[sacw] SACW #2 | 15 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 15 January 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Struggle for Kashmir Is Fueled By Clashing National Narratives=20
(SOMINI SENGUPTA)
#2. Governance in India: The Role of the BJP (Conference in Australia, 7 F=
eb)
#3. India's Politics of Brinksmanship on Kashmir (Achin Vanaik)
#4. Call for Papers for the 17th Annual Pakistan Workshop (10-12 May, 2002,=
UK)
#5. Cultural Studies Workshop - 'Postcolonial Cultures', (25th-31st=20
January 2002 near Calcutta, India)
#6. Pakistani Fundos Forced Underground (Kamran Khan and Craig Whitlock)
#7. Why Vajpayee will always prefer Zia to Musharraf (Jawed Naqvi)

________________________

#1.

The New York Times=20
Jan. 13, 2002

Struggle for Kashmir Is Fueled By Clashing National Narratives
By SOMINI SENGUPTA=20

JAMMU, Kashmir, Jan. 12 -- To speak to many Kashmiris today is to be told
of Mohandas K. Gandhi's visit here in 1947. As Hindus and Muslims
slaughtered each other during the partition of the subcontinent into India
and Pakistan, Kashmiris spared each other the same fate. Gandhi described
the Kashmir valley as a ray of hope in the darkness.
To speak to many Kashmiris today is also to be told of the unspeakable
curse that has since fallen on them.

In recent days, a Kashmiri teenager was set ablaze by an Indian
paramilitary officer. Over the last week, dozens of heavily armed
militants, many of them Pakistani citizens, were killed by Indian security
forces. Indian and Pakistani forces exchanged fire virtually every day
across the cease-fire line that divides the two countries. A 4-year-old
boy was killed by Pakistani fire on Thursday while playing in the fields
in his Indian village. Three days before, five Pakistanis, including two
women and two young boys, were injured by Indian mortar fire.
These things are routine.

In Kashmir today lies the detritus of partition. This valley is disputed
territory, and the two nuclear-armed rivals are poised for what could be
their fourth war in 53 years. Pakistan controls about a third of Kashmir.
India controls the rest as part of its vast Jammu and Kashmir province.

But Kashmir, nestled strategically in the Himalayas, with its saffron
fields and lakes hemmed by houseboats, is more than prime real estate. The
claim over Kashmir goes to the heart of the identities of these two
rivals. For Pakistan, its neighbor's claim over what is India's only
Muslim majority state, is the object of moral outrage. Pakistan's reason
for being was to create a homeland where the subcontinent's Muslims could
live free and prosper, not under the thumb of Hindu-dominated India. As
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the foreign minister and later the president of
Pakistan, declared in 1964, ''Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to
have its full meaning.''

Kashmir has also been essential to the Indian national project from the
start: to lose Kashmir to Pakistan would be to lose its mantle as a
secular, multiethnic democracy. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, an ardent secularist who vehemently opposed carving the
subcontinent along religious lines, was born to a Brahmin family from
Kashmir. His sentimentality about the place infuses Indian feelings about
Kashmir today.

''Many Indians think something would be diminished in our lives if Kashmir
were to go,'' said Kanti Bajpai, a international relations professor at
Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. ''Implicit in the Indian
argument is that whatever you might say, we're a good, functioning
democracy. We can probably work this out. But our neighbor is not letting
us work it out.''

India accuses Pakistan of waging a proxy war in Kashmir by arming and
training militants, first Kashmiris and then bands of radical Islamists
from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan says it provides only moral and
diplomatic succor to the Kashmiri freedom struggle.

The ardor of these rivals has squeezed Kashmir dry. Armed men around every
corner. A road built around Dal Lake, the jewel of Srinagar, Kashmir's
summer capital, lies in disrepair because of land mine explosions. Human
rights groups have repeatedly raised an outcry about disappearances and
extrajudicial killings.

The 12-year-old insurgency in Kashmir has left 35,000 dead, according to
Indian government estimates. Others believe that the number is twice as
high. Last year was the deadliest to date.

Kashmir's troubles may be a legacy of partition, but back then Kashmiris
could hardly have foreseen that they would be caught in such interminable
carnage, mired in such an intractable political bog.

The troubles began with the British ready to quit India in a hurry and the
dillydallying maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu ruler, not
especially popular with his mostly Muslim subjects. Like his counterparts
in the other 561 princely states, the maharajah, Hari Singh, was
instructed by the British to choose between India and Pakistan.

The maharajah was tardy in choosing. But his mind was made up when Pathan
tribesmen from what is now Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province stormed
into his kingdom. He fled Srinagar for Jammu, the Hindu-majority city to
the south, and he struck a swift deal with India.

Pakistan has never seen the maharajah's decision as legitimate. By
Pakistan's logic of partition, Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, belonged
to Pakistan. (Though the province of Jammu and Kashmir has a Muslim
majority over all, Jammu's population is nearly two-thirds Hindu, and
Ladakh, to the east, is equal parts Buddhist and Muslim.)

That first India-Pakistan war, which began in 1947, lasted for more than a
year. When it was over, Pakistan had seized a swath of northwestern
Kashmir. India agreed to hold a plebiscite under international monitoring,
to allow Kashmiris to choose which nation they wanted to join. India was
confident of its victory. Sheik Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri leader who
helped drive out the tribesmen, was a close Nehru ally.

Balraj Puri, a veteran of those times, recalls hundreds of thousands of
people standing in Lal Chowk, Srinagar's main square, shouting
anti-Pakistan slogans. ''It was an opportunity for the greatest triumph of
Indian secularism,'' he said. ''But India failed to maintain that
advantage.''

The plebiscite never happened. It became the mantra for Pakistani outrage
against India.

Neither India nor Pakistan pulled its troops from Kashmir, a prerequisite
for the vote. Cold war calculations came into the picture, and the United
States adopted Pakistan as its ally in the region. Nehru dug in his heels.
There would be no plebiscite anytime soon. Any suggestion of regional
autonomy was frowned upon. In 1953, when Sheik Abdullah made noises about
a Kashmir free from Indian and Pakistani rule, Nehru removed him from his
post as chief minister and jailed him.

A sense of betrayal began to swell among Kashmiris. Until that moment,
there had been no organized protests against India, said Muhammad Ishaq
Khan, a historian at Kashmir University in Srinagar. ''Sheik Abdullah
believed, Kashmiris believed that India had been their supporter,'' said
Mr. Khan, himself a Kashmiri. ''A problem which was not intractable
appeared to become so.''

Elections were eventually held in Kashmir, but they were dismissed as
rigged. By 1989, a Kashmiri guerrilla movement was hatched. Young men,
many of them college-educated and full of idealistic fervor, mounted a
bloody insurgency against Indian rule. The separatists won support among
many Kashmiris, their cause aided by the might of the Indian security
forces.

Within months, Srinagar's Brahmins fled, leaving behind homes and temples
that have since been transformed into barracks for Indian paramilitary
forces.

The Kashmiri insurgency has been radically transformed in the last 12
years with the introduction of better-armed and better-trained jihadis, or
holy warriors, based in Pakistan and fueled by Islamist movements in
Afghanistan and beyond.

Today, of the 2,400 militants active in the Kashmir valley alone, 1,400
are foreigners, according to Border Security Force estimates. The two
deadliest groups -- Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba -- are both based
in Pakistan, and they have prompted a crackdown by the Indian security
forces.

Efforts for peace bubbled up in 1998. A historic bus route was opened from
Delhi to Lahore, and both sides pledged to talk about Kashmir.

Then war broke out here for a third time in the summer of 1999, after
Pakistani troops broke through the cease-fire line at a place called
Kargil. Before the 10-week standoff was over, 1,000 people were killed on
both sides.

The end of the Kargil fighting only intensified the militancy here. In
village after village in Jammu, militants picked off Hindus suspected of
being friendly to the security forces. Village defense councils, mostly
made up of Hindus, were armed by the state. Army installations were
attacked. The State Assembly in Srinagar was bombed last October. A
temporary cease-fire between India and the largest militant group, Hizbul
Mujahedeen, fizzled in late 2000, after New Delhi refused to involve
Pakistan in Kashmir talks. The Dec. 13 attacks on the Indian Parliament in
New Delhi halted any hopes for dialogue. Pakistani and Indian forces faced
off at the border.

The competing claims to Kashmir have been complicated by the domestic
politics on both sides of the Line of Control. A radical Islam, with goals
of cleansing Muslim lands of infidels, has taken root in Pakistan. Hindu
nationalists control the government in New Delhi, straining India's moral
argument for Kashmir -- that Muslims can feel safe and prosper in secular
India.

Photo: Mohandas K. Gandhi, at the Lahore, Pakistan, train station on his
way to visit a still-peaceful Kashmir in 1947. (National Museum, New
Delhi) Chart: ''A Legacy Of Conflict'' After India and Pakistan gained
independence from the British in 1947, the princely state of Kashmir was
left to determine which nation it would join through a vote. But when its
Hindu maharajah, Hari Singh, held out in hopes for a sovereign state, he
faced insurgence from the predominantly Muslim population. Kashmir has
been a flash point ever since. While it is currently divided, the whole of
Kashmir is not recognized by the United Nations or the United States as
part of any nation. Key Points in Kashmir History October 1947 An uprising
against the maharajah is aided by Pakistani troops. The maharajah signs an
agreement to join India inexchange for military support. The first war
over Kashmir breaks out. 1949 A cease-fire by the U.N. leaves India with
two-thirds of Kashmir and calls for a plebiscite to determine which nation
Kashmiris want to join. The vote has yet to occur. 1962 China seizes a
piece of India-controlled Kashmir. India strengthens its military efforts
in the region. Pakistan worries that it might not be able to regain
control of the territory. September 1965 The second India-Pakistan war
over the territory breaks out, and again ends after a U.N. call for a
cease-fire. The Soviet-mediated Dashkent Declaration officially ends the
war in January 1966. December 1971 India helps East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
to secede from Pakistan. The third war erupts over Kashmir. It lasts only
two weeks and a peace accord is signed in July 1972. 1989 Discovery of a
rigged election in 1988 causes the Kashmiri discontent to erupt into
guerrilla warfare. India accuses Pakistan of assisting the militant
groups; Pakistan denies the accusation. 1998 Both India and Pakistan carry
out nuclear tests, renewing the dispute over Kashmir. 1999 Pakistan-backed
forces infiltrate Indian-held Kargil, setting off eight weeks of fighting,
which kills more than 1,500 soldiers from both sides. Pakistan ultimately
withdraws. December 2001 India blames groups based in Pakistan for the
terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. Both countries have mobilized
large numbers of troops near the border, increasing the tension. Map of
Kashmir highlighting the areas that are controlled by India and Pakistan.

______

#2.

Governance in India: The Role of the BJP

South Asia Research Unit, Curtin University of Technology
7 February -2002

James Mayers, South Asia Research Unit and South Asian Studies=20
Association of Australia,
fax: +61 8 9266 3166 Email: mayers@s...
______

#3.

Foreign Policy in Focus
India's Politics of Brinksmanship on Kashmir

by Achin Vanaik
January 9, 2002

Since the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament, the Indian=20
government has not been engaged in the politics of actually preparing=20
to go to war but rather in the politics of brinksmanship.

The military risks (the uncertainty of military gains given a=20
definite and strong Pakistan military response) and the political=20
risks (alienating international opinion, especially the U.S.=20
preoccupied with stabilizing the post-Taliban situations in=20
Afghanistan and Pakistan) are too great for India actually to go to=20
war. Of course, the high-risk strategy of brinksmanship carries the=20
danger of matters getting out of hand and may lead to an actual war.=20
This has not happened yet, and increasingly looks even less likely,=20
which comes as a relief. Since the nuclear weapons tests of 1998,=20
there is always the potential for any military conflict between the=20
two countries to escalate to the nuclear level.

The current crisis may simply be a prologue to future ones. The=20
Indian government, and a very large section of elite opinion backing=20
it, feels that the recent round of brinksmanship politics has=20
actually paid substantial dividends, domestically and externally.=20
Moreover, a growing section (albeit still a minority) of the Indian=20
elite has become progressively more belligerent and believes that=20
Indian security cannot be achieved through any strategy of=20
coexistence with Pakistan but only through the dissolution of the=20
Pakistani state.

The rise of such views is, of course, intimately connected to the=20
growing spread of the ideology of Hindu nationalism and chauvinism=20
espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party (and its cohort organizations=20
in Indian civil society), The BJP, which leads the current coalition=20
government, has long been determined to transform the Indian polity=20
and society into a more authoritarian and anti-secular direction.=20
This government has used the developments since September 11 and=20
December 13 to curb civil liberties, harass its domestic opponents,=20
further communalize the Indian education system, spread anti-Muslim=20
and anti-Pakistan sentiments, and promote a more belligerent and=20
aggressive elite nationalism in keeping with its general political=20
ideology. What's more, it has diverted attention away from its=20
political failure in Kashmir. The Kashmiri population has been=20
alienated not only by the brutalities inflicted by Pakistan-supported=20
terrorist groups but also by the terrorist repressions carried out by=20
the Indian armed forces in the region.

Externally, the politics of brinksmanship has succeeded in getting=20
the U.S. to do what it was reluctant to do before: namely, explicitly=20
blacklist certain Pakistan-based terrorist groups for the first time,=20
and put pressure on the Musharraf government to clamp down on these=20
groups. Like Israel vis-=E0-vis the Palestinians, the Indian government=20
utilized American behavior after September 11 as a precedent to=20
justify its own effort to isolate Pakistan politically, even if it=20
could not emulate the arrogance of Israel's military actions.

If the U.S. could disregard international law and norms concerning=20
presentation of evidence and proper procedures for the pursuit of=20
retributive justice and simply claim that in the "war against global=20
terrorism" it had the right to define who the world's terrorists are=20
(and are not), and was justified in attacking Afghanistan as the=20
country that harbors terrorists, then surely Israel and India could=20
do the same! The U.S., therefore, formally acknowledged India's right=20
to "self-defense" against terrorists but has acted behind the scenes=20
to prevent an outbreak of war.

The U.S. link with Pakistan has now become even more=20
important--making the medium- and long-term perspectives regarding=20
the India-Pakistan-U.S. triangle more complicated and uncertain,=20
irrespective of the current short-term gains made by New Delhi. The=20
U.S. has now for the first time established a military-political=20
presence in the region with major ramifications for its perceived=20
potential challengers: Russia, China, and Iran. This has to do not=20
just with oil and gas politics but also with larger geopolitical=20
considerations now that the U.S. is in Russia's traditional backyard=20
and wooing, with some success, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (and other=20
central Asian states) where it would like to establish more permanent=20
bases.

In Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, a significant U.S. military=20
presence has been secured. The challenge for Musharraf is whether he=20
can use this U.S. presence to outflank his opponents and reinforce=20
his links with the U.S.--or whether this will be a major handicap=20
eventually playing into the hands of his more militant Islamist=20
opponents. The U.S. is now deeply involved in trying to shape=20
Pakistan's internal politics to best suit its perceived interests.=20
Currently, this involves keeping the Pakistan army united behind=20
Musharraf through the disbursal of U.S. economic largesse and=20
weaponry. Pakistan's traditionally strong links with Saudi Arabia=20
remain important, in that American strategic dominance in the Middle=20
East requires maintaining the Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia tripod=20
of client states.

What will be the direction of Indian foreign policy given this=20
overall scenario? Earlier, New Delhi may have entertained hopes that=20
the U.S. would soon prefer India's replacement of Pakistan as its=20
most "allied ally" in the region, and also as a strategic=20
counterweight to China. This was always something of an illusion=20
given the enormous asymmetry of power between the U.S. and India. The=20
U.S. would prefer to pursue closer links with both India and Pakistan=20
rather than play the Indian game. Moreover, Washington is not about=20
to prioritize its relations with India over its relationship with=20
China. The lure of a closer strategic relationship with India is not=20
so important that it would be allowed to determine, or even seriously=20
influence, the nature of U.S. foreign policy perspectives vis-=E0-vis=20
China.

After Sept. 11, India has forsaken the idea that a strategic U.S.=20
shift away from Pakistan should be the precondition for a sturdy=20
India-U.S. alliance. Now it is more than willing to pursue such an=20
alliance in the mere hope that eventually Washington may come around=20
to sharing New Delhi's views about Islamabad.

Kashmir will continue to bedevil India-Pakistan relations. The new=20
American presence in South and Central Asia, and the emergence of=20
Kashmir as a possible nuclear flashpoint, mean that Kashmir has now=20
become internationalized, or more accurately, Americanized. The U.S.=20
has not yet established its range of strategic options concerning=20
Kashmir or how these would fit into its wider geostrategic ambitions.=20
But it will eventually get around to this. And it is these perceived=20
self-interests that will guide U.S. behavior, not the concerns of the=20
Indian and Pakistani governments--and certainly not the deep desire=20
for justice and peace that the long-suffering people of Kashmir on=20
both sides of the border may have.

(Achin Vanaik is an independent journalist and fellow at the Centre=20
for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Author=20
of numerous books on Indian politics and India's nuclear policy, his=20
most recent book, co-authored with Praful Bidwai is New Nukes: India,=20
Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (Interlink 1999).)

______

#4.

Call for Papers for the 17th Annual Pakistan Workshop
10-12 May, 2002
Rook How, Lake District, England

At the last Annual Pakistan Workshop we chose the theme 'Purity and=20
Hybridity' for the 17th Annual Workshop. While we think this is a=20
worthwhile and interesting theme we have decided to add a second=20
theme to the Workshop in light of recent events, 'Pakistan, Islam and=20
Terrorism'. The 17th Annual Pakistan Workshop therefore will have two=20
themes which we hope will provide stimulating cross fertilisation of=20
ideas as well as address very serious issues.

The total cost of the Workshop should be around =A355-60 for those=20
staying at the Rook How. This includes the reception on the first day=20
and a delicious Pakistani lunch on the second day, breakfast and tea=20
and coffee as well as accomodation at the Rook How. Participants=20
should include =A330 deposit when registering for the Workshop.

Deadline for Paper titles: 15 February 2002
Deadline for registration: 31 March 2002

For further information or to register please contact :

Stephen M. Lyon
Department of Anthropology & DICE
Eliot College
University of Kent at Canterbury
Canterbury, Kent
UK CT2 7NS

Eliot Extension L24A
Tel: (44) (0) 1227-764000 Ext. 3948
E-mail: S.M.Lyon@u...

______

#5.

The centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, a premier=20
research institute in India, will be holding the seventh All India=20
Cultural Studies Workshop from 25th-31st January 2002 at a venue near=20
Calcutta, India.
The broad theme of the workshop will be Postcolonial Cultures, where=20
the endeavour will be to explore histroical connections,=20
interlinkages and differences among countries and culturers of the=20
postcolonial world.

Information

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Calcutta
R-1, Baishnabghata Patuli Township
Calcutta: 700094
India
fax 91 33 462 61 83
email: cssscal@v...

______

#6.

Washington Post
Monday, January 14, 2002; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40823-2002Jan13.html

Pakistani Militants Forced Underground
Groups Reorganize in Wake of Crackdown

By Kamran Khan and Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service

KARACHI, Pakistan, Jan. 13 -- With their existence suddenly=20
threatened by Pakistan's promised crackdown on terrorism, Islamic=20
militants here are going into hiding, altering their identities and=20
reorganizing their movements into underground cells, according to=20
group leaders and government officials.

For years, militant organizations fighting to drive India from the=20
divided Himalayan territory of Kashmir have operated in plain sight=20
inside Pakistan. But as the Pakistani government has moved to rein=20
them in over the past three weeks, several groups have relocated=20
their bases to secret locations throughout Pakistan, where they plan=20
to continue recruiting members and raising money, leaders said. They=20
also have moved some public outreach offices to Pakistan's slice of=20
Kashmir, where they expect the government to tolerate their existence=20
as long as they keep a low profile.

"We will fight," Abdullah Sayyaf, a spokesman for the militant group=20
Lashkar-i-Taiba, told reporters today. "If the Indians have the guts,=20
let them stop us in Kashmir."

Pakistani police say they have detained an estimated 1,500 militants=20
and religious radicals in the past two days, many of them in this=20
port city. The roundup was planned in conjunction with a speech given=20
Saturday by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who declared=20
that he was banning five extremist groups and would closely monitor=20
other militants.

Musharraf's televised address received a cautious welcome today in=20
India, where the government has demanded that Pakistan curb Islamic=20
groups staging cross-border attacks. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant=20
Singh said that India agreed with the principles laid out by=20
Musharraf, but that "we have to see if there are any gaps between=20
what is said and what is done." [Details, Page A14.]

The Pakistani crackdown amounts to a rapid reversal in the=20
government's stance toward militant organizations. Until recently,=20
they were allowed and even encouraged to operate in the open. They=20
kept storefront offices, advertised in newspapers and aggressively=20
raised money in mosques and on the streets.

Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, there=20
were no restrictions against Pakistani citizens joining such groups.=20
Indeed, police officials in the southern province of Sindh said the=20
government had instructed them to allow militant groups in Karachi to=20
recruit soldiers for guerrilla training and to solicit contributions=20
for holy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

The new policy has been hard to enforce because the change was so=20
abrupt, said a senior Karachi police official. "It is too difficult=20
for us to adjust to the new guidelines," he said.

In his speech Saturday, Musharraf said the militants had done=20
Pakistan's image and society irreparable harm and would no longer be=20
tolerated. He announced that five groups would be forced to disband.

Three of them are religious militant organizations that the=20
government blames for sectarian violence within Pakistan that led to=20
400 deaths last year.

The two others -- Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Muhammad -- are=20
dedicated to disrupting Indian rule in Kashmir and were accused of=20
plotting the Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi=20
that claimed 14 lives.

Another Kashmiri separatist group, Harkat ul-Ansar, was banned three=20
years ago but resurfaced as Harkat ul-Mujaheddin, and remains active=20
despite being banned in October. Two other Kashmiri rebel=20
organizations, Al-Badr Mujaheddin and Hizb ul-Mujaheddin, have not=20
been outlawed but are preparing to carry out their activities in=20
secret from now on.

Senior police officials in the province of Punjab said commanders of=20
the five Kashmiri rebel groups have ordered thousands of followers to=20
go into hiding. Many have already changed their identities, police=20
said.

"We have learned the lessons from the blunders made by al Qaeda and=20
the Taliban. Those will never be repeated in Pakistan," said a=20
22-year-old former Karachi University student who gave his name as=20
Abu Hafsa. "In the future, each one of our registered activists will=20
use a cover name."

Hafsa said he belonged to Jaish-i-Muhammad and bragged that he had=20
participated in five guerrilla raids against the Indian army in the=20
Baramula and Aath Moqam districts of Indian-controlled Kashmir. "I=20
have seen my Pakistani and Kashmiri friends giving their lives in=20
Kashmir," he said. "Who is President Musharraf to stop me from waging=20
holy war against India?"

Several militants said the groups were working to build a=20
communication network that would enable them to continue their=20
actions without tipping off authorities.

Abu Nisar, a follower of Lashkar-i-Taiba, said members would keep in=20
touch via Web-based e-mail, Internet bulletin boards and electronic=20
paging, as well as short-messaging services on their mobile phones.=20
"In Afghanistan, it was not possible to do this, but here we use all=20
means of communication," Nisar said.

Pakistani intelligence officials said they can tap fixed and cellular=20
phones but lack the equipment and knowledge to intercept the other=20
forms of communications.

Pakistani officials also have had little success tracking the=20
financial assets of the militants. For instance, Pakistan announced=20
last month that it would freeze the assets of Jaish-i-Muhammad and=20
Lashkar-i-Taiba, but the Central Bank so far has found no money in=20
the group's bank accounts, according to government officials.

Pakistan's Interior Ministry has estimated that the five Kashmiri=20
rebel groups have about 5,000 followers, many of them trained in=20
guerrilla warfare.

A senior Pakistani official said the government was worried about a=20
backlash from the militants. "A new underground army of 5,000 armed=20
and trained religious extremists [could] revolt against this=20
about-face in the government's posture," he said. "They could pose=20
the greatest threat to law and order in Pakistan for weeks and months=20
to come."

Pakistani security officials said unemployed, semi-educated youths=20
form the core of the groups, but they noted that the militants also=20
attract doctors, engineers and people serving in sensitive government=20
jobs.

Officials and analysts in India play down fears of the militants=20
slipping underground, saying they are more concerned whether=20
extremist groups will continue to be supported by Pakistan's military=20
and its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). India contends that=20
groups such as Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Muhammad have been funded,=20
trained and equipped by Pakistan's military, a charge Islamabad=20
denies.

If Musharraf is serious about putting the groups out of business --=20
and the military follows his orders -- then it is unlikely the=20
militants will be able to retain much of their strength, even if they=20
operate clandestinely, the Indian officials and analysts said.

"The real question is what will the military and the ISI do?" one=20
Indian official said. "If they really crack down on these groups,=20
then it doesn't really matter if they try to change their names or go=20
underground. Where will they get their guns from? How will they get=20
money?"

Indian officials also argued that it would be difficult for the=20
groups to stay undetected in Pakistan, given the military's generally=20
tight control over the country. Even if the groups did succeed in=20
hiding their activities, Indian officials and analysts said, the=20
movement of large numbers of militants across the Line of Control=20
that divides Kashmir could not take place without the knowledge of=20
the Pakistani army.

"The militants cannot cross the LOC in significant numbers without=20
the knowledge and the support of the Pakistani military," said=20
Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyan, a former adviser to India's national=20
security council.

But a leader of a Pakistani religious party with close ties to Hizb=20
ul-Mujaheddin said the new government restrictions against Kashmiri=20
rebel groups would not prevent them from pursuing their cause.

"Musharraf can never stop the freedom movement in Kashmir. No one=20
can," said Khurshid Ahmad, vice president of the Jamaat-e-Islami=20
party. "The Kashmiri struggle will not cease. It may have its ups and=20
downs, but it will not stop."

Whitlock reported from Islamabad. Correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran=20
in New Delhi contributed to this report.

=A9 2002 The Washington Post Company

______

#7.

DAWN
14 January 2002

Why Vajpayee will always prefer Zia to Musharraf
By Jawed Naqvi

At the height of the post-Partition Hindu-Muslim riots, Asrarul Haq=20
Majaz, a legendary poet of the freedom struggle but known today, if=20
at all, as the maternal uncle of Javed Akhtar, was asked by the=20
Communist Party of India to take shelter in a friendly Hindu=20
dharmshala of Mumbai. He was advised to hide there with his other=20
colleagues from the progressive writers group, including Sardar=20
Jafri, Kaifi Azmi and perhaps Banney Bhai aka Sajjad Zahir, too.
They were all supposed to pretend to be Saryupaari and Kannauji=20
Brahmins and it seemed easy to do that since they all came from the=20
Avadh region of what is now Uttar Pradesh, heartland of a remarkable=20
variety of the erstwhile priestly class. They could all speak the=20
Avadhi dialect of Tulsidas with facility, knew more about the legend=20
of Lord Rama and even of the more involved Hindu traditions than many=20
Hindus themselves would be familiar with.
But something was to go wrong anyway. And so, after the priest at the=20
dharmshala welcomed the horde of masquerading Brahmins, and they had=20
sat down for tea, the portly pundit turned to Majaz and asked: "So,=20
sir, you are a Saryupaari Brahmin? So am I. And what may your gotra=20
be, sir?" Majaz, usually a great wit, lost his speech, spat out the=20
sip of tea in his mouth and wondered aloud to himself, in chaste Urdu=20
mind you: "Ma'az Allah, Ismey gotra bhi hota hai?" (Goodness=20
gracious, why didn't they warn me about this gotra business too?)
The complex skein of Hindu social order, whose yet one more hidden=20
strand was casually re-discovered by Majaz in 1947, is not any more=20
complicated than what obtains among Muslims, Christians, Jews, even=20
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs in India today. If I have left out any=20
religion, you may include that too in this argument and it wouldn't=20
alter much. Therefore, in discussing the cut and thrust of Islam=20
during the passing year, it would be prudent to keep an eye on what=20
was happening that was different with other religions.
The fact is that there is a rightwing thrust across the world today,=20
and that includes the world of Islam. If we take a cursory look at=20
our own neighbourhood, and see the governments that are in charge of=20
a billion plus people, it would not be difficult to come back to the=20
issue at hand, wither Islam? Ranil Wickremasinghe, represents the=20
Buddhist right, the new king of Nepal is by no means a=20
dyed-in-the-wool centrist. Begum Khaleda Zia, leaning heavily on the=20
Muslim clergy for support and our own Atal Behari Vajpayee, all have=20
one thing in common - they represent strong rightward-leaning=20
religious lobbies although in my humble but potentially unpopular=20
opinion in India, President Pervez Musharraf seems to challenge the=20
pattern. This was made amply clear by his landmark and globally=20
watched address on Saturday.
So Gen Musharraf is a rare exception to this generally overarching=20
pattern of religious metaphor intruding into the body politics of=20
nations which no doubt adds to the chagrin of his many detractors,=20
including the ones in India. (It must surely be rightwing opinion=20
that gets worried at the thought of Gen Musharraf's unravelling of=20
the religious obscurantist agenda of Gen Ziaul Haq.) Look beyond the=20
region and you would perhaps notice that the ascendance of President=20
George W. Bush and the decay of the British Labour Party into some=20
kind of ideological rudderlessness are by no means signs of more=20
tolerant and open societies ahead. Religious intolerance has seen war=20
and persecution in Europe.
Anti-Semitism was one such reflection of predominantly Christian=20
Europe not anywhere else. And be sure that it wasn't Adolf Hitler,=20
but more genial people like William Shakespeare who popularized and=20
sustained this hatred of Jews for centuries. It may sound banal, and=20
I confess it may even be a crass analogy, but it remains a fact in=20
more ways than one that the anti-Semitic Nazis were essentially=20
Christian Germans, who were eventually defeated not by a determined=20
Jewish resistance, but by the overwhelming force of a Christian=20
Britain and a Christian United States.
In India today, the rightwing thrust of Hindu nationalists, including=20
some very menacing self-pronounced zealots, is not being stalled so=20
much by Muslims, Christians or other assorted minorities as by the=20
majority Hindus themselves. In Sri Lanka, too, a complete and brazen=20
domination of Hindu and Christian Tamils by the majority Buddhist=20
Sinhalese could not have been thwarted without very influential saner=20
voices within the predominantly Sinhalese formations.
And yet there is a rising tide of religious atavism right across the=20
world. What could be giving rise to it? Or is there something=20
peculiar about Islam that we should guard against in particular? Or=20
is it possible that "fundamentalism" is actually the natural=20
progression of orthodox believers, including Muslims? If not, could=20
it be a calibrated, cynical and deliberately crafted new ideology=20
that uses religion as a vehicle, regardless of which religion, as=20
long as the objective to crush a more liberal and socially fair world=20
order is achieved?
For all practical purposes the word fundamentalist originated in the=20
energy shock of 1973 when the Arab countries discovered oil embargo=20
against the West as a weapon to bring their quarry to their knees. It=20
is here at this stage that we have to take note of the other linkages=20
in the drama. For example, the Vietnam war was not going too well for=20
the United States and in fact the 1973 oil crisis and the=20
Arab-Israeli war that triggered it had a clear if understated hand in=20
the ignominy for Washington in 1975 in Saigon.
In the Middle East, during this phase of Arab politics, the leading=20
voices against Israel and its Western supporters had little or=20
nothing to do with Islam. It was an Arab-Jewish or as the Arabs=20
prefer to say Arab-Zionist standoff in which the leading lights were=20
leftist groups of Palestinians and completely secular groups from=20
other frontline states. Leila Khaled, for example, who became the=20
world's first woman hijacker when she commandeered an Israeli plane,=20
no less, in 1968 was the member of the communist PFLP group of=20
Palestinians.
The secular imprint on the Palestinian movement was so strong in the=20
early days that even Yasser Arafat, a product of the truly=20
reactionary Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, could become acceptable as=20
its leader only after taking a secular position, not an Islamic one,=20
as even recently partly reflected in his quest to go to Bethlehem for=20
Christmas.
The factors that forced a secular movement of the Palestinians to=20
find itself inexorably overwhelmed by rightwing religious movements=20
like the Hamas are not different from the ones that marginalized a=20
secular, albeit leftist, uprising against the Shah of Iran, a feature=20
that repeated itself in Afghanistan with minor variations and a=20
longer time-table for creating right royal religious chaos.
The finger of suspicion points to the role of the United States.=20
Indeed there's no suspicion, it's an accepted fact. In 1998, former=20
US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told Le Nouvel=20
Observateur that he persuaded president Jimmy Carter to create the=20
Mujahideen in 1979, with the goal of "drawing the Russians into the=20
Afghan trap."
Asked how he could justify the subsequent collapse of any government=20
in Kabul and the Taliban takeover, Brzezinski said: "What is most=20
important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of=20
the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of=20
Central Europe and the end of the cold war?" History will judge. Is=20
the Northern Alliance of non-Pakhtoons not crammed with former=20
religious zealots of the Mujahideen days? And was it not the=20
Pakhtoons who were fighting for a secular Pakhtoonistan not too long=20
ago, with a little bit of help here and there from the Soviet Union=20
and India?
What Brzezinski achieved so cynically at a global level, Indian=20
politicians have been busy crafting for decades at a smaller but=20
equally vicious scale at home. The kind of support that orthodox and=20
often reactionary Muslim bodies get from the state, not just the=20
governments of the day, in their political calculations does not=20
require mention here.
For its short-term gains, the state of India has systematically=20
eroded its secular foundations to make room for the more pliable and=20
manoeuvrable social groups at the cost of the liberal silent=20
majority. That's one of the many heavy costs we have to pay for the=20
running of this behemoth called the world's largest democracy. Muslim=20
vote, Christian vote, Hindu vote, Dalit vote, and then we have Jat=20
vote, Gujar vote, Paasi vote, Shia vote, Sunni vote.
But look closely again, for example, at the Muslims of India and you=20
would perhaps notice that not only are they varied in regional=20
cultures, well beyond the grasp of ordinary parliamentarians, but are=20
religiously rooted in sects with diverse agendas, that include=20
Wahhabis, Ahle Hadis, Deobandis, Nadwat-ul-Ulema, Tablighi Jamaats,=20
Jamiat Ulema-I-Hind, Jamaat-i-Islami, Barelwis, Shias, Ismailis and=20
why not even Qadianis. All or anyone of them could have inspired=20
Akbar Ilahabadi, himself an orthodox Muslim, to guffaw thus:
"Wo miss boli ke main milwaa to deti apney father se; magar tume Alla=20
Alla karta hai, paagal ka maafiq hai."
Why single out Osama bin Laden for madness? As Fidel Castro said:=20
"The more the world moves to the right, the more leftist I look,=20
without even budging an inch from my original stance." Gen=20
Musharraf's crackdown on Muslim extremists in his country could be=20
the trigger to check this global drift to the right.

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