www.sacw.net
| July 3, 2006
South Asia's
Escape From Freedom
by Hassan N. Gardezi
(Keynote address at World Peace Forum 2006, Asia Regional Conference)
June 25, 2006, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Watching the rise of fascism in Europe, eminent psychologist Eric Fromm
raised the question "Why then is it that freedom is for many a
cherished goal and for others a threat?" The answer to his question he
found in the character structure of modern man fostered by the
capitalist system. Under this system, he argued, relationship of one
individual to the other has to be based on mutual human indifference,
otherwise any one of them would be paralysed in the fulfillment of his
economic task, that is to compete with each other and destroy each
other economically if necessary. On a social psychological level this
human indifference produces pervasive feelings of being driven by
forces outside one's self, isolation and insecurity which make fertile
ground for the rise of authoritarian leaders and ideologies. People
with feelings of powerlessness, loneliness, and insecurity tend to
follow a strong leader and submit to a powerful state in order to
overcome their own sense of insecurity and to acquire the strength they
lack. This was the phenomenon that gave rise to fascism in Germany and
Italy and it could also happen in democratic United States under
capitalism, warned Eric Fromm . If he was alive today he would indeed
marvel at his foresight to see the willingness with which Americans
have given up their fundamental freedoms under President George W. Bush.
The trajectory of escape from freedom in South Asia is somewhat
different. It is a more direct outcome of political and economic
developments in which expansive Western imperialism has played a
significant role, and not so much due to the appeal of fascism mediated
by social psychology.
India, united Pakistan and Sri Lanka acquired home rule in 1947- 48
when fascism was defeated in Europe and the British empire had become
unsustainable. These new nations, along with the anachronistic kingdom
of Nepal, had yet to translate their independence into freedom from
poverty and powerlessness which was the lot of all but a few of their
citizens. That required charting a course of economic and political
development free from both the structures of internal repression and
external control.
Some six decades later today that plan of independent development
appears farther from sight than ever before, as illustrated by the
post-colonial history of the two rival subcontinental states. Pakistan
was the first to submit to a reconfigured imperialism led by the United
States after the Second World War. The main features and
instrumentalities of this new imperialism included the Cold War defence
alliances, economic and military aid, World Bank and the IMF, giant
multinational corporations and eventually the global sweep of the
neo-liberal agenda of free trade, privatization and structural
adjustments.
From early 1950s Pakistan's ruling elite opted to enter a decade of
U.S. sponsored military alliances aimed at fighting the "threat of
Soviet communism," over India's objections. While these defence
alliances fully bureaucratized and militarized the state of Pakistan,
they also greatly enhanced the propensity of the state to use physical
coercion to suppress popular movements for social justice, democracy,
and ethno-national autonomy, the worst example being the brutal
military action in East Pakistan which resulted in the break up of the
country and creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
India itself was not able to resist the U. S. Cold War military
infiltrations. While Pakistan's ruling oligarches were busy enlarging
their defence establishment and pretending to take on India one day
over the Kashmir dispute, there occurred a shift in U. S. foreign
policy. The election of John F. Kennedy to the U. S. presidency
prompted a reevaluation of America's global defence alliances against
the Soviet Union. Kennedy favoured a greater involvement of India in
the pursuit of his country's geo-political interests.
When the Sino-Indian border clashes erupted in 1962, Washington jumped
at the opportunity to penetrate India both militarily and economically.
Along with Britain it dispatched high-powered missions to India to
negotiate long term military and economic aid to the South Asian giant.
The main barrier to the penetration of U. S. military assistance into
India was Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru's non-alignment policy. With
the brief Chinese border offensive that policy evaporated quickly as
Nehru himself made an urgent appeal for U. S. help. The united States
responded with immediate air lift of arms and military personnel to
India, making sure that the Soviet Union will not cease the initiative
in the matter. That doyen of North American liberalism, John Kenneth
Galbraith , U. S. Ambassador to India at the time, noted with much glee
that "the word non-alignment has disappeared from everything except the
Prime Minister's speeches and the left wing press." The client state of
Pakistan was now sidelined by the United States to pursue its
"overriding Cold War objective which was to build up India's military
strength as a bulwark against Red China.
Frustrated at this turn of events and anticipating increase in India's
future military buildup Pakistan's dictator, Ayub Khan and his advisors
launched a last ditch, miscalculated operation inside Indian held
Kashmir to stir up rebellion against New Delhi which triggered the 1965
full-scale Indo-Pakistan war. Both countries made liberal use of U. S.
supplied weapons against each other and Washington reacted by cutting
off its aid to Pakistan. Internally, the war intensified the simmering
discontent against Ayub's authoritarian rule in Pakistan, a factor in
his downfall a few years later.
Parallel to the militarization of Pakistan's political sphere there was
unfolding a dependent model of economic development, designed by a team
of Harvard University experts working with Pakistani technocrat
apprentices. It was narrowly focused on boosting the Gross National
Product (GNP) under a regime of low wages, high profits and generous
state subsidies to private entrepreneurs. The implementation of the
model over a decade resulted in remarkable increases in GNP from a
growth rate of 6.8 percent in 1960 to 10 percent in 1969-70,
accompanied by gross social and regional inequities. Just as this
achievement was being officially celebrated as an "economic miracle" a
popular uprising throughout Pakistan brought down the Ayub regime.
When this first decade long military rule fell apart, the country's
Punjabi dominated army finally allowed general elections to take place
on the basis of universal adult franchise, twenty four years after the
creation of Pakistan. The result of these elections required transfer
of power to Awami League, for having won a majority of seats in the
proposed parliament with its landslide victory in East Pakistan. But
instead or relinquishing rule to a party with an exclusively Bengali
constituency the Army establishment tried to block the implementation
of election results by launching a brutal military action against the
Bengali citizens of East Pakistan.
Thus the fiasco of militarization of the state, pursuit of a
development strategy wich bypassed any notion of distributive justice,
and brutal repression unleashed on the people of East Pakistan came to
a head in another war with India, fall of Dhaka to the Indian army, and
breakup of the country in 1971.
Whether Pakistan's ruling oligarches now realized that the loss of the
country's eastern half was an awful price to pay for denial of genuine
freedom to the people is hard to say. However, the army high command
had no choice now but to allow Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of
Pakistan Peoples Party which had won the largest number parliamentary
seats in West Pakistan to take over as head of the diminished state of
Pakistan. Bhutto, the scion of a landlord family of Sindh with an
egotistic streak in his character, played Bonaparte by tantalizing the
masses of peasants and workers with his rhetoric of socialism while at
the same time catering to the sectarian demands of right wing religious
parties, humiliating the old oligarches while rebuilding their power
base in the army and centralized state bureaucracy. In the end he was
able to do little more than excite much hope among the common people
for a life of freedom from poverty and political oppression, before
falling victim to another coup d'etat by his hand picked and obsequious
army chief, Gen Ziaul Haq in 1977.
Having overthrown and executed a populist prime minister, Zia proceeded
to cultivate still closer ties with United States' Cold War projects,
and at the same time manipulate Islam to consolidate and legitimize his
rule. In order to gain financial and military support of the United
States and its Western allies for his regime he allowed the American
CIA and the British M16 to use Pakistani territory and army personnel
to aid and abet a holy war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan
which had entered that country ostensibly to reconcile the two
communist party factions which had overthrown the remnants of Afghan
monarchy in April, 1978. In return for this acquiescence the United
States opened up the doors of economic and military aid to a compliant
Zia which were closed on Bhutto for his belligerence.
The political use of Islam and Islamist parties had been a common
practice of all previous political regimes in Pakistan. It served the
purpose of repressing the leftist parties and victimizing their workers
on charges of spreading godless communism, countering demands for
social justice, and attacking ethno-nationalist movements as subversive
of Islamic solidarity. In Zia's hands Islam and Islamic ideology became
an unprecedented tool of repression. He ingeniously introduced a
patriarchal, medieval version of Islamic sharia law taken from the
books of the country's vanguard Islamist party, jamat-e-Islami, to
cloth in religious piety his gross violations of civil and human rights
of the people, specially those of the female half. He is also to be
credited with the creation of the Hydra of Jehadi Islam in close
collaboration with his benefactors, the United States and Saudi Arabia,
the beast that has turned on its own creators and has paralysed United
States' imperial ambitions in the 21st century.
Dictator Zia was physically removed from Pakistan's political scene in
the fiery crash of his military plane in 1988, but not before leaving
behind an all powerful army, and a greatly weakened institutional
structure of democracy. Confident of its control over state power, the
Pakistan army high command now allowed the return of civilian rule for
the next 11 years during which Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were
alternately elected civilian prime ministers without completing their
full terms of office. Working under the shadow of the army while
trapped in the constraints of a polarized society and external
compulsions they were unable even to guarantee the basic livelihood and
physical safety of the people.
To make matters worse for both Bhutto and Sharif, the restoration of
parliamentary democracy in 1988 coincided with the rise of a new phase
of economic imperialism popularly known as globalization. It posed new
and more serious problems for Pakistan's pursuit of economic
development. The IMF and World Bank loans now came with new conditions,
the brunt of which was to be borne directly by the poor and not so
poor. Euphemistically called structural adjustments or simply reforms
these loan conditions required, as they do, the privatization of state
assets, deregulation of production and commerce, downsizing of labour,
introduction of regressive sales taxes, and elimination of state
subsidies to essential public services and utilities. The adoption of
these "reforms" increased the misery of low income and subsistence
workers as jobs disappeared, wages declined, prices rose, union
membership dropped, and state supported essential services were further
trimmed.
While people were smarting under the burden of these structural
reforms, Nawaz Sharif decided to test explode Pakistan's nuclear bomb
to rival a similar explosion by India in May 1998, despite warnings
from the international community. When these tests brought Pakistan
immediately under international sanctions his government imposed
further austerity measures on people, touching off a spate of economic
suicides.
Still confident of his popularity, Prime Minister Sharif tried to
replace his army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf, following the 1999
debacle of Pakistan's military action in the Kargil sector of Indian
held Kashmir. But the General struck back, imposed martial law and
exiled the prime minister to Saudi Arabia.
For a short while Washington made some noises deploring the military
takeover of yet another democratically elected government in its client
state, but all that changed after the 9/11 suicidal attacks on the
World Trade Center Towers in New York and on the Pentagon in
Washington. In retaliation George W. Bush decided to unleash America's
awesome fire power on the luckless Afghans and coopted Gen. Musharraf
of Pakistan in his "war on terror."
It is Ironic that while a pervious Pakistani dictator was generously
rewarded for collaborating with the United States to create Islam's
holy warriors or Jehadis in Afghanistan, the new one was being
manipulated vigorously to hunt them down. The ultimate victims of this
treacherous game, still in progress, are the countless innocent Afghan
civilians who continue to be killed by America's Operation Enduring
Freedom, and ordinary Pakistanis who are being blown up in their
bazars, mosques and Churches by the explosives of desperate jehadis
venting their misplaced anger on soft targets identified by them as
members of wrong sects and faith groups.
The Case of India
One might argue that genuine freedom eluded Pakistan because it had few
prerequisites of a nation state at independence in 1947 and could only
survive as a political entity by serving the geopolitical interests of
the United states as a post-war imperial power. But what about India,
the largest South Asian state? If there was any post-colonial state in
South Asia with a better prospect of genuine freedom and independence
from imperialist domination after the end of British rule, it was
India. The governance of the new state was transferred to the Indian
National Congress, a well established political party with a long
experience of anti imperialist struggle at a certain level. Reliance on
foreign capital was minimal and one frequently heard of a socialist
road to development from Prime Minister Jawahir Lal Nehru. There was a
sizable presence of national bourgeoisie both inside and outside the
Congress. Under these circumstances there was a conscious attempt made
to develop India into an independently industrialized society with a
strong public sector. Unlike Pakistan the framework for this
development was internally designed and came to be known as
Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy aimed at the core objective of accelerating
growth of heavy industry in the public sector and freeing India from
foreign dependence for capital goods. The state was to serve as the
engine of economic growth, investing in high risk areas, regulating
production and setting priorities in the national interest, or at least
in the interest of the national bourgeoisie.
Although this strategy of economic development has been blamed
endlessly by Western and many Indian economists for India's slow,
"Hindu," rate of growth in GNP in the past and other socio-economic
problems that the country ran into, it was already being abandoned, if
not sabotaged, as the framework of Second Five Year Plan (1956-1961).
As soon as this Plan, which provided for a large outlay by the state
sector for building up heavy industry, ran into financing difficulties
the strategy of developing a self-reliant economy was set aside and the
process of development became increasingly dependent on Western loans,
technical assistance and advice. From 1958 onwards, the Aid to India
Consortium began to meet annually under the auspices of the World Bank
to determine the amount and conditions of aid. By mid 1960s, after the
episode of Indo-China border clash and Nehru's acceptance of U. S.
military aid, the World Bank was providing assistance to India at
levels reaching $1.5 billion annually conditional on India's acceptance
of its policy recommendations which "represented a fundamental
departure from basic principles of planning laid down by Nehru." The
net inflow of foreign capital into India rose from 6 percent in 1954 to
almost 23 percent in 1964-65, most of it originating in the United
States.
In the 1970s and 1980s under the governments of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv
Gandhi the liberalization thrust of the Word Bank/IMF policies was
further increased and India became a preferred recipient of loans from
these sources. External loans received just in one decade of 1980s
quadrupled the country's external debt pushing India to the brink of
default. The Western credit monitoring agencies promptly downgraded
India's credit ratings and the international commercial banks put a
squeeze on further lending. As the familiar story goes, in this
situation stepped in the World Bank and IMF with emergency financing
and their latest package of structural adjustments and the neo-liberal
medicine.
These were not exactly the shock therapies that were administered to
Russia by Western agents of capitalism after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but they did achieve the desired effects. India's stigmatic rate
of growth in GNP began to climb to match Pakistan's growth rates of
1960s. By late 1990s India's full and final embrace of the latest creed
of neoliberalism and its "benefits" were attracting a chorus of
acclamations in the Western media, think tanks, and the statements of
political leaders, as if after the demise of the Soviet Union this was
the next major victory of Western capitalism. "Nehru had it wrong ,"
declared The Economist in the lead article of its issue marking the
50th anniversary of India's independence from colonial rule. The same
article noted triumphantly that India now has a "new breed (of) bright
young official ... more likely to have an MBA from Stanford or Chicago
then a Ph D on Marx's theory of value from London School of Economics."
Despite all this fanfare one cannot help but note some eerie
similarities between the unfolding of India's "economic boom" at the
turn of the century and Pakistan's "economic miracle" of 1960s.
Pakistan's president Ayub Khan was overthrown as a result of popular
uprising in the year 1969 when his regime was celebrating the "economic
miracle" of boosting the growth rate of GNP to 10 percent. Atal Bihari
Vajpayee lost his prime ministerial office in May 2004 when he called
elections claiming credit for "India Shining," a watchword referring to
a GNP growth rate that had hit 8 percent per year, accompanied by
record levels of foreign investment and "unprecedented prosperity" of
urban upper classes. Political pundits at home and abroad were so
impressed by the Vajpayee years of economic progress that they were
predicting a landslide victory for him. But to their surprise masses of
poor and marginalised rural and urban dwellers turned out in large
numbers and voted to trounce the incumbents in favour of a shaky
Congress Party and its leftist allies.
However, this does not mean that the new prime minister, Manmohan
Singh, is going to give up the "India Shining" model of development of
which he was himself an influential architect as a past finance
minister and the Economist's "bright young official," although he is an
alumnus of Cambridge and Oxford, not Harvard or Chicago and admirer of
Margaret Thatcher and not Ronald Reagan. He is quite content with the
crumbs India's "largest middle class in the world" receives as a
platform of cheap, educated and flexible labour in the globalized
capitalist economy. As an unelected prime minister picked from the
nominated members of the Indian Senate, he does not have to worry about
the fact that the people of India living in poverty far exceed the
"world's largest middle class." Economic growth as measured by the rate
of increase in GNP is now approaching the magical figure of 10 percent
under his watch. Relentless implementation of structural adjustments
based on " Washington Consensus" is the order of the day, as it is also
in Bangladesh and Pakistan. In Sri Lanka the full transition to
neo-liberalism and its structural adjustments is linked to the peace
process recently launched by "donor countries." The only problem is
that as the pursuit of neoliberal agenda enhances the strength and
mobility of global capital and incapacitates the state as a key player
in moderating the depredations of free market, it undermines the
workers' right to full-time employment and a living wage.
India's farmers have perhaps been the hardest hit by liberalization of
imports and laissezfair policy of the state. Since 1997 there has been
a surge of farmer suicides. According to official statistics between
2001 and 2006 there were 8,900 farmer suicides in just four states of
Andhra Paradesh, Karnatika, Kerala, and Maharashtra, all of which are
among the agriculturally more developed states. With the influx of
agribusiness multinational corporations into the country, dismantling
of farm support programmes and elimination of import tariffs required
by WTO the Indian farmers are facing escalating debts while losing
whatever gains they had made in the past with the introduction of land
reforms and Green Revolution.
The contradiction between the policies of the Indian ruling class and
ordinary peoples' needs and aspirations became once again quite clear
during the March 2006 visit of George W. Bush to India. While Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh was obeisantly courting the U. S. president and
putting his signatures on the insidious Nuclear Accord between the two
countries, people in the major cities of India took to the streets by
tens of thousands to tell Bush to go home. The Accord followed the vote
earlier by India in favour of a U. S. sponsored resolution in the IAEA
meeting to report Iran to the UN Security Council for pursuing its
uranium enrichment programme. While these commitments bind India more
closely to the U. S. design to establish its imperial primacy, they do
little to meet India's domestic needs or enhance the country's
geo-political position. They do sabotage the proposed
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, harm India's relations with Iran, an
old ally, and undermine the international nuclear regulatory regime. In
the process they further erode the role India could play to promote
peace, economic freedom and development in the South Asian region.
Staying the course with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline,
not only had the potential of meeting India's need for cleaner fuel, it
could also have tied India and Pakistan into a relationship of
interdependence thereby minimizing conflict and competition.
As India's ruling class continues to seek "economic growth" and
political strength though integration into the "New American Century"
imperialism, it not only fails the aspirations of most Indians, it also
preempts India from playing any significant role to influence the
course of events in the rest of South Asia. The tragic history of
discord between India and Pakistan is well known. Both flush with
American arms are still eager to do each other in, one as a "Strategic
Partner" of the United States and the other as the "Major Non-NATO
Ally" of the United States. Neither has India managed its relations
with Bangladesh too well, a country it can claim to have liberated from
internal colonialism of the Pakistani state.
More telling is the story of India's inability to mediate positively in
Sri Lanka's internal strife involving its Tamil population of Indian
descent. Soon after independence Sri Lanka disfranchised its most
exploited population of Tamil plantation workers by an act of
parliament while the Indian establishment watched silently. When Lal
Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru as prime minister in 1964 he even
agreed to the deportation of thousands of Tamil plantation workers from
Sri Lanka to India. From 1977 onwards President Jayawardene began to
dismantle Sri Lanka's nationally regulated economy, withdrew state
sponsored social programmes and instituted free market reforms. This
course of action brought much economic hardship to all working people
resulting in political unrest. The Colombo ruling elite and right wing
political parties responded to the unrest by stoking the fires of
anti-Tamil communalism resulting in widespread Sinhalese-Tamil
confrontations and violence wich became progressively worse. By early
1980s Tamil resistance to government repression and ethnic strife
turned into an intractable civil war between the Sri Lankan armed
forces and guerrillas led by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
In 1987 President Jayewardene reached an Accord with India's Prime
Minister Rajive Gandhi in an attempt to end the war between LTTE and
his state army. The Accord stipulated autonomy for the Tamils in the
northern and eastern Provinces in return for the surrender of arms by
Tamil guerrillas to a contingent of Indian army brought into Sri Lanka
as a peacekeeping force.
But in the virtual absence of a plan to address the socio-economic
roots of the conflict, India's intervention in Sri Lanka soon
degenerated into an all-out war between the replenished Indian army and
the LTTE guerrillas. After much loss of life and greater poisoning of
relations between the warring sides, India had to withdraw its forces
from the island nation in 1990 at the request of the newly elected
president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa.
The civil war in Sri Lanka raged on into the post-9/11 world when the
major powers began to see it as a threat to regional stability and a
major obstacle to a greater integration of the Island's economy into
globalized neo-liberal capitalism. The result was a Norwegian brokered
Cease Fire agreed to by the Sri Lankan government and LTTE in 2002
followed by a peace process sponsored by the United States, European
Union, Japan and Norway. These countries met in Tokyo in 2003 as donors
and pledged $4.5 billion in aid to Sri Lanka, conditional on the
success of negotiated peace between Columbo and the Tigers.
This coupling of aid with the internationalized peace process is no
doubt an attempt to clear the way for greater integration of Sri Lankan
political economy in the framework of global neoliberalism. In
practical terms it means a return to the free market reforms which
created the conditions for the civil war in the first place in early
1980s. If the donors fail in their objective through the peace process
which is already in tatters, there is always the "war on terror"
option. By declaring the LTTE a terrorist organization, and
successfully pressuring the E. U. to do the same, the United States has
isolated the Tigers and set the stage for exercising this option.
India which also considers the Tigers terrorists has been sitting on
the fence without playing an overt role in the Sri Lankan conflict
since the previously failed military intervention. But the country's
newfound strategic partnership with the United states raises fresh
possibilities and new rationales to intervene in the affairs of its
neighbours. Under the Bush doctrine the United States, and by extension
its strategic partners, have the right to wage war on terrorism from
wherever it emanates and by preemptive strikes if necessary. It is no
secret that the U. S. has in fact been providing training in jungle
warfare and anti-terrorist operations to the armed forces of both India
and Sri Lanka.
It is, however, not easy for the India's ruling class to play the "war
on terror" card on its neighbours. This is evident from India's
official reaction to the April Revolution in Nepal. When the people of
Nepal, after a long and bloody struggle, were able to overcome the
brutal repression of king Gyanendra, they expected support from the
world's largest democracy next door. But when India finally decided to
intervene, it was in the pathetic and incredible form of dispatching
Maharaja Karan Singh to meet with the Nepali King to negotiate his
confirmation as a "constitutional monarch," knowing fully well that the
democratic struggle of the people of Nepal was for the end of monarchy.
India's ruling class of course does not want to see an unfettered
democracy in Nepal where power is likely to be shared with Maoist
rebels, for fear that it might give impetus to the spreading Naxalite
movement within its own borders.
This fear of India's ruling class is symptomatic of a deeper
socio-political problem which it shares with practically all its
neighbouring South Asian states. The problem originates in reliance on
institutions, economic and energy policies, trading frameworks and
armed forces originating outside the region, a heritage from colonial
times. While this reliance ensures the survival of the ruling classes,
it severely limits their capacity and willingness to adopt internal
strategies of development and foreign policies aimed at creating
conditions for the freedom of their people from the shackles of
poverty, powerlessness, and class oppression whatever form it might
take.
It is the absence of these fundamental freedoms that, over time and
under certain conditions, generates mass discontent wich takes the form
of armed struggles as we see today in many parts of South Asia, albeit
in some cases deformed and distorted into ethnic and religious
violence. To return to the question raised by Eric Fromm, why is it
then that freedom remains for many a cherished goal and for others a
threat? In the case of South Asia, with a history of capitalism very
different from Europe the answer may lie in a candid confession made by
Jawahilal Nehru just before India became independent from direct
British colonial rule:
The present for me like many others like me, was an odd mixture of
medievalism
appalling poverty and misery, and somewhat superficial modernism of the
middle
classes. I was not an admirer of my class or kind. And yet inevitably I
looked to it
for leadership in the struggle for India's salvation. That middle class
felt caged
and circumscribed and wanted to grow and develop itself. Unable to do
so in the
framework of British rule, a spirit of revolt grew against this rule,
and yet this
spirit was not directed against the structure that crushed us. It
sought to retain
it and control it by displacing the British. These middle classes were
too much
the product of that structure to challenge it and seek to uproot it.
The British have long been displaced, but the structure that has
crushed the people of South Asia remains in tact under class rule,
greatly strengthened by new doctrines and alliances being struck in the
context of new imperialism under the primacy of the United States.
End Notes
1. Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom, Rienhart, Toronto, 1959
2. Francine R. Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The
Gradual Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979, 215.
3. Sir James Morice, Pakistan Chronicle, London, Hurst and Company,
1993, 102
4. Francine R. Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The
Gradual Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978, 271.
5. Paresh Chattopadhyay, Some Trends in India's Economic Development,
in Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma, (eds.) Imperialism and Revolution,
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973.
6. Ajai Chopra and Charlse Collyn, The Adjustment Program of 1991/1992
and its Initial Results in India, Economic Reform and Growth,
Occasional Paper No. 134, Washington D. C., International Monetary
Fund, 1995, 15.
7. The Economist, August 16, 1997.
8. Economic and Political Weekly, April 22, 2006.
9. For the New American Century manifesto of the neo-conservative group
guiding the Bush White House, see the web site:
http://www.newamericancentury.org/
10. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, New York, Anchor Books,
1960, 26
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