[Source: Economic and Political Weekly | November 20-26, 1999 | Commentary ]
Reconstructing Pakistan: The Way Ahead
by Iftikhar H Malik
FEELING nostalgic for a wayward and rather criminalised democratic system by being cynical of a military takeover or even feeling euphoric over this extra-constitutional change-over will not help Pakistan in resolving her rather enduring problems of governance. It is definitely not an auspicious occasion to stumble into another crisis so soon after the Kargil imbroglio. Unfortunately, the country seems to be mired in a vicious cycle of democratic yet inefficient and drifty administrations being dismissed unceremoniously to be followed by unmandated interim arrangements all at the behest of the army leadership. The generals, initially, express their non-chalance towards assuming full responsibility and only talk of cleansing the administration by curbing disorderliness and putting the economy back on rails within a short while, yet end up staying longer. No wonder, for more than half of its history Pakistan has been under direct military rule whereas the interregnums, in most cases, appear pseudo-democratic with the army dictating behind the scene.
The armyÇs direct control accompanies a complete depoliticisation of the people, though on the way the generals, like the erstwhile discredited politicians, themselves assume full-fledged populist pretensions to stay in power. Concurrently, they begin seeking discretionary ideological and sectional props to legitimate their takeovers which seriously fragments the society. By that time the civic groups begin to show signs of disgust, and demand for democratisation, restoration of unfettered civic liberties and free press start reviving themselves which are further accentuated by serious economic anomalies. In the process, the generals use both the brutal force as well as diverse temptations to the obliging elite to carve out a parallel niche.
Even after the generals are presumably gone as a result of some popular movement as was the case with Ayub Khan in 1969 or due to a humiliating defeat as under Yahya Khan in 1971, or through some accidental death like that of General Zia in 1988, the successive democratic administrations suffer from weaker political culture, economic inabilities and unscrupulous personalist ambitions. Even their dismissals followed by the interim arrangements or full-fledged mandated governments fail to reverse the processes of deinstitutionalisation, corruption and general disarray.
In other words, despite the temporary respite following the dismissal of a corrupt, increasingly repressive and crisis-prone Sharif administration, there are reasons to be sceptical. There are no quick fixes unless the country overhauls its archaic system and policies. Equally, these squabbles are, to a great extent, intra-elite problems whose common interest in maintaining the system is quite obvious. SharifÇs second administration, despite a massive mandate, suffered from an unrelenting assault on institutions including judiciary, media, presidency and military command. His accountability campaign smacked of partiality despite the fact that he and his close associates topped the list of defaulters. His confused stance on the Kargil issue displayed opportunism rather than any well-thought-out policy perspective causing Pakistan a major humiliation and global isolation though he, indirectly and not totally unjustifiably, tried to shift the responsibility to the army leaders. His quick extension of General Pervez Musharraf as the chairman of joint committee and then the ridiculous yet dangerous moves to sideline him turned out to be the last straw. Retrospectively, Sharif looks like an irresponsible and unstable politician totally devoid of any calibre who, despite being the most powerful prime minister in Pakistan's history, turned out to be a childish figure amassing all the toys only to crush them with a hammer. Rather than resolving the big four K's confronting Pakistan (Kashmir, Kabul, Karachi, Kalashnikov) he added another one in the shape of Kargil fiasco. Concurrently and ludicurously he strengthened the existing C's centralisation, corruption, control, chaos, conflicts and cronyism. He was not a threat to the system at all.
Having said that the ideal scenario for Pakistan would have been to bring about an in-house change from within the parliament with further persuasion for vital reformative changes. The suspension of the constitution, keeping elected assemblies in a state of limbo, imposition of emergency and assumption of parallel executive authority, despite all the good intentions, not only add to the current confusion, they pull the rug from under an elected, democratic system. However inefficient this elected framework may be, still its unilateral dismissal makes a mockery of the concept of popular sovereignty. The non-mandated interim regimes are a stop-gap and care-taking arrangement since no government can carry out major responsibilities without legitimate authority. The judicial legitimacy sought through the Supreme Court or from past traditions of similar takeovers is not at all a substitute for duly elected institutions. Besides constitutional propriety, such temporary arrangements, as seen in the past, simply compromise PakistanÇs locus standi as a fully sovereign, confident and vibrant nation.
There is no doubt that Pakistan was achieved through a political movement rooted in constitutionalism. The countryÇs political traditions and institutions are understandably weak, not that the entire nation lacks in well-meaning and competent elements but rather due to a rectifiable systemic malaise and a continued fiddling of the democratic processes by the statist institutions. Democracy, as we see in post-Soviet states and elsewhere, requires patient and sustained efforts from all sides and this human project suffers from extremist measures undertaken by so-called åstrongÇ men. PakistanÇs authoritarian leaders have not only sought props from non-democratic institutions but have even used Islam nefariously to skirt the vital issue of legitimacy causing serious dissension in a big, populous and extremely diverse country like Pakistan. It is only through a democratic system with built-in accountability and mechanisms of peaceful transfer of power besides a corresponding political economy prioritising development that Pakistan can achieve its cherished Jinnahist ideals. PakistanÇs agony stems from its elitist nomenclature run by the same class of bureaucrats, generals and politicians and given their chequered past one has reason to be sceptical of any momentous and healthier changes coming from the representatives of the same class whether they appear in one garb or the other. Pakistan needs and deserves a breath of fresh air and that has to come from within.
It is Pakistan, its nationhood, civic and democratic institutions which have been the main casualty of the hide-and-seek game amongst its powerful ruling elite. It will be just a few weeks more when the sad and predictable realities of a centralist, outdated system will become apparent to ordinary Pakistanis. Economic problems, especially following the sanctions, will come back to haunt the innocent millions and a new crisis of legitimacy will reactivate itself to further jolt public confidence. A vulnerable country thoughtlessly made dependent on foreign loans and directives thanks to its insecure and corrupt elite and unbalanced political economy with a massive non-development sector will soon deromanticise the mystique of obtaining accountability and distributive justice. Being part of the same pervasive malaise and, given their predominant position in the polity both as leaders and unchallengeable guides, the generals are institutionally and ideologically not equipped to resolve the enduring problems of governance. As the years pass by, it is becoming clearer that Pakistan is at the mercy of the same class of elite and the rules of the game do not allow any massive, long overdue reforms which may steer the country out of this morass and change the vicious cycle with a virtuous one.
The military takeover of Pakistan characterised by a mixed administration of technocrats and military brass with promises to hold election and legally legitimated through the law of necessity is history repeating itself. Even without any sympathy for Sharif one is reminded of the fact that the country's political culture has been totally unable to build up a mechanism for replacement rather than sheer displacement. The takeovers, dismissals and interim arrangements are no bail-outs and a country dependent on such ad hoc and inherently inimical arrangements must be only intensifying its governability crisis.
The current coup led by General Musharraf, either owing to compulsion or by intention, leaves very little hope for any radical departure from similar coups in the past. However, there is still a possibility that the military-led administration, by properly persuading the existing legislators, may herald a new era of stability and reformism long overdue in Pakistan. The disgust with the tested political leadership of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and massive desire for accountability and good governance may help them usher a short but substantial reformism characterised by constitutional mechanisms, economic egalitarianism and administrative decentralisation.
Whereas the demands for accountability are understandable they equally exhibit a short-term element of vendetta since it may only zero in on politicians absolving the bureaucrats and generals who, like their political counterparts, are suspect. Just witch-hunting the politicians will merely smack of opportunism and expediency unless the remit is wider both in terms of timeframe and its scope. Corruption, inefficiency and lack of accountability exist across the board in all the official cadres. While politicians may be rent-seeking; the generals have lost several battles ignominiously including the former East Pakistan, Siachin and so on and have never been held accountable. They dented politico-constitutional institutions brazenly for decades; grabbed prime properties; held the entire nation to ransom with an undefined theocracy and are responsible for tragedies like the Ojhri arms dump of 1988. It is always the politicians who have been made the scapegoats for such disasters. Pakistan's military leaders muzzled civil liberties; were hand in glove with the maulvis and frequently left the poor innocent citizens to the wolves. It was always the ordinary, poor and helpless Pakistanis who were being lashed in the 1980s whereas the powerful elements got away with murders, drug trafficking and other serious crimes. Not one of them, especially from within the armed forces, was ever taken to task for the crimes and dire tragedies that this poor nation had to bear. On the contrary, many of them, with their huge pensions and salaries, live easy churning out memoirs of non-existent victories.
Theoretically as well as technically, state (hereby meaning the government) and nationhood are intricately linked with the sovereignty rooted in the latter. The state is essentially meant to represent and guard the interests of the society in an equitable manner. If, on the contrary, state and her components like the bureaucracy and politicians are simply motivated by their own partisan interests then the institutions will decay, corruption will become the order of the day without any redress and nationhood will simply evaporate to give way to personalist and sectional interests. The truly democratic regimes, despite their slowness and other problems, are the best in their performance because they balance statist unilateralism with societal prerogatives; protect civil liberties; promote politics of dissent and through negotiations neutralise run-away forces from within the body politic. In recent years, scholars have more vocally begun to prioritise civil societies over statist institutions so as to lessen centralist and monopolist tendencies, and also to broaden public participation in various politico-economic processes. That is why the idea of civil society is linked with societal pre-eminence and even the privatisation of the economy is occasionally envisioned to deemphasise statist inertia and centralism.
In most cases around the world, states emerged following the birth of the nations themselves, with the latter delivering the statehood. In the cases of post-colonial states, state formation has preceded nationhood. Thus, the states, despite a generous usage of terms and emblems like nation state, have either tried to perpetuate their own authority and interests or have pushed very exclusionary processes towards achieving nationhood. That is why, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Algeria, Iraq and several other so-called strong states are contrasted with the dilemma of weaker or even warring nations. In Pakistan, the dilemma is quite obvious as, over the decades, it is only the governmental institutions which have flourished in numbers and facilities whereas the society has languished as a non-priority. If there ever was a national project it has suffered from a lack of recognition of plural realities. The societies in Pakistan have never been a part of the nation-building process as the elite have never shown any national characteristics nor any programmes to empower the subalterns.
In such a perspective, like the feudalist politicians, the military commanders are essentially bureaucrats at the very hub of this state system without any apparent interest or inherent attitude to empower society at large. Like any other bureaucracy, they are supposed to be intrinsically status quoist with a total distaste for anything radical or even reformist. If Pakistani generals augur healthy, diverse and dynamic changes in the larger interests of the populace they would be doing something which has not been accomplished in this poor country since the demise of the Quaid.
Historically, PakistanÇs entire set-up is essentially colonial by origin as well as by choice. It is centralist, manipulative, averse to change and challenge and derides political processes. At the most, it likes to manipulate the political processes as mere appendages. The clear preference is for administration instead of governance and the emphasis is on unity by vetoing diversity. The ideal administrator is a file pusher (rather, file piler now) who operates as the formidable political agent on the frontier buying people off to use them against one another; dismisses people's traditional norms, values and wisdom as anachronistic tribalism; and glows in the glory of his power as a demigod. This politics of unquestionable mai bapÇ and the final arbiter of powers, funds and justice all in one as was the case with the deputy commissioner (called collector in other Indian provinces), was embedded in a politics of patronage dished out to the local intermediaries. The local landed elite were worth a few petty favours and could be bought without any recourse to reason, morality or justice. The protection of this feudatory class by the administration operated at the expense of other vital institutions with no place or pity for ordinary people lacking influence or affluence. No wonder, both the officialdom and the feudals thrive in the Pakistani state structure. The army is essentially a bureaucratic set-up and over the years it has used Pakistani landed elite to its advantage by doling out favours. Both Generals Ayub and Zia were quite adept in it. In the process they made the entire political system a handmaid to this paternalism. The feudals may have Oxbridge degrees but their interests are non-ideological, localist and extremely reactionary. By giving them plots, development funds and other material inducements General Zia was simply reinforcing the colonial tradition. The new military set-up may be tempted to follow suit seeking its support from these regional influentials.
We live in an age where pluralism is a reality. A truly democratic system succeeds by taking pluralism aboard whereas its authoritarian counterpart seeks shortcuts abhorring pluralist identities. The democratic ethos achieves national harmony by respecting and co-opting pluralism while non-representative regimes scoff at it and their coercive measures, in the name of monoethnic nationalism, trigger violent reactions. The very composition of Pakistan's state structure (including military and civil bureaucracy) is massively upper Indus Valley-centred which, despite good intentions, is not national per se and is not helpful in achieving a national consensus. The top-brass military and bureaucracy do operate as a class over and above ethno-sectarian diversities yet at the middle class and lower levels it has generated a genuine grudge with serious portents.
The political system of every country seeks stability and sustenance from its economic vigour and any distortions simply weaken the political mores and national ethos. Pakistan's economy is heavily tilted towards defence and loan servicing with very little for development. If the army wants to genuinely improve the economic conditions in the country, then it needs serious rethinking. The country's defence is a necessity but its present levels, expenditures and strategies are untenable. Pakistan needs peace from within and without. So far we have not won any war through any military venture and instead have invited more catastrophes. It is time to think in terms of neutralising our adversaries to ward off any aggression; break our regional and global isolation and to reevaluate our policies vis-a-vis India.
India may be pushing Pakistan ( like the US vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union ) into a blind alley and indirectly we may be making the life of Indian Muslims and other minorities in both the countries extremely vulnerable to majoritarian fascism. We have genuine interests in Kashmir and elsewhere but any balkanisation of India; fragmentation of Afghanistan, troubles in Sinkiang or other central Asian republics will endanger Pakistan. We must have a regional approach to create stability and security. Our relationship with India merits a fresh perspective and a continued single-factor pursuit is potentially dangerous for both the countries. The Indians owe a greater responsibility to the region and it is also in their interest to let the economies and political systems in the neighbouring countries grow positively so that all these plural societies benefit from peace and prosperity. A continuously weak Pakistan is not in India's favour the way a turbulent India means serious bad omen for Pakistan and various minorities in the region. Dialogues on various issues must go on to achieve friendly and cordial relations. With peace abroad we will strengthen peace within. An enduring peace may win Islamabad something that the future generations will always cherish as it will release scarce resources for education, health and rural development.
The systemic malaise needs bold efforts in empowering at the grass roots by giving economic and political powers to the locally elected officials. Pakistan urgently needs devolution in the true sense of the word. Several new provinces (better called states) with more natural and acceptable boundaries, characterised by elected and accountable institutions, will provide a new leadership from below since just changing a few individuals in Islamabad or provincial capitals is not going to stem the rot. We need free and unfettered civil society as institutions like press, judiciary and human rights groups are the soul of a nation and must be protected and celebrated. They are the pillars of hope, progress and rationality and as guardians of conscience have succeeded where others have failed. We need our ulema to understand a true version of a humanist and tolerant religion like Islam. Any outfit in the name of sectarian or extra-regional agendas must be properly taken to task. Fundamentalism is the gravest threat to our own humane values. The ordinary people are ready for a war on illiteracy and violence and do not have time or energies to send their loved ones into othersÇ wars. The leaders need to strengthen the people's confidence in themselves and in their country by giving them a clean, efficient and secure system.
Return to: October 1999 - Military Coup in Pakistan: Analysis & Reactions