is for
"sovereign, secular, independence." 'However
much as these findings might shock some
knowledgeable peddlers of the "Kashmir
Question,"' Raina continues, 'those are the
facts.'
Praful Bidwai ('Wanted: policy, not hubris',
Frontline, July 6, 2002) points out two related
problems with the results. First, 'the
overwhelming majority of those who would prefer
to be Indian citizens belong to Jammu and Ladakh,
not to the Valley. The "don't know" answers to
the question are concentrated in Srinagar.' To
elaborate, whereas 99 per cent of respondents in
Jammu and 100 per cent in Leh felt they would be
better off as Indian citizens, 78 per cent of
those in Srinagar said they did not know while 9
per cent felt they would be better off as Indian
citizens and 13 per cent as Pakistani citizens.'
Bidwai explains: 'the 78 per cent "don't knows"
clearly include a large number who subscribe to
azadi or that version of it which equals autonomy
or independence from India, but who reject merger
with Pakistan. Given that the core Kashmir
problem is about the Valley, this is a sobering
thought.'
Second, Bidwai observes that 'the critical issue
within Jammu and Kashmir is not just "free and
fair" elections, but inclusive and free
elections.' In other words, 'fairness in
determining the popular will can mean very little
unless the electoral process involves the broadly
representative spectrum of political opinion in
the State.' As a matter of fact, several currents
of opinion have just not been allowed to function
in Jammu and Kashmir for decades. This fact,
combined with decades of violence resulting in
nearly a hundred thousand civilian casualties,
untold economic misery, and the general
alienation of people from articulated political
process, explain the staggering figure of 'don't
knows', which, as Bidwai pointed out, is crucial
for understanding the situation in Kashmir.
Raina is entirely silent about this part of the
MORI findings. As noted, his strategy is to build
up on the fact that these findings are restricted
to the valley, hence they are irrelevant in view
of the 'all regions' condition imposed by him.
Further, the 'don't knows' don't count since,
according to him, 'unarticulated private
predilections of any group of people in any part
of the state cannot be authorized agenda as the
problem is addressed.' In other words, first we
are advised to overlook the historical conditions
which have led to 'unarticulated' opinion in vast
sections of the people; then we are advised to
ignore the opinion since it is 'unarticulated.'
Raina has another strategy to defray this
'sobering' aspect of MORI findings: for the
valley, instead of depending on the MORI poll, he
shifts to the Synovate poll taken three years
later in 2005, despite his 'all regions'
condition, and juxtaposes these results with that
of the (inconvenient) MORI poll. According to the
later poll, 36.2% Kashmiris in the Valley and
Rajouri (equally muslim dominated) prefer the
India option. This enabled Raina to conclude from
articulated opinion that 'by no stretch of the
imagination then can it be argued that the
overwhelming sentiment in the state of Jammu &
Kashmir is for "sovereign, secular,
independence."' Setting aside the algebraic issue
of whether the remaining 63.8% represent
'overwhelming sentiment', recall the historical
feature of (a) that, as time flows and the
prospects of attaining basic rights recede,
people are likely to resign to less desirable
options in the absence of organized democratic
struggle.
The period between 2002 and 2005 - the post 9/11
world - has seen a setback to people's democratic
struggles in these parts of the world.
Specifically, the turn around in Pakistan's
Kashmir policy under US pressure, the continuing
violence and economic misery, the sectarian
character of the jehadi groups, and the
opportunism of Hurriyat and other political
parties, on the one hand, and the limited
restoration of the electoral process and opening
up of some economic activity, on the other, could
have led to an increase in the resigned opinion.
In other words, there is no evidence that the
crucial democratic test of 'fairness in
determining the popular will', advocated by
Bidwai, has been met. By adopting the synchronic
perspective, Raina has failed to appreciate the
historical condition of people under duress.
Division of people?
Turning to (b) above, let us examine the validity
of Raina's 'all regions' condition. As noted,
Raina has a two-pronged argument: (A) people in
the valley do not have the 'overwhelming
sentiment' against India; (B) taking all regions
into consideration, the 'overwhelming sentiment'
is for India. Combining the effects of (A) and
(B), Raina's ill-concealed message is that, even
if (A) is false, (B) takes precedence. In other
words, even if the people in the valley are
overwhelmingly against India (and for
independence), we should ignore their opinion
since people in the region as a whole want to
remain in India. Raina puts the message
rhetorically as follows: 'how is the desire for
"independence" of half the valley's population to
be squared with the overwhelming opinion in the
valley?' The additional argument that (A) could
well be true just bolsters Raina's strategy. We
saw that (A) is not likely to be true. This
leaves the entire burden of Raina's argument on
(B) alone - the 'all regions' condition.
Since the 'all regions' condition looks like a
classic, pre-emptive, statist move to defray any
demand for secession, the leftist Raina needs to
find 'democratic' arguments in support of the
condition. Alongwith much rhetoric, he weaves in
two facts: (1) "people in all regions are in
general agreement that 'the unique cultural
identity of Jammu and Kashmir-Kashmiriyat-should
be preserved in any long-term solution. Overall,
81% agree, including 76% in Srinagar'; (2) 'An
overwhelming 92% oppose the state of Kashmir
being divided on the basis of religion or
ethnicity.' So the argument is that, since a vast
majority of people wish to uphold 'Kashmiriyat'
and are against the division of Kashmir on
religious or ethnic grounds, the demand for
independence by a section of the population ought
to take the backseat. In fact, those who demand
independence while upholding (1) and (2) - there
must be some given the numbers - are plainly
inconsistent, and hence, they can be ignored.
Notice first that the charge of inconsistency
assumes that if the people in the valley wish to
secede from the Indian state, they would be doing
so on religious or ethnic grounds. Once we decide
to look at people's movements only through
communal or sectarian lenses, we lose sight of
the basic historical issue that vast sections of
people may simply wish to secede from a State. It
is the Indian state the people in the valley are
against, the state that is seen to have
confiscated their own statehood first by
fraudulent means by entering into an undemocratic
pact with a raja, and then by half a century of
accelerating repression. If religion were the
issue, the valley would have preferred the
Pakistan option which is overwhelmingly rejected
by the people in the valley, as the MORI findings
cited by Raina show.
In fact, the charge of inconsistency - if not
downright sectarianism - applies to Raina
himself. Having argued in favor of the view
expressed in (B), Raina also argues strongly in
favour of turning the current LOC (line of
control between India and Pakistan) into a state
boundary since 'Kashmiris that live in what is
called the POK are not Kashmiri-speaking, barring
a sprinkling, and even within the valley there
never has been much love lost between
Kashmiri-speaking muslim Kashmiris and those that
are non-Kashmiri-speaking Mirpuris or Punjabis!
If anything, it is the Pandits who tend to be
missed as blood brothers! Wheels within wheels,
you might say.' Setting aside the issue of
truth-content of these remarks, Raina is now
clearly advocating a division of Kashmir on
ethnic lines in contradiction to the stated
position in (B).
I am not suggesting that there is no tension
between the desire for unity of all Kashmir on
the basis of Kashmiriyat and conflicting
region-wise opinion on the issue of secession
from India. But the difficult task of resolving
this and other conflicts bestows on the people of
Kashmir when they prepare to exercise their right
of self-determination with freedom and dignity.
When the conditions for exercising the will of
the people occur, all parties have the right to
approach the people with their opinion. But,
ultimately, the people must give the verdict on
how they wish the difficult issues to be
resolved. The right of self-determination, in
other words, is supreme and absolute.
It is interesting that Raina barely touches the
fundamental issue of self-determination, and
restricts his discussion only to what he
considers to be hurdles in 'granting'
independence to the people in the valley. Again,
the message is ill-concealed. If independence is
not admissible in the first place, people in the
valley lose the right to exercise this option.
Once they lose the right to exercise a specific
option, the general right to exercise any option
loses meaning. Hence, the people in the valley do
not (really) have the right of
self-determination. As a result, Raina holds that
'the right to secession,' which was 'at one time
a part of the theoretical repertoire of the
undivided Left in India' needs to be revised by
the division of the current left to which Raina
belongs. In the revised picture, basic rights of
the people are viewed by Raina as 'nothing but
another form of Idealism,' 'a thin ground' for
'granting secession'. So, what was viewed as the
basic right of people by the 'undivided Left'
turns out to be dispensable rhetoric for that
strand of the current left which views the stakes
for the Indian state as higher than the rights of
people.
______
[4]
18/19 April 2007
FAMILY LIES
by Mukul Dube
When the Election Commission took the BJP to task
for the communally charged content of its UP
election propaganda CD, that party reacted
immediately by disowning the CD. We see here a
response which characterises the Sangh Parivar:
an outright lie.
The BJP could not continue to hide behind
that lie after the makers of the CD stated on
record that they had been told what line was to
be taken in it and that party high-ups, who were
kept informed at every stage, had approved it
when it was completed and had released it with
some fanfare.
The BJP then swung out its usual second
line of defence: different spokesmen saying
different things, all false. One said that the CD
was the work of uncontrollable fringe elements in
the party, quite forgetting the central
importance of Lalji Tandon in UP. Another said
that the CD was an aberration in a record
presumably unblemished otherwise. There was also
the laughable but unsuccessful distraction of
party luminaries courting arrest: another
familiar Hindutva ploy, the Red Herring Defence.
I have not seen the UP election CD; but I
have seen or heard some of the other propaganda
material brought out by the Hindu Right over the
years, and it has been consistent in its
hate-mongering and its demonisation of Muslims. I
therefore believe the TV channel which broadcast
portions of this CD and said that it was
deliberately not showing some, and that at places
it was silencing the audio track, because they
were altogether too lurid and offensive.
That various limbs of the Hindutva
organism have routinely been putting out such
propaganda without any action being taken against
them is a reflection of the failure of the law
and order machinery to live up to the promise of
religious equality made in our Constitution. That
machinery has failed to uphold what is clearly
stated in various laws. As Achin Vanaik told
Praful Bidwai (Inter Press Service, 12 April
2007): "The BJP got away with murder in the past
because India's establishment failed to apply the
law of the land and pandered to Hindu
majoritarianism."
What is the law of the land? It is
perhaps stated the most clearly in Section 153-A
of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with
"promoting enmity between different groups ...
and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of
harmony."
Had the law been enforced, the now silent
"Sadhvi" Rithambara would years ago have been put
behind bars. Joining her would have been Narendra
Modi, who fought the 2002 Gujarat election
against "Miyan Musharraf", in effect calling not
just Gujarat's but the whole of India's Muslims
Pakistanis, and who notoriously described the
refugee camps for terrorised Muslims in his state
as "breeding factories".
In the matter of the UP election CD,
other branches of the Hindutva "family" have thus
far been silent. Indeed, the fact that the BJP is
not in power in New Delhi seems to have kept them
muzzled since the last general elections. It
remains to be seen if they will be made to swing
into action or if the old charioteer Advani will
begin another "rath yatra". Like those of
Pavlov's subjects, the Family's responses are
conditioned.
______
[5]
Navhind Times
April 15, 2007
EMERGING THREATS TO GOA'S COMMUNAL HARMONY
by Vidyadhar Gadgil
We have just passed the first anniversary of one
of the blackest days in the recent history of
Goa, on March 3, 2006. This day witnessed the
first organised communal violence, taking place
in what has till now been a relatively peaceful
state. Starting from a dispute over a religious
structure, the issue snowballed and led to
unprecedented attacks on the Muslim community in
the Sanvordem-Curchorem area. Fortunately, no
lives were lost, but property worth crores of
rupees was destroyed and looted, and many Muslim
families had to flee for their lives, returning
to their homes after many months. Even today,
there is a noticeable atmosphere of fear within
the Muslim community in the area.
After this incident, there have been many
attempts made to come to terms with the reality
of the situation. There have been many attempts
made to explain away the communal violence in
Sanvordem-Curchorem as an aberration rather than
something that fits in as part of the current
political reality. 'Goa's syncretic culture' and
'Goa's tradition of communal harmony' are phrases
that are commonly heard even now, albeit with a
somewhat defensive note. A commonly expressed
feeling is that Goa, with its 'unique history and
culture', cannot fall prey to organised
communalism and fascism. This ostrich-like
attitude is a sure invitation to future disaster.
Goa has the longest history of colonialism in the
subcontinent. Conquered in 1510 by the
Portuguese, it was under foreign rule for a long
period of 450 years. One of the legacies of
Portuguese rule was a divide between the Hindus
and Christians, as the Portuguese actively
discriminated against Hindus. This historical
fact, like the historical fact of forced
conversions in the 16th century, is an issue that
can become poison in mischievous hands.
Further fault-lines emerged over the years. The
first was at the time of the historic opinion
poll to decide on the issue of a merger with
Maharashtra. Political parties had been formed
with support bases from specific religious
communities, and the ruling Maharashtrawadi
Gomantak Party, with strong support among the
Bahujan Hindu masses, favoured a merger. The
United Goans' Party, with support largely from
the Catholics, was strongly against it. The
opinion of the masses, Hindu as well as Catholic,
was against merger though, and the proposal was
defeated. But, it was a narrow thing: 52 per cent
against and 48 per cent favouring merger.
Then came the Konkani agitation. The Catholics
were united behind Konkani, along with the
upper-caste Hindus. But, the Hindu Bahujan Samaj
was in favour of Marathi. Now we have the script
controversy.
The fact of the matter is that there are deep
divisions in Goan society along religious lines.
The peaceful nature of the Goan population
ensured, however, that there was tolerance, if
not acceptance, of other communities and faiths.
Also, four hundred years of mixing had created
common practices and forms of worship, and this
syncretism did stand Goa in good stead.
Though all the above-mentioned fault-lines and
divisions along religious and caste lines
existed, they had not become a cause of communal
strife. This was largely because there was no
organised right-wing force capable of exploiting
these issues in pursuit of communal politics.
Such a force emerged in the early 1990s. As the
ideology of Hindutva grew in strength all over
India, the RSS, which had only a marginal
presence in Goa until this time, suddenly began
to grow in a spectacular fashion. Benefiting from
the communal mobilisation that had taken place in
India over the Babri Masjid issue, the RSS
established a firm foothold in Goa. Its political
front organisation, the BJP, began to inch closer
to power, and made it there within a decade.
During its years in power, beginning in 1999, the
BJP took decisions that worked to communalise the
polity. Changes were brought in with a view to
bringing the Hindutva agenda into young minds. A
VCD was produced, which propagated a communal
viewpoint, while ostensibly dealing with Goa's
Liberation. Government schools were turned over
to RSS front organisations on one pretext or
another. Efforts were made to communalise the
police force, by ensuring that youth sympathetic
to the Hindutva agenda were recruited.
There was a furore over these attempts, and the
BJP had to backtrack to some extent. It lost
power in early 2005, as another spate of
defections succeeded in toppling the government.
The period which followed has been one in which
the Hindutva forces appear to have rethought
their strategy.
The realisation has crept in that the Christian
minority is substantial and powerful enough in
Goa to prevent overt attacks on it. Though the
anti-Muslim sentiment has always been present as
a sub-text in the discourse of the Hindutva lobby
in Goa, they had not harped on this issue much,
as the Muslims were in a miniscule minority. In
the recent past, the percentage of Muslims in Goa
has risen, largely due to migration, and this
provided a convenient weapon through which to
propagate its anti-minority message. Focusing on
Muslims, and branding them as 'outsiders' helped
to prevent the Christian community from
effectively allying with the Muslims in their
time of trouble.
Whatever Goa's tradition of communal harmony,
today, it is sitting atop a volcano waiting to
explode. The Hindutva forces have been
systematically stoking the fire, and incidents
like the recent desecration of a temple in
Sanvordem-Curchorem are bound to recur, as
mischief-makers engage in acts that will vitiate
the atmosphere. It is clear that March 2006 was
not an aberration, but part of a familiar
pattern, in which the politics of violence and
hatred will continue to escalate, and search for
new victims. The global atmosphere, with the
so-called 'War on Terror', only aggravates
matters.
The government has failed to respond adequately
to this menace. Though it constituted an enquiry
after the March 2006 communal violence, the
report lacks any teeth. The report accepts that
the violence was pre-planned in nature, and says
that systematic rumour mongering led to the
violence. Despite adequate evidence as to the
identity of the rumour-mongers, some of whom the
report even names (like Sharmad Raiturkar, the
BJP candidate from Margao in the 2005
by-election), it shies away from indicting those
responsible, claiming that it is not possible to
identify the hand/s behind the violence. With no
meaningful action being taken, the message that
has gone out is that one can engage in the
politics of hate and violence with impunity.
What is worrisome in such an atmosphere is the
response of the secular forces, many of whom have
been playing a role that can only be described as
soft communalism. After the Sanvordem communal
violence, many voices generally considered
'secular' were actually saying that the Muslims
should not have 'provoked' violence by exercising
their constitutional right to hold a peaceful
protest meeting -- a classic case of blaming the
victims.
An even more ludicrous response was that evoked
by the report of the Sanvordem violence-related
fact-finding committee, headed by internationally
renowned human rights lawyer Nandita Haksar. This
report made an honest attempt to examine the
roots of communalism in Goa. The reaction of the
BJP was predictable -- it condemned the report.
But, many secular commentators also reacted
adversely, saying that the report was bringing
Goa's culture into disrepute! Echoes of Modi's
repeated invocation of Gujarati asmita, the only
difference being that, in Goa, it was the
purportedly secular voices that were vociferous
in attacking the Haksar report on such grounds!
This is the biggest success of Hindutva ideology
-- it has succeeded in making its hate-filled
anti-minority perspective part of general 'common
sense'.
In sum, it is clear that there is no magic potion
in the Goan soil or culture, which is going to
protect the state against communalism. Like any
other part of India, there is plenty of history
and myth, which can be distorted and manipulated
by communal forces. Communalism and fascism may
take somewhat different forms in Goa, but the
nature of the beast is the same.
Communal ideologies have got firmly established
in Goa and it is going to be a long, hard haul
before they are defeated. Almost certainly,
things will get worse before they get better.
______
[6]
Siliconeer
April 2007
Volume VIII * Issue 4
Film Review:
PLEASANT, BUT SERIOUSLY FLAWED:
The Namesake - Reviewed by Partha Banerjee
(Rating **1/2 Mediocre)
(Above): Tabu and Irrfan Khan in "The Namesake"
As a first-generation Bengali immigrant from
Kolkata, I am happy that a long-overdue film to
tell our story to the mainstream American
audience is finally done. I am happy that Jhumpa
Lahiri's best-selling novel and Mira Nair's
making a film out of it explore and expose our
many experiences migrating, living and bringing
up the children in an environment of isolation,
marginalization, and identity crisis. In a
country where mass media and Hollywood are
preoccupied ignoring or undermining the
new-immigrant experience, The Namesake is a
welcome breath of fresh air. Undoubtedly, such a
story would please the open-minded, kind and
liberal Western viewer, and also the
educated-affluent, immigrant family, particularly
South Asians in New York, Boston, Jersey,
Chicago, Houston or Los Angeles, or the many
other small and unknown places they live in.
Readers can visit Partha Banerjee's Web site at:
www.geocities.com/chokmoki/
My problem, however, is that both the celebrated
novel and the Wall Street Journal-honored film do
just that: please a naïve, apolitical audience
that fails or refuses to dig deeper into the
superficial, nice concepts of diversity,
assimilation (or the lack of it), cultural
conflicts and personal tragedies in this
so-called Melting Pot. The story, however well
meant, successfully keeps the first-observer
uninformed about the true tale of a new
immigrant's life and struggle. Just like the
artificial Bengali pronunciations and sentence
constructions by its primary characters - the
Ganguli family, the film, with its often-imposed
and superfluous sequences, misses a great
opportunity to transform the story from an
obvious, broad-brush landscape into a subtle,
masterful one, grounded in earth. That's a
disappointment, because only an act of true
artistry and superior finesse would do justice
both to Bengal and the Bengali diaspora, from
both sides of the British-erected borders. After
all, Nair herself said that the film was "about
my deep love for Bengali life and the city of
Calcutta. And it's an homage to Satyajit Ray's
work."
Perhaps, the new-generation, Westernized Indian
authors and filmmakers with strong preference to
produce in the English language come from a class
so different (and removed?) that the stories they
tell lack that grounding that could come only
from a down-to-earth, grassroots experience to
live and struggle in the place they claim to
know. Mira Nair, Deepa Mehta and Aparna Sen - all
have deep understanding of the film medium; all
of them have created a major canvas or two that
boast about their cinematographic qualities
easily surpassing the run-of-the-mill Bollywood
kitsch. Aparna Sen's 36 Chowringhee Lane or Mr.
and Mrs. Iyer, Deepa Mehta's Fire or Water, and
Mira Nair's Monsoon Wedding or Kamasutra all bear
testimony to that superior mastery over their
tools of the craft. In The Namesake, combine it
with smart and enthusiastic performances by Kal
Penn, Jacinda Barrett or Zuleikha Robinson (and
ignore the against-the-grain-of-the-film, imposed
sex scenes), and you could find an exotic masala
to churn the unfamiliar recipe of the novel into
a rich, visual delight. Even Irfan Habib and
Tabu's purposefully subdued acting went well with
the slowly-unfolding thread of the story
encompassing three generations of a family spread
over two sides of the globe.
But the film simply misses too many points, and
fails to answer too many questions, and follows
the novel too religiously. A Bengali-American
immigrant in U.S., with real experience in the
life, culture and language the story talks about,
and perhaps one with the required acumen to
explore beyond the glossing-over, would thus come
home with a sense of frustration to see that a
multi-million-dollar effort was not used well;
instead, the production company's energies were
spent on pleasing a crowd that has the power to
officially adore, and elevate the stature of the
film in elite circles, who knows, maybe even for
an Oscar nomination as the Best Foreign Film.
After all, it's been the Hollywood trend for the
past number of years.
So, what's missing? For one, in a story of a
Bengali family, the principal characters do not
speak the language. Ashoke and Ashima Ganguli's
Bengali is awkward, to say the least, and the way
they speak it, however sporadically, is anything
but Kolkata-like; in fact, it's bizarre. Gogol or
his sister's grasp (read: no grasp) of the
language could be forgiven as many Bengali
immigrants choose, for reasons unknown to me, not
to inculcate it in their children. But in a
typical, educated Bengali immigrant household
where the apartment wall is adorned with
portraits of poet Tagore and nationalist leader
Subhas Bose (note: no Gandhi - a true Bengali
fact of life, indeed), isn't it only expected
that other essential lifestyle elements would
feature in? But they did not. The Ganguli couple
never cooks a Bengali meal on the stove, listens
to a Bengali song on the stereo, plays a Bengali
movie on TV, or teaches their children the
language via textbooks or stories, even though
these are precious belongings a Bengali immigrant
clings on to, almost as survival gears. Is it
because Ashima comes from a family where reciting
"The Daffodils" is more of a norm than singing
Tagore songs from Geetabitan? But the extended
family in Kolkata, the surroundings, and the more
natural West-Bengali conversations, complete with
grandmothers and all, show otherwise. Gogol, on
his first Kolkata trip, decides to go out
jogging, and before he's stopped by a family
servant from going far (a rather Johnny
Walker-type Bollywoodish spoof from the 60's),
the neighborhood suddenly changes from an upper
middle-class North Kolkata to a dingy and
super-crowded West Kolkata labyrinth. In fact,
other than an obligatory, ten-second sequence at
the Victoria Memorial, Kolkata, a city Mira Nair
said she loves (and I believe her), is mostly
shot at locations reminiscent of The City of Joy
- to overstate its contrasts with the nice and
quiet American suburbs. Even a crowded Queensboro
Bridge looks serene compared to the
Hollywood-forsaken "Armpit in the Third World."
Not that Kolkata is the most picturesque place on
earth; however, the selection of shots is rather
strange. To be fair, though, Nair does show,
rather well, a left-leaning Kolkata through
visuals of protest marches, but even there, she
focuses her camera way too much on the sickle and
hammer.
There are other cinematic flaws. I'd, however,
put more emphasis on the immigrant experience
illustrated in the novel, which is devotionally
transcribed into the movie - it didn't have to be
that way. Gogol's identity crisis is real, but
portrayed imposed. He's torn inside with his
Russian nickname that only his father associates
with, and gets angrier when his American
classmates make fun of the name. However, it
takes his father, who otherwise never spares a
moment to talk about his admiration for Nikolai
Gogol and his writings, literally a generation to
explain to his son what circumstances bonded him
with the name. He finally does it, again in a
Bollywood kind of way, just before his departure
from the family and death soon after. Gogol also
never knew the meaning of Ashima (the one with no
borders), until his wife Moushumi, who's more
fluent in French, told him about it. Moushumi
comes to Gogol's life during an introspection
after his father's death, as if Gogol has matured
now; however she abruptly breaks up within a
year. In an otherwise placid and quiet family,
Gogol dances wildly in his room to the tune of
ear-splitting rock n roll. And after being in
U.S. for so many years, Ashima, a librarian by
now, still finds it uncomfortable to be kissed on
the cheek by his grown-up son's girlfriend. The
educated and apparently modern family's friend
Mira uses a hocus-pocus ritual with a bunch of
red chili peppers (was it meant to be funny? If
so, I didn't get it) on Gogol, to chill him out.
The family comes back from an India trip (when
they left the house safely locked up and
unattended for weeks), and discovers their
mailbox smeared with slurs, but the neighborhood
looks too cul-de-sac'y for such an outburst of
vandalism, if not racism. Other than a handyman
(and Gogol's girlfriend Maxine), the family does
not have any white American guests that would
come and visit the parents or their children - an
unheard-of fact in an educated immigrant family
from Kolkata - and the Gangulis never encounter
African Americans or other persons of color, even
in New York City. In fact, the only underclass
the film shows is a group of poor folks in a
laundromat who take their clothes off in Ashima's
presence, in a manner that one may find
deprecating, especially when that's the only time
you decide to include the less affluent, merely
as a cinematographic detail, a "B-roll."
In fact, the best time the film (i.e., the novel)
makes a strong point about an immigrant's
de-humanization is when Ashima gets the news of
her husband's death through the voice of a
dispassionate telephone operator in a distant
hospital, where Ashoke suddenly dies of a heart
attack. But knowingly or not, the story-teller
decides not to spend any more time on it, and
even though it could have been a major, poignant
moment in the film, it was not meant to be.
Because of the broad-brush, multiple strokes the
film used to paint over this moment, it missed
its chance to highlight in this relevant tale an
extremely mechanized system that's often so
completely detached from humanity that it
traumatizes and tears apart even a so-called
successful, "mainstream" immigrant family.
Also, the film didn't even bother to, and one
might argue, that it didn't necessarily have to,
tell the stories of the millions of other
immigrants whose jeopardy is exacerbated by their
desperate economic and immigration status in an
apathetic and exploitative system, one that
champions diversity and assimilation, but treats
its newcomers with discrimination and misery (the
post-9/11, nightmarish climate is a living
chronicle of that).
Did I like The Namesake? How'd I grade it? Now,
that's the hardest question of all. On one hand,
I know deep in my heart that the storyteller and
the film production company did not do justice to
the intelligent and inquisitive liberal mind -
Western or not - who wanted to know more; they
sort of glossed over a serious and complex
phenomenon that's become a hot-button issue for
politicians, left or right, worldwide.
Unintentionally, I believe, such a mass-market
production would actually help the people in
power to sweep the well-kept secrets about the
real immigrant experience in America deeper under
the rug. And that's a shame.
However, at the same time, I must not also forget
to show gratitude to Mira Nair and her crew that
they, for the first time, managed to put such a
story - our story of hope, pain, sacrifice,
suffering and joy, however partial and fragmented
- up on the big screen, for the consumption and
examination of a larger, mainstream, Western
audience. In that sense, if pleasing that crowd
helps it start examining more about the lives
we're living in alienation, on the many islands -
Bengali, Hindi, Spanish, Mandarin, Punjabi or
Creole - that would be a gain, however little or
late. Until and unless some of us, the more
politically educated activist type, get to make
our own mass form of expression, we'd very
reluctantly accept an effort such as The
Namesake, just because we have little other
choice.
And that's the real predicament.
______
[7]
Book Review / The Hindu
April 03, 2007
NEHRU ON NATION BUILDING
by Suranjan Das
Nehru had central concern for secularism,
cultural pluralism, communal harmony and
toleration
NEHRU'S INDIA -- Select Speeches: Mushirul Hasan
-- Editor; Oxford University Press, YMCA Library
Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001. Rs.
425.
This is yet another notable contribution from
Mushirul Hasan for the enrichment of our
understanding of modern India. Bringing together
judiciously selected `engaging and moving
speeches' of Jawaharlal Nehru, the volume unfolds
the thoughts of the country's first Prime
Minister on nation building. Hasan rightly
considers them as "a voice that we shall gain
much from by returning to more often." This is
especially true when sectarian and fundamentalist
forces constantly threaten the secular and
democratic pillars of our federal polity, when
the steady erosion of the presence of the state
in the realm public welfare is undermining the
structure of mixed economy, and when subservience
to American unipolarism is endangering India's
independence in world affairs.
Vision
The first section on `Sovereignty and the making
of the Indian Republic' presents three of Nehru's
speeches in the Constituent Assembly and his
address from the Red Fort on the second
anniversary of Independence. They outline his
vision of an Indian polity based on
politico-economic democracy, social justice,
secularism and federalism. His reflections
indicate how much he was influenced by the
French, American and Russian revolutions.
Nehru envisaged India's `leadership role' in
world affairs through the pursuit of
non-alignment and Asian solidarity. He, however,
urged his countrymen to be prepared for any
contingency, remaining "firm and not bow down to
evil". But he realised the advantage of
maintaining the British link, of course, without
compromising national sovereignty. That was the
context of his advocacy for India's membership of
the Commonwealth. All these thoughts on India's
foreign policy are recounted in the second
section.
Hasan returns in the third part to Nehru's
central concern for secularism, cultural
pluralism, communal harmony and toleration. The
trauma of the Partition could never be erased
from Nehru's mind. He emphasised the `vanguard'
role of the minorities in building a secular
India. But he opposed `communal representation',
although he supported the policy of reservation
for the Scheduled Castes since the issue was
neither caste- nor religion-centric, but required
to be considered "from the point of view that a
backward group ought to be helped". Nehru placed
a high premium on the role of universities,
viewing them as symbols of `humanism',
`tolerance', `reason', `progress', `adventure of
ideas' and `search for truth'.
Transformation
The fourth section on `The Nation's Vision'
captures Nerhu's thoughts on other crucibles in
India's transformation process. He dreamt of "a
classless society, based on cooperative effort,
where there is opportunity for all". But he
distanced himself from communists, preferring a
`democratic and peaceful transition'. He
propounded the concept of a `socialistic pattern
of society', realisable through planned economy,
land reforms, cooperative farming and
industrialisation - but without eroding the base
of agriculture and cottage industries - and by
`sinking of differences' between labour and
capital. He dubbed the demand for a linguistic
reorganisation of States as `parochial', saying,
"What is infinitely more important is what
happens on either side of the boundary, and what
happens within the state". He also stood for
"unfettered growth" of all Indian languages. A
passionate advocate of scientific spirit, he
hardly missed any inaugural session of the Indian
Science Congress.
I find the last part of the book particularly
rewarding because it incorporates some of Nehru's
less cited speeches. They, as Hasan aptly
remarks, "illumine Nehru, the man behind the
politician and administrator, an intellectual and
philosopher, much in the mode of Plato's
philosopher-King, whom he was so fond of citing."
Nehru's stress on extricating Indian
historiography from `unabashed eurocentricism' -
so brilliantly reflected in his Letters from a
Father to His Daughter and The Discovery of India
- is sharply driven home in his statement to the
Indian Historical Records Commission on December
23, 1948. Nehru underlined the importance of a
museum, which was not merely to be `a symbol of
... unconnected past', but "was meant to interest
and educate ... which connects its objects with
the things the visitors are used to seeing in
their lives and in their environments."
Tributes
This section also contains Nehru's moving
tributes to some of his illustrious
contemporaries. He saw Sarojini Naidu as the
representative of the composite culture of the
East and the West; he compared Maulana Azad with
the `great men of Renaissance'; he revered
Rabindranath Tagore as one of India's sages and
rishis. Many commentators refer to differential
perceptions of Nehru and Gandhiji.
Nehru had the highest respect for the Mahatma
whom he described as "a rock of purpose and a
lighthouse of truth". Referring to the
universality of Gandhian message, he emphasised
"Whatever truth there was in it was a truth
applicable to all countries and to humanity as a
whole".
Nehru was a visionary par excellence, as has been
amply testified to by the speeches presented in
this volume with an appropriate introduction by
Hasan. But much of his vision remained
unfulfilled. We need to explain why there
remained a gap between what Nehru visualised for
a new India and what actually transpired. We look
to scholars like Professor Hasan for an answer.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
More information about the SACW
mailing list