[sacw] SACW #1 (17 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
17 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. No bum deal, please, we're Pakistanis (Sherry Rehman)
#2. Bhopal Anniversary: International Call for Action
#3. Afghan merchants welcome US missiles (Iqbal Khattak)
#4. The Trouble With Kabul (Ahmed Rashid)
#5. The Meaning of Doha (Walden Bello and Anuradha Mittal)
#6. Pakistan's red carpet fraying at the edges (Ayaz Amir)

________________________

#1.

The Friday Times
November 16 - 22, 2001
No bum deal, please, we're Pakistanis

Sherry Rehman
analyses the national psyche to conclude that the time is ripe for a=20
broad-based government in Afghanistan and Pakistan
------------------------------------------------------------------------

As the map of Afghanistan is redrawn along new fault lines after six=20
weeks of aerial bombing, the shock waves continue to pulsate through=20
Pakistan. Without doubt, the price tag for aligning with the West=20
(officially estimated at US$2.5 billion) is crippling Pakistan and=20
this isn't reflected in the western media. But that's only one part=20
of the story. A more fundamental crisis relates to the heavy social=20
cost of this war.

Although most Pakistanis, silent or otherwise, have positioned=20
themselves behind the government, every child is painfully conscious=20
of the contradiction at the heart of this alignment. Osama Bin Laden,=20
September 11, and the bombing of Afghanistan have unraveled tensions=20
in the Pakistani psyche at home or abroad. Issues of state formation,=20
political culture, class, religion and ethnic identity have all=20
tossed up the face of a fragmented society uneasy with itself in many=20
ways. Here's why.

Pakistan's intimate yet disastrous involvement with Afghanistan has=20
educated everyone in the changing tribal complexion of that failing=20
state. It has taught Pakistanis that the Taliban are not=20
interchangeable with the Afghan nation. And it has brought home the=20
truth that the Northern Alliance proxies currently sweeping=20
Afghanistan are no liberating army either. So unless reprisals=20
against the Pashtun community unfold, no tears will be shed for=20
either band of bloodthirsty warlords that have alternately controlled=20
Kabul since the departure of the Soviets.

In any case, circumstances and temperament have both conspired to=20
make Pakistanis quite cynical. Unlike perceptions created by the=20
western media, our loyalties are often tentative and passions usually=20
mild. Urban Pakistan is almost a different country from tribal=20
Pakistan, while the south negotiates its port-city multiculturalism=20
with a provincial Punjabi heartland. In the absence of a myth of=20
strong national-unity, an existential condition of being culturally=20
and confessionally Muslim is the only symbolic glue that binds such a=20
heterogeneous republic together. This partly explains why, despite=20
the fact that every armchair cynic in the moderate belt is now a=20
born-again patriot, the actual act of becoming more than a=20
theoretical recruit is abhorrent to most people.

Essentially, Pakistanis were asked to make a difficult, and clearly=20
divisive, choice. The demands of loyalty to the nation-state, a=20
concept reviled by socialists, pan-Islamists, and old-fashioned=20
humanists, have put a moral sting in the tail of this choice. Opting=20
for Pakistan today means to many minds opting for the western=20
coalition that has bombed the daylights out of a neighbouring state=20
that has been a Pakistani client for years. Despite a strong current=20
of dislike for the Taliban and the crude misogynist Islam they have=20
publicized, there has been a swelling tide of unease among moderates=20
about supporting the western alliance. For one thing, nobody in=20
Pakistan sees this war as a war on terrorism. For another, the=20
rolling news coverage of a monstrous rain of terror from the skies on=20
a people displaced in a biblical tide of refugees, bewildered and=20
broken by 23 years of uninterrupted battling, has caused the=20
political ground to shift in Pakistan. In a surreal blurring of=20
certainties, partnership in what seems to be an increasingly unjust=20
war has not just opened up old fissures in civil society but also=20
brought an unhappy convergence of views between traditional rivals.=20
Despite a deep epistemological divide between the two groups in=20
society, the political left and its moderate cousin are incongruously=20
united in an uneasy alliance with their ideological antithesis, the=20
religious right. It is this effigy-burning mob that continues to=20
spearhead the growing tide of anti-American sentiment in the streets.

Meanwhile, the fact of al Qaida's elusiveness and Osama bin Laden's=20
tenacity has not helped the Western coalition. Despite the overnight=20
sweep ofAfghanistan's cities by the Northern Alliance, the strategic=20
goals of the war remain unfulfilled. Instead of OBL's capitulation,=20
we witness cult-personality status accorded to him on a global stage.=20
If the Taliban regime has fallen andkey interlocutors have=20
disappeared into the impenetrable Pamir caves or melted into=20
Pakistan's border towns, how has the war against terror been won?=20
No-one should be surprised then if every day a new theory is floated=20
among perfectly sane people looking for reasons behind this senseless=20
war. Some of the theories, in fact, get a respectful hearing in=20
newspapers and other forums of public record.

Take the most compelling one, for instance. Despite the official=20
spin, the idea of a modern-day great game of neo-imperialist forces=20
seeking oil lanes instead of warm water is now accepted as the most=20
fundamental strategic motive driving the American war machine. The=20
second most popular theory rationalizing American causality in this=20
war is domestic politics. The gladiatorial feeding of American public=20
opinion as a sort of atavistic monster has settled into the Pakistani=20
psyche as a profound motivation for this bizarremilitary campaign=20
from a height of over 20,000 feet.

In Pakistan the real issue right now is not just about the quid pro=20
quo from Washington in terms of money or power brokering. It is also=20
about how Pakistan survives this trial in terms of social and=20
political cost. The reality of being at war not just against its=20
neighbour but against its own unresolved dilemmas has brought most=20
Pakistanis to the edge of their traditional inertia. This new impulse=20
of patriotism activating Pakistan, for instance, is fuelled in one=20
part by a hydraulic rage at American double standards and in another=20
by a grudging sense of despair at their own collective failures as a=20
community. Fear that the centre may not be able to survive the=20
seismic eruptions caused by this war is keeping many people united=20
behind General Musharraf. Challenges to his regime by the religious=20
right are being treated as seditious at a fragile moment in=20
Pakistan's history. While OBL's call to Pakistanis to rise against=20
their own flag, which he says is standing under the banner of=20
Christianity, is dismissed by many as typical of his political=20
hubris, the same swathe of public opinion sees American state=20
arrogance in much the same light. And while fear of a religious=20
militancy that is alien to indigenous Pakistan prompts many to see=20
this war as an opportunity to wipe out sectarian extremism and the=20
organizations that feed it, doubts about the government's ability to=20
put this genie back in the bottle are not misplaced. Although the=20
Taliban overspill in Pakistan's tribal areas remains unaccounted for=20
in official media, the Taliban's presence in urban centers is=20
increasingly reflected in a violent brand of the cash and gun-fuelled=20
madrassah culture which attracts local recruits from among the=20
unemployed and impressionable.

But this is not the only worry animating our debates. Anxiety about=20
Pakistan's frontline status is compounded by the paradox of=20
supporting a military dictator as the nation's new bulwark against=20
religious extremism. As he returns from red-carpet receptions in=20
Western capitals that once spurned him as politically illegitimate,=20
General Pervez Musharraf's reluctance to include mainstream political=20
parties in a war cabinet leaves him with the imprimatur of a man with=20
little political space for manoeuvre, particularly when the nation is=20
being dragged through this traumatic conflict without the benefits of=20
transparency and accountability. His announced intention to retain=20
the office of president in an electoral system that is based on the=20
primacy of a prime minister has also unleashed a tank-full of doubts.=20
Despite all these questions, however, General Musharraf's domestic=20
star is still in the ascendant. What erodes this new war-pumped=20
anti-fundamentalist popularity is not his reluctance to distance=20
himself from an unpopular ally right now. That will depend on the=20
nature of the coalition the allies and the UN are able to swing in=20
the current political vacuum in Kabul. What sours the public=20
imagination against him is his alacrity in adopting all American=20
recommendations without apparent questioning or public debate.

The worst thing for Pakistan right now would be greater domestic=20
divisions. General Musharraf recommends a consultative assembly or=20
loya jirga for tribal Afghanistan. What about forming a consultative,=20
broad-based government for his own country until October 2002?=20
Questions about his own status as president can then be dealt with=20
through a multi-party constitutional committee. Meanwhile, no=20
referendums please, we're Pakistani. We're still trying to forget the=20
bum deal General Zia ul Haq gave us with his self-serving=20
single-issue poll to anoint himself as life dictator.

______

#2.

Bhopal Anniversary: International Call for Action

(PLEASE EMAIL nity68@v... with any queries. Copy
ntangri@e... and amit@i...)
For more information, visit: www.bhopal.net, www.bhopal.org and
www.corpwatch.org (search "bhopal")

BACKGROUND
December 3-10 will be observed as an international week of action
against Corporate Crime and Toxic Pollution around the world,
because this coincides with the 17th anniversary of the Union
Carbide gas disaster in Bhopal, India. The disastrous gas leak has
killed more than 19,000 people and left half a million with
permanent injuries.

After the disaster, Union Carbide abandoned the factory site in
Bhopal and left the factory grounds strewn with deadly toxic
wastes. The poisons in the wastes have entered the groundwater
which feeds the community living adjacent the factory. Repeated
demands by the community asking for cleanup have been ignored
by Carbide. Now the company has been acquired by Dow
Chemicals, another US multinational with a track record of
manufacturing poisons and polluting the environment and people.

Dow Chemicals has refused to accept any liability although it now
owns all the assets of Union Carbide.

YOU ALSO LIVE IN BHOPAL
The fight for justice in Bhopal is not merely a local fight. It is a fight
against an establishment that allows multinational corporations to
poison our land, water, air and our bodies. What happened in
Bhopal is happening in slow motion in communities around the
world -- in Louisiana, in South Africa, in the Niger delta, in
Richmond, California.

YOU CAN HELP BY TAKING ACTION

AXN POSSIBILITIES:
1. Screening of films/videos on corporations and their toxic crimes.
2. Conduct a toxic tour of your neighborhood. Visit your local
polluter and petition the company.
3. Initiate panel discussions by inviting knowledgeable people.
4. If you live near a Dow facility or its subsidiary, organise a
demonstration against it. Petition the facility with a list of demands
(below).
5. We can arrange to send bottles of water contaminated by Union
Carbide's poisons from the well near Carbide's Bhopal factory.
These glass containers hold about 200 ml of water and will be
labelled attractively.

If you're interested, you could place a request for anywhere between
20-400 bottles which you could either display at a kiosk in a public
place to educate people about Dow/Unoin Carbide's crimes.
Alternatively, you could set up the bottles near the Dow facility and
engage the workers and try to build pressure from within to get
Dow to clean up Bhopal and make provisions for water.
6. Organise a non-violent direct action against your local polluter.
You could burn effigies of multinational chemical corporations

DON'T FORGET THE MEDIA
Whatever you do, don't forget to invite the media, and don't forget to
issue a press statement on your group's letter head. Link it to the
Bhopal disaster. Mention that despite the loss of lives, it's
business as usual for the chemical corporations, and suffering as
usual for the communities living around these ticking time bombs.

THE DEMANDS
Whether you issue a press statement, burn an effigy, picket your
local polluter or petition your local authorities, kindly send in a
letter on your organisation's letterhead to the CEO of Dow
Chemical Company expressing your solidarity for the demands
(below) of the survivors from Bhopal. Kindly ensure that a copy of
the letter is sent to:
Amit Srivastava
India Resource Centre
P.O. Box 29344, San Francisco, CA 94129, USA
Tel: 1 415 561 6472 Fax: 1 415 561 6493
Email: amit@c...

THE DEMANDS
a) Secure medical rehabilitation and long-term medical
treatment facilities for the survivors of Carbide's poison gas leak;
b) Secure economic rehabilitation for the gas-affected persons and
their families;
c) Bring the criminals of Carbide to justice;
d) Ensure clean up of the toxic factory site at Dow's expense;
e) Secure clean drinking water for the communities that are forced
to consume groundwater containing Carbide's poisons;
f) Put in place an international protocol that will hold corporations
criminally and financially liable for industrial disasters.

______

#3.

The Friday Times
November 16 - 22, 2001
Afghan merchants welcome US missiles

Iqbal Khattak
says Afghan scrap traders have the merchandise dumped near Torkham
=09=20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
=09=20
Metal scrap from US bombs and cruise missiles rained over Afghanistan=20
by the US military has been dumped by Afghan traders on the other=20
side of the Torkham checkpoint on the Durand Line for possible=20
shipping into Pakistan, TFT has learnt from customs agents in=20
Landikotal.

"I can tell you that this merchandise is dumped on the other side of=20
the border in Afghanistan," Farman Shinwari, who runs a customs=20
clearing agency in Landikotal, a sub-division of Khyber Agency, told=20
TFT during a visit to the area to confirm news of shipment of scrap=20
to Peshawar.

While sources confirm that Afghans have been picking up bombs and=20
missiles pieces as metal scrap to be brought into Pakistan, TFT could=20
not confirm whether any consignment has actually reached Pakistan=20
through the Khyber Pass.

Most people familiar with the trading and smuggling patterns between=20
Afghanistan and Pakistan say the scrap will ultimately find its way=20
into the markets in Peshawar but that such large consignments would=20
require the situation to calm down a little.

"Border guards have been very alert in the past month or so. The=20
traders and smugglers would wait until the situation cools down,"=20
says Shinwari. He said this could take some time. "This type of=20
merchandise does not require immediate delivery," he said.

Customs agents say the price of 50 kilos of such scrap would be Rs=20
410 on the other side of Torkham. "Add to it labour charges of Rs 40=20
plus transportation charges from Torkham and every 50 kilos would=20
cost about Rs 600 in Peshawar," says one.

Traders in Peshawar say the scrap has not arrived in Peshawar because=20
of various reasons. "The delay could be because of security problems=20
at the border or the traders in Afghanistan might have calculated=20
that their profit margins would be less," says a trader

The scrap business is nothing new between the Pakistani traders and=20
their Afghan counterparts. Tons of scrap continued to come into=20
Peshawar during the Afghan war years and even later. Much of it was=20
metal from destroyed Soviet tanks, APCs, jeeps and trucks and guns.=20
"A lot of scrap also comes to Peshawar from Tajikistan, though it is=20
not destroyed bombs or missiles," says Shinwari.

During the Afghan war, destroyed Russian planes, helicopters, tanks=20
and military vehicles could be seen lying along the=20
Torkham-Jalalabad-Kabul highway. Afghans would cut them up into=20
pieces and sell the scrap in Pakistan.

______

#4.

Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong)
November 22, 2001

AFGHANISTAN
The Trouble With Kabul
The Taliban's retreat from northern Afghanistan sets the stage for=20
new military battles. But taking the capital also accelerates the=20
challenge of finding a legitimate leadership in a country where war=20
is a way of life
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Ahmed Rashid/ISLAMABAD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FACING A RELENTLESS United States bombing campaign and an offensive=20
by the United Front, the Taliban had calculated on carrying out a=20
tactical retreat from northern Afghanistan. However they badly=20
underestimated the power and speed with which the forces arrayed=20
against them would move. After the United Front, also known as the=20
Northern Alliance, captured the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif on=20
November 9, the Taliban retreat turned into a rout. Four days later=20
the United Front strolled into Kabul, as the Taliban fled pell-mell=20
to their strongholds in southern Afghanistan.

The fall of Kabul and northern Afghanistan is the first significant=20
achievement for the U.S. military campaign after nearly six weeks of=20
intense bombing of Afghanistan and will come as a relief for U.S.=20
military planners, who were facing increasing criticism at home and=20
abroad for the lack of progress in the war against terrorism. It will=20
also be the first political test for Washington's partners, the=20
United Front, whose grim record and past failures of governance will=20
now be put to a critical test that every Afghan will be watching=20
closely.

Since early November Taliban troops in the low hills some 48=20
kilometres to the south of Mazar-e-Sharif were taking a pounding from=20
U.S. bombing strikes. On the evening of November 9 the Taliban front=20
lines finally crumbled. Rather than face street-to-street battles and=20
an uprising by the city's largely anti-Taliban population, the=20
8,000-troop Taliban force evacuated the city. That night the forces=20
of three United Front commanders helped by dozens of U.S. special=20
forces troops took control of the city in just two hours.

Over the next few days the United Front swept east, west and south,=20
capturing nearly the whole of northern Afghanistan. In the west Gen.=20
Ismael Khan trapped Taliban troops trying to flee Mazar-e-Sharif,=20
took control of three western provinces, and then attacked Herat,=20
which fell on November 12 after its Taliban garrison of some 6,000=20
troops surrendered. U.S. aircraft bombed fleeing Taliban troops=20
leaving a swathe of destroyed pickups and bodies on the roads.

In the northeast, after a 12-hour battle, the United Front captured=20
Takhar province and former United Front headquarters at Taloqan; in=20
central Afghanistan they took control of Bamiyan province after mass=20
defections from the Taliban, allowing the United Front to link up=20
with their troops outside Kabul for the first time in three years.=20
Only in Konduz, close to the border with Tajikistan, did the Taliban=20
continue to resist despite relentless bombing. U.S. officials later=20
claimed that Taliban troops had begun to abandon Konduz as well.

As province after province fell, the U.S., Britain and Pakistan urged=20
the United Front to exercise restraint and not to enter Kabul. What=20
nobody expected was a further Taliban retreat. As night fell on=20
November 12, Taliban tanks and trucks revved up and fled Kabul.=20
United Front forces entered the capital the next morning in triumph,=20
facing only sporadic resistance by do-or-die Arab and Pakistani=20
mercenaries.

Continents away at the United Nations General Assembly, Western=20
leaders and UN officials watched aghast as their slow-moving plans to=20
call a council of all Afghan factions, which they hoped would set up=20
a transitional government before Kabul fell, appeared to be falling=20
apart. "Nobody, not even the CIA foresaw a Taliban rout and such a=20
speedy advance by the United Front," says a UN official in New York.

After meeting with Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf on the=20
sidelines of the UN General Assembly, U.S. President George W. Bush=20
urged the United Front not to enter Kabul so that efforts to form a=20
transitional government could be made first. "We will encourage our=20
friends to head south . . . but not into the city of Kabul itself. We=20
believe we can accomplish our military mission by this strategy,"=20
Bush told a news conference on November 10. His words were ignored.

The United Front had controlled 10% of the country; within days it=20
occupied 50%. Now the Taliban, rather than the United Front, are the=20
ones confined to ever dwindling pockets of territory.

The United Front, a loose alliance amongst three ethnic=20
groups--Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara--now has to establish a credible=20
administration rather than divide the conquered cities into personal=20
fiefdoms as it has in the past. It must also prevent revenge killings=20
of the Taliban and their foreign mercenaries, who include thousands=20
of Pakistanis, Arabs and Central Asians. There were early reports of=20
looting from Kabul, and a UN official spoke of unconfirmed reports=20
that 600 Taliban supporters were executed in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Aides to former King Zahir Shah in Rome urged the commanders to set=20
up a civilian administration under the Supreme Council for National=20
Unity, which Shah and the United Front set up in October. "This would=20
be the first opportunity to establish a national government in a part=20
of Afghanistan, which could then develop as the alternative=20
transitional government to Taliban rule," says a senior aide to the=20
king in Rome. But persuading the headstrong United Front commanders=20
to listen--the Uzbek, Rashid Dostum; Tajik, Atta Mohammed; and Shia=20
Hazara commander Ustad Mohaqiq--will not be easy.

A PLEA TO THE UN
However, the political leadership of the Tajiks, who have taken=20
Kabul, immediately called upon the UN to come and help the Afghans=20
establish a new government. They insisted that they would not form a=20
government on their own and their security force would only=20
facilitate the meeting of a grand council of all Afghan factions=20
which could decide on the details of a new transitional government.

Foreign ministers from eight key countries meeting in New York on=20
November 12 urged UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to=20
"facilitate efforts by Afghan groups committed to a free and peaceful=20
Afghanistan to establish a broad-based Afghan administration on an=20
urgent basis." However, there is little hope in doing so as long as=20
the majority Pashtun ethnic group, from whom the Taliban are drawn,=20
remain unrepresented. Until now, efforts by the U.S. and Pakistan to=20
draw out defectors from the Taliban leadership have failed.

The key to U.S. strategic success is still the Pashtun heartland of=20
southern Afghanistan where the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaderships are=20
based. Washington has been slow to support anti-Taliban Pashtun=20
leaders in the south. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun tribal chief who is=20
mobilizing support for an anti-Taliban revolt in southern=20
Afghanistan, says he has received no U.S. support despite statements=20
by U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that food and ammunition=20
had been provided.

"I need international aid, especially food and water for hundreds of=20
my men, because we have nothing. There is a very desperate situation=20
here," Karzai told the REVIEW by satellite telephone on November 11.=20
Karzai, who entered Afghanistan with a small group of well-armed=20
supporters on October 8, the day after the U.S. began its bombing=20
campaign, remains in the southern part of Uruzghan province, just=20
north of Kandahar. His pleas for aid reinforced widespread criticism=20
from many Afghans that the U.S. has failed to help anti-Taliban=20
forces in southern Afghanistan. Earlier this month Abdul Haq, another=20
Pashtun commander, was captured and executed by the Taliban after he=20
tried to stir up a similar revolt.

SEEKING PASHTUN SUPPORT
In a belated move, on November 8, the U.S. State Department appointed=20
Ambassador James Dobbins to coordinate support for all anti-Taliban=20
forces. Dobbins is travelling to Pakistan and Central Asia to meet=20
Pashtun exiles and United Front leaders. Now that the United Front=20
has pushed into Kabul, the U.S. will need to move more quickly in=20
building Pashtun alliances.

Karzai claimed he was receiving a tremendous response from Pashtun=20
tribes and that Taliban forces in the south have been demoralized.=20
"There is a tremendous weakening of morale amongst the Taliban which=20
is loosening their repressive grip on the countryside," he said.=20
"Local people have been bending over backwards to help us."

With Ismael Khan's forces now heading down the road from Herat to=20
Kandahar, the Taliban may well surrender their southern cities=20
without a fight. But if they do they will take to the mountains and=20
continue a guerrilla war. And in the Pashtun heartland the Taliban=20
will likely try to gather popular support with claims that the U.S.=20
is attempting to divide Afghanistan and set up a separate government=20
in the north.

However, hundreds of Taliban fighters were reported to be deserting,=20
dropping their weapons and either going home to their villages or=20
trying to cross the border into Pakistan. The mass defections from=20
the Taliban in the south will now help U.S. intelligence in finding=20
Osama bin Laden. The United Front and the United States will be sure=20
to take quick advantage of the mayhem, which has loosened the grip of=20
Taliban repression and control on the population there for the first=20
time in years.

Copyright =A92001 Review Publishing Company Limited, Hong Kong. All=20
rights reserved.

______

#5.

[16 November 2001]

The Meaning of Doha

By Walden Bello and Anuradha Mittal*

The results of the WTO Ministerial in Doha, Qatar, have
elicited some confusion among many of those following the events.

A New Round?

Something was launched at Doha, but to call it a "round" of
trade negotiations might be stretching the concept of a round. A
round means negotiations on a broad range of issues directed at trade
liberalization. What was agreed at Doha were: a) negotiations to
clarify or revise some existing agreements, e.g., anti-dumping rules;
and b) eventual negotiations for new agreements, e.g., transparency
in government procurement, investment, and competition policy.

Getting immediate negotiations going on investment,
competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation was
at the top of the agenda of the trading powers in Doha. They fell
short of this objective, being able to secure a commitment for
negotiations on these issues only after the fifth ministerial in
2003, and only with a "written consensus" from member countries.

Doha and the Developing Countries

What is clear is that, contrary to the claims of European
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, Doha did not launch a "development
round." The key points of the Doha Declaration, in fact, contradict
the interests of the developing countries. For example,

- There is only a perfunctory acknowledgement of the need to review
implementation issues, which was the key agenda of the developing
countries coming into Doha;
- The language on the phasing out of agricultural subsidies is
watered down owing to the strong objections of the European Union;
- There is no commitment to an early phase-out of textile and garment
quotas because of the strong resistance of the United States;
- The demand for a "development box" to promote food security and
development which was being pushed by a number of developing
countries was completely ignored;
- There is no commitment to change the wording of the TRIPs
(Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement to accommodate
developing countries' overriding of patents for public health
purposes;
- There is no commitment to change the TRIPs agreement to outlaw
biopiracy and patents on life, which was a key developing country
concern coming into Doha;
- The declaration eliminates the reference in the draft to the
International Labor Organization (ILO) being the appropriate forum
for addressing labor and trade issues, which leaves the door open for
the WTO to assert its jurisdiction in an area where it has no
authority or competence.

The resolution of the TRIPs and public health issue is being
trumpeted as a victory for developing countries. This is
exaggerated. While an attachment to the declaration does recognize
that there is nothing in TRIPs that would prevent countries from
taking measures to promote public health, there is no commitment to
change the wording of the TRIPs agreement. This is a serious flaw
since TRIPs as it is currently written can serve as the basis for
future legal challenges to countries that override patents in the
interest of public health.

A Defeat for Democracy and Development

In fact, Doha was a defeat for the developing countries,
notwithstanding the resistance they--and in particular, India--put up
against arm-twisting, blackmail, and intimidation from the big
trading powers. Those of us in Doha were witness, as the Equations
team puts it, "to the highhanded unethical negotiating practices of
the developed countries =8A linking aid budgets and trade preferences
to the trade positions of developing countries and targeting
individual developing country negotiators."

Doha was a victory for the forces with a strong interest in
subverting the interests of the developing countries that form the
majority of the membership of the World Trade Organization by keeping
the decision-making process non-transparent and undemocratic.

Why Doha will Backfire

This is why this victory may well be a Pyrrhic one for the big
trading powers. The combination of developing country resentments
inflamed by the Doha process, a deep global recession brought about
by the indiscriminate locking together of economies by accelerated
trade and financial liberalization, and reinvigorated civil society
resistance to corporate driven globalization, cannot but erode the
credibility and legitimacy of the institutional pillars of free trade
like the WTO.

And without credibility and legitimacy, institutions, no matter how
seemingly solid they may seem, eventually unravel.

At the conclusion of the Fourth Ministerial, Director General Mike
Moore thanked the delegates for "saving the WTO." The end result may
well be, instead, the accelerated decline of the WTO.

* Walden Bello is the Executive Director of Bangkok based Focus on
the Global South and Anuradha Mittal is the Co Director of oakland
based Institute for Food and Development Policy.

______

#6.

DAWN
16 November
Pakistan's red carpet fraying at the edges
By Ayaz Amir
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/ayaz.htm

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