WHY AN INTERIM CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL FAIL
By Pervez Hoodbhoy
International reaction to last Tuesday's coup has,
predictably, been negative. The European Union, Canada, and
several other countries have outrightly condemned it. The UN
Secretary General has deplored it, and the IMF director has
declared that loans to Pakistan will be suspended until
democracy is restored. Faced by a hostile international
environment, and with its lifeline of foreign loans and aid
in serious jeopardy, Pakistan's military rulers appear
inclined towards appointing an interim government to be
followed by general elections. While this seems to be what
the rest of the world wants, it actually amounts to a recipe
for continued instability that shall further deepen the
crisis of state and society in Pakistan.
While the motives for demanding an immediate return to
democracy are perfectly understandable and laudable, this
demand is based on an inadequate recognition of one fact so
important that it overshadows all else. State power in
Pakistan has always been distributed so that key goals have
been set and prioritized by the military, and civilian
governments have had the job of implementing them. This
unnatural separation between goal making and execution makes
for a system that has crashed frequently in the past, and is
destined to keep crashing in the future. The military has
sometimes been invisible, and at other times visible, but
has been ever-present as the hand behind the system. At this
critical juncture of Pakistan's history it needs to accept
responsibility for having contributed to the country's
present political and economic situation, and be permitted
to lead it out of the morass.
My contention is that setting up a caretaker government will
be a fruitless endeavour doomed to fail. Selected by the
military from a fractious lot of political aspirants with
generally dubious credentials and no credible program of
action, it will have no mandate or authority to address
issues of real national significance. In 1967, Field Marshal
Ayub Khan had written disparagingly of the Combined
Opposition Parties as being like "nine cats with their tails
tied together". Since his time the countrywide population of
these prolific felines has almost doubled; there are at
least sixteen in the Grand Democratic Alliance. When their
tails were untied on Tuesday, the free-for-all race began.
The fundamental problem is that, for all past civilian
governments, three critical areas have remained wholly or
largely closed to intervention, and to an extent even
inspection. These are, in order of increasing opacity, the
economy, foreign policy, and nuclear and defence affairs.
Let us examine each in turn.
Nuclear and defence matters have always been closely
controlled by the military while civilian governments have
played a supportive role. However, their power to make
decisions of substance has been very limited. In fact, it is
doubtful if such governments would, if they had demanded it,
have had access to critical information such as the number
and location of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles,
the detailed chain of command, fissile material inventories
and production rates, future plans, and so forth. Benazir
Bhutto has admitted that, during the years of her tenure,
she was at the very margins and far away from where the real
decisions were being made. Nawaz Sharif appears to have been
only somewhat more knowledgeable because of his greater
acceptability (at one time) to the army. However, officials
of the Foreign Ministry -- even the ones who need to know --
appear to have little information on subjects that they are
supposed to be experts in.
The implications of this are considerable. Whether in Delhi,
Geneva, or Washington, no civilian Pakistan government can
engage in meaningful negotiations whether on the CTBT,
fissile materials cutoff treaty, limits to weaponization or
deployment, etc. It is neither empowered to take significant
decisions by itself without consultation and clearance from
the "higher" authority, nor even adequately knowledgeable.
Hence, in the past little has been gained from protracted,
expensive conferences and meetings.
The second key area is Pakistan's foreign policy. For 52
years nothing has occupied our energy, time, resources and
emotions more than relations with India. Three wars (unless
Kargil can be called the fourth), punctuated with only brief
periods of cooperation and coexistence, have hardened
attitudes on Kashmir on both sides. Brutal suppression of
Kashmiri human rights by Indian security forces, and a
guerilla war waged by heavily armed mujahideen trained in
camps across the border, has established a tragic pattern
that has inflicted enormous suffering and claimed tens of
thousands of lives.
It is far from clear how and when the stalemate can ever be
broken. What is perfectly clear, however, is that any
accommodation on Kashmir with India, though far from a final
resolution, must be negotiated directly with the Pakistan
military and not a civilian government. No civilian
government can dare close down the offices or training camps
of any mujahideen group. On the other hand, the mujahideen
withdrawal from Kargil at the orders of the military has
conclusively established the extent of control that the
military exercises upon them.
Negotiating with the military is likely to be tough because
it is committed to the liberation of Kashmir as its highest
priority goal. There is also a general belief, articulated
repeatedly by many retired Pakistani military chiefs, that
India can be bled in Kashmir at little expense to Pakistan.
These are admittedly impediments, but there are two reasons
why India, and the Western countries, must recognize this
reality. First, negotiating a major change in Pakistan-India
relations with any party other than the military is futile
and possibly dangerous. The Lahore Declaration, because it
lacked army support, in the final analysis proved to be a
step backward rather than forward. A majority in India
thinks that, after being deceived in Lahore, negotiations
with Pakistan are fruitless. Second, if one strips away the
rhetoric, a strong residue of pragmatism is evident within
the military. There is considerable evidence of this;
agreeing to withdraw from Kargil in order to avert a
full-scale war, the hesitation in imposing martial law
because of the anticipated international reaction, and the
successful use of some confidence building measures such as
hotlines even at a time of conflict.
A very similar argument applies to Pakistan's role in
Afghanistan. By and large, there is a feeling of pride in
the military in having successfully established a client
state on the western border. While certain aspects of the
relationship are problematic, such as the sharp decline in
Pakistan-Iran relations and possible involvement of
Afghanistan based groups in the murders of Shias in
Pakistan, making an overtly anti-Indian and largely unified
state in post-Soviet Afghanistan is considered as a great
strategic achievement. In these circumstances meaningless
and contradictory utterances on these issues, like those of
former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz, are all that can be
expected from any civilian government. Action on Afghanistan
requires dealing with those who have the capacity to affect
developments.
Thirdly, and finally, is the question of economic rescue.
Pakistan's current budget is split between debt servicing
and defence, with barely 20% left for all else. Yet, in
spite of its preeminent size, defence spending is a simple
one-liner. The Economic Survey of Pakistan, the official
document of the ministry of finance, lists only the total
amount. One presumes that reasons of national security are
supposedly responsible for this total opacity. But how is a
rational allocation of expenditures possible in such
circumstances?
Once again, this becomes an argument for directly dealing
with the military on an issue of the greatest importance, on
which civilian governments are unable to deal effectively.
It assumes special significance given that foreign aid and
loans are increasingly being linked to defence spending.
Given that the country is teetering on the brink of default,
hence economic collapse, this needs fast thinking and the
capacity to act decisively. The Nawaz and Bhutto governments
failed in collecting taxes rightfully due to the state,
retained and strengthened feudalism and tribalism, and led
the country to its present economic predicament. Only the
army has the power to voluntarily decrease its own
expenditures and the strength to confront tax-evaders and
loan defaulters. The question is: will it?
For better or for worse, the military has broken an 11-year
old taboo of directly intervening in national politics by
having dismissed a corrupt and dictatorial, but
democratically elected leader. As yet no restrictions on
civil liberties have been imposed, nor have the dreaded
military courts been imposed. There is no justification for
these. But now, instead of resorting to back-seat driving
once again, the Pakistan military must take full
responsibility in steering Pakistan out of its present state
of crisis, a crisis for which it also bears much
responsibility. Putting up a front government will achieve
simply nothing.
[15 October 1999]
Return to: October 1999 - Military Coup in Pakistan: Analysis & Reactions