[sacw] [ACT] Beyond Lahore: From Transparency to Arms Control

[Harsh Kapoor]

=46YI
(South Asians Against Nukes)
------------------------------------

BEYOND LAHORE: FROM TRANSPARENCY TO ARMS CONTROL
[by] Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana
Center for Energy and Environmental Studies
Princeton University

(Published in Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, India, April 17-24, 199=
9)

=46ollowing the examples set over the last fifty years by the U.S. and the
other nuclear weapon states, the governments of India and Pakistan have now
clearly chosen to rely on weapons of mass destruction and terror as the
basis for their relationship with each other and the rest of the world. The
nuclear tests they conducted in May 1998 and the accompanying political and
military crisis raise genuine fears for the future of the people of South
Asia. In the same way as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did decades ago, India and
Pakistan have started to turn to "transparency" measures as a way to
reassure themselves, and the international community, about the dangers
that they have created. These measures, however, do not confront the
central fact that the two countries now have acquired the means to fight
nuclear war. Nothing in the Lahore agreement changes this or even imposes
any restrictions on it. The recent tests of Agni-II and Ghauri-II and
references to Agni-III, Ghauri-III, Shaheen-I and II demonstrate just how
little restraint the Lahore agreements impose on the two states continuing
to develop their nuclear arsenals.

THE LAHORE AGREEMENTS

The agreements sketched out at Lahore are designed only to offer limited
transparency and thus, it is felt, some kind of early warning that could
prevent disproportionate responses from events associated with the nuclear,
missile and military programs. The two sides agreed to consult on their
nuclear strategies and thinking and to notify each other about planned
missile tests as well as accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incidents
that could create the risk of nuclear war. There were also agreements to
prevent untoward incidents at sea and to review existing communication
links.

Many of South Asia's hawks, who championed the acquisition of these weapons
in the first place, have welcomed the transparency measures. They have
followed the American example, step by step, first in believing in
deterrence and now transparency measures. They have even adopted the same
turn of phrase used, over a decade ago, by Strobe Talbott who described
such measures as "mutually agreeable rules of the road in the arms race -
rules that will make the competition somewhat more predictable." Like
Talbott, the hawks see no end to the competition.

Each one of the agreements put up for negotiation at Lahore draws directly
on agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the early 1970's.
The original agreements were little more than means to thin the fog of
crisis that characterized superpower relations. The more significant arms
control treaties, actually restricting the testing and deployment of
weapons, such as the ABM Treaty, the Threshold test ban Treaty,
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties came later.

Moreover, the borrowing from superpower experience is partial and
dangerous. As transparency measures, the Lahore agreements are limited in
their scope. They do not address crucial details such as deployment
patterns, command and control arrangements or early warning systems. The
superpowers tried to compensate for these omissions by investing billions
of dollars in spies and satellites and even more in their own early warning
systems. India and Pakistan cannot resort to such expensive technological
solutions both due to the lack of technological and financial resources and
the fact that the geographical proximity of the two countries rules out any
possibility of early warning under any circumstances.

These constraints create an additional imperative to push beyond the
transparency measures that are on the table. It is here that the hawks are
likely to resist. They want to see their respective states further develop
and deploy their nuclear arsenals. Their response to even moderate arms
control measures is likely to be similar to their superpower counterparts
and characterized by suspicion and hostility. These attitudes are what has
led them to support the weapons in the first place and leads them to an
obsession with the possibility of cheating and thus the need for
verification of any agreement.

BUYING TIME WITH ARMS CONTROL

As a way of getting to grips with the weapons themselves and recognizing
that the hawks have by and large hijacked the decision making process in
both countries, we suggest some small concrete verifiable arms control
measures that can go beyond the transparency agreements. Like the
transparency agreements, some of these steps draw upon superpower efforts
during the cold war. It is difficult to justify making proposals that are
so derivative and so restricted, especially given the sorry history of the
cold war and superpower arms control. For decades, arms control failed to
restrict the size or sophistication of superpower arsenals and showed that
it takes political change to achieve real results. However, in the interim
it is vital to engage in measures that could help slow the momentum that
has been created by the nuclear weapons tests and set the stage for a real
dis-armament process. We have no doubt that the fundamental problem is a
political one and the long-term solutions, therefore, would lie in the
political realm. Our aim is to help create time for the mobilization of a
peace movement that can challenge the elite and its way of thinking that
has led the two countries to the edge of the nuclear abyss.

In trying to assess ways of dealing with nuclear weapons, it is important
to be sensitive to the constraints created by the technology as well as the
larger context into which the weapons as well as the proposed forms of
constraint are to work. There is no getting away from the fact that the
material character of these weapons demands technical solutions of certain
kinds. Just as treating these weapons as purely technical artifacts is
inadequate - they are after all part of a larger social, political,
scientific and military system, that creates them, maintains them and
justifies them - ignoring their specific technological and material nature
misses out on a key way in which, as with other technological artifacts,
they influence the societies into which they emerge.

We divide our proposals into two - measures that would limit the potential
size and destructiveness of the arsenals and measures that reduce the
immediate danger to the people of the region from the existing weapons.

THE TEST BAN

One place where the awkward and difficult character of positioning oneself
on arms control has been the tortured debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Recognizing the limited nature of the treaty, and the fact that it
allows nuclear weapon states to keep their existing capabilities while
excluding other nations from acquiring the same, there are nevertheless
genuine benefits that follow from a CTBT in constraining the further
development of nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that we, like the
peace movement elsewhere, support the treaty and argue for a more serious
engagement with the aspirations that guided the struggles for the treaty
over the past four decades.

The coming into force of the CTBT should be supported and built on by
committing to help force the nuclear weapons establishments the world over
to stop further development of nuclear weapons. This would involve closing
down the test sites, stopping subcritical and hydrodynamic tests, and
research into a new generation of nuclear weapons. Closing the loopholes in
the CTBT would put to rest the options that Indian and Pakistani nuclear
weapons scientists and their international peers are trying to create for
themselves to keep conducting weapons related research and development in
the hope that there would be another "day the sun rose twice. "

NUCLEAR MATERIALS

=46ISSILE MATERIAL TREATY

The other multilateral arms control measure that is under consideration is
the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). This has been a priority for the
nuclear weapon states, especially the United States, ever since they
stopped producing fissile materials themselves. Fully aware of the effects
of the cutoff on its =ABnuclear option=BB, India, for a while, blocked progr=
ess
on the FMT claiming that the treaty should be firmly linked to a time-bound
program for nuclear disarmament. However, in the aftermath of the May 1998
nuclear tests, as part of its efforts to ease international pressure, India
relaxed its objections and has started participating in the negotiations at
Geneva and has taken a similar position as the other nuclear weapon states.
As negotiations develop, hard-liners in India may force renewed objections,
as with the CTBT, because of the relatively small size of India's fissile
material stocks.

Currently, the main dispute is over the question of the enormous existing
stockpiles of fissile material possessed by the nuclear weapon states (see
Table 1).
Table 1: Estimated Stockpiles of Directly Weapons-usable Fissile Materials
Nuclear-weapon state Weapon-grade Uranium (tons) Weapon-grade
Plutonium (tons) Reactor-grade Plutonium (tons)
U.S. 580 99.5 0
Russia 1050 131 33
Britain 21.9 7.6 51.3
=46rance 25 5 35
China 20 4 0.0
Israel ? 0.5 0.0
India ? 0.33 0.45
Pakistan 0.2 0.0 0.0

The nuclear weapon states, led by the U.S., categorically refuse to discuss
these stockpiles. Earlier this year, the director of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, declared "we will not agree to
any restrictions on existing stocks." It should be obvious that leaving
stockpiles untouched and banning only future production would serve no
disarmament purpose at all. The non-nuclear weapon states and the
non-aligned movement have recognized this; in the words of the Indonesian
CD ambassador: =ABbrushing aside the issue of stockpiles, would, once again,
render the cutoff treaty a mere non-proliferation measure...[with] no added
value to date.=BB India, reflecting its new found status, has opposed any
discussion of stockpiles while Pakistan insists on talking about
stockpiles, pointing to asymmetries in the stockpiles within South Asia as
well as conventional weapons levels. It is vital that pressure be brought
to bear on the nuclear weapon states to include stocks in the negotiations
and make the FMT into a disarmament treaty.

AN INTERIM PRODUCTION FREEZE

Whatever be the scope of the treaty, negotiations are likely to take a long
time. Pakistan and India may well use this time to pursue their ongoing
arms race by building up their stocks of weapons useable fissile material
with the attendant environmental and economic consequences. To avoid this,
the two countries should declare, as with testing, a moratorium on the
production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In parallel, they
could call on the nuclear weapon-states to publicly formalize their
existing moratoria on fissile material production.

The easiest way to ensure that India and Pakistan are complying with the
moratorium would be for them to shut down their research reactors,
reprocessing and enrichment plants (see Table 2 and Table 3). Without
reactors to make the plutonium, and reprocessing plants to extract it for
use in nuclear weapons, and enrichment plants to make highly enriched
uranium for weapons, the two countries would no longer be able to increase
their stockpiles of the raw materials for bombs. It would be relatively
easy to verify that all known facilities are not being used by monitoring
them using commercial satellites or aerial observations.

Table 2: Indian Nuclear Facilities affected by a Fissile Material Moratorium
=46acility Characteristics
CIRUS, Mumbai Research Reactor
Dhruva, Mumbai Research Reactor
=46BTR, Kalpakkam Research (fast breeder) Reactor
PFBR, Kalpakkam Fast Breeder Reactor, planned
Ratnahalli Uranium enrichment centrifuge plant
Trombay, Mumbai Plutonium reprocessing plant
PREFRE, Tarapur Plutonium reprocessing plant
KARP, Kalpakkam Plutonium reprocessing plant

Table 3: Pakistani Nuclear Facilities Affected by a Fissile Material Morator=
ium
=46acility Characteristics
Khushab Research Reactor
Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Plant
New Labs Reprocessing plant

In a bid to keep their facilities open, the nuclear establishments in both
countries are likely to claim that these facilities serve other purposes.
Pakistan, for example, will say that Kahuta is meant to supply low enriched
uranium for the new Chashma reactor. However, China has signed a contract
to supply this reactor with fuel; there is therefore no need for Pakistan
to produce its own fuel. Likewise, it has been claimed that the Ratnahalli
plant in India is not capable of enriching uranium to the extent necessary
for use in weapons and is actually intended to produce fuel for India's
nuclear submarine. An enrichment plant can be easily modified to produce
weapon-grade uranium. Further, the nuclear submarine is a colossal waste of
money, and suggests only that India, like the other nuclear weapon states,
intends to deploy nuclear missiles at sea - ample reasons to oppose the
project in any case.

India also operates three reprocessing plants, including the recently built
one at Kalpakkam, purportedly to produce plutonium for its fast breeder
reactors. Quite apart from the possibility of making weapon-grade plutonium
at fast breeder reactors, there are good economic and environmental reasons
to stop the program. Despite these reasons, if India were to go ahead with
its fast breeder program, then it could well do so by putting them under
inspections. After all the Japanese and German programs were fully subject
to international monitoring.

Alongside this, they should agree not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire,
tritium for use in nuclear weapons. Tritium is used in order to "boost" or
increase the yield of nuclear weapons. A ban on the production of tritium
would, therefore, limit the numbers of thermonuclear weapons that could be
produced, each of which would have a destructive yield many times that of
ordinary fission weapons. Such a ban would also reduce the incentive for
Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists to continue pursuing a thermonuclear
weapon of their own and so impede the potential for larger and more
destructive weapons.

A BAN ON MISSILE TESTS

As the recent tests of Agni II and Ghauri II show, the ballistic missile
race is on and in danger of accelerating in the near future. Just as a ban
on nuclear tests inhibits the development of new weapons designs, a ban on
flight testing of missiles would inhibit the development of new missiles.
India has conducted one flight test and continues to work on a new version
of the Agni, an intermediate range ballistic missile. It is believed to be
developing the Sagarika, a sea-launched missile. Pakistan, for its part,
has tested a new version of the intermediate range Ghauri and is working on
a new missile called Shaheen. The limited number of tests of missiles that
have been conducted so far by India and Pakistan amount to experiments with
missile technology; without many more tests it is not possible to deploy
them with the level of confidence that military systems usually require.
More tests are going to lead to growing confidence in the missiles and thus
demands to deploy these missiles with the attendant increases in tension
and danger.

Table 4: Ballistic Missile Systems under Development or Production
Name of Missile Range Warhead Size Development Stage
Indian Missiles
Prithvi I 150 km 1000 kg deployed
Prithvi II 250 km 500 kg developed
Prithvi III 350 km 250 kg? under development
Agni I 1500 km? 1000 kg? technology demonstrated
Agni II 2500 km 1000 kg? technology demonstrated
Sagarika 300 km? 500 kg? under development
Pakistani Missiles
Hatf I 80 km 500 kg technology demonstrated
Hatf II 300 km 500 kg technology demonstrated
Hatf III up to 800 km 500 kg technology demonstrated
M-11 290 km 1000 kg? in storage?
Ghauri 1500 km? 700 kg technology demonstrated
Shaheen 700 km? 1000 kg? displayed

There should be no illusion about the suggestions made above. These
agreements in themselves do little to reduce the immediate danger to the
people of the two countries from the current weapons. The most such
measures could do is to restrict the potential devastation that could be
wreaked upon them. They would also forestall an arms race between the two
countries. Since leaders in both countries have stated repeatedly that they
do not wish to participate in such a race, implementing these steps would
be a way for the governments to demonstrate the sincerity of these
statements.

MAKING SPACE WITH NO-DEPLOYMENT ZONES

To address the immediate dangers another set of measures should be pursued
in parallel that relate to the weapons themselves. These follow along the
lines of the recent Indian resolution at the United Nations entitled
"Reducing Nuclear Dangers" that seeks to have the nuclear weapon states
dealert their nuclear arsenals. What follows herein are, in a sense, an
application of analogous steps in the South Asian context.

The greatest danger of nuclear war arises when missiles are deployed with
nuclear warheads. It is believed that India and Pakistan have not yet
placed their nuclear weapons on missiles or otherwise deployed them. This
arrangement should be formalized as part of a verifiable treaty. This could
be done by storing warheads at sites away from missiles and airbases. An
additional benefit is that fears about the primitive and inadequate command
and control systems that the two states may possess can be put to rest.

It is relatively straightforward to verify that a missile does not have a
nuclear warhead without divulging any details of its construction by just
looking for characteristic radiation patterns. Since both India and
Pakistan could deliver their nuclear weapons by aircraft, any arrangement
would have to cover not just missile development and deployment, but also
airbases. Airbases would have to be opened to inspectors, periodically and
when challenged, who could look for storage sites for nuclear gravity bombs
as well as observe aircrafts to ensure that their bomb bays have not been
altered to allow loading of nuclear bombs. Such inspections have been
conducted as part of the START I treaty by Russia and the United States.

The very short flight time of missiles allows no time for any response
other than immediately launching one's own missiles in the event of a
warning. Thus it is important to increase the time for the two countries to
respond. This is made more difficult by the missiles already inducted in to
the armed services, namely the 150-250 km range Prithvi and possibly the
290 km range M-11 missiles. Due to their short ranges, if they are to be
deployed, there is no alternative but to put them close to the border.

Despite the claims made about them, there is little military value of
relatively inaccurate missiles. Prithvi, which is said to have an accuracy
of 150 m when fired up to a distance of 150 km, would need to be used in
extraordinarily large numbers if armed with conventional, non-nuclear
warheads and used to attack the kinds of targets it is said to be intended
for.
Table 5: Number of Prithvi Missiles Required to Damage a Single Airbase,
Command Centre, or Radar using Conventional Warheads as a function of
Accuracy
Accuracy (m) Airbase Command Centre Radar
50 96 16 2
100 168 63 3
150 256 140 6
250 512 393 13
300 672 558 18

There are two consequences that follow from the characteristics of these
missiles. If they are deployed in small numbers, as they are currently,
they are likely to be seen as carrying nuclear warheads and so elicit a
similar response. If they are deployed in large numbers, even with
conventional warheads, they are likely to be seen as a first strike weapon,
and capable of launching a surprise attack. This may well elicit a greater
determination to use nuclear weapons very early in a war, before they are
destroyed - the classic 'use them or lose them' problem. In view of these
dangers, Pakistan and India should agree to move their missiles away from
the border to a distance greater than their respective ranges.

The control by hawks over the policy-making process in the two states makes
it likely that any agreement will confront accusations that the other side
is likely to cheat and the means available to detect such cheating are
limited, if not absent. However, there are many ways by which compliance
may be overseen. There are several technologies based on experiences with
the verification of treaties like the START, INF and Open Skies treaties.
One possibility would be for a single cooperative monitoring centre, or two
co-located ones, with international commercial satellites providing
Indians and Pakistanis identical high resolution imaging data from a
several hundred km wide swath on both sides of the border. The exact width
of the swath could be such as to ensure that neither Prithvi nor the M-11
could be deployed close enough to the border to be able to threaten
significant areas of the other state without being detected. An alternative
to using satellites is to rely on joint aerial observation flights.

A second more robust and economical possibility is moving all missiles to
designated, monitored storage sites that are to be located outside this
no-deployment zone. Sensor systems can be deployed around these sites to
detect any movement of the missiles outside the restricted area. These can
be combined with a system of electronic tags associated with each missile.
The tags would send out regular signals that would allow the other party to
know when one of the missiles has been moved beyond the storage site. These
technologies can be complemented with a system that allows challenge
inspections of these designated sites, especially if there is evidence of
prohibited activities.

Asking the international community for help with setting up such monitoring
mechanisms would be a useful contribution to peace. In contrast, attempts
to obtain dual-use technologies in the case of India or purchasing
expensive arms in the case of Pakistan are only likely to fuel suspicion
and further the arms race at the level of research and development if not
weapon systems.

CONCLUSION

At a time when the search is on for the rules of the nuclear road, it is
important to appreciate that it is the hawks who have their foot on the
accelerator and their hands on the steering wheel. What is a needed are
initiatives from the peace movement rather than hand-wringing after every
nuclear and missile test. These initiatives must recognize that at the
present moment the peace movement is not in any position to try to take
control the car and bring it to a stop (and put the people on a bus that
goes far beyond Lahore).

Political parties, in the current climate, have little experience or
technical knowledge and are surrounded by advisors and so-called experts
from the nuclear-scientific-military-industrial complex who are setting the
limits of the debate. Not surprisingly, they are then able to pass of the
most limited suggestions as proof of their commitment to peace.
It is the responsibility of the peace movement to provide more robust and
reliable measures that can gauge the reality of these commitments. The
agreements suggested here also offer ways of testing the sincerity of
India's offer of a No-First Use Treaty and Pakistan's offer of a
Non-Aggression Treaty.

We recognize the limitations of the proposals listed here and intend them
only as ways of buying time. Even this time will not be without risk. The
only certain way to prevent the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia as
elsewhere is the absolute and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.
The urgent task is to engage in the political work that will put peace at
the top of the agenda.