Why Pakistan's Military Government Will Fail
by S Akbar Zaidi
[December 2, 1999.]
After seven weeks of Pakistan's third military coup, the time and space to
wait-and-see, is fast being replaced with a sense of anxiety and the fear
that the military government which replaced the democratically elected
government of Nawaz Sharif, has little to offer in terms of concrete,
focussed, and targeted solutions to Pakistan's numerous and well-recognized
problems. There is growing concern, that the military government, like all
its (civilian) predecessors, is concerned more with goodwill, rhetoric and
promises than with any form of concrete action. Moreover, the concrete
measures that have been taken in the last seven weeks, have produced few,
if any, positive measures. In fact, many of the outcomes may actually have
very serious negative consequences on investment confidence and on attempts
to revive the economy.
This article will try to articulate the likely reasons why the military
government will fail, in its attempt to change things around based on the
self-proclaimed Chief Executive's Agenda and subsequent pronouncements of
his team, a strange coterie of people, in itself. We will not question the
motives or intentions of the military government in its desire to improve
things and change them around, and will even assume that the military
government is very sincere in wanting to achieve what it professes.
Nevertheless, the ambitious Agenda will achieve little in terms of concrete
successes, resulting in a desperate and disastrous collapse of the very
high expectations that people have regarding the military government.
Foreign Policy
There are three main planks to Pakistan's foreign policy which have come to
determine the country's domestic, economic and international status and
position, and is responsible for many of the problems that exist in the
country. The United States, Afghanistan and Kashmir/India determine
Pakistan's relations with these countries and the rest of the world, and
also have an impact on the domestic situation in the country. The military
government's proclamation that 'our foreign policy will remain the same' as
in the past, gives a clear indication that this military government has not
thought things through on this front, and has not been able to see the
connection between foreign policy and many of the problems articulated by
General Parvez Musharraf in his interviews and in his Agenda.
Many of us who have been writing in the press and in academic journals,
have repeatedly emphasised that in the past, a large number of Pakistan's
problems had emerged due to ill-perceived and ill-thought foreign policy.
The fact that Pakistan is one of only three countries which recognize the
Taliban government in Afghanistan, should itself be indication of
Pakistan's international isolation. Moreover, the excessive involvement of
Pakistan's religious and military establishment in the Taliban 'factor',
has had repercussions on civil society in the country. The religious
lobbies in Pakistan have been strengthened and emboldened by the successes
of their brethren in Afghanistan, harbouring visions of creating
talibanesque societies across Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan and Kashmir. The
impact of the presence of the Afghans and of Pakistan's involvement with
the Taliban, have been felt particularly in the NWFP, where social,
economic, cultural, political and institutional conflicts continue to
simmer between the migrants and the rest of the population. However, it is
the military's involvement with the Taliban, which has repercussions on
military and civil relations within the country.
If Pakistan's previous policy vis-a-vis India and Kashmir is likely to
persist, that too does not bode well for Pakistani citizens. After the
military's disastrous adventure into Kashmir this spring and summer, one
would have hoped for a more rational and progressive policy with respect to
India in order to sort out contentious issues once and for all. The fact
that our foreign policy will 'remain the same', is a sign that we have not
learnt from our mistakes in the past. While the military is and has always
been the greatest beneficiary of Pakistan's adventurous and aggressive
policy towards India, one would have hoped that now while it has complete
authority and control over the country and does not have to compete with a
civilian set-up for resources or for power, it could have come up with
saner statements regarding India, and could have actually worked to resolve
issues which have persisted for more than five decades. To retain the
status-quo regarding India, is a great step backwards.
The aggressive and militaristic basis of Pakistan's foreign policy results
in bad economics and has subsequent repercussions on the attempt to revive
Pakistan's economy. One key feature of Pakistan's economic policy in the
past, has been the large share of military expenditure under non-military
regimes. Now, with the military itself constituting government, the nature
of the 'military' budget becomes a little blurred.
Revival of the Economy
One of the most important planks of the military government, the
possibility of a revival of the economy, looks exceedingly bleak, given the
fact that the military government will not undertake new measures, but like
foreign policy, will continue with the pollicies of the past. In Pakistan's
case, the policies 'of the past', are mainly those devised and enforced by
the IMF and the World Bank.
There is little disagreement between economists, that the period 1988-99
has been Pakistan's worst, in terms of economic indicators. Low growth
rates for the economy as a whole, low growth in the manufacturing sector, a
high balance of payments deficit, growing unemployment and poverty, and
abysmal investor confidence have tended to symbolize Pakistan's economic
record in the last decade. And, all of this cannot simply be put down to
the corruption of elected representatives. Despite the numerous governments
of the elected and non-elected form in the last decade, economic policy has
been more or less consistent and has relied largely on loans and conditions
imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. If there is no change in this aspect
of Pakistan's economy, a revival is a near impossibility.
The fact that the government has more or less decided to go ahead with a
rise in domestic petrol prices in line with international prices, and to
extend the scope of the General Sales Tax, reveals that for the moment at
least, the economic policy also remains unchanged. Also, the continued
reference to 'harsh measures' is preparing the public of worse to come.
With investor confidence still very low partly due to the military
government's accountability drive (see below), a 'revival' of the economy
seems very unlikely.
Accountability
The one area where the government has already taken some action in its
first seven weeks, is the area which it likes to call 'accountability'.
However, this is a misnomer, if ever there was one. By going after bank
defaulters the military government has recovered a mere five percent of bad
loans, mainly from politicians and other well-connected businessmen. In its
enthusiasm to arrest the corrupt, the military government did not even take
the trouble to implement proper foreclosure laws or to bring about measures
which would deal with bank defaulters, many of whom are already facing
cases in the banking tribunals. By identifying a handful of
businessmen/politicians who have taken loans that they have not returned,
the government has only made matters far worse.
In an environment where investor confidence is already at 'rock bottom' --
the new military government's favourite cliche -- indiscriminately going
after those who had taken loans, has only forced real investors to shy away
from attempts to expand their business or to play their part in the process
of reviving the economy. In addition, banks with excess liquidity these
days, are also less willing to lend to their clients, as they fear a second
round of 'accountability' which will target bank officers who had made
loans in the past. All this means that attempts to jump-start the economy
are likely to fail.
Most important, however, in the military's understanding of the concept of
'accountability'. Bank defaults form only a miniscule element of the term
accountability, but going after such defaulters does not either improve the
government's fiscal/economic position, and nor does it address the nature
of the problems that afflict most Pakistanis. If any government was serious
and sincere about starting a process of accountability, it should have gone
after those who extort money from the lay public or who misuse their
governmental positions. Police officers and thanaydars, SHOs, SDMs, petty
officials of the numerous government departments, custom officials, judges,
and a host of other government officials are the bane of the common
citizen of Pakistan, and not those who have taken large loans from public
sector banks.
The military government has failed in its attempts to hold other than a few
individuals 'accountable'. None of the measures taken so far affect the
common citizen of Pakistan. In fact, many observers feel that the so-called
accountability process started by the military government is merely an
attempt to vilify politicians, which has no real intention (or is incapable
of) starting a proper process of accountability at the lower tiers in the
country.
Decentralization
Will the fervour of General Musharraf's military government regarding its
'decentralization' agenda be reminiscent of General Zia ul Haq's zeal for
his particular brand of Islamization? All indications so far seem to
suggest so, as growing lip service is paid to this concept by the General
himself and by other officials of his military government.
There can be no denying the fact that there is a need for a substantial,
'radical' restructuring of the state in order to address issues that affect
all of us, whether in large cities or in remoter rural areas. In fact, many
of us have been arguing for many years now, that social, economic,
demographic and political changes in Pakistan over the last two decades,
have come into conflict with the existing structures of the (old) state,
and hence, there is a need to rethink the entire concept and nature of the
Pakistani state. This means rethinking the nature of the duties and
structures of power between different tiers of government. A thorough and
substantive restructuring of the Pakistani state will raise questions about
the present administrative boundaries of the provinces; whether there
should be only four provinces, or three times that number; whether the
concept of an autonomous elected metropolitan government for Pakistan's
eight one million-plus cities can be delayed further; whether the role of
Commissioners and their deputies in the rural areas ought to continue as
before; whether the role of the federal government should continue as it
does at district level; whether provincial autonomy can be further delayed,
and a large number of other extremely important structural issues need to
be discussed, debated, and some alternatives need to be suggested.
Unfortunately, despite the lip service being paid to the idea of
decentralization, devolution, etc., all indications suggest that the
military government cannot (or will not) take 'radical' and structural
measures. Discussions with those who are in a position to propose policies
and implement them, reveal that they feel that they 'do not have the luxury
of time' to implement any substantive changes. If that is how this military
government feels, that indeed is a lost opportunity.
What this means then, is that the military government will, at best,
propose some changes in existing laws (perhaps in the Local Government
Ordinance of 1979), but little else. The Local Government Ordinances of the
four provinces were promulgated twenty years ago under a Martial Law
government. The economic, social, demographic and particularly political,
conditions under which those Ordinances were framed, are very different to
the nature of Pakistani society in 1999. There is very little that can be
'reformed' from the 1979 set of rules, and what is required is a
substantive and restructured programme which talks about the issues
mentioned above. Clearly, the fine tuning of an outdated model will solve
few of the problems that exist. The military government's half-hearted
attempts at decentralization may follow the same pattern as the
Islamization programme of Pakistan's last military dictator.
What Is to be Done when 'Civil' Society Joins Uncivil Society?
By adopting a modern, secular, liberal, modern facade, the military has
been smart enough to co-opt a large number of individuals into positions of
government, from something called 'civil' society. (Can one still call it
'civil' society when it not only endorses but actually joins, uncivil
society, i.e., the military?). The greatest tragedy for many of us who have
been critical of military rule in Pakistan, has been the jubilant reaction
of members of 'civil' society celebrating General Parvez Musharraf's
military coup. Many liberals and democrats (at least one was under the
impression that this is what they were) have jumped onto the bandwagon and
accepted positions of prominence as ministers at the federal and provincial
level, while others are active behind the scenes, assisting or advising
government and waiting to be asked to join government at a more formal
level. Sadly, not too many of those from 'civil' society now in high office
would have been willing to work with previous (elected) governments. It has
become increasingly difficult to find individuals who feel that despite the
'sham' or poor democratic showing in Pakistan since 1985, the process of
democracy should have been allowed to continue.
Under most authoritarian and/or military governments, 'civil' society has
played a key role in either overthrowing those governments or forciing them
to move towards democracy. In the Phillipines, South Africa, in India
during the Emergency, in almost all of Latin America, and in many other
countries, 'civil' society institutions have played a prominent role in
subverting the aims and ambitions of military/authoritarian governments.
Clearly, the character of 'civil' society in Pakistan differs
substantially from that in other countries. Rather than take on and resist
the military government, it is now part of it!
For those of us who do not have much faith in the ability of the military
government to enforce substantive and far reaching structural changes in
Pakistan's foreign and economic policies, or to initiate measures to
restructure the very character of the state itself (which by its very
nature would undermine the status, role and position of the military), the
choices are far too few. For the very few individuals and members of
'civil' society who are not as yet in, or with, the military government,
this is the time to take stock of what constitutes 'civil' society
especially now that it has joined uncivil society. In addition, this is
also an appropriate moment to propose alternative visions for Pakistan,
regarding economic and foreign policy, decentralization, accountability,
matters of law and justice, and a host of other areas and disciplines which
need to be redefined. All of these measures, however, require political
action. One of the major shortcomings of 'civil' society in Pakistan in the
past, has been its lack of engagement with broader political issues, and
more specifically, with political parties. For those of us who are still
part of that small group which would continue to call itself 'civil' rather
than be bracketed with the uncivil part of society, perhaps there could be
no better opportunity to realize that it is crucial that civil society
embrace political society and begins to play a role worthy of its name.
Return to: October 1999 - Military Coup in Pakistan: Analysis & Reactions