women's rights page @ www.sacw.net | May 2, 2008

Faith in the state? Asian women's struggles for human rights in the UK

by Pragna Patel*
(in: Feminist Legal Studies, April 2008)

Abstract  The discourse of multiculturalism provides a useful means of understanding the complexities, tensions, and dilemmas that Asian and other minority women in the U.K. grapple with in their quest for human rights. However, the adoption of multiculturalist approaches has also silenced women's voices, obscuring, for example, the role of the family in gendered violence and abuse. Focusing on the work of Southall Black Sisters, and locating this work within current debates on the intersection of government policy, cultural diversity, and feminist activism, this article examines, and critiques, the Labour government's current "multi-faith" agenda for its impact on Black and minority ethnic women in the U.K.

Keywords  Asian women - black women - domestic violence - multiculturalism - multi-faithism - religious fundamentalism - secularism - state policies - women's human rights

Introduction

This article draws on the experiences of predominantly South Asian women who approach Southall Black Sisters, whose lives encapsulate the contradictions facing many black and minority women in their struggle for survival and freedom in the U.K. The struggle for the rights of black and minority women in the U.K. is inextricably linked to the practice of multiculturalism. Indeed, it is impossible to discuss the one without discussing the other. A focus on multiculturalism also provides a useful means of understanding the complexities, tensions and dilemmas with which Asian and other minority women in the U.K. have grappled, in their quest for human rights. The key question is whether the state's approach to race relations and minority communities has hindered or enhanced their struggle for rights, particularly in relation to the family where they are most vulnerable to abuse, violence and unequal treatment. Experience shows that at its worst, multiculturalism has colluded in the silencing of women's voices. But now, an even greater danger looms: the government promotion of the faith agenda (a Blairite initiative) and the drift from multiculturalism to "multi-faithism" provides an opportunity for fundamentalists and religionists to set an agenda that poses a major threat to the human rights of Asian and other minority women. The need for vigilance and activism is now more urgent than ever.

Southall Black Sisters

Southall Black Sisters (S.B.S.) first set up in 1979, initially as a campaigning organisation comprising African-Caribbean and Asian women, in the midst of intense anti-racist activity. We consciously adopted a secular feminist identity, one based on a shared history of racism and religious patriarchal control. The absence of the recognition of gender power relations within the anti-racist movements and the absence of an acknowledgement of racism within white feminist movements had resulted in the invisibility of black and minority women. It was this invisibility which gave rise to our organisation and others like us.

Southall Black Sisters now operates as a not for profit, advice, campaigning, resource and advocacy centre for black women with a particular focus on the needs of South Asian women. Whilst based in West London, an area with a large South Asian population, we have a national reach.
The history of S.B.S. in a sense has been a history of resisting imposed identities. Throughout our existence, we have attempted to shake off singular identities foisted on us by the community, the anti-racist movement and the state. Over the years, women who walk through our doors, largely South Asian, have demanded support and assistance in the face of domestic violence and other forms of gender based violence and restrictions on their personal freedom, exacerbated by poverty and racism. Our work by its very nature has therefore had to simultaneously challenge violence against women and racism.

More recently, we have been forced to challenge very specific fundamentalist and nationalist identities that have been fostered by the rise of Sikh, Muslim and Hindu religious fundamentalist movements in the U.K. and abroad.
In Britain, the rise of fundamentalism in all religions has in part been due to the role of the British state and the privileging of Christianity,1 but the form of multiculturalism that has been practiced at national and local levels has also provided the space for religion to emerge as the main badge of identity in minority communities. This political development has compelled us to defend the secular space that we had created and, until the early 1990s, we had taken for granted.

Religious fundamentalism in this context is defined specifically as any modern political movement that exercises selectivity in the interpretation of its religious texts. However, two features that are common to all fundamentalist religious movements stand out: first, they claim their version of religion to be the only true one and feel threatened by pluralist systems of thought; and secondly, they use political means to impose their version of the truth on all members of their religion. Fundamentalism is not a term that is specific to any one religion but cuts across all religions and can take different political forms. However, at the heart of all fundamentalist movements is support for the patriarchal family as a central agent of control. And women are viewed as embodying the morals and traditional values of the family and the whole community (see Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992). These movements demand absolute conformity to religious laws as interpreted by male religious leaders in denial of countless variations in interpretation and cultural practices that have evolved in different communities.

Multiculturalism

It needs to be stated at the outset that our criticism of multiculturalism should not be taken as a rejection of multiculturalism per se. It is still viable in the fight against racism because it recognises diversity and promotes pluralism. It involves an acknowledgement of distinct cultural and group identities and the right to guard against cultural hegemony. However, the effectiveness of multiculturalism must be considered not only in relation to combating racism but also inequality based on gender and class within minority communities. Our view is that the struggle for citizenship rights must involve a challenge to racism, economic disadvantage, discrimination and other exclusionary practices which affect entire minority groups, but the struggle for minority women's rights must also be located within that wider context. By highlighting the flaws in multiculturalism, our aim is to call for its redefinition so that human rights and citizenship rights are not denied to Asian and other minority women or indeed other vulnerable minorities. This requires constant struggle and negotiation since the demand for the state to intervene in the family affairs of black and minority communities in its protective capacity must also take into account the state's control of black and minority communities - primarily through oppressive immigration and policing practices.

Multiculturalism has been the dominant social policy approach to race relations between the state and minority communities in the U.K. It was first introduced in education but was quickly accepted as a tool of national policy across a range of issues at the local and national levels (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Although the present government has attempted to revert back to aspects of previous (discredited) policies based on assimilation, predicated on the notion that 'good' race relations can only be achieved if minority communities shed all aspects of their religious and cultural identity and blend in with the "British way of life", the multicultural model, with some variation, is still prevalent. The difficulty with the multicultural approach, however, is that in practice it has lost its more progressive aspects. Instead of distinguishing between valid cultural demands and fundamental human rights, it was and is seen as an end in itself - a way of simply recognising and 'tolerating' difference.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the multicultural model is that it assumes that minority communities are homogeneous or monolithic entities, with no internal differences based on class, gender or even caste lines which give rise to differences of power and advantage. Instead, differences are constructed in a stereotypical and essentialist manner, fixing and reifying boundaries of community affiliation. The more 'different' an identity is, the more authentic it becomes. In many respects, it draws on previous models of British colonial rule whereby the indigenous laws of the colonised country were codified with reference to religious texts but without reference to changing customs, practices and interpretations (see, e.g., Sahgal 1992). Minorities are therefore viewed primarily as targets of social policy, rather than as actors in the democratic system (Ali 1992), and notions of citizenship are deemed not to apply except in a facile way - to demand allegiance to the state. This process has been heightened since 9/11 with the creation of "faith communities" - a construction borne out of community self-definition and state social policy. The result is that a complex web of political, social and cultural factors, which helps to form a particular identity, is reduced to purely religious values.
Groups like S.B.S. have also criticised the multicultural model for providing the space for unselected community representatives, usually male and from religious groups, but also from the business classes, to determine the needs of the community and to mediate between the community and the state. Although the interests of the community are often articulated in the name of anti-racism or even human rights, this very rarely includes recognition of the individual rights of women or other powerless sub-groups within the community. In this process, the struggle for community representation at the political level becomes highly contested, but it has largely been won by predominantly fundamentalist and conservative male-dominated groups who usually have exclusionary if not extremist political agendas.

On a daily basis, the nature of state intervention in the family within minority communities has had a detrimental impact on women's struggles for greater freedom. Indeed, the practice of multiculturalism has often led to the adoption of a culturally relativist approach by the state welfare services and the legal system. In an effort to appear "culturally sensitive" and "tolerant of diversity", such state institutions often ignore the rights of the more marginalised groups and individuals within our communities. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the response that has, with few exceptions, been given to women and children escaping violence and abuse from their partners or families.2 In addressing issues such as domestic violence, suicide rates (up to three times the national average (see Raleigh and Balarajan 1992; Bhugra and Desai 2002)), rape and sexual violence, honour crimes and forced marriages within Asian communities in particular, S.B.S. has had to challenge multicultural policies for their effect in reinforcing rather than challenging such abusive practices. Until the London bombings, however, one important area of our achievements was the shift in thinking around multiculturalism as it impacted on minority women.

In the last decade or so, secular feminist groups such as S.B.S. and Forward3 made some progress in redefining multiculturalism, particularly in relation to protecting women and young children (largely female) from practices such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation and honour killings. For example, in the debates on forced marriage in 1999 and 2000 held by the Home Office Working Group on forced marriage, the then Home Office Minister, Mike O'Brien, acknowledged that "multiculturalism cannot be an excuse for moral blindness". Echoing our concerns, he advocated a "mature multicultural" approach which demands that violence against women and other oppressive restrictions need to be understood as abuses and violations of women's fundamental human rights, irrespective of the cultural or religious contexts in which they occur. Unfortunately, instead of promoting "mature multiculturalism" and building on the concept, this government has since taken several steps backwards.
From Multiculturalism to "Multi-faithism"

Despite these dilemmas and difficulties, we have found ourselves in the ironic position of defending multiculturalism as sections of the British government and media have decided that multicultural policies are no longer functional. Following the terrorist bombings in London in July 2005, the focus has been on the need for social cohesion and assimilation. Yet at the same time, the need to find Muslim allies for the so called "War on Terror" has intensified as the government searches for a largely male religious leadership with which to engage in a dialogue, in an attempt to co-opt their public support for the war and for an authoritarian law and order agenda (see Sahgal 2006). This policy shift has also encouraged the state to conflate issues around racial inequality with 'authentic' religion and religious identity as defined by fundamentalist and conservative religious leaderships, and has led to the direct sponsorship of fundamentalist or reactionary organisations such as the Muslim Council of Great Britain (M.C.B.),4 The Muslim Association and the Hindu Forum of Britain, all of whom now enjoy an unprecedented influence on state policy towards minorities.

The increasing emphasis on religion and religious identities has led to the transformation of multiculturalism into "multi-faithism", a model of 'integration' which views the discrimination and exclusion of many in black and minority communities not as a product of class inequality or racism, but as a historical failure to respect and facilitate religious identity within public institutions. A new settlement is taking place between "faith groups" and the state in which "faith groups" use the terrain of multiculturalism to further an authoritarian and patriarchal agenda. These groups use the language of equality and human rights whilst at the same time eschewing these very ideals. The result is that secular spaces and secular voices within minority communities are being squeezed out, which in turn means that fewer alternatives will be available to minority women and others from restrictions on fundamental freedoms.

Growing Religious Intolerance and the Threat to Fundamental Human Rights

Following the Rushdie Affair, the mood in all the various minority communities has been one of growing intolerance for all those who seek to challenge cultural and religious values and religious abuse of power. Muslim fundamentalists within South Asian communities have been the most vociferous, although other minority religious fundamentalists and religionists have also been quietly organising and jockeying for key positions as mediators between state and community. In our communities, we have witnessed, with alarming frequency, fundamentalist and authoritarian protests at any form of dissent from the dominant religious orthodoxies. There have been aggressive and intimidating if not violent campaigns against feminist, gay and lesbian and other non-conformist activities. It would seem that all the religions are vying for control of the representation of their communities. In the process, what is made transparent is the re-invention of essentialist notions of religion as a framework for highlighting inequalities and demanding recognition (see Yuval-Davis 1992).

In August 2000, the Islamic Human Rights Association5 protested against a government-backed European directive which, according to them, would force Muslim charities and schools to employ non-believers and homosexuals. This was considered to be an attack on religious freedom and would have exposed faith-based organisations to infiltration by hostile campaign groups. Much like the Christian charities that have recently opposed discrimination law applying to their adoption services, the Association argued that the duty not to discriminate undermined the religious ethos of their organisations. In 2005, we witnessed protests by elements of the Sikh community against the play "Behzti" (Dishonour) which dealt with issues of rape and abuse of power within a Gurdwara (Sikh temple). Whilst the protests led to intimidation and threats of violence from Sikh extremists, even so-called moderate Sikhs (for example the so-called Sikh Human Rights Commission) felt that the play's author, Gurpreet Bhatti, had "crossed the line" and caused extreme offence by setting her play in what is regarded by Sikhs as a 'sacred' place. Extremist and moderate Sikhs alike were notably more preoccupied with the question of blasphemy than with the reality of women who are raped and assaulted on a daily basis, sometimes by or with the collusion of the very custodians of community morality!

Not to be outdone, the Hindus have followed the example set by Muslim fundamentalist leadership in using the language and techniques of human rights. In 2006, we saw successful attempts by Hindu fundamentalists to stop an exhibition of paintings by the renowned India painter, M.F. Hussain, on the grounds that his depiction of naked female deities offended Hindu religious sensibilities, irrespective of the fact that over the centuries, Hinduism has been littered with such images. The campaign was led by the so-called "moderate" Hindu Forum of Britain and the shadowy Hindu Human Rights group.6 Both took it upon themselves to represent all Hindus in the U.K., although they have no such mandate to determine issues of identity and representation. However, this has not stopped the Forum, with the support of organisations like the Runnymede Trust, from constructing a monolithic 'Hindu' voice and community in the U.K.7 Yet whilst professing to uphold democracy, the rule of law and justice, the Forum has remained silent about the violent tactics employed by Hindu fundamentalists in India, who have threatened the painter and his property. Indeed, the General Secretary of the Forum, Ramesh Kallidai has recently gained further respectability as a Commissioner for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, although he is known to have links with the neo-fascist Hindu organisation the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R.S.S.), whose leadership in the past has declared open admiration for Hitler and called for the R.S.S. to adopt Nazi Germany's ideology and tactics in dealing with India's Muslims and other minorities including secularists.8 Elsewhere, so called "moderate" Hindus have campaigned against the depiction of Hindu deities in consumer products and, more importantly, against the depiction of domestic violence and forced marriage within Hindu populations.9

The growing climate of intolerance is, of course, not confined solely to minority communities. It is also reflected in the wider society, as shown by the protests against the Jerry Springer Opera broadcast by the B.B.C. in December 2004 and in the recent campaigns to prevent discrimination law applying to gay adoptions. The difference, however, is that in the wider society, there is greater space and protection for those wishing to dissent. In minority communities, religious institutions are dominated by a conservative and even misogynist and homophobic religious agenda, and although there are liberal strands, their voices are marginal. For example, the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain published a courageous report on the prevalence of child abuse within madrassas or Muslim religious schools, but it was overlooked by all so-called "representative" Muslim and other faith institutions and there remains a resounding silence as to its content and implications within all the Asian communities (see Muslim Parliament of Great Britain 2006).

Even when harmful cultural practices are addressed, often religious or community leaders fend off criticism by claiming that their religion does not condone abuses against women or children. However, the problem with such assertions is that issues such as forced marriages or honour crimes are simply seen as symptoms of a declining or malfunctioning culture, and nothing to do with religion per se. But such assertions are often disingenuous, since they allow religious spokespersons to condemn the custom and practice of everyday life within minority communities without having to admit that there are no neat distinctions between culture and religion or without having to take any responsibility for tackling the abusive practices. Further, such denial and avoidance is used as a ploy to argue even more forcefully that communities should return to the 'purity' of original religious teachings.

The furore surrounding the "Behzti" play is but one recent example of attempts to silence the voices of women. We are aware of countless cases around the country where South Asian and minority religious institutions have been involved in, condoned or remained indifferent to domestic and sexual violence and child abuse. There have even been cases where religious leaders have sought to 'exorcise' women or children by beating them, sometimes to death, for non-conformist behaviour perceived as "possession" by "evil spirits". Whilst these cases represent the more dramatic end of the spectrum, women find their aspirations quashed by religious leaders on a day to day basis. As minority women in the U.K. have no effective political representation and no power to challenge the hegemony of the religious establishment, they along with other sub groups have the most to lose.10 Women have only their voices of dissent as a tool by which to demand more freedom. The suppression of dissent is therefore literally a matter of life and death for many. This is precisely why many of us opposed the creation of a new criminal offence of incitement to religious hatred in 2005. We perceived it as an attempt to extend the outdated blasphemy laws11 through the back door and we argued that the main targets would be not those engaged in fomenting hatred towards other religions, but those wishing to dissent within religion itself; in other words, those representing a challenge to orthodox traditions. We feared, above all, that the Act would contribute to the emergence of a culture of intolerance. Our fears were confirmed by a spokesperson from the Sikh Human Rights Commission who, in response to the "Behzti" affair, stated on television that, if the law had existed at the time, the group would have used it to prevent the play from being performed.
The Emergence of "Faith Communities"

For secular feminists within minority communities, the challenge of religious fundamentalism is only a part of the battle. A much more difficult struggle lies with mainstream religious leadership itself - the moderates - who, with the demise of progressive secular institutions within minority communities, are seen to be fulfilling a crucial role in mediating between state and community. This is, of course, a process that has always occurred, but what is different this time is the assertion by the state that religion is a vital part of public life which cannot be ignored, even by those who consider themselves to be secular in outlook.

Since the London bombings and civil unrest fuelled by racial tensions, black and ethnic minority communities, redrawn as "faith communities", have been specifically identified by the state as important sources of social capital. There is a growing assumption that the social networks, experiences and resources of the "faith groups" have been neglected for too long. They are deemed to be invaluable to urban regeneration and therefore full opportunity is given to faith groups to build capacity and to participate fully in civil society.12 Interestingly, the approach represents the other side of the "War on Terror" campaign, since it is mainly Muslim faith groups that are deemed to be relevant to stamping out extremism and achieving social cohesion.13 This development happens also to fit neatly into a wider neo-conservative agenda, which sees as essential the privatisation of what were once considered to be vital state functions such as schooling and welfare provision. Faith groups have therefore been placed at the heart of the regeneration of communities and as a direct result, religion is becoming increasingly entrenched within state institutions at central and local levels, and is reflected at all levels of state policy.

The faith-based approach to multiculturalism has provided the space for the politics of identity based on religion to flourish, and faith-based campaigns for legal tolerance, cultural rights, freedom from discrimination and access to public resources have gained momentum. Only some such demands are borne out of experiences of alienation and exclusion due to racism; others are borne out of the perceived need to maintain religious identity through the control of female sexuality in particular. The result is that the various religious leaderships within minority communities have been strengthened considerably. It has also brought into their domain areas which hitherto have been addressed by progressive, secular, anti-racist and feminist groups, including issues such as domestic violence, children's rights and child protection, and the rights of black and minority offenders in the criminal justice system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that faith groups are encroaching on Asian feminist projects and in doing so, they are subverting the feminist and democratic principles upon which such projects are based. Indeed, the work of secular groups, especially Asian women's groups that have organised across religious and ethnic divides, is thus not only being ignored but increasingly left out of funding and policy initiatives.

The emphasis has shifted to the need to provide "religious and culturally sensitive" services, which has resulted in the segregation of Asian community projects into faith-based projects and organisations. Notions and models of citizenship based on respect for individual human rights are being replaced by notions of social cohesion and integration involving adherence to "core British values". However, adherence to core values does not displace cultural or religious identity. In fact, the faith-based approach encourages adherence to cultural and social autonomy as well as to a core set of values which are mostly about the maintenance of public order. For example, the Islamic Human Rights Commission has made it clear that it sees no reason why minority communities cannot be guided by their personal religious laws, since this does not impact on social cohesion. The approach, therefore, substitutes the demand for equality with the demand for greater recognition of diversity and the need for "religious literacy", that is, the need to understand the theological values and traditions as espoused by religious leaders, but not recognition of the various liberal cultural and religious and non-religious traditions within a community.

Multiculturalism and the Law's Response

When viewed in the context of the emergence of "faith communities", the state's current response to black and minority women's needs reveals two contradictory approaches. First, years of campaigning by S.B.S. and others mean that from time to time, we still retain some influence on state policy on issues concerning black and minority women. Even here, however, there is a tendency for state institutions to 'exoticise' the more dramatic, culturally-specific practices such as honour killings and to isolate them from wider debates on violence against women and state accountability. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that issues such as honour killings and forced marriage are often utilised to legitimate a racist and restrictive immigration agenda or to set up more training programmes aimed at increasing cultural and religious awareness which, in the absence of community and state accountability, do not enhance the rights of minority women. The response of the police to the case of Banaz Mahmood, a young Kurdish woman horrifically murdered by her father and uncle with others, is a case in point.14
Secondly, although the state has begun to assert more clearly the view that harmful cultural practices will not be tolerated, the faith-based approach contributes to a set of policies aimed at recognising and protecting religious identity, often to the detriment of women's rights. In our experience, the recognition of religious identity within state institutions, including the legal system, is undermining, albeit slowly and surreptitiously, the rights of minority women.

The growing recognition that the worst forms of oppression are often experienced at the point of intersection of a number of factors that make a person vulnerable to abuse or exploitation - race, gender, age, sexuality and class - is to be welcomed. In the U.K., for instance, we have long been arguing for an intersectional analysis to address and meet the needs of black and minority women. We have highlighted, for example, how racist nationality, immigration and asylum laws impact on black and minority women's experiences of domestic or gender-based violence and compound their vulnerability, therefore requiring changes to both domestic violence and immigration and asylum laws and policies. But the present political climate should also compel us to address the complications that arise when religious discrimination is treated unproblematically as an equality strand. We must take account of how, at national and local levels, religious identity politics is being contested by women and other minorities in their struggle to be free from gender violence or other restrictions. Often what is forgotten is that absolute rights from which the state cannot derogate under any circumstances - such as the right to life or the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment - are implicated in women's struggles against gender-based violence and for equality. The right to manifest one's religion and religious identity, however, is not and can never be an absolute right - it is, by its very nature limited, subject to the impact that it has on others, particularly those more vulnerable. If we don't grasp this, we will be supporting the very reactionary, exclusionary and even fascistic agendas that fundamentalists and religionists seek to promote.

It is important that bodies such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission are aware of the potential conflict between different equality strands, especially between the gender and sexual equality strand on the one hand and the religion/belief strand on the other, and not to assume that religion can be cross cut easily with other strands. Religion often poses a major obstacle to the realisation of universal human rights in the family sphere within minority communities because those who claim to speak on behalf of the community also claim that the human rights principles of individual choice and autonomy are "western" or "alien" concepts.

On a daily basis, we have witnessed an increasing dilemma in respect of the law's response to the needs of black and minority women. For most women within minority communities, in the absence of internal democratic and accountable mechanisms for resolving disputes, the legal system becomes an indispensable tool in the struggle for freedom. It is not a luxury but a necessity. Yet what we find is that the law also struggles to accommodate a multicultural perspective that does not undermine the individual rights of women. At the heart of the dilemma lie the two contradictory approaches to Asian and minority women - the "culture is no excuse" approach and the need for greater "religious literacy or awareness". For example, in cases of forced marriage, nullity based on lack of consent due to duress has been granted. Yet following the conclusion of a case in which we were involved, P. v. R.,15 where nullity was granted, academic commentary warned against what is perceived to be the imposition of western cultural values on other systems of belief:

The international clash of cultures in which the issue of forced marriages contracted overseas arises is a context that may require greater tolerance to achieve international comity. It could be argued that the degree of choice implied by consent to marriage (as opposed to the fact that consent is required) is a matter for the law of jurisdiction of celebration... [I]t could be argued that English cultural expectations are being imposed on other jurisdictions because it depends on the subjective state of mind of the petitioner and could therefore be readily extended to mild resistance to arranged marriages if things go wrong.16

At the heart of this comment is a relativist approach to different cultures - that individual rights can be traded for the sake of international relations and different cultural expectations. The comment also presumes that human rights cannot be intrinsic to other cultures since they originate in the West. Yet any approach by the courts will be suspect if it fails to take account of the U.K.'s obligations under international law (such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (C.E.D.A.W.)) or the struggles of women worldwide against the practice of forced marriage. So far, we have not encountered any attempt by the courts to adopt an approach which might have undermined the struggle against forced marriage,17 but there is no room for complacency in view of the challenges posed by fundamentalists and religionists who, while demanding the right to have a parallel legal system based on personal (religious) laws, also appear to have adopted a strategy aimed at demanding greater recognition of religion in civil and criminal law.

More recently, we have witnessed cases where the Human Rights Act 1998, a key component of our political and legal strategy in addressing violence against women and indeed the worst aspects of multiculturalism, has been utilised by both radical and moderate religious groups alike, as a way of legitimising restrictions on women.

Shabina Begum18

This case concerned a challenge to the politics of multiculturalism in a secular, mixed, state high school. It concerned a 14 year old Muslim girl, Shabina Begum, who wanted to wear the jilbab (full ankle length dress) rather than a salwar kameez (long tunic and trousers) and head scarf, which conformed to the school's uniform policy. In 2006, the House of Lords delivered a judgment stating that Shabina's rights to manifest her religion or belief and her right not to be denied an education had not been violated, and any infringement was necessary and proportionate for the protection and well being of the wider school community. The judgment in many respects represents a crucial victory for women in particular, whose bodies often become the means by which religious identity is imposed.

However, it is significant that the judges argued that the school had a carefully considered uniform policy which took account of 'mainstream' Muslim opinion, which confirmed that the uniform conformed to the Islamic dress code. In respect of its consultation process, therefore, the school could not be faulted since it had taken advice from Muslim parents, community leaders (many of whom were represented on the school governing board) and other Islamic theological experts. The court praised the school for showing respect for Muslim beliefs in a way that was "inclusive, unthreatening and uncompetitive".19

More significantly, the court made specific mention of the fact that throughout her battle with the school, Shabina had been supported and represented by young Muslim men, including her older brother. At one point, an unnamed extreme right Muslim group even held demonstrations outside her school, interestingly protesting not against the school uniform policy but against the education of Muslim children in secular schools! The demonstrations had the effect of intimidating other female students who complained of harassment and interference from the group. They did not support Shabina's demand, fearing that if she was successful, they too would be pressurised into wearing a jilbab. They, along with the school, feared the deep divisions that would be created between those who were perceived to be pious and religious and those who were perceived to have lost their religious way. They were afraid that if they did not conform they would be labelled 'bad' Muslim girls. The court alluded to the fact that Shabina's challenge had been motivated by those who sought to impose a political religious identity on women and young girls. It recognised that the school had in fact carefully balanced the need to respect its diverse population with the need to enable those who did not wish to conform to their religious identity to do so without fear of repercussions.

Whilst there is much to commend the overall judgment and in particular its nuanced approach to religious identity, religious fundamentalism and multiculturalism,20 there is nevertheless considerable discomfort as to how the notion of multiculturalism is increasingly taken to mean reflecting multi-faith diversity. The House of Lords justified its decision by noting that the school feared divisions between the different groups and that racial harmony and social cohesion was at stake. Yet what is legitimised by the court ruling is the strategy adopted by the school in pursuit of social cohesion within state schools. Shabina's case was in effect a battle between religious fundamentalists and the more moderate, 'mainstream' Muslims, in which the latter won. But in this battle what room, if any, is there for those who wish to dissent from mainstream religious opinion? What standing would minority secular women's groups have, if they sought to challenge the authority of religious leaders by drawing on other liberal or even feminist traditions? On the basis of the court's reasoning, they would be deemed to be outside of "mainstream opinion" and therefore not "representative" of their community. Ultimately, what concerns us is that the judgment reflects and reinforces the emergence of a multi-faith world order, in which secular spaces are being squeezed out of public life. For these reasons, the court's approach does not cross the multicultural threshold.

R. v. Sumra21

This case concerned a traditional Muslim woman who was raped by her husband, who was then prosecuted. However, at trial she claimed that her religious requirements meant that she could not take part in a legal process in which she would have to answer questions of a sexual nature asked by men. She stated that her religion did not permit her to hear or answer to a male voice. In other words, she could not engage in a public world occupied by men. In response, the prosecution counsel requested the defendant to change to a female counsel, but that request was refused, presumably on the valid grounds that this interfered with the defendant's right to choose his own legal representation. The prosecution counsel then requested that the victim be allowed to give evidence via a video link through a female interpreter so that she would not have to see or hear the defendant's barrister, or indeed any other male within the court room. To accommodate this request, the judge adjourned the hearings to obtain reports from a Muslim cleric in order to ascertain the position of Muslim women in public spaces. Following this report, on religious and cultural grounds, he permitted her to give her evidence and be cross-examined via video link through a female interpreter.

It is easy to have a feminist knee jerk response to this case; to view the measures taken by the court as very necessary in a situation where there is a need to improve the notoriously low rate of prosecutions in rape cases. However, when examined more closely, the court's approach gives rise to some concern mainly because it came close to undermining the rules of evidence in order to allow for greater religious and cultural accommodation. The court's response was not about the valid need for witness protection or even about making the court process less intimidating for female rape victims, but about the need to 'respect' the religious identity of Muslim women as endorsed by the Muslim theological expert used by the court. What is endorsed is the view that Muslim women should not have a public presence or in any way assert their own agency. In many other situations, the same religious framework used to determine the state's response to minority women can and will work against the interests of women precisely because it is not they but religious 'experts' who validate their responses. In a political climate where there is huge pressure on women to conform to standards laid down by fundamentalists and religionists, it is women who have the most to lose when the rule of law or important legal safeguards are undermined or when needs are determined upon the basis of religious identity. More widely, in the context of the resurgence of religious fundamentalism, experience worldwide tells us that it is women's human rights that will be the first to be suspended or denied. It therefore becomes all the more necessary to uphold the rule of law, since women's freedom is as dependent on it as is the freedom of those who are targeted as so-called "terrorists". In the struggle to make the law more accountable to minority women's needs, we have never adhered to the view that gender equality should override important principles of law - in this case rules of evidence, which are necessary to protect both men and women from arbitrary arrests and trials.

The court's approach in this case does not empower minority women but actually facilitates their removal from the public world. Yet the approach taken by the court has been widely circulated by the police as a model of how to address religious and cultural issues within the criminal justice system. The approach is ultimately alarming in that it is only a short step to accepting the view that Muslim and other ethnic minority women have no need to utilise the criminal or civil laws of the land since they are governed by their own community or personal laws. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Germany when a Moroccan Muslim woman was denied a divorce in the face of domestic violence by a judge who stated that as a Muslim woman, she was governed by the Koran and not the civil law of the land (see Hari 2007). We would argue that whilst religious and cultural contexts should be taken into account in all legal proceedings where appropriate, they should not be the overriding frameworks by which those from ethnic and religious minorities are perceived, since they inevitably draw on very narrow assumptions about religion and the role of women.

Another particular concern is the creation of a 'Muslim' woman standard by which all other minority women are measured. For example issues of honour and culture, which are central organising features of all South Asian families and communities, are increasingly being attributed to Muslim women only. Many organisations have unfortunately fallen into this trap, thereby adding to the process of the communalisation (segregation along religious lines) of what were once Asian or even Black communities. One glaring example of this is the way in which the Muslim Women's Network, set up in 2002 by the Minster of Women and supported by the Women's National Commission, gave voice only to Muslim women's needs when they conducted a series of closed focus group discussions in 2006 (Muslim Women's Network 2006). The report launched by the Muslim Women's Network identified many issues such as violence against women, immigration difficulties, community pressures, racism and the lack of political representation - none of which are specific to Muslim women only. However, the faith-based strategy of isolating Muslim women's needs as somehow 'different' from those of other Asian women is deliberate and divisive. It plays into the fundamentalist segregationist agenda and denies the overwhelming success of secular Asian women's projects. The approach strongly undermines the solidarity that has been forged across ethnic and religious lines within and outside of our communities. It also encourages groups to compete for resources and separate provision based solely around religious identity.

The Dangers of Mediation within the Legal System

We are concerned, too, that the increasing emphasis on mediation or alternative forms of dispute resolution within civil law will have specific ramifications for women from minority cultures. We recognise that mediation can have a role to play where marital tensions exist, but only in contexts where the partners or family members occupy a more equal playing field. In the vast majority of our cases, women from minority communities usually make several (almost always failed) attempts at informal methods of resolution, usually involving family or community elders, before seeking outside help. The reasons for the high rates of failure are to do with the fact that the family structures and community dynamics in many minority communities are built on unequal power relations between men and women, legitimised by culture and religion. Women are not heard in reconciliation or mediation meetings, and even where they are, they are still blamed and made to feel guilty for the state of the marriage or the disintegration of the family. Women, in particular daughters-in-law and children, are the most powerless in the family and have little or no right to assert their own wishes and desires. In many cases, in mediation meetings, women are lulled into a false sense of security by community elders promising to protect and intervene if future problems occur, only to find that they are punished further through violence and other means. In more extreme cases, following mediation, they are abducted, killed or maimed for having brought dishonour to their families and communities. Moreover, given the fact that Asian women in the U.K. are more likely to attempt and commit suicide due to pressures to conform to their cultural and religious identity, mediation as an option or alternative to utilising the civil law is an extremely problematic if not a highly dangerous practice.
The proposals to encourage mediation as a first step or as an alternative to court action also tie in with demands made by many community and religious leaders for the state to recognise personal laws and to give them the same equal legal footing as civil law. Indeed, concepts such as "alternative dispute resolution" have been welcomed for this reason (see, e.g., Kehsavjee 2004). Personal laws, like informal methods of resolution, are extremely dangerous for women since they place emphasis on reconciliation and mediation as key in solving all marital or family problems and in keeping the family together at all costs. The emphasis on mediation and reconciliation in family law initiatives will therefore have a disproportionate and discriminatory impact on women from some communities, since it will chime with community demands for less court intervention.

Multi-faithism and Social Policy

The speed with which the English legal system and indeed all public institutions are absorbing ethnic minority religious identity is alarming. For example, a seminar on children's rights in 2006, organised by the Law Society and the Muslim Lawyers Association, began (uncharacteristically for a legal seminar) with Muslim prayers, thereby setting the tone for the rest of the seminar. The panel included a Muslim lawyer who explained Islamic legal principles in relation to children's contact and custody issues. There was no attempt to contextualise the speech or indicate how such perspectives are to be addressed within English civil law. Nor was there any debate about the potential of religious laws and values to conflict with principles established in civil law. Alarmingly, the Law Society and the majority white audience stayed silent, possibly out of 'respect' or fear of causing 'offence'. Throughout the seminar, the view that the best interests of the child can be met through Islamic law remained unchallenged! Yet the speaker's agenda is clear when placed in the context of the overarching objectives of the Association, which is to see an Islamic perspective reflected in children and family law. In April 2007 for instance, the Association organised a conference entitled "Safeguarding Children in the U.K. - An Islamic Perspective", the aim of which was to influence both the legal and health services. Some of those who spoke at this conference were Islamic scholars linked to the Muslim Council of Britain.

One direct effect of such collaborations between the Law Society and faith groups is that it contributes to the false construction of the wider society as 'secular' whilst attributing only religious values to minority communities. We wonder if the Law Society would entertain the idea of organising a seminar on children's rights between lawyers and Christian scholars and whether a similar silence from the audience would ensue? On the contrary, it is likely that assumptions made by religion about children's rights would be laid bare, where they clash with universal human rights of the child. Yet in relation to the seminar about Islam and children's rights, the Law Society actually recognised and uncritically accepted the role of so-called "Islamic values" as part of the continuing education programme for solicitors and barristers!

Similar partnerships between state institutions and faith groups are evident up and down the country. In Bradford for instance, C.A.F.C.A.S.S., which claims to uphold the individual rights of children, has worked closely with Islamic scholars to determine the impact of Islam on private law. Nowhere is there any acknowledgement of possible conflicts between parental and children's rights or the power dynamics involved in the struggle for the representation of culture and religion within the community. There is also an automatic assumption that all Muslims are religious and therefore guided by religious principles. In Bradford, C.A.F.C.A.S.S. has developed links not with those who work within minority communities on abuse, marital breakdown and violence to children but with religious leaders who can advise from an Islamic perspective.22

As multiculturalism moves into a new phase in the U.K., the impact of "multi-faithism" on the state's policies on domestic violence is clearly discernable. We have witnessed the development of integrated court systems bringing together civil and criminal courts and "one stop shops" designed to bring together different agencies under one roof, with the aim of providing a holistic, multi-agency approach to issues such as domestic violence. Yet in keeping with state policy on increased participation of faith groups, these new initiatives also seek to embrace "faith communities". Organisers of such projects justify the involvement of faith groups by referring to the need to be "sensitive" to other (minority) faiths. In the process, such initiatives ignore the political struggles waged by black and minority women within their communities against domestic violence and the stranglehold of religion and culture on their lives. At best secular voices are taken into account, but they are considered no more legitimate than those of faith groups, even though faith groups have no history of addressing women's rights or issues of social justice.

In July 2005, the Greater London Domestic Violence Project organised a round-table discussion on domestic violence with faith leaders from London's main religions, many of whom belonged to minority religions. But no secular feminist groups that have worked on domestic violence within minority communities were invited to be part of the discussion. The effect of this is two-fold. Firstly, it ensures that community leaderships do not have to account to their communities for their actions since they are encouraged to relate only with the state and not with their own constituents. Secondly, the absence of Asian feminists and progressive groups from such discussions serves to delegitimise feminist and secular approaches to social issues within minority communities. The event led to the publication of a report entitled "Praying for Peace". Whilst it does contain feminist analysis of domestic violence, it also encourages partnerships between faith leaders and the "domestic violence sector" (presumably white feminist projects) in addressing issues of domestic violence. Unsurprisingly, the entire debate on violence against women is circumscribed within a religious framework which by its very nature compromises progressive human rights language and principles. For example, the report utilises religious notions of "karma" and "sin" which clearly act as substitutes for the feminist notions of human rights, choice and autonomy. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the report is that a contract between state and faith leaders in relation to domestic violence and abuse within minority communities is taking shape: in return for taking responsibility for domestic violence, faith leaders can expect to see domestic violence refuges and services accommodating religious identity and the development of partnership working arrangements with local faith leaders (see Greater London Authority 2006). The overall message is clear. White feminist groups working on issues such as rape and domestic violence can continue to organise along secular lines and from time to time enjoy the support of the liberal establishment including the Church of England. And individual women can retain their right of choice as to how they wish domestic violence to be addressed. Minority women who face violence and abuse, on the other hand, must be corralled within their religious identity whether or not they wish it and be represented by 'their' religious leaders, irrespective of the ideology and objectives of such leaders.

In the new, multi-faith world, the future of black and minority women's projects on domestic violence in the U.K. could look like the current experience in Canada, involving collaborations between the domestic violence and rape crisis sector and the 'Muslim' community (comprising various ethnic groups including Palestinians, Somalis and Bosnians) through mosques and business institutions. The Muslim Family Safety Project in Ontario, for example, is funded by the Government of Canada Crime Prevention Strategy. Amongst other things, it seeks to establish a dialogue between the Muslim community and anti-violence agencies; facilitate an environment of mutual understanding and respect between the Muslim community and anti-violence agencies; generate a positive awareness about Islam; and enable the collaborative development of prevention and intervention materials and services that meet the needs of Muslim women.23 What is striking about the project is the attempt to marry feminist good practice with a religious ethos based on an acceptance of the need to establish mosques as safe places for the abused and disenfranchised. In addition, the project encourages research and study of domestic violence from a Quranic world view and demands solutions based on Islamic values. It also calls for the need to ensure that each community cultivates or identifies persons who have domestic violence and Islamic training, conflict resolution skills and counselling skills. The project endorses the Statement of the National Muslim Task Force on Domestic Violence which begins with a prayer. Nowhere in the statement is there reference to human rights, women's rights or individual autonomy. Instead, constant reference is made to Islamic values, the need to support and care for the 'family', the need to come together as a Muslim community to address domestic violence, and to return to the true principles of Islam over cultural practice.

Conclusion

S.B.S. has always sought to challenge mainstream religious leaders for their claims to be the 'authentic' voice of their constituencies. The entrenchment of faith communities represents a particular threat for women, particularly in regions where there are no effective alternative voices to counteract the stranglehold of religious institutions. But at the same time groups like S.B.S. have been caught in a double bind. On the one hand, the various religious leaderships and their institutions represent immense dangers for women's rights; yet the continuing dismantling of the welfare state also forces us more and more into the hands of those very institutions, to provide basic services for the women that we see.24
The problem with the state accommodation of religious fundamentalism and even moderate religious leaderships is that it has undermined the political and social forces in our communities that have struggled against racism, poverty and gender discrimination. On the other hand, religious forces in our communities have grown confident and stronger. Their financial positions and vast membership bases have enabled them to occupy key positions from which to consolidate their power and control over their constituencies. The ideology of these groups, whilst claiming to be "moderate", is usually profoundly anti-democratic, working against and not for social justice and equality. Such groups use the language of discrimination and human rights to reassert a patriarchal world order by removing women from the public sphere (metaphorically if not physically) and by assuming absolute control of their freedom and liberties in the private sphere.

Our struggle to retain our secular spaces, our secular voices, and to build a truly democratic secular state, has taken on a sense of urgency and desperation. But our real fear is that we can no longer be sure of our allies.

References

Ali, Y., Muslim Women and the Politics of Ethnicity and Culture in Northern England, in Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in Britain, eds. G. Saghal & N. Yuval-Davis (London: Virago, 1992) 106-128
Anthias, F. & Yuval-Davis, N., Racialised Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle (London: Routledge, 1992)
Awaaz - South Asia Watch, "The Islamic Right - Key Tendencies" (June 2006). Available at http://www.awaazsaw.org/awaaz_pia4.pdf
Berkeley, R., Connecting British Hindus: An Enquiry into the Identity and Public Engagement of Hindus in Britain (London: Department of Communities and Local Government and Hindu Forum of Britain, 2006). Available at http://www.hfb.org.uk/FileServer.aspx?oID=307&IID=0
Bhugra, D. & Desai, M., Attempted Suicide in South Asian Women, British Journal of Psychiatry 8 (2002), 418-423
C.A.F.C.A.S.S., Annual Report and Accounts 2005-2006 (London: The Stationery Office, 2006)
Fawcett Society, Black and Ethnic Minority Women in the UK (London: Fawcett Society, 2005)
Greater London Authority, Praying for Peace: Domestic Violence and Faith Communities Round-Table Report (London: Greater London Authority, 2006). Available at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/strategies/dom_violence/docs/faith-report.rtf
Hari, J., "How Multiculturalism is Betraying Women", The Independent (23 October 2007)
Home Office Faith Communities Unit, Working Together: Co-operation Between Government and Faith Communities - Progress Report (London: Home Office, 2005). Available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/151996
Home Office Faith Communities Unit, Working Together: Co-operation Between Government and Faith Communities (London: Home Office, 2004). Available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/workingtog-faith040329.pdf?view=Binary
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, "Faith as Social Capital" (2006). Available at http://www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/socialpolicy/0136.asp
Mulholland, H., "Blair to Crack Down on Funding for Religious Groups", Guardian Unlimited (8 December 2006)
Kehsavjee, M.M., "Multiculturalism and the Challenges it Poses to Legal Education and Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Situation of British Muslims", Lecture to the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 6 May 2004. Available at http://iis.ac.uk/view_article.asp?ContentID=104713
Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, Child Protection in Faith-Based Environments: A Guideline Report (London: Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, 2006). Available at http://www.muslimparliament.org.uk/Documentation/ChildProtectionReport.pdf
Muslim Women's Network, She Who Disputes: Muslim Women Shape the Debate (London: Women's National Commission, 2006). Available at http://www.thewnc.org.uk/pubs/shewhodisputesnov06.pdf
Patel, P., Multiculturalism: The Myth and the Reality, Women: A Cultural Review 2 (3) (1991), 209-213
Raleigh, V.S. & Balarajan, R., Suicides Among Immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent, British Journal of Psychiatry 156 (1992), 46-50
Sahgal, G., Legislating Utopia: Violence Against Women, Identities and Interventions, in The Situated Politics of Belonging, eds. N. Yuval-Davis, U. Vieten & K. Kannabiran (London: Sage, 2006) 205-224
Sahgal, G., Secular Spaces: The Experience of Asian Women Organising, in Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in Britain, eds. G. Sahgal & N. Yuval-Davis (London: Virago, 1992) 163-197
Sahgal, G. & Yuval-Davis, N. (eds.), Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in Britain (London: Virago, 1992)
Yuval-Davis, N., Fundamentalism, Multiculturalism and Women in Britain, in Race, Culture and Difference, eds. J. Donald & A. Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992) 279-291

Footnotes

1     See, for example, the Education Reform Act 1988, which imposed a daily act of Christian worship in all schools. This came about as a result of intense lobbying by the Association of Christian Teachers. A last-minute amendment was introduced by Baroness Blatch, amending a previous clause contained in the Education Act 1944 on compulsory religious worship.
2     The case of Victoria Climbié is significant for the multicultural assumptions that were made which led social workers, the police and health professionals to ignore the abuse to which she was subjected.
3     Forward is a London-based African women's rights organisation that works on the issue of female genital mutilation.
4     See Awaaz - South Asia Watch (2006), which traces the M.C.B.'s roots to the older Islamic right political party, the Jamaati-I-Islami (J.I.) from the Indian sub-continent. Awaaz is a U.K.-based secular network of organisations and individuals set up to monitor religious hatred in South Asia and the U.K: http://www.awaazsaw.org
5     According to Awaaz, the Islamic Human Rights Commission (I.H.R.C.) in the U.K. is a radical Islamist organisation that uses the language of human rights to promote an extremist agenda including the adoption of sharia law. See Awaaz - South Asia Watch (2006).
6     There is very little detail available on this organisation or how it has come to represent the views of all Hindus in the U.K. Yet during the M.F. Hussain affair, it was quoted in the press as if it was representative of the Hindu 'voice'.
7     See Berkeley (2006). This report purports to identify the nature of the British 'Hindu' communities, yet there was no democratic consultation process with Indians of Hindu origin to ascertain their concerns or indeed how they identified themselves. Most of it is based on the views of members of the Hindu Forum of Britain, many of whom are from Hindu upper and middle caste backgrounds.
8     Awaaz - South Asia Watch notes that in April 2006, Ramesh Kallidai attended a meeting of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (H.S.S.), a British branch of the R.S.S. At the meeting he paid homage to a previous R.S.S. ideologue, M.S. Golwalkar, who admired and promoted Nazi-like, fascist and violent ideas in India. The R.S.S.'s extreme Hindu-supremacist ideology has been widely blamed for large-scale anti-minority violence in India. It has been banned three times in India since Independence. The murderer of M.K. Gandhi was a former R.S.S. member. See http://www.awaazsaw.org
9     For instance in 1994, a group of Hindu fundamentalists attempted to ban "Bhaji on the Beach", a film depicting the lives of Asian women who survive domestic violence. A group of men surrounded a cinema in Nottingham to intimidate and prevent people from attending.
10     See, for example, Fawcett Society (2005). This report confirmed the massive inequalities faced by Asian women in many areas of their lives.
11     Southall Black Sisters and our sister group, Women Against Fundamentalism, have repeatedly called for the blasphemy laws to be repealed on the grounds that they are outdated and privilege Christianity over other religions, thus opening the door for more not less involvement of religion in public affairs.
12     See Home Office Faith Communities Unit (2004, 2005); Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2006). The latter is a summary of a major study conducted by sociologists funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, which examines the contribution that can be made by "faith communities", increasingly viewed as "social capital". It is an example of the high level of academic activity that is now devoted to constructing notions of "faith communities" and looking at ways to improve the participation of faith-based groups in civil regeneration.
13     In 2005, the government announced that it was making £7.75 million available to faith-based groups and in August 2006, a further £4.5 million capacity-building fund was announced for such groups. Yet at the same time, in a contradictory statement, before resigning as Prime Minister, Tony Blair also announced that the government's intention was to crack down on funding for groups that were "tightly bonded around religious, racial or ethnic identities" (Mulholland 2006). So far, evidence suggests that it is not the faith-based projects but the funding of black autonomous secular groups such as Southall Black Sisters which is seriously threatened by the pursuit of so-called "community cohesion".
14     Bahnaz Mahmood's case received high profile media coverage as an honour killing in 2007. However, its real significance was not that this was an honour killing, but the fact that prior to her murder the police failed to act on her demands for protection. The police response, or lack of it, demonstrates the need for an urgent public inquiry on the question why, after three decades of legislation and policies, the state continues to flout its obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and international human rights law to protect women from domestic violence in all its manifestations, including honour crimes. There continues to be little or no comprehensive investigation into continuing police failure in domestic violence cases, with the result that, with a few individual exceptions, no progress is evident except at the policy level. Implementation of policies on domestic violence remains extremely poor and patchy and the same mistakes are being repeated by police forces across the country.
15     P. v. R. [2003] 1 F.L.R. 661.
16     See commentary on "P. v. R. (Forced Marriage: Annulment: Procedure)", Butterworths Family and Child Law Bulletin no. 68 (May 2003), available at http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2003/08/11/41724/may-2003.html
17     Until 2000, the response of the courts as well as other statutory bodies told a very different story. In cases of forced marriage, their common response was to deny protection to young girls on the grounds that they could not interfere in different 'cultural' practices. See, for example, Patel (1991).
18     R. (on the application of Begum) v. Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 A.C. 100.
19     R. v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 A.C. 100, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at para. 34.
20     Baroness Hale's analysis was influenced by Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis, whose publication Refusing Holy Orders (1992) was quoted.
21     The details of this case were circulated to S.B.S., amongst other organisations, on 20 October 2006 by fax by Detective Inspector Brent Hyatt from the Specialist Crime Directorate of the Metropolitan Police Force.
22     See C.A.F.C.A.S.S. (2006, p. 25): "In Bradford, staff attended a University of Bradford course entitled 'working with conflict in Muslim families'. This gave them the opportunity to meet with local religious scholars to inform and explore how the English justice system sits alongside cultural and religious issues for Muslim families experiencing separation and divorce. Links were established to consult with local scholars and to act as mutual advisers. A seminar is planned to consider the impact of private law matters in an Islamic context, with a local Imam speaking".
23     See http://www.Ifcc.on.ca/mfsp.html
24     For example, the "No recourse to public funds" requirement within the U.K.'s welfare and immigration law means that abused women who do not have secure immigration status cannot avail themselves of the welfare support - social housing and benefits - recognised as prerequisites to leaving a violent relationship. Such women are thus trapped in abusive marriages because they face destitution and deportation if they contemplate reporting to outside agencies. Whilst the government has enacted the "Domestic Violence Rule", allowing women to remain in the country if they can demonstrate that they are victims of violence, few women are able to use it, since they cannot report incidents due to "no recourse". The existence of the "no recourse" requirement therefore defeats the very purpose of the Domestic Violence Rule and signals a discriminatory approach to issues of gender-based violence within black and minority communities. In these circumstances, groups like S.B.S. have no choice but to turn to religious institutions for assistance; to feed and house women who have escaped an abusive marriage. Although we insist that all casework will be conducted by us, needless to say however, the boundaries between us and religious organisations are not always respected. In any event, religious institutions are not appropriate in the rehabilitation of such women since they frequently encounter hostility or pressure to return home for the sake of preserving their marriage or family honour.

*(Southall Black Sisters, 21 Avenue Road, Southall, Middlesex, UB1 3BL, UK)
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