SACW | April 8-10, 2007
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Mon Apr 9 22:45:57 CDT 2007
South Asia Citizens Wire | April 8-10, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2386 - Year 9
[1] Kashmir : You can't take silence for
victory' An interview with Sanjay Kak (Shivam Vij)
[2] Pakistan's disappeared:
- Without a Trace - Declan Walsh
- A Leadership 'Beyond Repair' : An interview
with Asma Jahangir (Ron Moreau)
[3] India: BJP's Temple Index (Pamela Philipose)
[4] India: The Utterances of the high and the mighty (Bina Srinivasan)
[5] India: Modernising fast - but beware if you
try to choose who to marry (Randeep Ramesh)
[6] Book Review : Memory, lived and forgotten (Urvashi Butalia)
[7] UK: Star values (Rahila Gupta)
[8] Events:
Sahmat's new art project, Making History Our
Own (New Delhi, 12 April, 2007)
____
[1]
Tehelka.com
Apr 07 , 2007
YOU CAN'T TAKE SILENCE FOR VICTORY'
Sanjay Kak spent three years making
Jashn-e-Azadi, a documentary. He tells Shivam Vij
India may not yet be ready for withdrawing troops
from the Valley
Sanjay Kak
What was your motivation in making a film on Kashmir?
When I went to Srinagar in 2003 it was after a
gap of 14 years. I was shocked by what had
happened to Kashmir. To walk from our home to the
nearby market in Lal Chowk one had to make it
past half-a-dozen bunkers, with soldiers with
fingers on the triggers of ak-47s, with
transparent magazines with bullets shining
through. This was not the Kashmir I knew at all!
Then as I began to move about the city, and then
to the countryside, the level of militarisation
was so awesome, the fear and sullen anger amongst
the people so palpable - I was convinced there
was something very complex here that needed to be
engaged with.
Would it be fair to say that your film
Jashn-e-Azadi is about the secessionist movement?
It's a film that tries to understand the desire
for azadi without trying to assign to it the
rigid certainties that most Indians seem to
demand of it. Whether that desire amounts to
secession from India, as an independent State, or
a merger with Pakistan, I don't know. I don't
think there is a definitive answer to that in
Kashmir either. But azadi is certainly about
self-determination. And it is the ignorance of
azadi that I find missing in the public discourse
about Kashmir in India.
Neelakash Kshetrimayum
Were you shocked to see the disconnect between the people and the State?
Our ignorance of Kashmiri feelings about India is
the outcome of 60 years of a hermetic, controlled
knowledge system which forces us to think of
Kashmir in only one way: that it's a part of
India. But in Kashmir you will see that there is
a long history to this distance. Many Kashmiris
have not naturally seen themselves as Indian. My
own grandfather was a Kashmiri Pandit, but I can
remember up until the 70s, when he was going to
Delhi he would say he was going to India. He had
grown up in an independent Kashmir, and even
after 1947 a certain distance had remained.
The film acknowledges the use of video from
"anonymous Kashmiri cameramen". How credible are
the archival videos?
That archival video is testimony of an incredible
time. So is the video gathered for network
television today. The filtering actually takes
place in newsrooms in Delhi. It has been my
experience that the often-deadly images that come
from Kashmir can make it to the afternoon news,
but are slowly reduced, until they become
meaningless 30-second news-bites in primetime
news. This works backwards to the crew on the
ground who realise there is no point risking your
life shooting something you know the network
doesn't value. So self-censorship builds in. On
the other hand these "anonymous Kashmiri
cameramen" of the 1990s wanted to communicate a
sense of what was happening there. You can use
video to tell lies, but you can also search
within it for truth. You can decide whether you
want to be exhilarated by the sight of 7,000
people protesting or be terrified by it
The film has not really dealt with the issue of Kashmiri Pandits.
It has often bothered me that all discussion on
Kashmir in Indian public discourse invariably
turns into a discussion on Kashmiri Pandits. In
the last 20 years, there was first a sentiment
for azadi, then an insurrection, and then the
Pandits had to leave. So why can't we, just once,
go back and understand what's behind there, and
then make our way forward?
Most Kashmiri Pandits obviously saw themselves as
a part of India, but how do you resolve a
situation where they are a tiny minority in a
place which is fighting for self-determination?
It was thus not altogether unexpected that they
felt isolated, even targeted, and had to leave.
In this film I wanted to first bridge the
understanding of what the sentiment for azadi in
Kashmir is.
What has happened to Kashmiri Pandits is
terrible, particularly to the rural and poorer
class among them. It is an enormous failure on
the part of Kashmiri society that they have not
been able to resolve. But why is nobody asking me
why I haven't dealt with other important issues
in Kashmir: custodial deaths, the politicisation
of the Army or the continuing presence of
Kashmiri Sikhs there? Does it have to do with the
unacknowledged but tacit assumption that India is
a Hindu country?
Surely all Kashmiri Muslims didn't want
self-determination even in the early 90s.
I can only go by what I hear and read. I think it
is fair to say that in the 90s, the overwhelming
sentiment in Kashmir was pro-azadi. You may take
as evidence what Jagmohan writes in his memoirs,
that when he arrived as Governor in Srinagar in
1990, the only people he could trust were the
security guards at Raj Bhavan!
What were the reasons for such an overwhelming
sentiment of azadi to appear 40 years into Indian
independence?
In my own understanding of Kashmir, I think that
the hundred years prior to 1947 are a very
crucial piece of history. That century of Dogra
rule was highly brutal and oppressive for the
vast, vast majority of Kashmiris, especially it's
predominantly Muslim peasantry. So in 1947 when
the Maharaja left, there was a huge surge in
expectations of what was expected to follow.
There followed the highly successful land reforms
in 1952 that unshackled the productive capacities
of the peasant and led to a self-assertiveness in
the face of perceived injustice. Of course,
Pakistan played an important role in encouraging
these tendencies, particularly after India played
mid-wife to the birth of Bangladesh.
Do you think the Kashmiri Muslims have felt let
down by not just India but also Indians?
Absolutely. The Indian liberal-left-progressive
can and does take a position on the massacre of
Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, or of Muslims in Gujarat
in 2002. Even mainstream media like ndtv and
Indian Express can. But to honestly deal with
Kashmir asks for a lot more from us. If people
are making a sustained argument for some form of
disengagement with the Indian republic for 60
years, should we not at least understand what
they are saying? Or should we say - oh, there've
been human rights violations and if we control
them, all will be well. I think Kashmir forces us
to ask very fundamental questions of how India is
constituted and how much of it is held together
by coercion.
Until 1993, Indian civil liberties groups had a
substantial engagement with Kashmir. But by the
mid-nineties, when the apparently secular jklf
faded out, they were probably not comfortable
when the avowedly Islamic Hizbul Mujahideen took
over the driving seat. But Kashmiri sentiment
didn't change, did it?
In 2007, what do you think the Kashmiri Muslim wants?
The overwhelming demand is that of troop
withdrawal, of a disengagement of the military
apparatus. From ordinary Kashmiri Muslims in the
countryside to even those sitting in the Srinagar
secretariat, they will all say they want
withdrawal of troops.
Has the Indian State been a victor in Kashmir?
Are you talking about the reduction in the number
of militants? A former militant veteran told me
that at a certain point there was a tactical
retreat by the militant leadership. He said "We
didn't want an azadi that nobody was left to
enjoy the fruits of. We could not afford to
continue losing our best young men who were being
killed like flies". But you can't take silence
and domination for victory. The Indian security
forces dominate every aspect of life in Kashmir.
But can they take the lid off even briefly?
Can it?
An Army officer once told us the situation in
Kashmir was totally under control today, unlike,
say the mid-nineties. When was the Army
withdrawing, we asked? He was shocked: Withdraw?
There would be chaos, he said. I suppose he means
that the Army is not only controlling the
militants but also sitting on top of a civil
population. As you lift that lid, there might be
a few surprises in store for India. I'm not
saying militants will run amuck in the Valley but
you never know what form politics will take. You
see how the security forces clear out of the way
whenever there is the funeral of a militant
commander, when thousands come out to protest and
shout slogans of azadi. The film begins with one
such in 1992 and ends with one in 2005. In those
few hours when the lid is lifted, the expression
of rage is in very much the same terms. Over 14
years we hear the same slogans, the same anger
and rage and passion. We can't assume that since
the people are exhausted and if you remove the
chains they will, like docile lambs, walk into
the Indian Union.
_____
[2]
The Guardian
March 16, 2007
WITHOUT A TRACE
Seven-year-old Saud Bugti's father was picked up
by secret police on a street corner in Karachi
last November. No one has heard from him since.
He has joined the ranks of Pakistan's
'disappeared' - victims of the country's brutal
attempts to wage war on both al-Qaida and those
who fail to support the government. But how many
innocent people are being caught up in this? And
what is America's connection to the barbaric
torture of suspects?
Declan Walsh reports
Saud Bugti, 7, whose father disappeared last November. Photograph: Declan Walsh
They vanish quietly and quickly. Some are dragged
from their beds in front of their terrified
families. Others are hustled off the streets into
a waiting van, or yanked from a bus at a lonely
desert junction. A windowless world of sweat and
fear awaits. In dark cells, nameless men bark
questions. The men brandish rubber whips,
clenched fists, whirring electric drills,
pictures of Osama bin Laden. The ordeal can last
weeks, months or years.
These are Pakistan's disappeared - men and women
who have been abducted, imprisoned and in some
cases tortured by the country's all-powerful
intelligence agencies. The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan has counted 400 cases
since 2002; it estimates hundreds more people may
have been snatched. The phenomenon started with
the great sweeps for al-Qaida suspects after
September 11, but has dramatically increased in
recent years, and now those who disappear include
homegrown "enemies of the state" - poets,
doctors, housewives and nuclear scientists,
accused of terrorism, treason and murder. Guilty
or innocent, it's hard to know, because not one
has appeared before a court.An angry Pakistani
public wants to know why. The disappearances are
increasingly perceived as Pakistan's Guantánamo
Bay - a malignant outgrowth of the "war on
terror". This week, the issue moved centre stage
with the showdown between President Pervez
Musharraf and Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry. Many believe the judge is
being victimised for championing the cases of the
disappeared. "These are Gestapo tactics," says
Iqbal Haider, a former minister. "The more we
protest, the more innocent people are being hurt.
And what frightening stories they tell."
For Abid Zaidi it started with a phone call one
afternoon last April. The softly spoken
26-year-old was at work at Karachi University's
department of zoology in a cavernous room of
stuffed animals, sagging skeletons and yellowing
name tags. The voice on the phone instructed him
to report to Sadder police station in the city
centre. There, a handful of men were waiting for
him: he believes they belonged to Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), the army's powerful spy
agency. They clapped cuffs on his wrists, wrapped
a band around his eyes and drove him to a cell.
Then, he says, the torture started.
The men beat him, he says, with a chain, until he
collapsed. He was brought to a military hospital;
there doctors brushed off his pleas for help.
Then he was flown to another detention centre,
where he was shown graphic images of torture.
"People's skin was being removed with knives and
blades and they were being drilled," he says. "It
was really terrible." Then they hung him upside
down from a butcher's hook, his face dipping into
a pool of sewage water.
The interrogators wanted Zaidi to admit his
supposed part in the Nishtar Park bombings. In
early April, a suicide bomber had killed 50
people at a Sunni religious gathering in central
Karachi. The officials accused Zaidi, a prominent
young Shia, of orchestrating the massacre. Zaidi
tried to explain he was more interested in
zoology than zealotry. They did not believe him.
In July, an official told him he had been
sentenced to hang. Zaidi wrote a will. "I felt at
peace because I knew God was with me," he says.
But it was a ruse. At 4am on the morning of the
"execution", having refused to admit his guilt, a
dramatic reprieve was announced. Shortly
afterwards, he underwent a lie detector test and
on August 18 he was flown to Karachi. The
blindfold was lifted. Zaidi was driven through
the city. The car stopped, a man handed him 200
rupees (£1.80) and pushed the car door open. "He
said, 'Don't open your eyes,'" says Zaidi. When
the engine noise had receded, he found himself
standing at a bus stop near Karachi University.
He got down on his knees and prayed. Then he
phoned his brother to take him home.
Zaidi's account cannot be verified because,
officially speaking, he was never in government
custody. However a senior police officer familiar
with the case describes it as a major
embarrassment. "That boy was picked up by a young
officer," says the official, who asks not to be
named. "[The police] knew it was the wrong guy.
But they refused to listen."
The ISI is the most powerful arm of Pakistan's
intelligence establishment, commonly referred to
as "the agencies". Founded by a British army
officer in 1948 and headquartered at an anonymous
concrete block in Islamabad, the ISI is famed and
feared in equal part. Its influence soared during
the 1980s, when it smuggled vast amounts of
American-funded weapons to mujahideen guerrillas
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. More
recently, it has organised guerrilla groups
fighting Indian troops in Indian-controlled
Kashmir. The other major agencies in Pakistan are
Military Intelligence and the civilian
Intelligence Bureau, and all three of these major
agencies have variously been accused of rigging
elections, extra-judicial assassinations and
other dirty tricks.
But until 9/11, disappearances were rare. Then,
in late 2001, as al-Qaida fugitives fled from
Afghanistan into Pakistan, Musharraf ordered that
the agencies show full cooperation to the FBI,
CIA and other US security agencies. In return,
the Americans would give them equipment,
expertise and money.
Suddenly, Pakistan's agencies had sophisticated
devices to trace mobile phones, bug houses and
telephone calls, and monitor large volumes of
email traffic. "Whatever it took to improve the
Pakistanis' technical ability to find al-Qaida
fighters, we were there to help them," says
Michael Scheuer, a former head of the CIA's Osama
bin Laden unit. An official with an American
organisation says he once received a startling
demonstration of the ISI's new capabilities.
Driving down a street inside a van with ISI
operatives, he could monitor phone conversations
taking place in every house they passed. "It was
very impressive, and really quite spooky," he
says.
The al-Qaida hunt became a matter of considerable
pride for President Bush's close friend, the
president of Pakistan. "We have captured 672 and
handed over 369 to the United States. We have
earned bounties totalling millions of dollars,"
wrote Musharraf in his autobiography last year.
(The boast sparked outrage at home in Pakistan
and was scrubbed from later Urdu-language
versions of his book.) Prize captures included
the alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Muhammed, who has apparently confessed to a
string of terror plots after four years as a
captive, and Abu Faraj al Libbi, another alleged
bin Laden lieutenant. But certain innocents were
also swept up in the dragnet.
Brothers Zain and Kashan Afzal, for example, were
detained and beaten many times over eight months
by Pakistani agents convinced they belonged to
al-Qaida. Zain, now 25, remembers that, in
between the thrashings, the "FBI wallahs" - a
woman and two men - would come to visit. "They
showed me a picture of Osama and asked if I knew
him," he says at his home in Karachi. "I told
them I had only seen him on television." As
American citizens - the brothers were born in the
US, where their father lives - they might have
expected better treatment. Instead, they got
threats. "The Americans said if we did not tell
them everything, they would send us to Guantánamo
Bay," says Zain.
Like many of the disappeared, the Afzals had a
colourful past that drew the attention of the
agencies. According to a well-informed source,
their names appeared on a list of potential
recruits found on a laptop belonging to Naeem
Noor Khan, an al-Qaida computer expert arrested
weeks earlier, in July 2004. They were also
questioned about a visit they had made to the
lawless tribal belt of Waziristan. But whatever
they had done, it was clearly not enough to
warrant prosecution by either Pakistan or the US.
In April 2005, they were brought to Lahore
airport, handed a pair of airplane tickets in
other people's names, and set free.
The physical damage has healed - Zain suffered a
burst eardrum - but the mental scars remain. "He
hears voices in the night coming to take him away
again," says his wife Sara. The couple agreed to
meet the Guardian and give their first newspaper
interview in an attempt to press their case for a
new American passport. Despite numerous
entreaties, the US consulate in Karachi has
stonewalled requests to re-issue their passports,
which were confiscated during their arrest. "I am
scared because of what has happened," says Sara.
"Pakistan is not a reliable country, you know." A
US embassy spokeswoman in Islamabad declines to
comment on their case.
The truth is that the American government still
quietly supports the disappearances of al-Qaida
suspects, says Ali Dayan Hasan of Human Rights
Watch, which has documented many cases. "The
abuse has become even more brazen because of US
complicity," he says. He claims that American
officials are regular visitors to ISI safehouses
in Islamabad, Lahore and Rawalpindi where torture
has occurred. They have supervised interrogations
from behind one-way mirrors, he says. In FBI
internal documents, he says, torture is referred
to as "locally acceptable forms of interrogation".
For some detainees the safehouses are the back
door to the mysterious world of CIA "black sites"
- secret prisons in Afghanistan, eastern Europe
and across the Arab world where torture is
allegedly rife. Marwan Jabour, a Palestinian who
was picked up in 2004, recently gave an
extraordinarily detailed account of life in this
system. After being tortured by ISI agents in
Lahore - they strapped a rubber band around his
penis - he said he was moved to a "villa" in
Islamabad where he was questioned by US
officials. "It seemed to me that this place was
controlled by Americans. They were in charge," he
told Human Rights Watch. "They would say: 'If you
cooperate, we'll let you sleep.'" A female
official told him in Arabic, "Fuck Allah in the
ass." One of four fellow Pakistani detainees bore
the marks of severe torture. "You can't imagine
how much they were hurting him," said Jabour, who
was released last summer.
In its annual human rights report published last
Tuesday, the US State Department acknowledged the
disappearances but skated around the US's own
role. "The country experienced an increase in
disappearances of provincial activists and
political opponents," it noted.
In fact, most recent disappearances have nothing
to do with al-Qaida. To quell an insurgency in
Baluchistan - a vast western province with
massive oil and gas reserves - the agencies, in
particular Military Intelligence, have rounded up
hundreds of suspected rebels in the past two
years. Of the 99 abductions registered by the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan last year, 73
were from Baluchistan. Officials believe many
more have gone unreported. Shamsa Toon, a
70-year-old woman, crouches on the pavement
outside Karachi's Press Club clutching a giant
photograph of her son, Gohram Saleh. He has been
missing since August 8 2004, she says; this was
the 166th day of her vigil. Her 13-year-old
granddaughter is threatening to commit suicide if
there was no news. "He's just a cab driver, not
any rebel," she says, tears streaming down her
face. "His only crime is that he is a Baluch."
Musharraf's officials swat the issue away with
blunt denials. "I can say with authority that
these people are not with any agency or
government department," says Brigadier Iqbal
Cheema, head of the "crisis management cell",
which spearheads anti-terror operations, at the
Interior Ministry. "Most of these people creating
a hue and cry belong to the militant
organisations and have jihadi backgrounds. They
are involved in these activities themselves." But
the current confrontation with the chief justice
has brought a renewed focus. Western diplomats
are queasy about such obvious abuses from an ally
they claim is "moving towards democracy". And the
death of Hayatullah Khan, a tribal journalist who
was found dead last June after seven months
apparently in the custody of the agencies, has
further fuelled the outrage.
Last November, Chaudhry, the chief justice,
ordered the agencies to "find" 41 people who had
gone missing. Subsequently, half were quietly
released. But the court actions have mostly just
underlined the impotence of the civilian
institutions in the face of a powerful military
machine. When ISI lawyers plead that they "cannot
locate" certain detainees, the judges can only
fume and bang their benches.
Meanwhile, tearful relatives are left grasping
for even a shred of news. Qazim Bugti, the mayor
of Dera Bugti, a small town in Baluchistan, was
picked up last November. His wife Asmat, left
behind to look after their five children, weeps
when she talks of her husband's disappearance.
"Does President Musharraf not have children of
his own? Would he like to see them treated like
this?" she says in the family's Karachi
apartment. She agrees to speak despite whispered
phone warnings to keep quiet: the agencies do not
appreciate publicity.
Several relatives say they have been instructed
not to contact the media or human rights groups.
Khalid Khawaja, who led a pressure group on
behalf of some detainees, himself went missing
last month. He was reportedly taken to Attock
Fort, a notorious military prison. But the most
audacious disappearance, perhaps, is that of
Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost.
During his three years of captivity in Guantánamo
Bay, Dost, 37, became known as the "poet of
Guantánamo" for his sharp verse. After his
release, he wrote The Broken Shackles of
Guantánamo, and it was published in the Pashto
language last September; it became an instant hit
in Peshawar's bookstalls, selling more than
10,000 copies. It also contained stinging
criticism of the ISI. Weeks later, policemen in a
van abducted Dost as he walked from his local
mosque after Friday prayers. His brother,
Badruzzaman Badr - also a former Guantánamo
detainee - says, "The book is the reason behind
this. They are angry about what we have written.
They claim to have democracy and freedom of
expression in this country, but it is not real."
When Dost's case came before a local court for
the third time in January, the judges again asked
the ISI to produce the missing man. Again there
was no answer. Now Badruzzaman, who has abandoned
his gemstone business and no longer sleeps at
home, fears he will be next. "I do not feel safe,
they could arrest me any time. But where can I
go?" he says.
Abid Zaidi, the zoology student from Karachi, has
also learned the price of going public. In late
October, he travelled to Islamabad to describe
his ordeal before a press conference organised by
Amnesty International. Shortly afterwards he was
picked up again, this time by men in uniform.
Zaidi says they were flushed with anger. "They
told me: 'Next time, we will not pick you up. We
will kill you'".
o o o
Newsweek International
April 2, 2007 issue
THE LAST WORD: ASMA JAHANGIR
A LEADERSHIP 'BEYOND REPAIR'
by Asma Jahangir
These are tough times for Pervez Musharraf. Under
increasing criticism for his inability to control
Islamic militants in the country's tribal areas,
the Pakistani president now faces a revolt within
his own judicial establishment. For the past two
weeks, hundreds of lawyers have staged protests
and gone on strike over the president's decision
to suspend Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry for alleged misuse of
his powers. (The charges include nepotism and an
excessive fondness for luxury cars and aircraft.)
In addition to the demonstrations, eight judges
and the deputy attorney general have resigned,
raising questions over the future of Pakistan's
judiciary-and its leader's grip. NEWSWEEK's Ron
Moreau spoke to Asma Jahangir, one of Pakistan's
foremost Supreme Court lawyers and chairwoman of
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Excerpts:
MOREAU: What is Musharraf's motive for suspending Chaudhry?
Jahangir: Insecure dictators see ghosts
everywhere. This is not the first time it has
happened. He forced the Supreme Court justices to
swear a loyalty oath to him when he came in [via
a bloodless coup in 1999.] He's insecure. Not
only does he want a pliant judiciary, he wants a
totally subservient one. But it's very difficult
in 2007 to have that with today's free media and
the independent bar.
Musharraf claims that he is only following
procedure-that Chaudhry's suspension is standard
reaction to the charges against the chief justice.
The president has tried once again to lie and to
mislead everybody. His move is not as casual and
simple as he puts it. It was obviously
preplanned. He claims that placing Chaudhry under
house arrest was a tactical error. Yet for two
days this "tactical error" continued.
Chaudhry ordered the government to begin looking
into the hundreds of so-called Islamic extremists
who had been detained and disappeared. Is this a
factor in Musharraf's decision?
Musharraf is a very skillful liar, but now he is
losing his touch. He says: "I've been very
worried about the missing people, too, but what
can I do? They are jihadis." He wants the world
to feel that these disappeared people are Islamic
militants, which is not true. I would say 60
percent to 70 percent on the list of the 141
disappeared people that we have given to the
Supreme Court are Sindhi and Baluch nationalists
who are secular. And some of these nationalists
are well known in the country. They are poets and
writers, and their work is secular. They have no
connection to jihad, or Al Qaeda or Taliban.
Either he's living in denial or is misled. But I
think he is just lying.
But Chaudhry ruled that the government should
produce the missing people, didn't he?
As far as the missing people are concerned,
Chaudhry has not given a single judgment on it.
He kept the Human Rights Commission's petition
pending for one and a half months. But since we
are lawyers of renown, it is very difficult for
any judge to kick us around-he had to hear it.
But he went at it very slowly. He did give a
notice to the government [to act], but he really
didn't give a judgment. There was not a single
time when he said that those who kept these
people should be brought to justice. All he was
doing was saying to the government, "Let's find
some people." How can any court close its eye to
hundreds of people who have disappeared?
Was Musharraf worried that Chaudhry would rule
against his retaining a dual role as president
and chief of Army staff later this year?
Whether the president can continue to wear his
uniform or not was not an issue. We do not think
that any judge has that kind of courage,
including Chaudhry. We don't think that these
judges have gumption or courage.
The police roughed up Chaudhry as he went to his hearing last week.
You even see the chief justice on television
being dragged by the hair. It was all over the
newspapers and television. It's a violation of
human rights. What frightens people the most is
that if they can treat a chief justice so
shabbily and humiliate him so shamelessly, then
nobody is safe. We all feel that we are next in
line.
What will happen if the Supreme Judicial Council
exonerates and reinstalls the chief justice?
If the SJC restores [Chaudhry] to the bench I
don't know if he can perform independently
because lawyers are championing his cause. Would
a chief justice who comes back riding on the
shoulders of lawyers be able to sit on the bench
and not be able to think about the fact that he
owes his reinstatement to lawyers?
How do you see this ending?
They [the government] probably feel the longer
they prolong the proceedings the greater the
chance that the movement will eventually fizzle
out. My own assessment is that the situation will
become defused because lawyers can't stay on
strike and keep protesting for months on end. But
this government will make another mistake. This
government is beyond repair.
© 2007 Newsweek, Inc.
______
[3]
Indian Express
April 05, 2007
BJP'S TEMPLE INDEX
Why underplay Ayodhya in UP? Party's reacting to popular aspirations
by Pamela Philipose
Point to be noted. It was not the BJP that
attempted to raise temperatures on Babri
Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi in this Uttar Pradesh
election campaign. It was a Rahul Gandhi
desperate to get his party on the map that has
all but rejected it since 1989.
This time, from all evidence, the BJP is agnostic
about the virtues of flogging the Temple issue,
and the party's manifesto released earlier this
week testifies to this. It is widely realised now
that whipping up communal frenzy against a symbol
that can be invested with hatred is far easier
than whipping up communal frenzy for something -
an observation that Christophe Jaffrelot has made
in The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian
Politics. Election results bear this out. From
its all-time high of 221 seats in the 1991
elections after the Ayodhya campaign, the BJP
could manage only 177 seats in the first
elections after the demolition in 1993.
L.K. Advani may have been the political
sheet-anchor of the Ayodhya movement, but he was
among the first to realise that the BJP needed to
dilute its Temple tinge if it was to grow.
Indeed, it was only after this was done and after
Atal Bihari Vajpayee - the leader least
associated with the Temple campaign - was
projected as the party's prime-ministerial
candidate that the BJP could discard the
'untouchable' status it had acquired because of
the demolition, strike coalitional deals and come
to rule India. The Temple is still, of course, an
intrinsic part of the BJP's ideological and
programmatic identity, as indeed are the demands
for a uniform civil code and the scrapping of
Article 370. It will be faithfully trotted out in
election manifestos for a long time to come. But
the party seems to have long ceded the campaign
to more extremist outfits within the Sangh like
the VHP and Bajrang Dal.
Yet while electioneering in UP, in contrast to
campaigns elsewhere, the party had always
maintained a stridency on the Temple issue. Its
relatively muted treatment this time is therefore
intriguing. There could be three reasons for
this. The first, of course, is the abject failure
of the card to bring in votes. The 2002 UP
elections saw a lot of local political activity
around the Temple. The BJP government at the
Centre revived the Ayodhya cell mandated to clear
all impediments in constructing it. The demand
was also raised that the "undisputed land" around
the Masjid be handed over to the Ramjanmabhoomi
Nyas so that work could commence, even as
artisans were put to work on carving the pillars
of a "grand temple". Meanwhile, the Bajrang Dal
announced its plan to train 10 lakh people in the
martial arts and arm 3 lakh volunteers to
overcome possible resistance to the project. But
the 2002 UP elections saw the BJP lose almost
half the seats it had won in 1996 - from 174, its
tally came down to 88 - with its vote percentage
declining from 33.31 per cent to 25.31 per cent.
It was the BJP's worst performance in 10 years.
The second factor is the transformation of UP. A
great deal has happened in the 17 years since
L.K. Advani's first rath yatra, and perhaps
nothing represented this change more eloquently
than the response to the gravely provocative bomb
attack on the Sankat Mochan mandir at Varanasi
last year. In an earlier era, such an attack
would have led to a blood bath. This time there
was a unified voice of condemnation, and the BJP
and VHP/Bajrang Dal were not allowed to make
political capital out of the tragedy.
There has also been, meanwhile, the rise and rise
of caste-based parties like the BSP and the SP.
Their formidable presence indicates more than the
mere resurgence of identity politics; it reflects
the aspirations of the previously dispossessed to
control power in order to transform their lives.
Political mobilisation along caste lines is also
about bijli, sadak, paani plus education, health
and jobs - but at one remove. UP remains as
always at the bottom of human development chart,
but the difference is that today social
expectations and general awareness are far higher
in the state than ever before whetted by some
social and economic progress. According to the
World Bank and the Directorate of Economics &
Statistics, Planning Department, UP, the number
of the poor in the state has declined from 59
million in 1993 to 48 million in 2002, with
poverty rates in rural areas falling from 42.3 to
28.5 per cent. It is the pressure from below that
is forcing every political party in the current
fray to go beyond its committed voter base;
beyond talking to the converted; beyond pressing
familiar campaign buttons. The SP wants the
Rajput vote along with its Muslim-Yadav base. The
BSP is wooing the Brahmins. The BJP is forced to
do a deal with Apna Dal for its Kurmi-Koeri base,
and project Kalyan Singh not as a Temple savant
but as an OBC messiah.
Which brings us to the third aspect: there is by
no means a consensus within the Sangh Parivar on
how the Temple issue is to be handled, with the
hardliners, convinced that a 'Hindu Vote' can
indeed be consolidated on this issue, pitted
against those who believe gaining power demands a
broader appeal. The recent resistance within the
BJP to allowing Yogi Adityanath to dictate terms
when it came to seat sharing - even after he had
threatened to field his own candidates under the
Hindu Mahasabha banner - underlined this divide.
It took the considerable weight of the RSS and
saffron stalwarts like Ashok Singhal to bring
about a compromise on the issue. Today, the hope
of consolidating the 'Hindu Vote' is leading the
party to woo Uma Bharati, whose party has plans
to contest from a hundred seats in the state.
The results of these elections will decide how
the BJP will play its Temple card in the future.
But it is clear that the fallen domes of the
Masjid and the imagined spires of the Mandir have
come to acquire a whole new sub-text in the
heartland today. Listen to what poet Jamuna
Prasad Upadhyaya from Ayodhya has to say: "Namazi
bhi nahin hain, pujari bhi nahi hain/ jo woh
Masjid aur Mandir ke liye ghamgin rehte hain/
Ayodhya hai hamari aur hum sab hain Ayodhya ke/
phir kyon surkhi mein Singhal aur Shahabuddin
rehte hain?" (There is nobody to read the namaaz,
nobody to conduct the puja/ They remain bereft of
the Masjid and Mandir/ Ayodhya is ours and we are
Ayodha's/ So why in the headlines do Singhal and
Shahabuddin remain?)
______
[4]
http://www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/bina7april2007.html
www.sacw.net > Communalism Repository - April 7, 2007
THE UTTERANCES OF THE HIGH AND THE MIGHTY
by Bina Srinivasan
How blithely he said: Forget about the post
Godhra violence, citizens of Gujarat, there is so
much investment coming into the State. This, in
his capacity as chairperson, IIM Ahmedabad.
So, now all of us can live happily ever after.
After all, there are shopping malls galore that
have replaced the simple vegetable markets and
the like. And there is Pizza Hut, and MacDonalds
and so on. Each name more bizarre than the rest.
I think about Gujarat. All the time. And, something starts crumbling.
What is it that begins to fall apart in Gujarat?
Is it the notion of democracy, citizenship? I
wonder. Maybe. Or maybe it is more than that.
Like sheer humanity. When my neighbour tells me
that in 2002, she told her domestic help that she
should also go and loot the near by fruit
vendor's place, since everybody was doing it, a
chill runs through my spine.
What happened to her, my neighbour? Who is so
good to me, so good with plants, with mongrel
dogs, who gather each day at her gate for their
meals. I admire her. Yet, I don't.
Lately, I heard that there have been more than 30
'encounter' deaths in 2006 in a span of seven
months in Gujarat. Three guesses for the
religious community of these people, who were
picked up and done to death. Just like that.
Come easy. Go easy. As they say. Yet going is
never easy. Especially not when you are being
raped by policemen and then being burnt alive.
You must remember that Gujarat is a fascist
paradise. And the erosion of democratic rights
is complete. Specially if you are poor, Muslim
and a woman. No jokes intended. I have always
said so and will reiterate: we saw the
transformation of the state. It's a Hindu
Rashtra.
All of you who are skeptical about these words.
Just also mark these words. Gujarat was no
laboratory, as a friend of mine pointed out today
to me. It was and is just ripe. Like, an
Alphonso mango.
And now we are told we must forget about Godhra
and its aftermath. That means we blank ourselves
to the 81 relief colonies that exist. Or the
number of women who have been forced to take to
sex work. Or the families who live in abysmal
poverty, denied now of sanitation, water supply
and what have you. Don't even talk about
luxuries of education. Did I hear somebody say,
education for Muslim girls?? Now, that is a joke.
A Hindu Rashtra out to eliminate a quarter of its citizens.
Let's all forget Hitler too.
I have middle class Muslim friends whose eyes go
weird with tears when they talk about living in
ghettos.
Helpless. Hopeless.
Unless we take to the streets.
The other end of the spectrum, of course, is
Nandigram. Screaming and screeching with the
truth about a world riven with globalisation, and
a different kind of fundamentalism.
Want to flip a coin and make a choice? Choose.
And then tell me if you can live happily ever
after. I will migrate to your island.
______
[5]
The Guardian
April 9, 2007
MODERNISING FAST - BUT BEWARE IF YOU TRY TO CHOOSE WHO TO MARRY
LOVE STORIES HIGHLIGHT DURABILITY OF CLASS AND RELIGIOUS DIVIDES
Randeep Ramesh in Kosamba
Amir Mirza first noticed his future wife, Swati,
when she arrived at the home of a physics tutor
they both went to. Four years on, he still
recalls it was her "really green" eyes that made
a lasting impression. In between classes the
teenagers would chat about grades, exams and the
difficulties of getting into good colleges.
Friendship blossomed in the dusty streets of the
Indian town of Kosamba, in Gujarat.
Soon Amir and Swati were falling in love. Their
conversations turned to marriage and kids. Few in
modern-day Britain would consider that unusual.
But in small town India, Amir and Swati had dared
to break two social taboos, with disastrous
results. Not only had they chosen each other
without parental consent but Amir, a Muslim,
wanted to marry a Hindu.
What followed was a cautionary tale about love
and marriage in a country where economic progress
has brought only superficial changes to a
conservative society. Marriages are arranged in
the interests of the family or community -
choosing a partner is too important a step to be
left to chance.
Towns in Gujarat are distinguished by a religious
segregation. In Kosamba Hindus and Muslims live
on opposite sides of the main road and rarely mix
more deeply than meeting in markets and schools.
"My parents were against [the marriage]. Her
parents had problems. Our friends thought it was
a bad idea. At that time we only had ourselves,"
says Amir. To be together they eloped to the
southern city of Bangalore.
"We had to get away. I took out all my savings,
about 8 lakhs (£9,500), and we got married on 21
June 2006. The happiest day for us."
In an attempt to win over their parents, the
newlyweds returned to Gujarat a few months later,
only for a now-pregnant Swati to be kidnapped by
her family. "They invited us over for lunch and
then grabbed me from the car with the help of
some of their friends," she says, blinking away
the tears.
Drugged and locked up in her brother's house, the
19-year-old says she was forced to sign papers
claiming her husband had assaulted her. Later she
was taken to a hospital where she was
anaesthetised and an abortion of her 63-day-old
foetus induced.
"I lay down with terrible stomach pains. There
was blood and I blacked out. I do not remember
anything but know I lost our child," says Swati,
who escaped after two weeks' imprisonment. She
says her family disowned her after she refused to
renounce Amir. Swati says her family's actions
mean she will take a new name, Mariam, and adopt
"as much Islam" as she can.
The couple are now in hiding but they agreed to
be interviewed at the Mirza family home. Amir
says his parents have reluctantly agreed to their
marriage. "No one is happy," he says.
Across the road in Kosamba's Hindu suburbs is the
home of one of the men accused by the young
lovers of kidnapping Swati. Mohan Chowksi, a
local jeweller, admits comforting Swati's family,
but denies any crime. "Under our customs Hindus
should not marry Muslims. But I did not take the
girl," he says. "The Muslims have brainwashed
her. She is not madly in love - just mad."
Despite modern India's new malls and shiny office
blocks, traditional values are deeply entrenched
in a society where family, caste and religious
obligations persist. Nowhere is this more obvious
than in affairs of the heart. An opinion poll of
15,000 people, carried out in January by Delhi's
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies,
found that 70% of Indians thought parents should
have the final say in marriage. Less than a third
of young people said it was OK to "date".
Some couples have defied their parents and
settled down despite the disapproval - but almost
all come from the upper and middle classes.
Josephine Joseph, a Christian, had to wait six
years to marry her Hindu husband, B P Thanmaya.
Both come from highly educated, liberal families.
Josephine, 30, says she had had two close
relationships before; but her family expected her
to marry a Christian from her home state of
Kerala.
"My mum kept saying my dad was unwell, and could
not break the news to him. Really she did not
know how he would react. There was a lot of worry
about what [Christians] would say."
"My father-in-law wanted me to convert [to
Hinduism]. I refused. We wanted to get married to
each other. It took years but in the end everyone
had to accept it. It was a church wedding one day
and a Hindu one the next."
The most vehement opposition in India is to
inter-caste marriages. In the survey,
three-quarters of Indians said it was wrong to
marry a person from a different caste. India
remains a stratified society and the caste system
relies on marriages being arranged to preserve
bloodlines and lineage. A romance across the
caste divide is often fatal. In the back streets
of a poor housing colony in east Delhi, a father
weeps for his dead son. Chander Bhan Kumar, who
comes from a dalit, or untouchable, community,
says his eldest boy, Kishan, was killed because
he dared to marry an upper-caste girl, Laxmi, in
2005.
Her family abducted her 10 days after the
ceremony, and the two were kept apart. Mr Kumar
says Kishan, 26, refused to give up hope. But
last November he was shot dead while sitting on
his motorbike in traffic.
Five men, including Laxmi's two brothers and
father, have been arrested. The police said the
brothers killed Kishan to "avenge humiliation".
"Kishan loved that girl, but the family could not
bear marrying into our family," said Mr Kumar.
"It was shame for them. But my son had his heart
broken and then was killed. All because of love.
Even today, being low caste can lead to death."
In many aspects, Indian marriages appear more of
a commercial transaction than a romantic
expression. Matrimonial adverts carried on the
internet and in newspapers generally list the
caste, age and education of prospective brides.
Women are marketed as "fair" or with a "wheatish
complexion". Dowries are widely negotiated,
despite being illegal.
Dipankar Gupta, professor of sociology at Delhi's
Jawaharlal Nehru University, says there is "very
little real freedom to choose one's own way in
life.
"India is not a liberal society in that sense.
Marriage is a very obvious example where even
today most young people cannot easily choose
their own partner."
Backstory
The triumph of romantic love may be celebrated in
Bollywood but it is estimated that 95% of Indians
have arranged marriages. Marriage in India is a
union between two families rather than two
individuals. The procedure tends to follow a
strict pattern. A girl's parents put the word
about that they are looking for an "alliance".
India's scores of marriage websites are well
subscribed to and pages buzz with pictures and
CVs. Once a suitable boy has been found, families
exchange summaries that list a person's
attributes. Horoscopes are also consulted. There
follows tea so that prospective groom and bride
can check each other out. If they like each
other, more discreet meetings can be arranged.
Once a proposal is accepted, it is not unusual
for families to check that the groom was honest
about his job and income. Dowries, under the law,
can be given but not asked for. In reality there
is a negotiation. Divorce rates are rising, but
the law is biased against women - who unlike
their counterparts in the west are only entitled
to maintenance and alimony, not a chunk of wealth.
______
[6]
www.sacw.net > Partition of 1947
http://www.sacw.net/partition/Urvashi9April2007.html
Book Review
MEMORY, LIVED AND FORGOTTEN
Ravinder Kaur's work breaks new ground in the study of Partition to understand
how it still affects its inheritors
by Urvashi Butalia
( The Financial Express, April 1, 2007)
[Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi
by Ravinder Kaur, Oxford University Press, 2007]
Among the recent spate of books on the Partition
of India, Ravinder Kaur's stands out for its
meticulous attention to detail and its wealth of
information. Her focus on the city of Delhi, and
within that three resettlement colonies, and a
specific time period stretching from 1947 (not
August but March when the actual movement of
people began as a result of the early
disturbances) to 1965, the year the
rehabilitation programme was officially closed,
both marks this book as different and enables a
close, detailed examination of one aspect of this
multi-layered history.
Kaur turns her attention to the lived experience
of Partition among refugees who arrived in and
made the city of Delhi their home. She examines
how the shape of the city changed and how the
process of such change, impacted the lives of the
migrants. Taking the widely accepted image of the
Punjabi refugee as enterprising, dynamic, proud,
and hardworking, she asks why it was that Delhi,
for example, did not see the kind of violence
that Karachi fell into very shortly after the
influx of refugees there. Why was it that the
Punjabi refugee in Delhi was more acceptable than
his/her counterpart in Karachi?
But more, Kaur's work breaks new ground in the
now increasingly important study of Partition and
memory. Looking at the link between private and
collective memory, Kaur shows how the two
influence and shape each other. Partition
refugees often personalize stories of general
violence and trauma, telling, and feeling them to
be their own, and marking the shifts in political
climate, location, as felt, personal things. Her
introductory chapter explores this in detail,
pointing out that many Partition studies have
looked at the then and after of Partition
refugees, but have not necessarily addressed the
process that went into the making of a refugee,
and into the making of his or her life thereafter.
She further complicates the discussion of memory
by showing how the fragemented ways in which
memory is stored in an individual's mind can
often turn, in the narrating of such accounts,
into a linear narrative where the connections can
be borrowed from the received collective
recounting of the meta narrative of that event.
In this way, according to her, the meta and micro
narratives overlap and inform each other.
The whole question of the definition of who is or
who is not a refugee is also discussed. People
who had already left their homes for one reason
or another, before the events of August 1947 and
who were subsequently unable to return, became,
willy nilly, refugees. But the official
definition of refugee did not have the space to
accommodate them, for in order for it to do so,
they would have had to have fled across an
international border. The arbitrariness of dates
and state definitions touched people's lives in
profound ways.
Supplementing this question is another key area
of enquiry: what does it mean to speak of
refugees being well settled. Who defines what
being settled is, and Kaur suggests that any
attempt at definition must engage with the local
groups that have emerged out of this 'critical
event' (to borrow Veena Das's formulation), and
the new modes of action and behaviour that came
in with them, for, according to her, the
pre-history of critical events is as important as
the event itself.
Kaur's conclusions support much of what has been
learned and offered by recent enquiries into
Partition and its multiple histories. As more and
more fields of enquiry open up, it becomes
increasingly clear that there is no longer one,
single, undifferentiated narrative of Partition.
Rather, such a major historical event contains
within it multiple, layered and nuanced
narratives - which are in turn encoded within
various layers of silence dictated by class,
location, gender, majority or minority status and
so on and which enable us to seek out its
multiple histories. In that sense this book is a
welcome addition to the increasing body of
literature that is engaged in this important
exercise.
______
[7]
The Guardian
April 7, 2007
STAR VALUES
This week's premiere of Provoked exemplifies how
the allure of celebrity can be put to good
purpose.
by Rahila Gupta
On Tuesday night I attended the Leicester Square
premiere of Provoked, a British Asian film based
on the story of Kiranjit Ahluwalia, an Asian
woman who set her brutal husband alight after 10
miserable years. I was at that vibrant indoor
mela for three good reasons: as a member of
Southall Black Sisters, who had secured her early
release from prison; as a co-writer of her
auto/biography, Circle of Light (now re-issued as
Provoked) on which the film was based, and as
someone who had co-scripted the screenplay of the
film itself.
From the moment that Aishwarya Rai, Bollywood
superstar and face of L'Oreal, agreed to play
Kiran, the production has rarely been out of the
media spotlight. When she signed on the dotted
line, the money began to roll in and we were
assured of audiences who wouldn't normally bother
with a film about domestic violence. She - along
with Nandita Das and Steve Mcfadden, of a star
cast which includes Miranda Richardson, Robbie
Coltrane and Naveen Andrews - were in attendance
at the premiere.
Imagine an almost completely full 1,300-seater
cinema: as a writer and activist, that is truly
gratifying. For me, writing is politics by other
means. To bring about change it is necessary to
raise awareness as widely as possible. Large
waves of raucous humanity rose and subsided on
the rumour that Aishwarya Rai was in the
building. When she finally made her appearance,
the crowd went berserk. I saw young British-born
Asians falling at her feet (literally), normally
a gesture of respect reserved for older people on
the sub-continent.
There we were, SBS, a small band of activists,
thrilled at the possibility of reaching those
sections of our community that are hard to
mobilise in such large numbers for a "cause". Rai
had made this possible. Internet chatrooms
populated by young Asians have been buzzing with
debate about the rights and wrongs of Kiran's
actions. Domestic violence has permeated public
consciousness as never before.
The allegation that Rai herself has faced
domestic violence also helps to make the point,
both explicitly and implicitly, that this affects
women of all classes when it can disempower
someone as powerful as Rai.
The choice of Rai was a controversial one. It was
the question I got asked most frequently by
journalists. Some even made the ridiculous
argument that she was too beautiful to be beaten.
It is true that Rai is not renowned for her
acting abilities. However, this has been her best
performance to date. There may have been other
actors who would have done a better job but they
do not have her pulling power. What we gain in
reach, we lose perhaps on subtlety and intensity.
But what the goddess giveth, she also taketh
away. For all her lofty comments in support of
Kiranjit's plight, Rai refused permission for the
film's poster to be used on the cover of Kiran's
reissued auto/biography which made it a less
attractive proposition to publishers. Our brush
with celebrity left us bruised rather than
shining in its glow.
Whilst we should acknowledge that her celebrity
will deliver audiences, the benefits are mutual.
Why did Rai agree to take on a role like this or
indeed why did the director, Jag Mundhra think it
was an important film to make? Surely SBS has to
take the credit for that. The historic change in
the law on provocation was brought about by a
group of black women doing good, solid,
old-fashioned, groundbreaking work. Immortalising
that moment of history on celluloid has its own
attractions for celebrities like Rai whose
fluffiness gains weight through participation.
Maybe this film will help put her career back on
the road from Bollywood to Hollywood.
Rahila Gupta is on the management committee of
Southall Black Sisters. She co-wrote the book
Provoked, with Kiranjit Ahluwalia and the
screenplay for the film. The book can be ordered
for £8.99 by emailing
<southallblacksisters at btconnect.com>
______
[8] EVENTS:
Sahmat's new art project, MAKING HISTORY OUR OWN,
at The Indian Women's Press Club, on National
Street Theatre Day, April 12th, 2007 at 5.30pm
SAHMAT
8 Vithalbhai Patel House
Rafi Marg, New Delhi 110001
Tel: 2371 1276, 2335 1424
E Mail: sahmat at vsnl.com
April 6, 2007.
Sahmat invites you to view their unique new art
project, Making History Our Own, at The Indian
Women's Press Club, on National Street Theatre
Day, April 12th, 2007 at 5.30pm. This year-long
travelling project was launched here in Delhi,
and will return next January after crossing the
country. Artists have been invited to make work
which interprets their own histories and
inspirations or their own vision of the National
histories which will be commemorated this year -
1857 and 1947. The collective personal visions
will add up to a visual history of the arts in
our country. Many senior artists and Sahmat
regulars are contributing work as well as many
younger and emerging artists.
They include Gulammohammed Sheikh, Neelima
Sheikh, Zarina, Arpita Singh, Paramjit Singh,
Shobha Broota, Vivan Sundaram, Shamshad Husain,
Pooja Iranna, Jehangir Jani, Ram Rahman, Sunil
Gupta, Manisha Parekh, Indersalim, Gigi Scaria,
Meera Devidayal and Lalitha Lajmi amongst many
others.
The exhibition is on the web at:
www.sahmat.org/makinghistoryourown.html
Indian Women's Press Corp, 5 Windsor Place, New
Delhi 1. Opposite Meridien Hotel. Till April
19th, 11 am - 10 pm.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
More information about the SACW
mailing list