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Citizens
Action & Ideas for Peace in South Asia | 27 June 2008
Sri Lanka: Finding The Road To Peaceby Rohini Hensman(Published in:
The Island, 25 June 2008)
For
the overwhelming majority of people in Sri Lanka, the civil war has
been a disaster. Those in the war zones of the North and East have been
worst affected, suffering death, displacement, and destruction of their
livelihoods. But the lives of many in other parts of the country have
been devastated too. Numerous soldiers as well as civilian victims of
terrorist attacks have been killed and maimed; their families have
suffered bereavement and loss of breadwinners. The effect of terrorist
attacks is to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, because
anyone could be a victim of the next one. Government efforts to fund
the war by printing money have led to hyperinflation far worse than
that occurring in most other countries affected by spiralling oil
prices; foreign borrowings are creating a debt trap. Finally, precious
democratic rights and freedoms are under attack, not only in
LTTE-dominated areas, where they were destroyed long ago, but also in
government-controlled areas. A symptom of this is the assault on
journalists whose only crime is that they have tried to report the
truth. This is not just a denial of the journalists’ right to freedom
of expression, but also a denial of the public’s right to information
about issues that are of vital importance to them; both are
indispensable pillars of democracy.
It would not be an
exaggeration to say that all but a tiny minority are sick and tired of
the war, ready to do or endure anything to end it. Why, then, has it
not been ended so far? One major reason is that there is so much
confusion about the question of HOW to end it. The other is that the
war places power in the hands of a small oligarchy, which has no
interest in ending it because that would curtail its totalitarian
control.
Negotiations with the LTTE
One road that
appeared to promise peace was a ceasefire and negotiations with the
Tigers. The longest journey down this road followed the CFA of 2002,
but there were other attempts earlier. Why did they all fail?
A
dispassionate look at the evidence would lead us to conclude that the
primary reason why they failed was that the LTTE under Prabakaran DOES
NOT WANT a democratic settlement of the conflict. He is not willing to
settle for anything less than a separate, exclusively Tamil state under
the totalitarian control of the LTTE. This is why he has used every
ceasefire – above all the last one – to prepare for war and eliminate
critics and opponents. He even tried to kill his own lieutenant Karuna
Amman when the latter expressed doubts about the goal of Tamil Eelam.
The
logical conclusion is that negotiations with the LTTE cannot, by
themselves, bring peace. No one should foster illusions that they can,
because that makes disillusionment and the turn to war all the more
extreme when the talks break down. That does not mean there should
never be negotiations with the Tigers; but in future, any ceasefire
agreement leading to talks should be accompanied by a human rights
agreement monitored by an independent party, preferably the UN. If that
had been the case in 2002, hundreds of Tamil critics of the LTTE would
not have lost their lives, and thousands of children would not have
been conscripted. Even if and when the war broke out again, it would
not have been possible for either side to attack civilians with
impunity, as they have been doing. Without this condition, a ceasefire
and peace talks could actually prolong the war, by decimating the peace
constituency among Tamils and by allowing both sides to rearm.
A Military Solution
When
negotiations with the LTTE turned out to be a dead end, various
governments backtracked and pursued what appeared to be another path to
peace: a military victory over the LTTE. That is the current situation,
and there have been similar attempts before. In all cases in the past,
they failed to end the war by defeating the LTTE, and the same thing
seems to be happening today. The victory in the East was,
paradoxically, partly a result of the earlier ceasefire, which
engendered sufficient dissatisfaction with the LTTE in the East to
split the organisation and deprive it of its Eastern fighters. But now
a stalemate seems to have been reached, with neither the government nor
the LTTE making any headway.
The reason why a purely military
strategy cannot end the war is that the war is a result of
long-standing and absolutely justifiable grievances among Tamils, who
have suffered discrimination, persecution and violence in Sri Lanka for
decades. Like pus oozing from an infected wound, the LTTE is a product
of those grievances. The organisation was formed in 1976, and according
to DBS Jeyaraj, had only 30 members – 7 of them part-timers – by July
1983. If it has grown to be a formidable military and terrorist outfit,
it is thanks to the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1983 and the subsequent
violence against Tamils, which has fed its recruiting and fund-raising
drives. To try to defeat it without a political settlement providing
justice to Tamils is like trying to mop up the pus without healing the
infected wound. The process could go on for ever. Like negotiations
with the LTTE, this road leads to a dead end.
Again, this
doesn’t mean that military action by the state should be ruled out in
all circumstances. But where it becomes necessary, it should be carried
out strictly in accordance with international law, taking all
precautions to avoid civilian casualties and harm to non-combatants.
Otherwise it, too, will end up prolonging the war by helping to send
recruits and supporters into the arms of the LTTE.
The Third Alternative
If
neither peace talks with the LTTE nor a military offensive to wipe it
out can end the war, what is the alternative? The third road to peace
is a political solution which protects the human and democratic rights
of all members of all communities in all parts of the island, and it
has hardly been explored. Such a solution, if accepted, would convince
the overwhelming majority of Tamils that they would have a far brighter
future in a united democratic Sri Lanka than in a fascist Tamil Eelam.
Support for the LTTE would vanish rapidly, leaving only fanatical
hardliners who would not be able to hold out for long.
The key
requirement of a political solution that satisfies all communities is
that it should be democratic through and through. This means, first and
foremost, abolishing the Executive Presidency, which negates the rule
of the people by concentrating dictatorial power in the hands of one
person. The attempt to curtail the powers of the president by passing
the 17th Amendment has failed, because, ironically, the president has
the power to override it. It is therefore clear that there is no point
trying to tinker with the system: the Executive Presidency has to go.
Secondly, all the rights that have been taken away from the people
should be restored, starting with the right to life. Thirdly, the
principle of equal rights for all, special privileges for none, should
be adhered to. And lastly, government should be brought closer to the
people.
It is the third requirement that seems to cause most
problems. On the one hand, Sinhala nationalists feel that Sinhalese
Buddhists should have special privileges, while everyone else should
only be allowed to live in Sri Lanka on sufferance, or, perhaps, be
driven out altogether. Tamil nationalists feel the same about the
territory they claim as their own: Tamils should have special
privileges in the Northeast, while non-Tamils should only be allowed to
live there on sufferance, or be driven out altogether, like the Muslims
and Sinhalese of the North. A democratic political solution must ensure
that all people in all parts of the island have equal rights, including
the right to communicate with the state in their own language.
The
idea that government should be brought closer to the people has also
been opposed by Sinhala nationalists, who cannot reconcile themselves
to the idea that people in provinces where the majority are
Tamil-speaking should control government powers over the police and
land. This is why they insist on a totalitarian unitary state, where
the central government would be able to wield these powers throughout
the country. Their argument that devolution of power to the provincial
level would lead to the triumph of separatism is contradicted by
historical experience, which shows that, on the contrary, it is
excessive concentration of power in a mono-ethnic centre that leads to
separatism in a multi-ethnic country. Their unitary formula also
deprives people from poorer provinces with a Sinhala-speaking majority
from controlling their own lives and resources.
A new,
democratic constitution would, if implemented, not only lead to the end
of the war but also empower the vast majority of people of all
communities. The most serious move in this direction occurred from 1995
to 2000, during the Kumaratunga presidency. It was scuttled largely due
to UNP intransigence, although the SLFP leadership was also to blame
for failing to pursue it with sufficient persistence, and for putting
too much emphasis on negotiations with the LTTE. Under the Rajapakse
presidency, hopes for a political solution were revived by the creation
of the APRC, and at first, those hopes appeared to be justified. The
talks were incomparably more inclusive than previous talks between the
government and LTTE, and a proposal that would satisfy the democratic
majority of all communities was well on the way to being crafted.
Yet
in a bizarre twist, the ruling party and president put one obstacle
after another in the way of the APRC process, finally consigning the
whole exercise to the dustbin when the president proclaimed that a
‘solution’ would have to be found within the present constitution: a
constitution that has not only been a major cause of the war, but has
also been responsible for a conflict in which tens of thousands of
Sinhalese were killed by Sinhalese! The UNP, which could have put the
president and his party on the spot by proclaiming their support for
the APRC process, instead helped to sabotage it. It looks less and less
likely that a political solution can emerge during the term of the
present government, but that does not change the fact that there is no
other way of healing the wound that exudes war and terrorism. This is
therefore a road that leads to peace, unlike the dead-ends of a purely
military solution and peace talks with the LTTE.
Eliminating Obstacles on the Road to Peace
Having
identified the road to peace, the next task is to eliminate the
obstacles blocking the way to our destination. One is undoubtedly the
LTTE, and we have already said that the best way to remove this
obstacle is to propose a political solution that drains away its
support base. The other obstacle is the government. The experience of
the last sixty years tells us that the two parties which have been in
power during this period are not capable of the task. Both have played
the communal card repeatedly, and the SLFP, whose human rights record
was not as bad as that of the UNP, is catching up rapidly. In other
words, their commitment to democracy is very much in doubt.
Yet
various minority parties have gravitated towards one or the other, or
to one at one time and the other at another time. It is understandable
that the leaders of parties which are already being targeted by the
LTTE might want the security of being protected by the government, but
selling their support to a Sinhala chauvinist government in order to
buy power for themselves, as the EPDP and TMVP have been doing, is
surely a betrayal of their constituency. The desire for power should,
even in the case of minority parties, be tempered by some degree of
integrity.
If minority parties can be criticized for supporting
parties following totalitarian Sinhala nationalist agendas, it is even
more condemnable that Left parties have done the same. It is a supreme
irony that today, ‘the Left’ and ‘Marxists’ in Sri Lanka have been
identified with the JVP, whose ‘Leftism’ is drowned out by its Sinhala
nationalism. But there is a very good reason why this has happened: the
JVP has retained its independence and separate identity, whereas the
LSSP and CP have submerged their identities in various Popular Fronts
with the SLFP, even at times when it has had a rabidly Sinhala
nationalist agenda. Some of the smaller breakaway Left parties, on the
other hand, have in the past been in favour of appeasing the LTTE, in
the mistaken belief that it was fighting for self-determination for
Tamils.
Pandering to Sinhala nationalism on one side and Tamil
nationalism on the other, Left parties have lost their support amongst
working people of all communities. Rebuilding this support would entail
asserting their independence in no uncertain terms. Having a separate
May Day rally was an encouraging gesture, but it needs to be followed
up with much stronger action, above all dissociation from a government
which was condemned by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other prominent
human rights defenders for horrific crimes against its own civilian
population, and consequently lost its seat on the UN Human Rights
Council. At the same time, Left parties need to make it clear that they
are not in favour of appeasement of the LTTE, but of a just and
democratic political solution to the civil war. If they do this, they
could form a pole of attraction for the progressive minority parties,
and rally the overwhelming majority of working people, who are sick and
tired of the war, behind them. Together, they could constitute a force
capable of sweeping aside the biggest obstacle on the road to peace.