[sacw] SACW #2 | 23-24 Feb. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #2 | 23-24 February 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Assault on Minorities in Bangladesh: An analysis (Meghna Guhathakurta)
#2. India: Closure of Hoshangabad Science Teaching Program (Vinod Raina)
#3. India: Supreme Court will hear a petition challenging the BJP's=20
attempts to saffronise education
#4. India: Christian Council moves NHRC against ICHR seat for=20
minorities-baiter N S Rajaram

________________________

#1.

Meghbarta
January 2002

ASSAULT ON MINORITIES IN BANGLADESH: AN ANALYSIS

Meghna Guhathakurta

The post-election violence in Bangladesh (2001) specifically=20
targetted the Hindu minority population though in a broader frame it=20
also encompassed Awami League supporters and other progressive forces=20
in the rural areas. The violence has largely been known to be=20
initiated by BNP supporters in various localities. The backlash after=20
the elections was systematic and severe. Bangladeshi press has=20
reported that attackers have entered Hindu homes, beaten family=20
members and looted their property and rape and abduction of women too=20
were reported. Though these attacks were condemned by national as=20
well as international institutions, a silencing process has also been=20
at work both as a result of terrorising policies of the ruling party=20
as well as the self-censoring practices of the liberal civil society.=20
It is the roots of this silencing process which I wish to highlight=20
in this article, because it unpacks questions of class hegemony in=20
the current Bangladesh state. I therefore locate the question of=20
religious minorities in Bangladesh in the broader frame of the class=20
discourse.

Class formation through Extortion: a background

In the aftermath of independence, itIn the aftermath of independence,=20
it was thought by some scholars that Bangladesh had a ruling class=20
but it was not an hegemonic one. The reason behind this proposition=20
was that the power base of the then Awami League who had an absolute=20
majority in parliament, were predominantly petit bourgeois and the=20
rural rich, who did not have enough control over the=20
military-bureaucratic oligarchy which had traditionally controlled=20
the 'overdeveloped' Pakistan state. Rapid private accumulation during=20
this regime therefore took the form of plundering and extortion of=20
nationalized state resources represented by public sector. During=20
this phase two methods were used to appropriate surplus, one by=20
directly selling the distribution licenses gained through political=20
connections with the regime, and secondly, through siphoning off the=20
margin gained from the difference between ex-factory prices and=20
market clearing prices. It may be mentioned that although industries=20
were nationalized the distribution of products remained in the hands=20
of the private sector. A group of businessmen with close links with=20
the regime obtained distribution licenses and then sold them to the=20
private distributors. In this way the class which received state=20
patronage received jobs in the nationalized industries, grew rich as=20
smugglers, appropriated abandoned property and sold off government=20
permits and licenses to the highest bidders.

The military coup-d'etat which toppled the AL government in 1975=20
represented to a large extent a section of the military-bureaucratic=20
oligarchy who inherited their power from the Pakistan era and who=20
felt their power threatened by the attempted hegemonic control over=20
the state apparatus by the AL power base. It must be mentioned that=20
the class base of the newly established BNP were the same as the=20
previous regime, but who represented the section which throughout the=20
Pakistan era had been enjoying the privileges and patronage of the=20
state and had been annoyed at it being taken away from them in the=20
newly independent Bangladesh.

The resentment against officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan was=20
made manifest in the issueing of the Presidential Order No. 9 which=20
removed the constitutional protection enjoyed by the civil servants=20
of Pakistan (CSP) and subjected civil servants to dismissal without=20
cause or recourse to court review. This was used to purge the=20
bureaucracy of non-Awami leaguers and to replace them by Awami League=20
loyalists. Bureaucratic infighting prevented any resistance being=20
built up against this onslaught, but those who remained harbored a=20
growing sense of injustice, resentment and alienation towards the=20
Awami League. The situation of the military vis a vis the government=20
was worse. The military in post-independent Bangladesh found its=20
corporate interests threatened by the new government. The formation=20
of the Jatiyo Rakhhi Bahini a parallel paramilitary organisation=20
particularly instigated the military.

The change in regime did not witness a change in the basic=20
extortionist tendencies inherent in the previous regime. In many=20
cases it only meant a change of sides by the same 'beneficiaries'of=20
the previous regime, viz. Businessmen and subcontractors. One of the=20
vivid examples of this volte face has been described in Nilima=20
Ibrahim's Ami Birangona Bolchhi, from the perspective of a raped=20
victim of the 1971 war who helplessly witnessed her husband=20
compromising his role as a freedom fighter in order to obtain=20
licenses from the BNP government. But the change also meant=20
additional benefits and priveleges to those alienated by the previous=20
regimes. This meant the restoration of the power and privileges of=20
the bureaucracy, expansion of the military, centralization of power=20
in the hands of an elected president. Under Ziaur Rahman, the=20
'militarization'of the bureaucracy took place as he provided jobs for=20
senior officers at all levels of his administration. Six out of=20
twenty secretaries, 14 out of 30 superintendents of police, 10 out of=20
20 top public sector corporate dictatorships and some 32 diplomatic=20
posts were filled by officers drawn from the military. The floating=20
of the Bangladesh Nationalist party itself a conglomerate of diverse=20
interests (the support base which was drawn from sections of the=20
military, the bureacracy, the business community, pro-China radicals,=20
pro-Islamic elements and former members of the Awami league who had=20
opposed Mujib's authoritarianism), was held together by Ziaur=20
Rahman's patronage in the form of jobs, bank loans, licenses and=20
permits. Under Ziaur Rahman therefore corruption became=20
institutionalized. In a speech delivered in 1979, he himself admitted=20
that "corruption and misuse of power have led to the wasting of=20
almost 40% of the total resources set apart for development."

The military coup of March 1982 led to the creation of an=20
authoritarian military bureaucratic state dominated by general=20
Ershad. Following in his predecessor's footsteps, Ershad created his=20
Jatiyo Party to legitimize himself and even more than the BNP it was=20
held together by generous political patronage. Also lacking an=20
overarching ideology with which to attract popular support and=20
legitimacy he attempted to use religion, making Islam the state=20
religion. This was a mere consolidation of a trend started by his=20
predecessor.

Under Ershad, corruption became all pervasive. It included petty=20
corruption, project corruption, e.g. taking large commisions for=20
securing large public sector contracts and programmatic corruption,=20
e.g. food scandals. Ershad's government was not popular among=20
students and urban middle-classes. Their discontent culminated in the=20
mass movement of 1990 which created conditions for his forced=20
resignation from office.

The end of Ershad's rule coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet=20
Union and the worldwide movement for democracy witnessed the end of=20
direct rule of the military in Bangladesh politics on the one hand=20
but also heralded in a polarization of party politics between the BNP=20
and the Awami League to a level which even involved public and=20
professional institutions like the University, Bar Associations and=20
civil society forums. But it is important to bear in mind that the=20
polarization occurred at a superficial ideological level of Bangali=20
versus Bangladeshi nationalism or as many would like to purport at=20
the level of personalities i.e. a fight between the 'two ladies'. The=20
polarization therefore did not occur at the level of class. Conflicts=20
therefore between Awami League and BNP were more about power-sharing=20
than anything else? share in jobs, acquired property, business=20
licenses, tenders as has been nakedly demonstrated in open disputes=20
between the two students branches of the mainstream parties in=20
various University campuses. What has been bothering many=20
middle-class intellectuals and donors alike has been not so much the=20
disputes themselves but the "crude"and violent ways of resolving=20
them. According to them, the ideal and more "civilized" way of=20
resolving such disputes should have been processes of=20
consensus-building worked through democratic institutions such as the=20
parliament or meeting over a table in a local hotel as has been the=20
case in past resolution of conflicts between student branches of the=20
parties. But the near absence of the opposition in parliament and the=20
resolution of political issues out on the streets, much to the=20
annoyance of our liberal middle-class intellectuals and donors alike=20
have failed to bring about a happy working out of the principles of a=20
power-sharing consensus. That is why much of the take-over of power=20
(whether by Awami League or BNP) resembles the politics of 'char=20
dokhol' (occupation of charlands) that which is more typical of a=20
thriving peasantry than a burgeoning bourgois democracy!! But the=20
above history of class formation in Bangladesh through processes of=20
extortion and plundering should serve as a powerful reminder to us=20
that this is not a new phenomenon.

But before we bring in the issue of minorities into this class=20
discourse, there are two dimensions of class formation in Bangladesh=20
which draws our attention. The first is the element of kinship and=20
the other the increasing integration of Bangladesh into the world=20
capitalist system.

Kinship and Power Structure

Kinship as an integral element of the power relations has been well=20
researched in the context of Bangladesh village studies in the early=20
seventies. What has not been so closely researched however has been=20
how kinship also relates to the more elitist power configurations at=20
the core of national politics in Bangladesh. Since most of the=20
political leadership in Bangladesh ensues from the expanding=20
middle-class, it is not uncommon to find blood relatives among=20
political personalities belonging to even diverse ideological camps.=20
Thus although on one hand, competetion at party level can become very=20
violent and intolerant, the kinship factor exists almost as a buffer=20
zone where extreme views or positions are often negotiated. This has=20
been a clever entry point used by Islamist parties who wanted to gain=20
credibility in society. For example in the case of Rajshahi=20
University, members of Jamaat e Islami has been encouraged to marry=20
into families in university administration and therefore enhance=20
their status within the campus. This is also the reason why even=20
though there be political instransigency at the party level, members=20
of antagonistic parties are quite commonly seen together at social=20
events. It is this feature in Bangladesh politics which often enables=20
one to bypass or even subvert political positions such as right or=20
left or political issues such as the trial of war criminals of 1971.

The kinship factor also brings into play a particular pattern of=20
gendered politics which is often invisibilized at the level of a=20
political system. Since family and kinship ties are important in=20
power configurations women often forms the means through which=20
dominant power configurations may be made manifest. Hence abductions,=20
forced marriages, rape of women belonging to marginalised groups,=20
such as minorities or opposition party cadres are often resorted to=20
in the politics of domination. A less violent but nevertheless=20
effective method of inscripting women into the politics of class=20
hegemony is through encouraging 'political marriages' where an MP or=20
better still a Minister as a father-in-law can help smooth out=20
processes of obtaining licenses, securing jobs or ordering transfers=20
of lucrative government posts. It is also this kinship factor which=20
serves to exclude to a large extent religious and ethnic minorities=20
from the centres of power. Although technically speaking there is=20
nothing to prevent minorities to participate in mainstream politics=20
in Bangladesh and hence bring in their own kinship structures into=20
play, the foregrounding of a majoritarianism inscribing Bengali as a=20
state language and Islam as a state religion automatically=20
marginalises religious and ethnic minorities from attaining a central=20
role in determining class hegemony.

International Capital and Bangladesh

Whereas the kinship factor demonstrates the continuing trends in=20
class politics in Bangladesh, the gradual incorporation of Bangladesh=20
into the world capitalist system is a phenomenon closely linked to=20
changing class formations in Bangladesh. Ever since the Bangladesh=20
state opened its doors to the forces of privatisation and the market,=20
a certain class of indentors, subcontractors have gained windfall=20
benefit from it. This has created a process of inducting in new=20
recruits into the layers of a wealthy middle-class, often resented by=20
older members of the class who had to gain entry through the more=20
competetive system of gaining college education and entering the=20
professional stream. In fact one of the most common utterances to be=20
heard in the streets of Dhaka by the educated middle-class, are "who=20
are these 'uncouth' and 'uncultured' people who can be seen riding=20
cars and using mobile phones?" But despite this intra-class rivalry,=20
the wealth of this emerging middle class in Bangladesh is intricately=20
dependent on their rather tenous links with the fate and future of=20
international capital, whatever form that 'capital' may take, i.e.=20
whether it emerges in the form of a newly emerging Islamic power in=20
the oil-rich Middle-East or in the liberal democratic garb of the=20
West.

A more recent phenomenon to be taken into account is the advent of=20
the oil companies and the prospect of gas export to India which has=20
made Bangladesh and its politics a target for multinational companies=20
and their political allies. In the face of political instransigence=20
towards exporting gas to India, the media and the political scene in=20
Bangladesh has reportedly been subjected to a degree of lobbying and=20
bribes unprecedented in its history. Indeed if it was not for its=20
past hostility with India and the rampant use of "India/Hindu=20
bashing" as a prime instrument of electioneering strategies, all=20
might have gone well for this emerging middle-class.

Globalization is also a process whereby the construction of national=20
interests can no longer remain isolated from what goes on in the=20
external world. This has been the case from the late seventies with=20
the Iranian revolution and the Gulf War registering some of the peaks=20
whereby political sentiments rose high in the Bangladeshi political=20
scene. Needless to say the September 11th incidents as well as the=20
consequent US attack on Aghanistan made people much more antagonistic=20
towards the West than they normally would have been. Since the=20
October 2001 elections took place in Bangladesh the anti-US sentiment=20
throughout the Muslim world has also struck a chord in the hearts of=20
Bengalis left, right and centre. But whereas for the common man on=20
the street this fervour took the form of a hero-worship with pictures=20
of Osama Bin Laden stuck up on shops and walls (as was pictures of=20
Sadam Hussein of Iraq some years ago), for the educated middle-class=20
it was accompanied with a deep-seated anxiety and fear of exclusion.=20
Their tenous links with global capital and the privileges=20
accompanying it would be threatened by the growing anti-Muslim=20
feelings in the western world. Many Bangladeshis living abroad feared=20
reprisals in the form of riots, harassment or in terms of employment=20
opportunities. But even the urban middle-class in Bangladesh had=20
reasons to fear: in terms of investment and business opportunities,=20
children studying in western educational institutions, consultancies=20
etc. etc. The predominant fears voiced by many Bangladeshis on=20
returning home from the west were therefore whether the strike on=20
Afghanistan will be accompanied by similar strikes on Iraq and=20
Pakistan. These fears by themselves were not responsible for the=20
post-electoral assault on the minority community in Bangladesh but it=20
did feed into a Muslim consciousness which gave fuel to the existing=20
Islamic connotations of the ruling BNP-Jamaat coalition. But the=20
particular nature of the attack in the post-election phase was more=20
the manifestation of the criminalization of politics engaged in by=20
mainstream political parties in Bangladesh.

Religious Minorities and Politics in Bangladesh

The participation of religious minorities in mainstream politics have=20
been largely marginalized with the establishment of a pro-Islamic=20
ideology. Even so because of the specific historical connection of=20
the Awami League with the secularist notion they have been identified=20
as a substantive vote bank of Awami League. However, the existence of=20
many structural discriminatory practices as well as the Vested=20
Property Act which for over three decades until it was repealed by=20
the previous Awami League government, had been responsible for a=20
systematic and pervasive eviction of Hindus from their homesteads and=20
a resultant exodus into India. Land being a scarce commodity in=20
overpopulated Bangladesh was good enough a reason for local vested=20
interests to be interested in the communlazation of Bangladesh's=20
politics. The nature of the party structure and leadership has=20
contributed towards towards both the criminalization and=20
communalization of this politics.

The centralization of power within the the party structure has been=20
paralleled by a geographic centralization in the capital. Thus a=20
large number of MPs who win seats in parliament are ocassional=20
visitors in their constituencies and normally reside only within the=20
limits of the capital city. Hence much of their political control=20
over their constituencies are handed over to their local henchmen,=20
who in turn exercise control over local administration as well (not=20
unlike absentee lanlordism of past eras). When the time comes to=20
distribute the booties of an electoral victory, there are obviously=20
more candidates to satisfy than there are resources and hence leaders=20
often turn a blind eye to consequent processes of extortions which=20
goes on in the localities. One of the characteristics of the recent=20
assault is that most of them have taken place in rural areas. And in=20
a politics characterized by techniques of "char dokhol" or=20
"chandabaji", it is easier to justify extortions to their political=20
leaders if the victims happen to be political opponents or their=20
die-hard supporters or in other word those outside the purview of=20
state power. Indeed one may even stand the chance of being offered=20
the post of a minister or state minister as a reward for it!

The issue of the assault on minorities is therefore enmeshed in a=20
complex hub of power relations which characterizes the current nature=20
of politics in Bangladesh. Many say it is a careful plan to reduce=20
the number of Hindu voters and create a separate electorate for them=20
so that they no longer become a vote bank for the Awami League.=20
Others mention that this is due to the machinations of a powerful=20
circle allied to the ruling party whose own petty interests often=20
override the concerns of a national government.

Whatever the roots of this violence, it is simply not enough to=20
bellow out words such as 'citizenship' or 'democratic values' or even=20
'good governance' in the face of such criminalization and=20
communalization of politics. Rather we should remember that it is not=20
always the local hoodlums who face the prime responsibilty to=20
decriminalize hemselves but that the chain of responsibilty extends=20
from the local, through national to the regional and global level.

References:

Centre for Policy Dialogue, 1995, Experiences with Economic Reform: A=20
Review of Bangladesh's Development 1995, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
Guhathakurta, M. , Sonar Bangla: Inspiration, Illusion and Extortion,=20
Humboldt Journal of Social Relations vol.23, nos. 1 and 2.
Kochaneck, S. 1993, Patron-Client Politics and Business in=20
Bangladesh, Dhaka , University press Ltd.
Reaz, A. 1994, State Class and Military Rule: Political Economy of=20
Martial Law in Bangladesh, Dhaka, Nadi New press.
Sobhan, R. and M. Ahmed, 1979, Public Expenditure in an Intermediate=20
Regime: A Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh, Dhaka, BIDS.
Sobhan, R. 1979, Perspectives on Corruption, unpublished paper, Bergen.

______

#2.

Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 20:21:07 +0530
To: aiindex@m...
From: vinod raina <vinod.raina@v...>
Subject: CLOSURE OF HOSHANGABAD SCIENCE TEACHING PROGRAM

By now many of you must have heard that the District Government of=20
Hoshangabad District in Madhya Pradesh, through its District Planning=20
Board, acting on a letter from the local BJP MLA took the decision on=20
Feb 7 to close down the Hoshangabad Science Teaching Program, or=20
Hoshangabad Vigyan as it is popularly called. The programme has been=20
running continuously since 1972, and is counted as one of the best=20
independent initiatives in the country in improving the quality of=20
elementary education of Government schools. During these thirty=20
years, the program has evolved from an initial 16 school experiment=20
to cover all the middle schools of Hoshangabad district, and school=20
complexes in 13 other districts of Madhya Pradesh, adding to nearly=20
500 schools.

The meeting was chaired by the Minister-in-charge of the district,=20
the Finance Minister of MP, Ajay Narayan Mushran. From all accounts,=20
the decision was taken in a cavalier and a 'bannana court' manner,=20
with the Minister declaring "phansi ho gayi" as the judgement!

Since the fateful day, the attempt of Eklavya, the group associated=20
with the program has been to mobilise the local people-other members=20
of the DPB, school teachers, other MLA's, parents and people in=20
general. The response has been encouraging, and many members of the=20
DPB, who were not present, have formally written for a review of the=20
decision. But the BJP is ecstasic, with reports that members of the=20
BJP teachers union has been celebrating the decision. It is=20
worthwhile to keep in mind that during the BJP rule in MP from=20
1990-1992, Eklavya and its programmes had been specifically=20
targetted, and the Dewas office had been attacked.

It sounds very strange that a Congress ruled government, with a Chief=20
Minister (Digvijay Singh) who champions himself as a soldier of=20
secularism should close a program that has at its heart the promotion=20
of a secular, critical and scientific mind on the basis of a=20
complaint of a BJP MLA, but such is the politics of present times.

It is worthwhile to note that in 1990, the then Union Education=20
Secretary had in fact initiated a move to expand HSTP to other parts=20
of the country. An evaluation committee had been set up at that time=20
to assess the program and recommend on the advisability of extending=20
it to the entire country. The committee, hosted by the NCERT with=20
many eminent scientists and educationists as its members had=20
categorically suggested such an expansion. The matter was however=20
clouded by the coming in of the BJP Government in MP and its violence=20
towards Eklavya.

Many of you have been sending mails expressing concern and asking=20
what could be done. Your concern has given us a lot of strength. Now=20
that there is a sizable mobilisation at the local level, it seems to=20
be the proper time to supplement it with protests from all over,=20
directed both at the district and the state level.

Please send your protests, communications and letters to the=20
following persons. Instead of sending you a draft of such a protest,=20
we are leaving it to you to draft them in your own language so that=20
it does not read similar. The persons to write are:

Hoshangabad Collector (Ashish Upadhyay) Collectorate, Hoshangabad-461=20
001 dm@m... 07574-(O) 52800 (R) 52900

Ajay Narayan Mushran (Finance Minister and Minister in charge) 2,=20
Shyamala Hills, Bhopal 0755-(O) 551340, fax: 0755-661182 0755-(R)=20
661182, 661262

Digvijay Singh (Chief Minister) cm@m... 0755-(O) 551433, 551396,=20
551581 Fax-551781 0755-(R) 540361, 661503, 540500, 540464 Fax-540501

You could forward this to your and other networks and ask them to act=20
similarly.

For those of you who must be reading a lot about the 'good' things=20
that Digvijay Singh's government is supposedly doing in MP, and would=20
be surprised by this happening, let me tell you that the=20
confrontation between the present Government and social organisations=20
has been brewing for a few years now. Essentially, the policy seems=20
to do away with independent initiatives, unless they accept to get=20
integrated with state sponsored schemes. The argument normally=20
provided is that with 'decentralisation' in place-district=20
governments, panchayats, gram swaraj etc-social groups have little=20
credibility, and are at best a nuisance. The Hindustan Times is=20
planning a special supplement for MP which will be released on Feb=20
25. They had invited me (before the HSTP closure) to write on=20
precisely these issues-am appending the article for your perusal,=20
aware though that the opinions in it are strictly mine and may not=20
necessarily be shared by all.

In peace and solidarity,

Vinod Raina

p.s. Please do forward all that you send to me and to Eklavya=20
Hoshangabad at <eklavyah@y...> and <eklavyamp@v...>

o o o o

COLLABORATION AND CONFRONTATION - SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE OF=
MP

Vinod Raina

When Digvijay Singh came to power in 1994, his mandate from the=20
ballot was also accompanied by a fair amount of goodwill from social=20
organizations and the civil society of MP. That had a lot to do with=20
his track record as an accessible and helpful MLA and MP earlier on,=20
as also for his useful work during the communal riots in Bhopal in=20
the aftermath of the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992. Quite=20
obviously, his informal and likeable manner went a long way in=20
promoting such goodwill.

Unlike states like Maharashtra, Bengal and Gujerat, undivided Madhya=20
Pradesh did not have a great many social organizations (also called=20
NGO=92s now) or social movements till recently. I began working in MP=20
some thirty years ago with the Hoshangabad Science Teaching Program,=20
and such work was quite novel then, in the early seventies. Things=20
have considerably changed in this sphere during these years. The=20
first major social organization that came up during this period was=20
the Shankar Guha Niyogi inspired Chhatisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh=20
(CMMS). Eklavya was formed in 1982 to consolidate the school=20
education work started by Kishore Bharati and Friends Rural Centre,=20
Rasulia, as also to extend the work of the nationwide People=92s=20
Science Movement (PSM) in the state. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984=20
resulted in the coming together of victim=92s organizations, of which=20
the Bhopal Gas Pidit Mahila Udyog Sangathan (BGPMUS) continues to be=20
a major one. By 1988, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) had spread to=20
different areas of the river valley. The other social movements that=20
sprang up fairly rapidly were the Ekta Parishad, Adivasi Mukti=20
Morcha, Kisan Adivasi Sangathan, Bharat Jan Andolan and so on. Mass=20
literacy campaigns were spearheaded in the state by the other PSM=20
organization, Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti (BGVS). Along with other=20
developmental groups like the MP Vigyan Sabha, Samarthan, Sambhav,=20
Samaj Pragati Sahyog etc, social movements and organizations are=20
fairly vigorous in MP today.

The expectations of these organizations from Digvijay Singh=92s=20
Congress government were particularly high because of their bitter=20
experience with the previous BJP government headed by Sunderlal=20
Patwa, between 1990 and 1992. These two years saw a much heightened=20
atmosphere of confrontation between the state and social=20
organizations, on every front. The NBA had =91greeted=92 the new BJP=20
government with the Khalghat bridge blockade which led to repeated=20
reprisals subsequently, Eklavya programmes in school education were=20
threatened with closure and their offices were attacked and=20
publications burnt and banned, the literacy campaigns led by BGVS=20
received more criticism than support from the then state government.=20
The dismissal of the Patwa government, followed by a year of=20
President=92s rule had created a vacuum that Digvijay Singh seemed=20
eminently capable of filling. In the initial year or two, the=20
atmosphere seemed to be much more constructive and amicable. In spite=20
of differences, the NBA was able to enter into a regular dialogue,=20
with the state government accepting that the height of the Sardar=20
Sarovar dam needed to be reduced and the rehabilitation work needed=20
to be carried out with much more sensitivity. A similar dialogue=20
between the CMSS, BGPMUS and other major organizations and the state=20
government gave the feeling that at last confrontation was giving way=20
to constructive action. The successful completion of the panchayat=20
elections seemed to suggest that a lot of talk about decentralization=20
was not mere rhetoric, and found general support from even dissenting=20
groups and organizations. The conceptualization and drafting of the=20
state=92s Human Development Report, the first sub-national report in=20
the world, the implementation of the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS)=20
and many similar initiatives had the involvement of a large number of=20
individuals and organizations from the state, and also brought=20
adulation from academics, prominent individuals, organizations, and=20
the media from all over the country

However, social organizations in the state could discern a=20
perceptible change about a year before the reelection time in 1999.=20
Already, independent initiatives were being quietly questioned and=20
organizations were being pressurized to fall in line with=20
governmental initiatives, rather than seek innovative alternatives.=20
The state-wide =91Seekhna-Sikana=92 initiative in primary education,=20
worked out in collaboration with Eklavya and other groups was=20
dismantled. Everything in education veered around the EGS and the=20
externally supported DPEP. So much so that the scheme of appointing=20
para-teachers was legitimized for the entire school system,=20
abolishing the post of trained teachers in regular schools. Nothing=20
much came out of the dialogues regarding the streamlining of=20
compensation to the Bhopal gas victims. The Narmada issue moved to=20
the Supreme Court, even as the state government began to acknowledge=20
publicly that there was no land for rehabilitation. The literacy=20
campaigns, which saw the involvement of lakhs of volunteers in the=20
state through BGVS were slowly given up and replaced by the hilarious=20
Padhna-Badhna scheme whereby illiterates were expected to seek out a=20
guru who would teach them and who would be paid for his work. NGO=20
participation in watershed development programs was purposefully=20
shelved.

The downgrading and marginalization of civil society groups was=20
explained in terms of the supposed legitimacy of local bodies. Thus,=20
a series of decentralization measures, often in contradiction and=20
conflict with each other have been promoted, to appease everyone. The=20
panchayat system threatened the elected MLA=92s and other party=20
functionaries, so a district government was introduced, headed by a=20
Minister, which has marginalized the district panchayat and=20
downgraded the Zila Pradhan. But it is publicized as =91more=20
decentralization=92. Similarly, the gram swaraj system introduced=20
recently has come as a parallel to the gram panchayat, dividing=20
people even at the village level. With other parallel systems, like=20
the JFM committees, various village education committees and so on,=20
formed and sustained through endless, sometimes mindless, circulars=20
floating down from the top, the impression created in the media is=20
that a great deal of decentralization is happening. But in actual=20
terms, it is dividing and fragmenting the community more and more.=20
The real purpose seems to have been to question the credibility of=20
civil society groups, with the claim that the plethora of state=20
created and controlled conflicting local level bodies are the true=20
people=92s formations, calling into question the legitimacy of the=20
social organizations and movements.

This trend became apparent in a violent manner before the last=20
assembly elections when the Adivasi Mukta Morcha, centered in Sendhwa=20
in Khargone district was targeted since it threatened the fortunes of=20
the then Deputy Chief Minister, Subhash Yadav. Activists were=20
arrested and one of them was shot dead in a fake encounter. It was=20
made clear that if civil society groups became a threat to=20
reelection, they would have to pay a price, irrespective of the=20
issues involved. Gradually it has become apparent that whether it is=20
Narmada dams, Bhopal Gas Victims or other developmental or social=20
sector issues, a veneer of amiability hides a resolve to sideline all=20
civil society initiatives, and claim credit for state sponsored=20
proclamations and media-hyped schemes, and of course,=20
decentralization. The media preoccupation of the state machinery is=20
indeed its most important task. The reelection of the government in=20
fact surprised everyone, including perhaps the government itself. But=20
instead of ascribing it to the =91onion prices=92, read high prices for=20
all commodities, it was cleverly portrayed as a success of the=20
=91developmental=92 policies of the government, and unfortunately bought=20
hook, line and sinker by many prominent commentators outside the=20
state. That was enough to heighten the arrogance of the state further=20
and make it firmly conclude that it had and could deliver everything,=20
including occasional doses of decentralization from the top, and the=20
civil society formations were superfluous, or at best irritants. But=20
civil society involvement provides a good image, particularly when=20
bargaining with funding agencies, particularly of the external kind,=20
so a large number of committees have members from them, but now=20
mostly from those outside the state, who provide the face without=20
being a threat. Appraisal missions, evaluation and monitoring groups=20
and advisory groups have an adequate sprinkling of them, who perhaps=20
involve themselves in good faith, and provide regular testimonials=20
for the state government. But eleven police firings in the state=20
during these years, in particular the brazen killing of adivasis in=20
Mehndikheda in Dewas last April has dampened such involvement a bit,=20
particularly since it became known through the minutes of a meeting=20
chaired by the Chief Secretary that the sub-text for the killings was=20
to finish off adivasi sangathans in the state. For a government=20
claiming decentralized participatory democracy as its main political=20
thesis, such killings are hard to explain, as is the need to bring in=20
the Special Areas Protection Act 2000, introduced much before the=20
central POTO, and in many ways more oppressive. That a participatory=20
government should need a draconian law such as SAPA is an=20
anachronism, but the intent is clear, to suppress civil society=20
dissent and activities.

The veneer of participatory governance is finally peeling of rather=20
pathetically. The same government that stated its resolve to protect=20
its people from voluntary displacement from the Narmada dams in the=20
beginning, and pleaded helplessness when the Supreme Court held that=20
the Tribunal Award was non-negotiable, is now asking for negotiating=20
the same Award in order to change the land-for-land compensation, the=20
only redeeming part of the Award, to land-to-money compensation! It=20
claims to be peaceful state, more so now that most of the Naxal areas=20
have conveniently gone to Chhatisgarh, but yet feels the need for a=20
draconian and human rights violative SAPA. And in order to justify=20
the conversion of a woefully low quality school education system to a=20
further lower quality non-formal system of EGS, doing away with=20
pre-service trainings and the very post of a school teacher in the=20
name of decentralization, it has unleashed a tirade against one of=20
the most respected independent initiatives in quality education, that=20
of Eklavya, misusing an evaluation done by IIM Ahmedabad for the=20
purpose. And just a week back, it has threatened to close down=20
arguably the best independent initiative in school education in the=20
country, the Hoshangabad Science Teaching Program that has gone on=20
for thirty years and survived even the BJP government, on the=20
recommendation of its much touted district government. The district=20
government, chaired by the minister Ajay Mushran, gave the=20
pronouncement on the basis of a complaint filed by a BJP MLA! While=20
giving the impression that it is the Congress party that is fighting=20
the BJP agenda on school education throughout the country, it is=20
astonishing that it should be acting on a BJP complaint, and that too=20
against a programme whose basis is to instill scientific spirit=20
amongst the children!=20

In seven years the present government seems to have squandered all=20
the goodwill it had from the social formations within Madhya Pradesh,=20
and set the stage for widespread confrontation in the coming years.=20
It remains to be seen to what degree the informal, accessible and=20
likeable traits of the person in charge, Digvijay Singh, will survive=20
such a confrontation and help in reducing the otherwise volatile=20
portents of such a confrontation. What the government needs to=20
understand is that social organizations and elected local bodies are=20
not mutually exclusive; in fact the best agents for strengthening and=20
sustaining local bodies are grass-root civil society organizations,=20
who can act as resource support agencies in a manner no governmental=20
institutions can. Such a realization, as also the realization that=20
properly argued criticism and confrontation by social formations of=20
the state=92 s policies and actions, in an engaging manner, is their=20
primary role, and can go a long way in helping the people of Madhya=20
Pradesh. It might be possible to thus retrieve a relationship of=20
engagement which has otherwise definitely turned=20
confrontational.=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20

_____

#3.

The Times of India
FEBRUARY 23, 2002

History row goes to SC
TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2002 11:16:05 PM ]
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court will hear a public interest petition=20
challenging the BJP's attempts to saffronise education.=20
Constitutional lawyer and MP Fali S Nariman charged the Vajpayee=20
government with changing the entire policy on education without even=20
consulting the Central Advisory Board (CAB).
The CAB comprises mainly the education ministers of the states.
As petitioner Aruna Roy sought striking down of the changes made in=20
the history syllabus, alleging that it was done without consulting=20
the nodal body on education, a Bench, headed by Chief Justice S P=20
Bharucha, said the petition be amended so as to ''pinpoint what they=20
are objecting to and why''.
The Bench said the petition should be amended properly so that ''it=20
looks like a writ petition and not an essay''.

_____

#4.

ALL INDIA CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
79/B I&II Floors, Street 8, West Marredpally, Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh
President: Dr Joseph D=92 Souza Secretary General: Dr. John Dayal
Please correspond with Secretary General at:
Email: <mailto:johndayal@v...>johndayal@v...

Christian Council moves NHRC against ICHR seat for minorities-baiter=20
N S Rajaram

PRESS STATEMENT

23rd February 2002

The All India Christian Council has sought the intervention of the=20
national Human Rights Commission against the appointment of=20
engineer-turned Sangh Parivar pamphleteer N S Rajaram, calling him a=20
bigoted minorities-baiter who has made a career of his sustained=20
attack on Jesus Christ, the Pope and the Catholic and Protestant=20
churches in India.

Rajaram has been accused by historians and Indologists for=20
intellectual fraud in manipulating computer images of Harappan seals=20
to substantiate the Sangh Parivar=92s point of view on the origin of=20
the Aryans. He is equally notorious for his book =93Christianity=92s=20
scramble for India=94 published by the Hindu Writers Forum in New Delhi.

While the appointment of an engineer to the highest academic forum of=20
professional historians has already raised eyebrows in the country=92s=20
academia, it has particularly distressed the Christian community. =93It=20
would almost seem the Ministry of Human Resource development is=20
rewarding him for his blasphemous writings against Christ and his=20
communal tirade against the minorities,=94 Christian council secretary=20
general Dr John Dayal has said in his letter to NHRC Chairman Justice=20
J S Verma.

=93How can a man of such bigotry and narrow-minded outlook enrich the=20
intellectual and academic life of this great nation? On the other=20
hand, his presence in the leadership panel of the body which gives a=20
direction to the national historical research bodes ill for the=20
future of intellectual endeavour unless it is immediately reversed,=94=20
Dayal said.

The Council has pointed out that together with some other leaders of=20
the RSS and its sister organisations, Rajaram has mocked at the=20
symbols, tenets and articles of faith of minority communities, and=20
specially of the Christians. He has injured the religious sentiments=20
and feelings of the community by his statements on Jesus Christ.

Rajaram has also sought to alienate and isolate the Christian=20
community and to demonise it in the eyes of their fellow citizens by=20
his litany of falsehood, propaganda and malice masquerading as=20
scholarship in his books. He has not spared Mother Teresa, accusing=20
her of recruiting nuns for churches in the west, and has alleged that=20
missionaries in Karnataka are invading houses of others to force them=20
into Christianity.

In his writings soon after the burning alive of Graham Stuart Staines=20
and his innocent sons in Orissa, Rajaram all but justified the=20
murderous terrorism saying that the Australian missionary had invited=20
it upon himself because of his activities.

But he has reserved his worst for the Pope, the Vatican, the Catholic=20
Church and evangelicals. =93The Indian government should never have=20
allowed the Vatican to set up an embassy in India,=94 Rajaram has said=20
accusing the Vatican of =93a new thrust to expand its presence in=20
India. All that the Pope and his men in the media want is social=20
lawlessness,=94 the newly turned historian says in his writings.

What sort of a message is the government of India sending to the rest=20
of the world by appointing such a man to this prestigious position,=20
the Council has asked, urging the NHRC to intervene urgently and=20
order a review of the appointment.

The Council has also called on the Prime Minister to over rule the=20
Human Resource development Minister, Dr Murli Manohar Joshi, to=20
ensure that such appointments, which act as irritants in inter=20
religious dialogue and harmony, do not take place.

_____

#8.

South Asian Popular Culture
Launch Conference
Call for Papers
4 - 5 April 2002
University of Portsmouth, UK

The conference celebrates the launch of the forthcoming journal South=20
Asian Popular Culture. Papers accepted for presentation at this=20
conference will be invited to be submitted as articles for the=20
journal's launch issue in April 2003.

The journal South Asian Popular Culture is a peer reviewed=20
interdisciplinary publication designed to respond to the growing=20
interest in South Asian popular culture within the different=20
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. 'South Asian=20
popular culture' is defined in a broad and inclusive way to=20
incorporate textual, lived and performative cultures, the mass media,=20
ways of life, and discursive modes of representation.

The journal of South Asian Popular Culture seeks to serve as an=20
innovative and informative venue to discuss and debate the emergence=20
and vibrancy of new forms of social, cultural and political=20
strategies and representations in film, music, radio, television,=20
visual cultures, fashion, and sexuality. These forms, in fact, pose a=20
challenge that need to be understood within a context of culture that=20
allows a transnational focus and open attitude towards difference and=20
diversity.

South Asian Popular Culture will also feature a regular section=20
entitled 'Working Notes' that will include contributions from=20
cultural practitioners within South Asian popular culture (film-,=20
radio-, and television-makers, musicians, artists, personnel cultural=20
activists, fashion designers, and sexuality campaigners). Dialogues,=20
interviews, diary notes, short essays, visual images and discussions=20
that offer original insights into such cultural productions is the=20
envisioned format for this section.

The conference organisers invite the submission of papers that=20
address the above topics in the following areas:
* History of South Asian Popular Culture
* Film and Photography
* Music
* Television
* Radio
* Popular Literatures
* Print Media
* Visual Cultures
* Fashion and Commodity Cultures
* Gender and Sexuality
* Art and Culture
* Culture and Politics
* Diaspora and Globalisation
* Working Notes
Please send paper abstracts of up to 400 words by no later than 18th=20
January 2002 to: Dr Rajinder K Dudrah, University of Portsmouth,=20
School of Social, Historical and Literary Studies, Milldam, Burnaby=20
Road, Portsmouth, PO1 3AS, UK. Email: rajinder.kumar@p...

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