INDIA ABROAD, July 9, 1999 / Op-Ed.
Need to make Line of Control the international border
By AMITABH MATTOO
Rarely before, in the last decade, has there been such overwhelming
international endor-sement for India's actions in Kashmir and almost
universal dismay at Pakistan's violation of the Line of Control (LOC).
This "new internationalization" of Kashmir offers India a unique
opportunity. New Delhi could, with political imagination and diplomatic
skill, translate this support for the sanctity of the LOC into global
approval for the conversion of the line into an international border.
While such a move by India may mean going against the unanimous
parliamentary resolution that calls for reclaiming the territory under
Paki-stani occupation, a permanent division of Jammu and Kashmir along
the present Line of Control, with minor adjustments if need be, is the
only realistic, practical and just settlement of the problem which has
defied a solution for more than half a century.
As is well known, the LOC corresponds, more or less, to the Cease-fire
Line (CFL). Recall that the CFL was created after the suspension of
armed hostilities between India and Pakistan on Jan. 1, 1949. But it was
delineated on maps during the Karachi Agreement of July 27, 1949,
formally known as the "Agreement Between Military Representatives of
India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-fire Line in
the State of Jammu and Kashmir." By Nov. 3, 1949, with the help of
United Nations military observers, the borders on the map had been
demarcated on the ground by the two sides.
The CFL, however, was demarcated only from the west of the Chenab river
up to map coordinate NJ 9842, and not beyond. The absence of any
physical demarcation has led to competing claims over the Siachen
glacier, but the legality of the CFL itself has never been questioned.
The CFL, with minor changes, became the LOC after the Shimla Agreement
of July 2, 1972. It was delineated on maps and demarcated by top
military officers from both India and Pakistan.
Until the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil, the sanctity of the LOC had
been accepted and respected as such by the governments in Islamabad and
New Delhi and their military commanders on the border. In short, the
CFL/LOC has been the de facto border for 50 years.
There have been at least two occasions on which there has been an
understanding between top Indian and Pakistani leaders that Jammu and
Kashmir be partitioned along the CFL/LOC. In 1955, Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani Gove-rnor General Ghulam Mohammad seemed
to have agreed to a division along the CFL with minor adjustments.
But political opposition in Pakistan and India prevented the agreement
from being translated into reality. There is strong documentary evidence
to suggest that Pakistan's Governor General and Prime Minister were very
keen to settle the Kashmir "problem" along these lines.
Seventeen years later, Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, too, arrived at a similar understanding. They seemed to have
realized that converting the LOC into the international border was the
only way out of the Kashmir conundrum. Bhutto, however, did not want an
agreement in black and white since he "wanted time" to prepare his
people for the "deal."
The Pakistanis, Bhutto claimed, had been traumatized by the defeat in
the 1971 war and the dismemberment of Pakistan. Bhutto, of course, true
to form, reneged on the understanding within months.
Most of Indira Gandhi's advisers, however, knew about the secret
agreement. While her principal secretary, P.N. Dhar, has written about
it, even her close adviser, P.N. Haksar, was aware of the understanding.
There are at least four reasons why converting the LOC into the
international border is still the most practical solution to the Kashmir
issue.
First, a solution to the Kashmir problem cannot be provided on the basis
of absolutes. Absolute victory is not possible for either India or
Pakistan. It is unrealistic for New Delhi to imagine that it can, with
either force or diplomacy, reunify the whole of Jammu and Kashmir,
including the areas under Pakistani occupation.
Similarly, Islamabad, too, must realize that neither war nor support for
insurgencies or international pressure will force New Delhi to give up
the provinces of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.
Second, rewriting boundaries in South Asia will have disastrous
consequences for the region. Apart from displacing huge populations, it
may lead to communal clashes bloodier than the partition. Is Islamabad
really interested in a solution that could lead to the loss of millions
of lives?
Third, the present LOC corresponds, more or less, to a broad ethnic
division within the state. The population in Pakistan's Kashmir is not
Kashmiri in the true sense of the term. Mirpuris, for instance, are
linguistically and ethnically of Punjabi stock rather than Kash-miri.
Indeed, it is even believed that Sheikh Abdullah persuaded Nehru to
accept a cease-fire along the present line because he knew that the
influence of his National Conference did not extend to the other side.
It was the Muslim conference that was more popular there.
Finally, the two regions have lived as a part of India and Pakistan for
the past 52 years. Although they have grievances against their
respective leaderships, there has been a cumulative process of
integration which will be extremely difficult to reverse. It is
difficult to imagine how the existing political, economic and
communication links can be done away with without causing a tremendous
upheaval.
Conversion of the LOC does not mean continuation of hostilities. If
Pak-istan were to see the sense in such an idea and accept the plan,
both New Delhi and Islamabad could work toward converting the territory
around the LOC into a demilitarized zone. Gradually, there could be a
resumption of trade and eventually a free and "safe" passage of goods
and people across the divide.
(The writer is an associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi)
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